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A. Members of the Trial Defense Team.3 The core members of a capital defense
team include two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist. See ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, Guideline 4.1.A.1. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the depositions
of the following individuals:
1. Lead counsel - Rob Chastain. Mr. Chastain has refused Mr. Hall's
attempts to speak confidentially about his representation, indicating that he
would only discuss the case in the presence of a State's representative.4
2. Co-counsel - Deborah Krista!. Like Mr. Chastain, Ms. Kristal has also
refused Mr. Hall's attempts to speak confidentially about her
representation. In fact, Ms. Kristal has indicated that she views the State's
representative, Jan Bennetts, as her attorney in these post-conviction
proceedings.5
3. Investigator - Gary Starkey.
4. Mitigation specialist - Bruce and James Whitman.
In addition, Mr. Hall moves this Court to issue subpoenas decus tecum for each of
the above depositions, to include the following: 1) documentation identifying the cases
that the individual trial team member worked on during the course of their representation;
2) all e-mail correspondence between the individual trial team member and other team
3 Mr. Hall reserves the right to request discovery including the depositions of members of
his original trial team, including Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr. However, without the full
cooperation of trial counsel (Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal), it is impossible to
determined to what extent, if any, original trial counsel influenced the course of successor
counsels'representation.
4 Undersigned counsel is willing to provide an affidavit if the State disputes this claim.
5 See supra, fn. 4.
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members including their agents, such as expert witnesses; and 3) all email
correspondence between the individual trial team member and the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office and its agents.
II.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office.6 The
requested documents are relevant to, and are necessary to provide full factual
support for, Mr. Hall's claims for post-conviction relief, e.g., Claim M
("Deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately
investigate guilt-phase issues - failure to challenge the pathology"). See Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 7, 2009 (herein "Amended
Petition"), p.61.
1. All bench notes from the Cheryl Hanlon autopsy, sexual assault kit and
any other procedures performed or observed by Dr. Glenn Groben or any
other Ada County Coroner personnel.
2. Any peer review, formal or informal, whether internal or external to the
Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any documentation related
thereto, of Dr. Groben's opinions based on his examination and autopsy in
the underlying criminal case, or confirmation that no peer review was
conducted.
3. Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben at or near
the body recovery scene.
4. Copies of any diagrams prepared at the time of the physical examination
and autopsy.
6 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that the prosecutor must actively
search its files and the files of related agencies expected to have possession of evidence
favorable to the defense).
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5. Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or the Ada County Coroner
with any agency or professional association regarding his/its professional
performance, qualifications or veracity.
6. Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Hanlon's
body, including any reenactment photographs.
7. A copy of the forensic pathology procedural manual currently in effect as
well as in effect in March 2003 for the Ada County Coroner's Office.
8. All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction of the
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Amanda Stroud.
9. Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Groben or his agents
and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their
agents.
10. A copy ofDr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the instant case.
11. Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the Cheryl Hanlon case regarding
the following:
a. Reconstruction of ligatures
b. Fingernail clippings
c. Blood sample (tube)
12. Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon from Ada County Coroner's office,
signed by Glen Groben.
13. Ms. Hanlon's Record of Death from Ada County Coroner.
B. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. The
requested documents are relevant to, and are necessary to provide full factual
support for, Mr. Hall's claims for post-conviction relief; the particular claims are
noted below following the specific requests.
1. Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's guilt
phase case (including opening statements and closing arguments). See e.g.,
Amended Petition, Claim N ("The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
During Guilt Phase Closing Arguments"); Claim 0 ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing
Arguments").
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Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing
Arguments").
2. Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's
sentencing phase case (including opening statements and closing
arguments). See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim R ("The Prosecutor
Committed Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase Opening Statements By
Improperly Appealing To The Emotion, Passion, Or Prejudice Of The
Jury"); Claim S ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By
Failing To Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase
Opening Statements").
3. Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other documents shown to the
jury. See supra, Request Nos. 1-2.
4. Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's
office and the Ada County Public Defender's office regarding the Hanlon
case, including but not limited to, stipulations regarding evidence,
instructions, motions, and prospective jurors, as well as any plea
negotiations. See Amended Petition, Claim E ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel During Jury Selection"); Claim L
("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial
Counsels' Failure To Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction
Regarding Amanda Stroud"); Claim P ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Request
Adequate Jury Instructions And Supplemental Instructions Regarding
Felony Murder"); Claim KK ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance
Of Counsel For Failing To Request Sentencing Phase Jury Instructions").
5. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
the prosecutor's office with all expert witnesses, whether or not called at
trial, including but not limited to the Ada County Coroner's Office. This
request also includes any tests or results of examinations of the shoe prints
found at the scene with shoes allegedly worn by Erick Hall at the time of
Ms. Hanlon's death.
6. All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
the prosecutor's office with the media, including but not limited to press
releases. See Amended Petition, Claim D ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Object To
Impaneling A Jury From Gooding County In Lieu Of Changing Venue").
7. Gary Starkey's dates of employment and the names of the homicide and
rape cases he worked on while employed by the Ada County Prosecutor's
office. See Amended Petition, Claim A ("Deprivation Of The Effective
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 6
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Assistance Of Counsel Due To A Complete Breakdown In The Attorney-
Client Relationship").
C. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office Relating to
Particular Witnesses.
1. Jeff Carlson. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim M.4 ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate
Guilt-Phase Issues - Failure To Adequately Investigate And/Or Examine
The State's Guilt-Phase Witnesses")
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by Jeff
Carlson regarding the nature and scope of the argument he had
with Cheryl Hanlon on February 28 2003/March 1, 2003, and
statements and summaries of statements made by any other
individuals, regarding that argument.
2. Amanda Stroud. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim L ("Deprivation Of
The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction Regarding Amanda Stroud").
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless ofmedium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer.
c. All audio or video recordings, wrItmgs, or other mediums of
communications made by Ms. Stroud and obtained by the
prosecutor or law enforcement (Mr. Hall is currently is in
possession of the transcript of the 03110/03 interview by Detectives
Morgan and Smith, transcriber unknown, but does not have
possession of the corresponding audio or video recording.)
d. All law enforcement and prosecution investigative reports, notes,
and files regarding the Amanda Stroud homicide investigation.
e. March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada County Jail referenced in
Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating Amanda Stroud called
Kathy Stroud from Ada County Jail.
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f. All recorded conversations between Erick Hall and Amanda Stroud
from the Ada County Jail as referenced in the Affidavit for Search
Warrant, not notarized, signed on notary signature line by Judge
Minder on April 17, 2003.
g. Any documentation in which Amanda Stroud indicates that she
had engaged in consensual autoerotic asphyxiation with Erick Hall,
or any other documentation indicating that Mr. Hall expressed any
interest in asphyxiation during consensual sexual relations.
h. Any documentation in which Amanda Stroud indicates that Erick
Hall ever "blacked out" or experienced a mood change during
sexual relations or when touched on the neck.
3. Kathy Stroud. Ms. Stroud reported her suspicions that Erick Hall was
involved in the Cheryl Hanlon homicide to law enforcement based on
hearsay information apparently conveyed by her daughter, Amanda
Stroud. See e.g., Amended Petition, Claim L ("Deprivation Of The
Effective Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To
Object To Giving A Special Jury Instruction Regarding Amanda Stroud").
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless ofmedium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer.
c. Photographs provided by Kathy Stroud to investigator Doug
Traubel on March 5, 2007 showing brown shoes allegedly taken
between November 11,2002 and January 1,2003.
4. Norma Jean Oliver.
a. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of medium, in the presence of
the prosecuting attorney or investigator, limited to such statements
made following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman
murders.
b. All written statements and summaries of statements made by or
attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless ofmedium, in the presence of a
law enforcement officer, limited to such statements made
following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman murders.
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5. Dr. Pablo Stuart. See e.g., Claim AA.4 ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate And Present
Mitigating Evidence - Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate,
Prepare And Present Evidence Through Expert Witness Testimony")
a. Copy ofthe video tape deposition ofDr. Pablo Stuart.
D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement Agencies.
1. Field notes and logbooks. Because police reports do not contain all
information contained in original field notes and logbooks, Mr. Hall
requests all field notes and logbooks generated by any law enforcement
officer in the course of the investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon
homicides.
2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes.s Mr. Hall specifically requests unredacted
handwritten notes from the following officers:
a. Brett Quilter;
b. Dave Smith; and
c. Mark Vucinich.
3. Correspondence. All correspondence or summaries of correspondence
between law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding
the Hanlon case homicide investigation.
4. FBI I-Drives. Copies of all reports, communications or files contained on
any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon
investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise
field offices.
5. Task Force Lead Assignments.
6. Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation. Any and
all FBI reports containing "profiling" of the perpetrator in the Lynn
Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders.
7. Prior Offenses.
a. Copy of all police reports and notes regarding Ada County Case
No. M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex Offender case filed
against Mr. Hall.
8 Redacted versions of these notes were obtained in discovery by trial counsel.
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b. Police reports regarding Ada County Case No. H9600534, the
escape case filed against Mr. Hall.
8. Media Contact. All documented communications, or summaries of
communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not
limited to press releases.
9. Specific Reports, Documents, and Recordings.
a. A copy of the report of officer Delgadillo regarding the arrest of
Kenneth Tittle referenced in officer Vucinich's report.
b. A copy of the crime scene video, with audio, initially made by
Craig Nixon referenced in Tr., Vol. IX, p. 4668.
c. A copy of the Idaho Power security camera footage of alleged
appearance ofErick Hall and Ms. Hanlon.
d. A copy of the transcript and any recordings of interview of Jason
Vanderesch conducted by Greg Morgan and Mark Ayotte.
e. A copy of the relevant portion of the 'Crime Lab Activity'
electronic database referencing the underlying case.
f. A copy of the photo lineup shown to Daryl Lady on March 10,
2003 at 6:05pm.
g. A copy of attachment to lead sheet #50 (the notes indicate that a
crime stoppers memo was attached; however, nothing is attached
to the copy in discovery though a paperclip was photocopied on
page.)
h. Copies of the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, a 15 page
document referenced in Dave Smiths testimony, and the five
similar incidents resulting from that search. (Tr., Vol. XI, pp.6123
- 6124.)
10. Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
a. All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
the Idaho CODIS database, or any local or state database.
b. All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
the national NDIS database, or any national database.
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11. Rewards. All documentation and information regarding reward money
offered for assistance in the Henneman and Hanlon homicide
investigations including claims made on such reward.
12. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration. Documentation
from the Idaho sex offender registry involving registration, or attempts at
registration, by Erick Hall
13. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. Copies of any and all written
questions by jury to the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel.
14. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail
Records.
a. Copies of the Ada County Jail Visitation logs regarding trial
counsel or investigator visits to Mr. Hall. See Amended Petition,
Claim A ("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel
Due To A Complete Breakdown In The Attorney-Client
Relationship").
b. Copies of the Safety Practices Manual. Any and all manuals,
informal or formal policies, memoranda or guidelines regarding
safety practices for female correctional officers or other female
employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or believed to be
sexually violent toward women.
15. Documents Requiring Subpoenas
a. Copies of all Washington DSHS Division of Child Support records
pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean McCracken/Hall in Case
No. 70253. Court Order to specify that need for records outweighs
need for privacy. See Amended Petition, Claim AA ("Deprivation
Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately
Investigate And Present Mitigating Evidence").
DATED this 17th day August,2009'~llv~ult0.~
MARK J. ACKLEY
Lea Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
o.
NICOLE OWENS
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 17th day of August, 2009, served a
true and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR DISCOVERY as indicated
below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
---->-- Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
--
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
'!. Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 12
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Administrative Assistant 
    
S;~s,p.on: Neville082809
Session: Neville082809
Session Date: 2009/08/28
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue
Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s)
Case ID: 0002
Division: DC
Session Time: 08:30
Courtroom: CR501
Page 1
Case Number: CVOC08-3085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Public Defender:
2009/08/28
11:03:50 - Operator
Recording:
11:03:50 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
11:04:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Time set for status conference.
11:05:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes Answer filed and received draft of proposed stip
and proposed
11:05:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
order to implement the stipulation for scheduling.
11:06:07 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackleley stated stip signed this morning. Tenders to Co
urt
11:08:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes couple of changes to stipulation, Counsel ha
ve now signed and
11:08:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
initialed.
11:09:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court entered proposed order which tracks with stipulation.
11:10:13 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackley advised Court that SAPO's office schedule opened
a little. But
11:10:59 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
001074
  
  
   
    
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
   
   
  
     
    
 
  
  
     
  
  
 
   
    
     
     
     
          
  
     
       
      
          
 
     
          
    
     
 
     
        
      
         
   
      
  
S~s,~~on: Neville082809
< •
believe with State's calendar the scheduling order will work
11:12:32 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms.Bennetts responded regarding schedule. Working hard to g
et discovery
11:13:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
completed.
11:13:26 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Mr. Ackley advised Court on Hall I, schedule. State has bri
ef due Sept 18th
11:14:01 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
and SAPO's brief due mid october. Supreme Court docket fill
ed until end of
11:14:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
year, so hearing may not be until February next year.
11:14:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Ms. Bennetts responded re: petition re: sealed hearing, may
need some access
11:15:36 - State Attorney: VARlE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
to that record. Believe there was 2 or 3 hearings that may
need to have
11:15:56 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
unsealed.
11:17:02 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Believe can work out stipulation on that. Applies to waivor
of attorney
11:17:43 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
client privilege.
11:18:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
11:18:25 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
Believe that Court will probably rule that atty/client waivo
r. Do not
11:19:02 - Plaintiff Attorney: OWENS, MARK ACKLEY/NICOL
believe State need to file another motion.
11:19:10 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
Believe can stip to some things and try to get discovery co
mpleted by end of
11:19:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
year.
11:19:36 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has October 30th available. Would like to see in
advance what
11:21:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
stipulations counsel have resolved. Would like to know what
is contested.
11:22:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will request any stipulations and any matters cont
ested be
11:22:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
submitted to Court by October 16th.
11:24:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Counsel can submit by email.
11:24:27 - Operator
Stop recording:
Page 2
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
(CAPITAL CASE)
PETITIONERIRESPONDENT'S
STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT
OF SCHEDULING ORDER
Respondent.
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
COMES NOW, Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorney Mark
Ackley at the State Appellate Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), and Respondent,
STATE OF IDAHO, in and for the County of Ada, by and through its attorney Jan Bennetts at
the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, and hereby submit this stipulation regarding the scheduling
ofpost-conviction proceedings in the above-captioned case.
Petitioner and Respondent agree to the following modifications of the Scheduling Order
issued on February 2,2009:
(1) Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7,2009;
(2) Respondent filed an Answer to the Amended Petition on August 5, 2009;
(3) Petitioner and Respondent filed their motions for discovery by August 15,2009;
STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER 1
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1(4) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their responses to motions for discovery no
later than October 9, 2009;
(5) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their replies to the responses to motions for
discovery within fourteen (14) days thereafter, said replies being due no later than
October 23, 2009;
(6) The parties shall be prepared for a hearing on the motions for discovery within
seven (7) days thereafter, said hearing being held on or about October 30, 2009,
depending on the Court's docket;
(7) The parties shall complete discovery and any Court-ordered depositions no later
than April 26, 2010;
(8) Petitioner shall file his Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Final Amended Petition") within sixty (60) days of the completion
of discovery or the receipt of all transcripts from any Court-ordered depositions,
whichever occurs later;
(9) Respondent shall file an Answer to the Final Amended Petition within one
hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the final Amended Petition;
(10) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all dispositive motions within sixty (60) days
after the filing ofRespondent's Answer;
(11) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all responses to dispositive motions within
sixty (60) days after the filing of the dispositive motions;
Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant a scheduling order
implementing the above procedures, as reflected in the proposed Scheduling Order filed
herewith.
STIPULATION FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER 2
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this2'8i l-1day of Qcbbd ,2009. om
~~J . Bennetts
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor
STIPULAnON FOR AMENDMENT OF SCHEDULING ORDER 3
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, LS.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
NO.
---,-.f"Vl--:-/1-,.r,F1LEi'F.o~----
A.M.! ~ f}!: P.M.
'-----
AUG 2 82009
J. D~.~ NAVo\~~O ClE.erk~ _A1'"L,(~ 0~~
. OEPUlY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
(CAPITAL CASE)
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER
FOR POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS
Case No. CVPC08-03085
Respondent.
Petitioner,
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------.)
STATE OF IDAHO,
THIS COURT HAVING considered the party's respective positions during a hearing
held on August 28, 2009, and this Court being otherwise fully informed, hereby incorporates its
findings from said hearing and enters the below scheduling order for the above-captioned post-
conviction proceedings.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on April 7, 2009;
(2) Respondent filed an Answer to the Amended Petition on August 5, 2009;
(3) Petitioner and Respondent filed their motions for discovery by August 15,2009;
(4) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their responses to motions for discovery no
later than October 9,2009;
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER FOR POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 1
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(5) Petitioner and Respondent shall file their replies to the responses to motions for
discovery within fourteen (14) days thereafter, said replies being due no later than
October 23, 2009;
(6) The parties shall be prepared for a hearing on the motions for discovery within
seven (7) days thereafter, said hearing being held on or about October 30, 2009,
depending on the Court's docket;
(7) The parties shall complete discovery and any Court-ordered depositions no later
than April 26, 2010;
(8) Petitioner shall file his Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(hereinafter "Final Amended Petition") within sixty (60) days of the completion
of discovery or the receipt of all transcripts from any Court-ordered depositions,
whichever occurs later;
(9) Respondent shall file an Answer to the Final Amended Petition within one
hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the final Amended Petition;
(10) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all dispositive motions within sixty (60) days
after the filing of Respondent's Answer;
(11) Petitioner and Respondent shall file all responses to dispositive motions within
sixty (60) days after the filing ofthe dispositive motions;
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2..<4~ay ofAugust, 2009.
THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge
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•CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~AI ~~I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this _#'_11 day ofp~ ,2009, served a true and
correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF HEARING FOR ENTRY OF SCHEDULING ORDER
by the method indicated below:
JAN M. BENNETTS
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
MARK 1. ACKLEY
NICOLE OWENS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE, ID 83703
U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
FacsimileX Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
~Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
J. DAVID NAVARRO
CLERK OF THE COURT
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J. OAVIO NAVARRO. Clerk
ByL.AMES
DepUTY
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY
(HALL II)
Petitioner,
Respondent.
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and enters the State's
Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery which was filed on or about August
17, 2009. The State hereby incorporates by reference the State's Memorandum in
Support of the State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed with this
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II),
Page 1
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Objection. The State objects to the Petitioner's Discovery Request on the basis that the
discovery requests in the Petitioner's Motion are a precluded "fishing expedition" as
described in Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999). The State requests that
the Court exercise its discretion and not order discovery until the Petitioner shows that
each item of discovery is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights.
Aechliman, supra; State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t7//s.t day of September, 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II),
Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of September 2009, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was
served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake
Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted below:
~By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
IJ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
IJ By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at th csimile number: _
LJA
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II),
Page 3
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oepUTY
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S
OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY
(HALL II)
Respondent.
Petitioner,
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the State's Memorandum in Support of the
State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery in the above-entitled case.
The Petitioner filed his Motion for Discovery on August 17, 2009, requesting
depositions, a number of various documents and other evidence.
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 1
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I. LAW
Idaho Criminal Rule 57 (b) states as follows:
Filing and processing. The petition for post-conviction relief shall
be filed by the clerk of the court as a separate civil case and be
processed under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure except as
otherwise ordered by the trial court; provided the provisions for
discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the
proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court.
Discovery in post-conviction cases has been limited in a number of opinions
including the following. In Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999), the
Idaho Court of Appeals was considering a post-conviction motion following a second-
degree murder conviction against the defendant, Aeschliman. The defendant in that case
filed a motion for leave to engage in civil discovery, which the district court initially
denied without prejudice. The district court advised the defendant that he could renew his
discovery motion if he specified "particular areas of discovery required and how those
areas were relevant to the application." Id. at 400. The defendant failed to satisfy the
court's requirements and ultimately the district court denied his discovery request and
granted the State's motion for summary disposition. Id.
The defendant in Aeschliman argued that the denial of his motion for discovery
under Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) violated the equal protection clause of the United States
and Idaho Constitutions and procedural due process as well. The Court of Appeals held
that the defendant, as an incarcerated individual, was not a member of a suspect class. It
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 2
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further held that the granting or denial of discovery did not involve a fundamental
constitutional right. The Court held that the discovery rule involved was not obviously
discriminatory and "lacking in a discernable relationship to a governmental purpose." Id.
at 401.
The Court noted that in an ordinary civil case, "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to matters that are relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action [and that] from a practical standpoint, the parties self-limit
discovery because of a desire to limit costs." Id. (internal quotations & ellipses omitted).
Additionally, opposing parties can seek protective orders to protect themselves from
oppressive or burdensome discovery. However, in a post-conviction setting there is no
"self-limiting" limitation on discovery because "there is little if any financial disincentive
from engaging in unlimited discovery." Id. The obvious reason is that the criminal
defendant is usually indigent and is either pro se or has counsel appointed for him.
"Thus, unbridled discovery costs the applicant nothing and sanctions for discovery abuses
are, for the most part, impractical." Id. That is why Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b)
"limits discovery so that the prosecution will not be inundated with discovery requests
from applicants who are either unaware of the proper methods and subject areas of
discovery or are simply onfishing expeditions." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court went on to hold that denial of discovery was appropriate unless shown
to be necessary to protect the applicant's substantial rights. The Court stated:
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 3
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In order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant must
identify the type of information that he or she may obtain through
discovery that could affect the disposition of his or her application
for post-conviction relief.
Id. at 402.
It is the State's position that the Petitioner's multiple requests for discovery are
nothing more than a fishing expedition and are unwarranted. The Petitioner has made no
showing regarding how his multiple discovery requests would affect the disposition of his
Petition.
The Idaho Supreme Court made a similar finding in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286
(2000). In Fields, the Court upheld the denial of a discovery request in a successive
petition for post-conviction relief. The Idaho Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]here is no
requirement that the district court order discovery, unless discovery is necessary to protect
an applicant's substantial rights." Id. at 291. In upholding the district court's decision
not to grant the petitioner additional discovery, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
[t]he information Fields sought was unlikely to be contained in the
prosecutor's files. Furthermore, the potential evidence would be
generated more probably through the continuing efforts of Fields and
his representatives. The district court's denial of the discovery
request does not prevent further investigation on Fields' behalf, and
more importantly, does not deny Fields any substantial rights.
Id.
In Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court again
considered a discovery question in a post-conviction setting. The Court noted that the
"decision to authorize discovery during post-conviction relief is a matter left to the sound
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 4
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discretion of the district court." Id. at 605. In Raudebaugh, the district court reserved
ruling on the petitioner's discovery motion until he filed his second amended petition so
that the court could see if the petition alleged prejudice. "After the second amended
petition was filed, the district court determined that the petition and affidavits failed to
provide evidence that trial counsel's performance was prejudicial. The petition makes
conclusory statements about what an expert and an investigator might have testified at
trial but does not point to specific facts." Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of discovery and the district
court's conclusion that Raudebaugh had failed to provide evidence of prejudice sufficient
to defeat summary dismissal. In Raudebaugh, the petitioner was seeking release of the
knife that was used as a murder weapon for examination by his own expert.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the following:
Raudebaugh argues that once the district court found that trial
counsel's conduct was deficient, discovery should have been
authorized in the post-conviction action to permit scientific
examination or testing without requiring that the post-conviction
applicant also show any probability that the independent examination
will yield exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals accepted
Raudebaugh's position. However, this Court rejects that position in
this case.
Granting discovery is left to the discretion of the trial court. The test
is whether the district court abused its discretion by summarily
dismissing the petition without ruling specifically on the discovery
request. The district court intended for Raudebaugh to make a
showing of prejudice in the second amended petition and concluded
that Raudebaugh failed to provide evidence of prejudice sufficient to
defeat summary dismissal. The district court's conclusion is based
on the fact that Raudebaugh' s allegations only argue what the
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 5
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experts might have testified to had trial counsel employed them.
Raudebaugh's allegations are speculative. There is no showing that
the state's testing was flawed or that there is new technology that
would make current testing more reliable. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case without authorizing the
requested discovery.
Id.
In State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals
considered a motion for discovery in a post-conviction setting. In upholding the district
court's denial of the petitioner's motion for discovery, the Court quoted Aeschliman,
supra, and stated the following:
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put
to the sound discretion of the district court. Unless necessary to
protect an applicants substantial rights, the district court is not
required to order discovery. In order to be granted discovery, a post-
conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where
discovery is requested and why discovery as to those matters is
necessary to his or her application.
Id. at 810 (internal citations omitted).
The Court found that the petitioner in LePage identified specific areas of discovery
requested but failed to show why those specific areas were necessary to his petition for
post-conviction relief. The Court concluded that the district court had not abused its
discretion. Id. at 810-11.
The petitioner in LePage later renewed his motion for discovery and alleged
specific evidence and why he thought that evidence was pertinent to his case. The district
court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial, finding that the
petitioner had not shown that the evidence he requested was "necessary." Accordingly,
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 6
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the Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that there was an abuse of
discretion in the denial of his renewed motion for discovery. Id. at 811.
II. ARGUMENT
In the cases cited above, it becomes clear that the decision to grant discovery is
discretionary with this Court and should only be granted where it is necessary to protect
the substantial rights of the Petitioner. The Petitioner must not only make a specific
request for discovery, but he must also show how the requested evidence is necessary or
pertinent to his application for post-conviction relief.
In the present case, the Petitioner has made some specific requests and many
general requests for discovery. However, he has failed to demonstrate how those requests
are necessary to support his filed Petition for post-conviction relief. If he is unable to
make a specific connection between his requests for discovery and his Petition as well as
how and why the requested discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, his
motion for discovery should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his requests for
discovery are necessary to protect his substantial rights, his requests for discovery should
be denied.
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 7
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~I~day of September 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Janii::~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;;2 0)- day of September 2009, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of State's Objection to
Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State Appellate
Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted
below:
.~y depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first
class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S OBJECTION TO
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II), Page 8
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, LS.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712 OR1GtNAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
(Capital Case)
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR
A PROTECTIVE ORDER
Case No. CV PC 080 3085
Respondent.
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------- )
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and responds to the Respondent's
Motion for Discovery (hereinafter "State's Motion"). While the State's Motion is generally
divided into two parts; this response is divided into three. Part I involves the State's requests
for discovery from trial counsels' files. Part II involves the State's requests for discovery
from the SAPD's files. Part III involves Mr. Hall's request for a protective order.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
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RESPONSE
1.
THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF
TRIAL COUNSELS' FILES
Discovery in post-conviction proceedings is generally a matter of a district court's
discretion. Cf Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001) (setting forth the
standards for consideration of a non-capital petitioner's request for post-conviction
discovery). In this case, the State makes extraordinarily broad and non-specific requests for
discovery. State's Motion, p.1 (requesting the "the production of the entirety of trial
counsel's files"); p.3 (requesting "any materials, documents or other evidence not
specifically set forth above that relates to trial counsel's representation, defense, preparation
and trial of the Petitioner in this case."). The State requests discovery otherwise protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. In this case,
Mr. Hall has not explicitly consented to the disclosure of such privileged information.
Accordingly, this Court must first conclude that by raising claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Mr. Hall has impliedly waived the protections of these privileges.
Numerous federal courts have addressed the doctrine of implied waiver. See, e.g.,
Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156
(11 th Cir. 2001). As explained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
The doctrine of implied waiver allocates control of the privilege between the
judicial system and the party holding the privilege. The court imposing the
waiver does not order disclosure of the materials categorically; rather, the
court directs the party holding the privilege to produce the privileged
materials if it wishes to go forward with its claims implicating them.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
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Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 720. Under the doctrine, the State does not gain unlimited access to
privileged communications; any waiver is limited to only those communications relevant
to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 721-22. Accordingly, the
scope of the waiver will necessarily vary from case to case depending on the claims raised,
and "in many instances will require careful evaluation by the district court." Johnson v.
Alabama, 256 F3d 1156, 1179 (11 th Cir. 2001).
The discovery requested by the State is currently protected from disclosure under
both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Mr. Hall asks this Court to
analyze the respective waivers and requested information separately, and to adopt the
analysis set forth in Salt Lake Legal Defender Association v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997).
In Uno, the Utah Supreme Court ordered the trial court presiding over post-conviction
proceedings to vacate its order requiring trial counsel to produce for the State all their files
relating to their representation of the defendant at trial where the defendant had alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the pending proceedings. The court reasoned that:
It is not the client seeking access to the files-it is the client's adversary, the
State. Furthermore, at issue is the performance of counsel during preparation
and trial, not solely counsel's internal processes in compiling the file. Finally,
ineffective assistance of counsel is in significant part a question of behavior
observable from the record and ascertainable from counsel's testimony. The
contents of counsel's files mayor may not have a bearing on the specific
claims of ineffectiveness made in this case.
. . . A good defense lawyer in a capital case should be privy to a vast amount
of information about the defendant and the crime, much of which will find its
way into the files. A discovery policy that creates a significant likelihood that
such files will be opened in subsequent proceedings to the State, and thus to
the prosecution, would dramatically impair the trial preparation process.
There is simply no way to protect against improper use of information
damaging to the client that might be available in the files.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
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ld. at 590-91 (emphasis added).l
The same policies and protections that the Utah Supreme Court considered apply to
this case. Drawing in part upon the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, the Uno court
set forth a three-step process designed to "ensure that the State has access to information,
necessary and otherwise unobtainable, relevant to [Mr. Hall's] claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel [and] at the same time, it should preserve to the maximum extent
possible the integrity of attorney work product necessary in criminal cases and protect
criminal defendants from prejudicial disclosures not relevant to ineffectiveness claims." Id. at
591. First, Mr. Hall's current counsel will prepare and disclose to the State an index of all
the documents in trial counsels' files. Id. Second, after reviewing the index, the State must
demonstrate-for each document sought-that it has (a) "substantial need" for the document,
(b) that it cannot without "substantial hardship" obtain the substantial equivalent of the
information contained in the specific document by other means, (c) that the specific
document is at issue via a specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (d) that the
document is edited to prevent the disclosure of any information not related to the
ineffectiveness claims. Uno, 932 P.2d at 591. Third, the Court should then conduct an in
camera review of each document to which the State is able to demonstrate its preliminary
entitlement to ensure that it does not contain extraneous information that should not be
revealed to the State. Id.
I In Part III below, Mr. Hall requests the entry of a protective order limiting the temporal
scope of the implied waiver to these post-conviction proceedings. A protective order would
"protect against the improper use of information" at any retrial or resentencing. Mr. Hall will
not object to the disclosure of all relevant work product if the Court limits the scope of the
waiver to these proceedings or if the State agrees to such a limitation.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
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Thus, should this Court order Mr. Hall to disclose trial counsels' files, the Court
should order a similar procedure as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, in this case drawing
upon the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to LR.C.P., Rule 26, the State must show
a "substantial need [for trial counsel's] materials in the preparation of the [State's] case and
that the [State] is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means." I.R.c.P. 26(b)(3). Undue hardship is sufficiently shown where
the party seeking discovery is, with due diligence, unable to obtain evidence of some of the
material facts, events, conditions and circumstances of the case which the discovery will
probably reveal, and that on account of such showing such party is unable to adequately
prepare the case for trial. Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 311-12, 404 P.2d 589, 594
(1965).
II.
THE STATE'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF
THE SAPD'S FILES
The State seeks "any written statements; any audio and/or video recordings; any notes
authored by anyone working as an agent of the petitioner's appellate counsel; and/or any
email communications between any of these people and appellate counselor appellate
counsel's agents." State's Motion, p.l. This request extends to "any witness ... or any other
person" who the petitioner's appellate counselor agent has interviewed regardless of whether
that person will testify in these proceedings. State's Motion, pp.1-2. In short, the State
requests information prepared by post-conviction counsel in anticipation of the litigation
associated with these post-conviction proceedings. The Court should deny the State's motion
in its entirety.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
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The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the scope of pennissible discovery from
an adverse party, stating in relevant part as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the infonnation sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the infonnation sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(l) (emphasis added).
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may
obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and
that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation, including communications between the attorney and client, whether
written or oral. ...
I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, expected to testify,
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition ....
A party may not discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation
of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called
as a witness at trial, except as provided in Rule 35(b) or except upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(4) (emphasis added).
The requested information includes information created by the SAPD during these
post-conviction proceedings in anticipation of litigation, protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine. Accordingly, the information is not discoverable.
I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(l) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged .
. . .") (emphasis added). Further, the requested information is not even relevant to the subject
matter of these proceedings. The primary issue in these post-conviction proceedings
involves whether trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel; post-conviction
counsels' representation is not at issue. I.R.C.P., Rule 26(b)(I) ("Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action . ...") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the State's request
constitutes the epitome of a "fishing expedition," an abuse of discovery well beyond the like
of which the State accuses Mr. Hall of conducting in his motion for discovery. See State's
Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, p.2, filed 9/21/09; State's Memorandum in
Support of State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, pA, filed 9/21/09.2
By casting a wide net, the State has caught hold of some potentially discoverable
information which is not privileged. For instance, the names and addresses of witnesses
expected to be called at trial are discoverable, and not the work product of an attorney.
Wiseman v. Schaffir, 115 Idaho 537, 539, 768 P.2d 800, 802 (Ct. App. 1989). However, at
2 The State's request for the discovery of the SAPD's files is much more extreme than
anything requested in discovery by Mr. Hall. Notably, Mr. Hall has not requested any
information about the communications or interviews that the State has conducted during
these post-conviction proceedings, including but not limited to any conversations with trial
counsel. Indeed, trial counsel has refused to discuss their representation with the SAPD
absent the presence of the State, and Deb Kristal has gone so far as to say that the State's
counsel represents her in these proceedings.
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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this point, the Court has not granted Mr. Hall an evidentiary hearing, so it remains to be
determined whether any witnesses will be called at a trial on the petition. Therefore,
disclosure of otherwise discoverable information is premature until this Court determines that
any of Mr. Hall's claims survive summary judgment.
The State will not suffer any prejudice by waiting until a determination of whether an
evidentiary hearing will take place before obtaining any discoverable information because,
unlike an ordinary civil litigant, Mr. Hall has attached to his amended petition and will attach
to his final petition "[a]ffidavits, records, or other evidence" supporting his allegations. I.C.
§19-4903. This statutory requirement provides the State adequate notice of Mr. Hall's claims
and evidence in support thereof, thereby lessening the need for discovery that may justify
disclosure in a typical civil case. Cf State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560-61, 199 P.3d 123,
135-36 (2008) ("An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an
ordinary civil action ... [it] must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
claim that would suffice for a complaint . . . [it] must present or be accompanied by
admissible evidence supporting its allegations....") (citations omitted).
In conclusion, the State has not satisfied any of the requirements to obtain discovery
from files prepared by the SAPO in anticipation of litigation or trial. Indeed, the State has
not even attempted to make a showing that they have a substantial need for the requested
information that cannot be met through the exercise of due diligence without undue hardship.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court,
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted
inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. . . . Were
such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,
heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would
be poorly served.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11. Accordingly, the State's motion for the SAPD's
files should be denied.
III.
MR. HALL'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
To the extent the Court finds a waiver the attorney-client privilege and/or the work
product doctrine requiring the disclosure of trial counsels' files, Mr. Hall requests the entry
of a protective order, limiting the waiver to these post-conviction proceedings. In Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
waiver should be limited to the instant proceedings, consistent with a habeas petitioner's
interest in "obtaining a fair adjudication of his petition and securing a retrial untainted by
constitutional errors." Id. at 722. As stated by the court,
If [Mr. Hall] succeeds on any of [his] claims, it will mean that his trial was
constitutionally defective. Extending the waiver to cover [Mr. Hall's] retrial
would immediately and perversely skew the second trial in the prosecution's
favor by handing to the state all the information in petitioner's first counsel's
casefile. If a prisoner is successful in persuading a federal court to grant the
writ, the court should aim to restore him to the position he would have
occupied, had the first trial been constitutionally error-free. Giving the
prosecution the advantage of obtaining the defense casefile-and possibly even
forcing the first lawyer to testify against the client during the second trial-
would assuredly not put the parties back at the same starting gate.
Id. at 722-23. Accordingly, drawing upon the protective order in Bittaker, Mr. Hall proposes
the following:
All information received by the State pursuant to Mr. Hall's waiver of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges for the purpose of pursuing his
post-conviction claims, as pronounced in this Court's orders finding such
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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waivers, shall be deemed to be confidential to the extent such information is
not available through other non-privileged sources. This protective order
covers information obtained through interviews and depositions of trial
counsel, as well as trial counsels' agents. The information received through
these confidential sources may be used only by the State of Idaho for purposes
of any proceedings incident to litigating the claims presented in Mr. Hall's
petition for post-conviction relief pending before this Court. Disclosure of the
contents of the communications, the documents, and the documents
themselves may not be made to any other persons or agencies, including any
other law enforcement or prosecutorial personnel or agencies, without an
order from this Court. This order shall continue in effect after the conclusion
of these post-conviction proceedings and specifically shall apply in the event
of a retrial of all or any portion of Mr. Hall's criminal case, except that either
party maintains the right to request modification or vacation of this order upon
entry of final judgment in this matter.
See id at 717 n.2. Absent the entry of such an order, Mr. Hall will be prejudiced.
Specifically, he will have to choose between pursuing his due process right to meaningful
post-conviction proceedings (in which he would raise all potentially meritorious challenges
to his underlying judgment of conviction and sentence), and protecting his privileges, as well
as his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the event of a retrial of any portion of the
underlying criminal case. See generally, Bittaker, supra.
CONCLUSION
The State's request for discovery associated with trial counsels' representation is well
taken, but is nevertheless non-specific and overbroad. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the
Court to enter an order limiting the waiver of the attorney-client privilege to the scope of the
claims raised in his petition. Mr. Hall further asserts that the State should make a greater
showing of need and hardship before accessing trial counsels' files. Finally, Mr. Hall
requests this Court to enter a protective order limiting any waiver of the attorney-client
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
AND PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER
10
001102
             
         
         
           
              
            
           
         
             
          
             
           
                
             
       
                 
              
           
              
                  
       
 
            
            
                 
                
             
              
      
       
 
privilege and the work product doctrine to these post-conviction proceedings. Without the
entry of a protective order, Mr. Hall objects to the State's discovery request.
The State's request for discovery for the SAPD's files is not well taken. Post-
conviction counsels' representation of Mr. Hall is not the subject matter of these proceedings.
The State's motion seeks to undermine the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine while completely eviscerating the discovery provisions in Rule 26. Accordingly,
Mr. Hall objects to the State's discovery request.
For all these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court grant in part, and
deny in part, the State's motion for discovery, subject to Mr. Hall's request for a protective
order.
DATED this 9th day October, 2009.
MARKJ.A LEY
Lead Counsel, Capital ation Unit
u~uteO
NICOLfuwENS......
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712 GF\[GrNAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Case No. CV PC 080 3085
)
Petitioner, ) PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE
) STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
v. ) SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S
) OBJECTION TO THE MOTION
STATE OF IDAHO, ) FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II)
)
Respondent. )
) (Capital Case)
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter, "SAPD"), and replies to the State's
Memorandum In Support Of The State's Objection To Petitioner's Motion For Discovery
(Hall II) (hereinafter "State's Memorandum"). Mr. Hall hereby incorporates by reference his
Motion for Discovery filed on August 17, 2009. This reply is divided into two parts. Part I
addresses the law governing post-conviction discovery. Part II specifically identifies how the
requested evidence is necessary for meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II)
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1. Law Governing Post-Conviction Discovery
a. post-conviction discovery
Post-conviction counsel has an absolute duty to conduct a thorough investigation
independent of infonnation provided by their client, trial counsel, and the prosecution. ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfonnance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003)
(herein "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline lO.15.1(E)(4) (stating that post-conviction counsel
have an obligation to "continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case.").) The
commentary to the ABA Guidelines specifically notes that, "[w]here necessary, counsel
should pursue [efforts to secure infonnation in the possession of the prosecution or law
enforcement authorities] through fonnal and infonnal discovery." Commentary to ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 10.7.
Generally, a district court has discretion whether to authorize discovery in post-
conviction proceedings as provided by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 1.C.R 57(b).
However, discovery becomes mandatory when a petitioner shows it is "necessary to protect
[his] substantial rights." Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001).
Because the "significance of any item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until
the entire record is complete," this Court should resolve discovery disputes in favor of
requiring disclosure. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (noting the
"imprecise standard" for defining favorable evidence as set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373
) The ABA Guidelines have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (relying on the 1989 ABA Guidelines in finding trial counsel
ineffective in failing to "discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence") (emphasis
in original).
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
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001106
     
    
           
             
             
    1 . .      
               
           
              
          
   
           
             
             
               
              
              
              
              
                
              
           
  
          
          
u.s. 83 (1963». In addition, due to the heightened protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment to capital defendants generally, this Court should exercise
its discretion liberally in favor of disclosure when discovery is not otherwise mandatory. See
e.g., Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 971 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that "more
liberal discovery is appropriate in capital cases where the stakes for petitioner are so high.")
(relying on Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978».
Further, to the extent that Mr. Hall's trial counsel could have obtained the requested
discovery at trial, either through I.C.R. 16 or based upon Mr. Hall's constitutional right to
present a defense including his rights to compulsory process,2 confrontation,3 and due
process,4 such discovery must be provided in these post-conviction proceedings. Mr. Hall
asserts disclosure of the discovery requested in his motion, whether such disclosure is
mandatory or not, is necessary to ensure meaningful post-conviction proceedings, and thus is
2 The Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process guarantees the right to compel witnesses to
appear in court with requested documents. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54-58
(1987) (plurality); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
3 The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to demonstrate that a
witness is biased or that the witness's testimony is exaggerated or otherwise unbelievable.
Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Dept., 421 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).
4 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees the right to the production of
exculpatory evidence. Brady, 373 U.S. 83. The State's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
under Brady and its progeny extends to all stages of the judicial process, including post-
conviction proceedings. Imbler, 424 U.S. 409; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.
1992); Bowen, 799 F.2d 593; High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1264-66 (1Ith Cir. 2000)
(relying on a prosecutor's continuous duty to disclose Brady material does not relieve habeas
counsel of their duty to raise all claims in original habeas proceedings where claims could
have been identified by pursuing discovery).
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
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mandated by due process. Cf State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)
(recognizing that the absence of meaningful capital post-conviction proceedings may violate
state and federal due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). In short,
without the requested discovery, Mr. Hall will be denied a full and fair opportunity to
develop claims of trial error.
b. depositions
Unless otherwise ordered, the scope of discovery includes any non-privileged matter
that is either admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). A petitioner may employ any method of discovery available
under the civil rules including, but not limited to, depositions, production of documents,
written interrogatories, and requests for admission. I.R.C.P. 26(a). The Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedures Act specifically recognizes these methods of post-conviction
discovery by authorizing summary disposition "when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with
any affidavits" that there is no genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(c). (Emphasis
added).
Depositions are necessary to provide additional evidentiary support for Mr. Hall's
claims. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hall must first show that
his trial counsels' performance was deficient, and second, that such deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prove
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) 4
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deficient performance, Mr. Hall "must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. This means Mr. Hall must "reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for an objective evaluation of counsels'
performance at that time. Id. at 689. Mr. Hall "must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id.
Accordingly, depositions should be granted to afford Mr. Hall a full and fair opportunity to
meet his burden of proof. See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548 (lIth Cir. 1983) (relying
in part on the denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in finding that federal
habeas petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop facts to support his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); see generally Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009
(9th Cir. 1997) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion when the
discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim.") (citation omitted).5
Mr. Hall has requested the depositions of Rob Chastain, Deborah Kristal, Gary
Starkey, and Bruce and James Whitman. Mr. Starkey was an investigator and the Whitmans
were mitigation specialists; each were an integral part of Mr. Hall's representation during the
underlying criminal proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, (Guideline 4.1 ("The Defense Team
and Supporting Services,,).)6 A complete understanding of the scope of their investigations is
necessary to assess trial counsels' performance. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
5 Both Coleman v. Zant, supra, and Jones v. Wood, supra, addressed the rules governing
discovery in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
6 The ABA Guidelines provide that the core defense team consist of two lawyers, a
mitigation specialist, and an investigator. ABA Guidelines, Guideline 4.1 and commentary.
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL II) 5
001109
            
              
           
               
          t y.'"  
               
                 
                
                
              
                
             
            
              
              
           
             
            u.  
               
      
               
           
          
          
668, 690-691 (1984) ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."); Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing trial counsel's choices, courts
should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable). To rebut any
presumption that trial counsels' decisions were reasonable, Mr. Hall must conduct
depositions oftheir investigators.
Depositions are the only pre-evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly
developing Mr. Hall's claims. Unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions
provide both parties a full opportunity to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York,
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other
party is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and
can frame the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions.
Moreover, the party being examined does not have the opportunity to study
the questions in advance and to consult with counsel before answering, as is
the case if interrogatories are used. Attempts at evasion, which might be
stymied by a persistent oral examination, cannot easily be countered by
interrogatories. The flexibility and the potency of oral depositions is in large
part lacking in written interrogatories.
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted); see also
Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that it is proper under
most circumstances to disregard an affidavit when the affidavit is contradicted by the
witness's prior deposition testimony). Mr. Hall should be given the opportunity to take
depositions in this case.
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
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II. Discovery Is Mandatory In Mr. Hall's Case
When a petitioner shows discovery is "necessary to protect [his] substantial rights,"
discovery is no longer discretionary but instead becomes mandatory. Raudebaugh v. State,
135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001). Even if a petitioner cannot make a showing
that discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, the case law still gives the district
court discretion to order discovery. Aeschliman, at 402, 973 P.2d at 754 ("Unless necessary
to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district court is not required to order
discovery."). Once a petitioner shows discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights,
then the Court loses discretion and discovery is mandatory. Accordingly, even if Mr. Hall
cannot show discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights, he requests this Court
grant discovery, generally exercising its discretion liberally in large part because this is a
capital case.
Based on an examination of trial counsels' files and the record and transcript, as well
as current counsels' unsuccessful attempts to obtain requested materials through alternate
means of investigation, it is clear that certain information is in the State's possession, or in
State agents' possession, which is necessary for an adequate investigation but which cannot
be accessed without resort to discovery7. Mr. Hall enumerated each item of discovery
necessary to complete his post-conviction investigation in his Motion for Discovery, and
where possible demonstrated the relevance of each request to a claim raised in his Amended
7 The SAPD has attempted to obtain all documents in the possession of trial counsel on
multiple occasions. The SAPD has also attempted to interview trial counsel. Trial counsel
has refused to turn over the entirety of their files and has refused to discuss their
representation with post-conviction counsel absent the presence of the State's representative.
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
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Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Thus, the discovery is necessary for meaningful
consideration of Mr. Hall's claims.
Moreover, those items not previously tied to a claim in the Motion for Discovery can
be connected to his Amended Petition as follows:
• Request B(5) in the Motion for Discovery is necessary because it is relevant to
Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim M ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To Adequately Investigate Guilt-Phase
Issues.").
• Requests D(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(1O) and (11) in the Motion for Discovery are
necessary because they are relevant to Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim M
("Deprivation Of The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Adequately Investigate Guilt-Phase Issues.").
• Request D(8) in the Motion for Discovery is necessary because it is relevant
to Mr. Hall's Amended Petition Claim D ("Deprivation Of The Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To Trial Counsels' Failure To Object To
Impaneling A Jury From Gooding County In Lieu Of Changing Venue.").
Each one of Mr. Hall's discovery requests is necessary to protect his substantial rights
because they are relevant to claims raised in his Amended Petition.
Thus, because Mr. Hall has demonstrated how his requests for discovery are
relevant to claims in his petition, discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights and
this Court must grant his requests. Additionally, to the extent Mr. Hall's trial counsel could
have obtained the requested discovery at trial through I.C.R. 16, this Court should grant the
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE
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discovery request now. Granting discovery IS necessary to ensure meaningful post-
conviction proceedings.
DATED this 9th day October, 2009.
NiCoLE OWENS co
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
MARKJ.A LEY
Lead Counse , Capit
:\kU1U
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 9th day of October, 2009, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing PETITIONER'S REPLY TO THE STATE'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY as indicated below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
/" Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
XU.S.Mail
Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Jan M. Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
STATE'S SPECIFIC
RESPONSES TO
PETITIONER'S DISCOVERY
REQUESTS & REPLY TO
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE
TO STATE'S MOTION FOR
DISCOVERY & STATE'S
REPLY TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTION ORDER
(HALL II)
Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
Petitioner,
Respondent.
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------)
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and makes
specific responses to the Petitioner's discovery requests. In addition, the State
replies to the Petitioner's response to the State's motion for discovery request and
replies to the Petitioner's request for protective order.
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I. STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S DISCOVERY
REQUESTS
The State has already provided the legal framework within which the
Petitioner's requests for discovery should be analyzed in the State's Memorandum
in Support of the State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed
on or about September 22, 2009. The State hereby incorporates by reference the
law and analysis set forth in the State's Memorandum in Support of the State's
Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery.
In the Petitioner's Reply to the State's Memorandum in Support of the
State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed on October 9, 2009,
the Petitioner states that even if he cannot show that discovery is necessary to
protect his substantial rights, this Court should liberally grant his requests. (See p.
7.) The State objects to that standard being applied. The legal standard has been
set forth and should be followed. It is unfair to the State to permit the Petitioner to
go on a fishing expedition with his discovery requests.
The Petitioner also relies on the ABA Guidelines in support of his position.
However, the Petitioner's reliance on these guidelines is misplaced. As explained
in State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court has
declined the invitation to adopt these guidelines. Further, the United Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that such guidelines are just that, merely guides.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1988).
The State has attempted to follow the outline format in the Petitioner's
Motion for Discovery filed on August 17,2009, in making the responses below.
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I. DEPOSITIONS
A. Defense Team
1. & 2. The State agrees that the Petitioner may depose trial counsel Rob
Chastain and Deborah Kristal as requested.
3. & 4. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn these
requests at this time but that they may raise them at a later date.
It appears that the Petitioner has not formally requested to depose prior
counsel Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr. Accordingly, the State will not address that
issue until it is raised.
The Petitioner further seeks I) documentation identifying the cases that the
individual trial team member worked on during the course of their representation;
2) all email correspondence between the trial team member and other team
members, including agents, such as expert witnesses; and, 3) email
correspondence between individual trial team members and the Prosecutor's
Office and agents.
With regard to request numbered 1), the State objects to requiring trial
counsel to provide documentation regarding the cases they worked on during the
course of their representation. Certainly the Petitioner's counsel may inquire
during depositions regarding their workloads, but the State objects to requiring
trial counsel to provide documentation. Further, it is unclear what documentation
is sought. It would seem to the State that documentation regarding trial counsels'
clients is privileged information that is not accessible to the Petitioner, the State
and the Court.
The two additional requests numbered 2) and 3), refer to email correspondence
in trial counsel's possession. The State understands that trial counsel provided
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email correspondence to counsel for the Petitioner quite some time ago. The State
understood this because Ms. Kristal copied the undersigned on an email to counsel
for the Petitioner that indicates these emailswereprovidedbackinJune2008.To
be clear, the State did not receive the emails themselves that are the subject of this
request. Rather, Ms. Kristal copied the State on an email to the Petitioner's
counsel that indicated these emails had been provided to Petitioner's counsel. The
State is not comfortable talking with trial counsel about any details in this case
until this Court has ruled on the State's Motion for Attorney-Client Privilege
Waiver. The State can certainly facilitate the production of these emails after
there is a formal waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
Additionally, the Petitioner in his Reply to the State's Memorandum in Support
of the State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery filed on October 9,
2009, the Petitioner indicates that trial counsel have refused to tum over the
entirety of their files. (See page 7 n.7.) The State would note that Petitioner's
counsel had indicated that he has some 20,000 pages of documents. The State
does not know what is missing from the Petitioner's files, but can certainly work
with trial counsel and the Petitioner to facilitate the production of missing
documents as soon as the Petitioner's counsel identifies what items are missing
and the Court orders waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.
II. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Coroner's Office
Petitioner's Requests numbered 5. & 8.
Petitioner has withdrawn these requests.
The State understands that the
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Petitioner's Requests numbered 7. The State understands that the Petitioner
has withdrawn this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.
Petitioner's request number 1. The State will contact Dr. Groben to determine
if he has any bench notes regarding this case and will provide those to counsel for
the Petitioner if they exist.
Petitioner's requests numbered 2. through 4.,6.,9., through and including 13.
The State provided the autopsy report, photographs of the autopsy, the
coroner's investigative report, and other items related to the autopsy. All of the
State's discovery items that were disclosed in this case are outlined in the State's
discovery response, discovery letters, and the approximately 35 addendums
submitted to trial counsel in this case. In addition, the State provided a discovery
log that also outlines the State's discovery. The State understands that items can
get misplaced in the transition from trial counsel's office to the Petitioner's
counsel's office. If the Petitioner is missing items that have previously been
provided as outlined in the State's discovery responses to trial counsel and can
inform the State of what items it is missing, the State can copy those specific items
again, but the State needs counsel for the Petitioner to identify what items they are
mIssmg.
The State would further note as it relates to item number 3. (notes, reports, or
dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben at or near the body recovery scene), the
State provided to trial counsel the actual video of the body recovery with Dr.
Groben and the investigators.
Additionally, Dr. Groben's report outlines what he did in this case. The State
objects to the requests for items that are in addition to what has already been
provided. The Petitioner fails to state a basis for his requests other than general
reference to failure to investigate guilt-phase issues. This statement is an
insufficient basis to support his request for discovery. This request is a fishing
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expedition, especially in light of the fact that the Petitioner has the State's
discovery that was already provided to trial counsel related to the autopsy.
B. Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Petitioner requests a number of documents from the Ada County
Prosecutor's Office, numbered 1. through and including 7. The State objects to
the documents as follows.
The State objects to Petitioner's requests number 1. and number 2., trial
exhibits, because these exhibits are in the Court's possession. The exhibits were
referred to by exhibit number during the trial. Petitioner's counsel may view those
exhibits through the Court.
The State agrees to request number 3., PowerPoint slides.
The State objects to request number 4., copies of emails. Again, as noted
above, the State had understood that trial counsel had provided these emails to the
Petitioner through the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. In any event, the
State objects to providing its emails. Nor does the Petitioner cite any authority
that authorizes their release to him.
The State objects to request number 5., the State's communications or
summaries with experts. This request invades the State's work product and the
State is not required to provide these to defense counsel. The Petitioner cites no
authority whatsoever to support his request for the State's work product. Nor has
the Petitioner demonstrated a basis for this requested information. The Petitioner
requests examinations of the shoe prints found at the scene. The State has already
provided that information through discovery to trial counsel. Again, if items are
missing as identified by the Petitioner's counsel, the State can re-copy those items.
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Petitioner's request number 6., regarding the State's communications with
the media. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request at
this time but may raise it at a later date.
Petitioner's request number 7., regarding Gary Starkey. The State
understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.
C. Documents In Possession of Prosecutor's Office Regarding
Witnesses
l.a. Jeff Carlson. The State objects to this request for summaries. First, it is
the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for this requested information. Nor has the Petitioner
cited any authority that permits him to receive the State's work product. Second,
Mr. Carlson's statements to law enforcement were already provided through the
State's discovery response to trial counsel. If counsel for the Petitioner identifies
what items are missing, the State can re-copy those.
2. Amanda Stroud. The State notes at the outset that Amanda Stroud passed
away prior to the trial in this case. Accordingly, neither side could call her as a
witness. Nor could either side use her hearsay statements. The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for these requests.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request for summaries.
First, it is the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. Second,
the documentation of her statements to law enforcement were already provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel.
b. & c. Amanda Stroud statements. There appears to be an overlap in
requests as outlined in subsection b. and subsection c. In any event, this
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infonnation has already been provided through the State's discovery response to
trial counsel, including police reports documenting interviews with Amanda
Stroud, audio and video recordings and transcripts. The State can provide these
materials again if the Petitioner's counsel is missing something and infonns the
State what is missing based upon the State's detailed discovery responses in this
case.
d. Investigative Reports Regarding Amanda Stroud's Death. The State
understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.
e. Jail Recordings. The State does not find a reference to a recording in the
Search Warrant Affidavit, but rather that Kathy Stroud indicated to law
enforcement that Amanda had called her from the jail. The State does not have a
recording of this conversation. Nor does it appear that the Affidavit references a
recording, but merely that a call or calls were made from Amanda at the jail to
Kathy Stroud. The State has made an inquiry about the jail system used in 2003
and it appears as though a different system was used back in 2003 than is now
used. Although the State did not make inquiry about this specific case, even if
recordings had existed at one time, they would not exist now based upon the
State's inquiry. In any event, the Petitioner has failed to establish the basis for
this request.
f. Jail Recordings. Similarly, the State does not find a reference to a
recording of conversations between Amanda Stroud and the Petitioner from the
jail in the Search Warrant Affidavit. Rather, this Affidavit was prepared in
support of the Search Warrant that authorized law enforcement to open a letter that
the Petitioner had written to Amanda Stroud from the jail.
g. & h. Sexual Relations & Black Out. The State objects and refers its
response to subsection b. & c. above. The State has already provided discovery
regarding Amanda Stroud. In addition, the Petitioner does not provide any basis
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for this request given that Amanda could not be called as a witness by either party
in this case. Nor could any hearsay statements that she made prior to her death be
used by either party at trial.
3. Kathy Stroud.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request for summaries.
First, it is the State's work product even if such notes or summaries exist. Second,
the documentation of her statements to law enforcement were already provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel.
b. Law Enforcement Statements & Summaries. This information has
already been provided through the State's discovery response to trial counsel. The
State can provide any missing materials again if the Petitioner's counsel will
identify what they are missing from what the State has already provided.
c. Photographs. The requested photographs have already been provided
through the State's discovery response to trial counsel. The State can provide
these materials again.
4. Norma Jean Oliver. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.
5. Dr. Pablo Stuart. The Petitioner requests a copy of Dr. Pablo Stuart's taped
deposition. This was a deposition prepared at trial counsel's request. Although
this was trial counsel's evidence, the State does have a copy and can provide a
copy to the Petitioner.
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D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement
1. Field notes and logbooks. The State has already provided what information
it has through discovery to trial counsel. The State is uncertain what else the
Petitioner is seeking than what the State has already provided. This blanket
request is merely a fishing expedition.
2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes.
a. Brett Quilter. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.
b. & c. Dave Smith & Mark Vucinich. The State has already provided the
handwritten notes of Dave Smith and Mark Vucinich to trial counsel through the
State's discovery response. The State can provide these documents again.
3. Correspondence. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request.
4. FBI I-Drives. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this
request.
5. Taskforce Lead Assignments. The State understands that the Petitioner has
withdrawn this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.
6. Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation. The State
understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request.
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7. Prior Offenses.
a. Case No. M0303573: The Petitioner seeks police reports from this case
number. However, this case number is the "M" case number from the Henneman
murder case. This "M" number was bound over to case number H0300518, which
is the Henneman case number. The Petitioner refers to the case in this request as a
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. It is possible the Petitioner is seeking case
number H0300423, which is a Failure to Register as a Sex Offender case. Even if
the Petitioner is seeking police reports from H0300423, he has failed to
demonstrate a basis for this requested information. In fact, this H0300423 Failure
to Register case was dismissed on August 15, 2003. The State fails to see how this
is relevant to the Petitioner's Amended Petition and objects to this request.
b. Case No. H9600534: The Petitioner seeks police reports from this case
number. However, this case number is not the Petitioner's case. It is a Controlled
Substance charge for an offender named "Quinn Jorgensen." The Petitioner has
failed to demonstrate a basis for this requested information. The State fails to see
how this is relevant to the Petitioner's Amended Petition and objects to this
request.
8. Media Contact. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn
this request at this time but may raise it at a later date.
9. Specific Reports, Documents & Recordings.
a. Arrest Report. The State does not have this report and objects to this
request. The Petitioner has failed to provide any basis for this request.
b. Crime Scene Video. The State already provided a copy of this video to
trial counsel, but can provide another copy to the Petitioner's counsel.
c. Idaho Power Video. There is no Idaho Power video.
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d. Transcript & Recordings Jason Vanderesch. The State already provided
these to trial counsel, but can provide another copy to the Petitioner's counsel if
Petitioner's counsel will identify what they are missing.
e. Crime Lab Activity. The State does not understand what the Petitioner is
requesting. Again, if pages are missing, the State can re-copy missing pages.
f. Photo Line up. The State has previously provided the line-ups to trial
counsel. If the Petitioner can point to a particular item number as listed in the
State's discovery response that was not received, the State can re-copy it.
g. Lead Sheets. The State provided to trial counsel the Lead Sheets in its
possession, consisting of 278 pages. These sheets are numbered with prosecutor
page numbers. The State can re-copy any missing pages if the Petitioner's counsel
will provide the missing page numbers to the State. The Petitioner refers to Lead
Sheet #50 and the Petitioner indicates that a crime stoppers "memo" is missing.
The State does not see the word "memo" on Lead Sheet #50. Again, the page
numbers are in order, so the Petitioner can determine ifpages are missing.
h. Violent Crime Apprehension Program. This request relates to
Henneman case. The State objects to this request. In reviewing the portion of the
transcript cited by the Petitioner, Detective Smith testified that he used a
nationwide program to determine if another jurisdiction had a case with a similar
M.a. as the Henneman case. He received back five, "but the DNA did not
match." (Trial Transcript, at 6123-24.) The Petitioner has failed to establish how
this information is relevant to any ofhis claims.
10. DNA.
a. & b. CODIS & NDIS. The State objects to this request. This is a fishing
expedition and is so broad ("all documentation") that the State does not know
what the Petitioner is seeking. Nor does he relate this request to any claim in his
Amended Petition whatsoever. The State has provided all DNA testing results as
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was outlined in the discovery responses, addendums, and discovery letters
provided to trial counsel. The State does not have any additional documents in its
possession than have already been provided.
11. Rewards. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this
request.
12. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration. The State
objects to this request. The Petitioner fails to state a basis for this request.
13. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. The Petitioner requests copies
of questions from the jury to the Court, bailiff or other court personnel. These are
documents in the record. Counsel for Petitioner can obtain these documents from
the record in this case.
14. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail
Records. The State understands that the Petitioner has withdrawn this request at
this time but may raise it at a later date.
15. Documents Requiring Subpoenas. The Petitioner seeks Washington
records. The State does not have these records in its possession and objects to
providing them.
II. STATE'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO STATE'S
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY & STATE'S REPLY TO MOTION FOR
PROTECTION ORDER
A. State's Reply Regarding Trial Counsel Files
The State filed a Motion for Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver on March 11,
2008, based upon the filing of the Petition. The State also filed an accompanying
Motion for Production of Documents when it filed its Motion for Attorney-Client
Privilege Waiver that included a request for documents, materials and items that
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would be included in the work product doctrine. The State has since filed its
Motion for Discovery as noted above.
The Petitioner proposes that he only be required to turn over an index of the
documents in trial counsel's files. Then, he proposes that the State would be
required to demonstrate not only a "substantial need" for each document, but that
the State cannot, without "substantial hardship," obtain the substantial equivalent
of the documents in another way. The Petitioner then proposes that the State
establish that the requested documents relate to specific claims. Those items
would then somehow be edited. Then, finally, he proposes that the Court would
be required to view each document en camera and determine whether the
document contains extraneous information. The State objects to this process.
The Petitioner, by filing an Amended Petition, has waived his Attorney-
Client Privilege. See I.R.E. 502(d)(3). Moreover, the Amended Petition is not
limited to one or two narrow issues. Rather, the Amended Petition is nearly 200
pages in length and covers all aspects of representation. The Petitioner cannot
now claim that the privilege prevents the State from having all of the discovery in
the Petitioner's possession that relates to all aspects of trial counsel's
representation. Not only will all of the discovery relate to one or more issues
given that the Amended Petition leaves absolutely nothing out in terms of trial
counsel's representation, but trial counsel is entitled to review all of the documents
they had in preparation for trial in this case.
Moreover, the State understands from the Petitioner's counsel that there are
approximately 20,000 pages of documents in their possession relating to trial
counsel's representation. It would be an extraordinary and unnecessary
undertaking were the State required not only to document its need for each page,
but to document that it could not get the discovery another way without substantial
hardship. Similarly, it would be an extraordinary and unnecessary undertaking for
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the Court to then reVIew each of the 20,000 pages of discovery and then
apparently redact certain items before the State is entitled to review them. Not
only is this unfair to the State, but it is unfair to trial counsel who will understand
the significance of each document and who should be entitled to review ALL
documents without redactions. Accordingly, the State is requesting that all of trial
counsel's documents be provided to the State in their entirety without redactions,
deletions or exceptions.
In support of his position, the Petitioner relies primarily upon Bittaker v.
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) and Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v.
Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997). Uno discusses the procedures in Utah for
disclosing work product. The process involves the procedure outlined above that
the Petitioner has requested the Court to follow in this case.
However, Uno was decided by the Supreme Court of Utah and is, therefore,
clearly not controlling. More importantly, this Court should not consider Uno as
persuasive authority because it is substantially distinguishable. The Uno case was
decided based on the existence of a local rule. See Uno, 932 P.2d at 589-91.
Idaho does not have the same rule, which forms the basis for Utah's procedure in
this regard. Accordingly, Uno and the procedure outlined in Uno should not
dictate the Court's ruling as it pertains to the State's request for discovery.
A number of other jurisdictions have rejected similar claims as those made
in Uno. See State v. Taylor, 393 S.E. 2d 801, 805 (N.C. 1990) ("By alleging in his
amended motion for appropriate relief that his court-appointed attorney . . .
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial and direct appeal of
these cases, the defendant waived the benefits of both the attorney-client privilege
and the work product privilege, but only with respect to matters relevant to his
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel."); Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094
(Fla.1994) (When appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief claiming
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ineffective assistance of counsel, he waived attorney-client privilege and work
product protections. The state was entitled to the trial attorney's entire file, unless
the defendant moved to exclude particular items that contained matters unrelated
to the crimes for which defendant was convicted.); Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E. 2d
380, 387 (Ga. 2000) ("[W]e hold that a habeas petitioner who asserts a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel makes a limited waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine and the state is entitled only to counsel's
documents and files relevant to the specific allegations of ineffectiveness.").
The reasoning of this line of cases requiring production of work product
materials is compelling: "The passage of time often dims the recollection of a
defendant's original trial counsel with respect to client conversations and trial
strategies. At the least, it is only fair that the State should have a right to refresh
counsel's recollection concerning these matters by reference to the attorney's
files." Reed, 640 So.2d at 1097.
In addition to the persuasive cases from several state jurisdictions, the
Ninth Circuit has also ruled on the work product issue. In Alvarez v. Woodford, 81
Fed. Appx. 119, 120 (9th Cir. 2003), 2003 WL 22682463 (9th Cir. 2003), the Court
ruled that "the same concerns that dictate waiver of the attorney-client privilege by
a habeas petitioner raising an ineffectiveness claim also dictate the waiver of the
work product protection." In another case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that "the
making of a claim of ineffective assistance necessarily implies a relatively broad
waiver of attorney-client privilege." Duncan v. Us. District Court for the Central
District of California, 78 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 1996), 1996 WL 88084 3 (9th Cir.
1996). The State understands that the Duncan case is an Unpublished Opinion and
hereby notifies Court and counsel that it is an Unpublished Opinion. Nonetheless,
the Duncan case is instructive.
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The Duncan case dealt with document requests without differentiating
between attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The petitioner in
Duncan claimed error at nearly every stage of the proceedings, as is the situation
in this case. The Duncan Court noted that, "[d]efending against these claims will
require the State to introduce evidence regarding a variety of surrounding
circumstances. These circumstances will include what Duncan told his attorney,
what strategies the attorney considered and rejected and what witnesses were
available or unavailable to the defense." [d. at *3. The Court in Duncan
concluded that the district court's order compelling disclosure to the State of
contested documents was appropriate.
In a somewhat different situation, the Supreme Court of the United States
has concluded that, "[t]he privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not
absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived." u.s. v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 239 (1975) (Supreme Court concluded that calling an investigator to
testify waived work product protections regarding that investigator's report.).
The more applicable and persuasive authority indicates that by filing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, particularly where such claims encompass
nearly every element of the representation, the Petitioner has waived attorney-
client privilege and the protections of the work product doctrine. In the absence of
trial counsel's files, the depositions will be litigation by ambush. Questions will
either reference material possessed only by Petitioner's counselor depend on
those materials for an answer. If the depositions were held without disclosure of
the files first, they would be slow, cumbersome and likely repeated after trial
counsel had an opportunity to review their files with the State. Moreover, the State
has a right to be prepared for its role in the depositions and the proceedings that
follow.
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Further, there is really no functional difference in this context between the
work product privilege and the attorney-client privilege, which is waived by the
filing of claims of ineffectiveness against trial counsel. The logical extension of
the work product argument is that trial counsel could tell the State what the
defendant told them, but could not show the State notes documenting those
communications because the notes are work product. The policy behind the
waiver is to allow trial counsel to defend themselves against the claims, but also to
ensure that the trial court is fully informed of all relevant information necessary to
rule on the claims. It is the State's duty to see that the Court gets that information.
The State cannot carry out this important function without access to the
documentation. The Petitioner was aware of the requirement of waiver when he
filed his claims.
B. State's Reply Regarding SAPD Files
The State has agreed not to litigate the State's Motion for Discovery
relating to the SAPD files until it becomes relevant. The State understands that its
request for discovery relating to the SAPD files may be premature given that we
have not yet reached the point in these post-conviction proceedings where
evidence gathered by the SAPD has become relevant. The State also recognizes
that it has cast a broad net in its request because the State does not know what
discovery exists.
However, the State is not formally withdrawing its request for discovery.
Rather, the State is willing to request that this Court hold off ruling on the State's
request until such a time when the SAPD files may become relevant. For
example, should the SAPD seek to introduce evidence or rely on evidence that it
has obtained during the course of representing the Petitioner, the State would be
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entitled to renew its Motion and seek a copy of such evidence based upon the
State's previously filed Motion.
III. STATE'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A
PROTECTIVE ORDER
The Petitioner requests a protective order to limit the waiver to these post-
conviction proceedings.
Bittaker addresses whether materials provided by the petitioner in regard to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas proceeding can later be used in
the event of a re-trial in state court. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the federal district court to preclude "use of the privileged
materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas petition, and
barring the Attorney General from turning them over to any persons or offices ...."
Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled, to the contrary, that once the attorney-client
privilege has been waived it cannot be reasserted in future proceedings. See
United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987
(1987). In Suarez, the Court there noted that "the privilege is not a favored
evidentiary concept in the law since it serves to obscure the truth, and it should be
construed as narrowly as is consistent with its purpose." Id. at 1160. The
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit on this issue is more sound than that of the Ninth
Circuit. The tactical decision to waive the privilege during post-conviction
proceedings should not be without weight.
Further, the issue of admissibility of trial counsel's files at a retrial is not
ripe for determination. That question cannot be fairly determined until all the
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relevant facts are at issue. There are many circumstances that may influence the
decision of this Court in ruling on the admissibility of the information, such as
whether: the Petitioner waives the privilege by some other mechanism; the
information becomes available from an additional source; or the Petitioner takes
the stand and perjures himself, which opens the door to use of the previously
privileged material. To rule now that the information can never by used at future
proceedings invites the Petitioner to testify falsely at future proceedings, without
being subject to proper cross-examination.
Whether trial counsel's discovery is admissible in later proceedings should
be decided at that time when the relevant facts are fully developed. Accordingly,
the State asks the court to forego an order regarding future admissibility of the
information previously the subject of the attorney-client privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State's seeks an order denying the
Petitioner's discovery requests consistent with the objections outlined above.
Based upon the foregoing, the State seeks an order granting the State's
discovery request and requiring the Petitioner to provide the State with the entirety
of trial counsels files and other discovery as outlined in the State's Motion for
Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver, the State's Motion for Production of Documents
and the State's Motion for Discovery.
Based upon the foregoing, the State agrees not to litigate the State's Motion
for Discovery relating to the SAPD files until it becomes relevant.
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Finally, based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court forego
ruling on future admissibility until the facts are fully developed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~~ day of October 2009.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
~~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisZOp.. day of October 2009, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing State's Memorandum in Support of State's Objection
to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery was served on Mark J. Ackley, Deputy State
Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the
manner noted below:
¥-J3y depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
first class.
o By depositing copies ofthe same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available
for pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number:
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State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
1.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, 1.S.B. # 6330
NICOLE OWENS, 1.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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J. D
BY-R~~~FtN~:-b-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, Case No. CV PC 0803085
(Capital Case)
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC
RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
(HALL II)
Petitioner,
Respondent.
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------- )
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and replies, in part, to the State's Specific
Responses to Petitioner's Discovery Requests and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's
Motion for Discovery and State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order filed on October 20,
2009. Mr. Hall has contacted the State and the State does not object to Mr. Hall filing this reply.
Purpose of this Reply
The general purpose of this reply is to facilitate discovery proceedings. The specific
purposes of this reply is five-fold: 1) to reply to the State's additional response to Mr. Hall's
motion for discovery; 2) to withdraw additional discovery requests; 3) to provide additional
information requested by the State; 4) to attach relevant portions of the Court's discovery order
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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entered in Erick Virgil Hall v. State ofIdaho, Ada County Case No. SPOT0500155 (herein "Hall
I"); and 5) to renew a single discovery request to which Mr. Hall had indicated an intent to
withdraw.
First, Mr. Hall replies to the additional response filed by the State on October 20, 2009.
In its response, the State raised objections to discovery based on grounds that had not previously
been asserted, including but not limited to, the State's reliance on the work product doctrine. As
noted herein, the State's additional response to Mr. Hall's motion for discovery was not
anticipated under the Court's Scheduling Order. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall does not object to the
State's additional response so long as the Court is willing to consider Mr. Hall's additional
reply.
Second, Mr. Hall withdraws discovery requests in addition to those reflected in an email
provided to the Court on October 19, 2009. Specifically, Mr. Hall withdraws the following
requests:
• II(A)(6)("Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Hanlon's
body, including any reenactment photographs.");
• II(B)(l)("Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's guilt
phase case ....");
• II(B)(2)("Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's
sentencing phase case ....");
• II(C)(2)(e)("March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada County Jail referenced in
Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating Amanda Stroud called Kathy Stroud from
Ada County Jail.");
• II(C)(2)(f)("All recorded conversations between Erick Hall and Amanda Stroud
from the Ada County Jail as referenced in the Affidavit for Search Warrant, not
notarized, signed on notary signature line by Judge Minder on April 17, 2003.");
• II(D)(7)("Prior Offenses.");
• II(D)(l2)("Documentation regarding Sex Offender Registration."); and
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• II(D)(l5)(a)("Copies of all Washington DSHS Division of Child Support
records.").
In addition, for reasons noted herein, Mr. Hall conditionally withdraws the following
request:
• II(D)(lO)(a)("All documentation relating to entry of Mr. Hall's DNA profile into
the Idaho CaDIS database, or any local or state database.").
Third, Mr. Hall provides additional information to the State to assist the State in
disclosing requested materials. For example, where possible, Mr. Hall has provided specific
page numbers corresponding with discovery materials previously disclosed by the State where
such page numbers include reference to specific materials that have not been located by Mr. Hall
in reviewing trial counsels' files.
Fourth, Mr. Hall attaches relevant portions of the Court's discovery order in Hall 1.
Because this case overlaps in some regard with Hall I, and because this Court endeavored to
make consistent rulings in the two underlying criminal cases, Mr. Hall references and attaches
relevant portions of the Court's discovery order and the State's response thereto from the Hall I
post-conviction case to ensure consistent rulings in the two post-conviction cases.
Finally, Mr. Hall renews a discovery request. Specifically, as noted III the
aforementioned October 19, 2009 email.Mr. Hall previously informed the Court and the State
that he would agree to withdraw discovery request II(D)(ll)("Rewards."). For reasons noted
herein, Mr. Hall renews that discovery request and attaches additional support for that request.
Relevant Background
The State filed its motion for discovery on August 7, 2009 and Mr. Hall filed his motion
for discovery on August 17,2009. On September 21,2009 the State filed the State's Objection
to Petitioner's Motion for Discovery. On October 9, 2009, Mr. Hall filed both his Reply to the
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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State's Memorandum in Support of the State's Objection to the Motion for Discovery and his
Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and Petitioner's Request for Protective Order.
On October 20,2009, the State filed its Specific Reponses to Petitioner's Discovery request and
Reply to Petitioner's Reponses to State's Motion for Discovery and State's Reply to Motion for
Protection Order. Although Mr. Hall previously filed a reply to the State's Objection to
Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, this reply is necessary as the State has filed a second response
to Mr. Hall's discovery request. I
SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY
1.
DEPOSITIONS
A. Members of the Trial Defense Team.
1. The State has agreed to the deposition of trial counsel Rob Chastain.
2. The State has agreed to the deposition of trial counsel Deborah Krista!.
3. Mr. Hall has agreed not to litigate this request at this time on the assumption the
Court will consider a renewed request for the deposition of trial counsels'
investigator, Gary Starkey, following the depositions of trial counsel.
4. Mr. Hall has agreed not to litigate this request at this time on the assumption the
Court will consider a renewed request for the deposition of trial counsels'
mitigation specialists, Bruce and James Whitman, following the depositions of
trial counsel.
I Mr. Hall does not object to the State's additional response so long as the Court is willing to
consider this additional reply. Mr. Hall has contacted the State and the State does not object to
Mr. Hall filing this reply.
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Mr. Hall also moved this Court to issue subpoenas decus tecum for, inter alia,
documentation identifying the cases that the individual trial team member worked on during the
course of their representation. The State objects to this request. In addition, Mr. Hall requested
all e-mail correspondence between the individual trial team members and other team members
including their agents, and all email correspondence between the trial team and Ada County
Prosecutor's Office and its agents. The State does not specifically object to this request.
In support of his requests, Mr. Hall relies in part on the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003)
(herein "ABA Guidelines"), to support this request. The ABA Guidelines provide in relevant
part that trial counsel has a duty to facilitate the work of successor counsel. This duty requires
full cooperation with successor counsel, including providing all "the client's files, as well as
information regarding all aspects of the representation, to successor counsel ...." ABA
Guidelines, Guideline 10. 13(B). As noted in Mr. Hall's motion for discovery, trial counsel has
refused to fully cooperate with Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel. Mr. Hall requests this Court
to order no more than trial counsel is already obligated to provide.
II.
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
A. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office.
1. Bench notes. The State has agreed to contact Dr. Groben and provide any bench
notes he has relating to this case.
2. Peer review. The State objects to providing more to post-conviction counsel than
was provided to trial counsel. The basis for the State's objection is not valid. To
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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meaningfully assess trial counsels' perfonnance, it is necessary to detennine
whether trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation. See Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing trial counsel's choices,
courts should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984) ("[C]ounsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary."); see also ABA Guidelines, Commentary
to Guideline 10.7 ("Where necessary, counsel should pursue [efforts to secure
infonnation in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities]
through fonnal and infonnal discovery.") Indeed, "[pJeer review is the chief way
of satisfying" the requirement that an expert's opinion is based on scientifically
valid principles. Metabolift Intern., Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 837-38,
153 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 (2007) ("Relevant considerations in detennining whether
the basis of an expert's opinion is scientifically valid include 'whether the theory
can be tested and whether it has been subjected to peer-review and publication."')
Thus, trial counsels' failure to request discoverable materials is relevant to Mr.
Hall's claim that trial counsel failed to adequately challenge Dr. Groben's
pathology findings. See Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April
7, 2009 (herein "Amended Petition"), p.61 (Claim M ("Deprivation of the
effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate guilt-phase
issues - failure to challenge the pathology")).
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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3. Notes by Groben at body recovery scene. The State objects to providing more to
post-conviction counsel than was provided to trial counsel during the underlying
criminal proceedings. For the same reasons as noted above, this objection is not
valid. The State also objects on the basis it provided trial counsel with a copy of
the video of the body recovery. This objection is non-responsive. Mr. Hall has
requested copies of "any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr.
Groben at or near the body recovery scene." This information would not be part
of a video tape but would be the kind of information relied on by Dr. Groben
when forming his opinions. See I.R.E. 703 (providing for disclosure of the basis
of expert opinions); I.R.E. 705 (providing for the disclosure of facts or data
underlying expert opinions).
4. Autopsy diagrams. The State objects to providing more to post-conviction
counsel than was provided to trial counsel. As noted, this objection is not a valid
reason to deny post-conviction discovery. The requested materials include
matters that Dr. Groben would have relied upon when forming his opinions and
are thus discoverable. See I.R.E. 703 & 705.
5. Complaints against Dr. Groben. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
6. Photos ofMs. Hanlon's body. In light of the State's willingness to cooperate with
specific request for missing photographs, Mr. Hall withdraws this request
assuming the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of
his independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
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7. Forensic pathology procedural manual. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming
the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of his
independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
8. Notes etc. regarding death of Amanda Stroud. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
9. - 13. Correspondence between Dr. Groben and witnesses; a copy ofDr. Groben's
billing records; notes regarding tests; Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon; and
Record of Death. The State objects to these requests. In these requests Mr. Hall
specifically identifies matters Dr. Groben would have relied on in forming his
opinion. See LR.E. 703 & 705.
B. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office.
1. Illustrative exhibits used in guilt phase case. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
2. Illustrative exhibits used in sentencing phase. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
3. PowerPoint. The State has agreed to provide Mr. Hall with copies of PowerPoint
slides it used throughout both phases of the trial.
4. - 5. E-mails between prosecutors and public defenders; Communications by
prosecutor with expert witnesses. The State objects to providing copies of all e-
mails and all documented communications by the prosecutor's office with all
expert witnesses based on work product. However, these communications are
discoverable under controlling and persuasive precedent from the United States
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals and the Idaho Supreme Court.
In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the
prosecution violated its obligations under Brady by failing to disclose prosecutor
notes of an interview with a key witness which contained favorable information
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
TO PETITIONERS DISCOVERY REQUESTS (HALL II) 8
001143
           
            
         
             
             
           
              
            
      
           
             
            
              
         
          
            
           
          
          
             
              
           
            
     
       
not otherwise disclosed through police reports. Id at 448-449. Similarly, in
Service Deli, Inc., 151 F.3d 938 the Ninth Circuit held that a government
attorney's handwritten notes from an interview with a key witness constituted
Brady material that should have been disclosed because the government
attorney's notes included exculpatory information. Id at 942. Finally, in Sivak v.
State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a
capital petitioner's Brady claim following remand by the federal district court and
dismissal by the state district court. Notably, in federal habeas proceedings, the
federal district court ordered the state to open its notes and files, over the
prosecutor's work-product objection. Id. at 644, 8 P.3d at 639. The discovery
revealed for the first time letters by the prosecutor containing exculpatory
information.ld at 643-645, 8 P.3d at 638-640. On the appeal from the denial of
the petitioner's Brady claim, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he letters
clearly should have been disclosed to the defense, even without a specific
request." Id Therefore, a prosecutor's communications with its experts are not
only discoverable, but some instances, constitute Brady material.
6. Prosecutor's communication with media. Mr. Hall withdraws this request
assuming the Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of
his independent investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
7. Gary Starkey dates of employment. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming the
Court will consider a renewed request following the completion of his
independent investigation should he determine it is necessary.
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C. Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office Relating to
Particular Witnesses.
1. Jeff Carlson statements and summaries of statements. The State objects to this
request on the basis of work product. The State's assertion that witness
statements are "the State's work product" is incorrect. Specifically, according to
the criminal rules of discovery, the prosecutor must furnish to the defense any
statements made by prospective state witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the
prosecuting attorney's agents. 1.C.R. 16(b)(6). Thus, statements, or summaries of
statements, prepared by the prosecuting attorney is not work product, and even if
it is, then it is nevertheless subject to discovery. Indeed, the criminal rules
narrowly define "work product" so that it does not extend to the materials
requested by Mr. Hall. See 1.C.R. 16(f)(l) (limiting work product to materials
containing "opinions, theories or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or
members of the prosecuting attorney's legal staff."). In addition, as noted above,
according to the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Idaho
Supreme Court, the prosecutor's own notes are subject to disclosure under Brady.
Therefore, it is essential that the witness statements be disclosed in this case.
2. Amanda Stroud. The State objects to this request based on the fact Amanda
Stroud's hearsay statements could not be used at trial. Hearsay objections are not
appropriate when responding to discovery requests. See LR.C.P. 26(b)(l) ("It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."). Further, 1.R.E. 702 provides that experts, in
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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forming opinions, may rely on facts or data that would otherwise be inadmissible.
Thus, statements attributed to Amanda Stroud could have been shown to trial
counsels' experts to help them in forming their opinion and could have been used
during sentencing.
a. Prosecutor summaries of statements by Amanda Stroud to Prosecutor. The
State objects to this request on the basis of work product. However, as
detailed above, the States work product argument fails. See I.C.R. 16(b)(6) &
I.C.R. 16(f)(1).
b. - c. Amanda Stroud recorded statements. The State has agreed to provide
these materials if Mr. Hall informs the State what is missing from trial
counsel's files. Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests the following:
1. Audio: Cited in the supplemental report of Detective Greg Morgan.
(Attachment 1.) ("On Sunday, 3-9-03 at approximately 1430 hours, I
began an interview of Amanda Stroud at the Ada County Jail. This
interview was tape recorded on a concealed micro cassette (later review
revealed poor tape quality) Stroud stated.....")
11. Audio: Cited in the supplemental report of Detective Greg Morgan
3/01/03 interview with Kathy and Amanda Stroud. (Attachment 2.) ("Det.
Ayotte and I then drove [redacted] and met with Kathy and Amanda at
their residence at approximately 1400 hours. We attempted to interview
Amanda on the front porch of their residence but due to her brothers and
stepfather who were working on a car with a radio playing loudly, we
asked that they accompany us to [redacted] Police Dept. At approximately
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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1520 hrs., we began a second interview which was also taped.")
(Emphasis added.)
d. Amanda Stroud homicide investigation. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
e. - f. Jail Recordings. The State has inquired of the jail if such recordings were
made whether the recordings exist now and was informed they would not
exist. Based on the State's response, Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
g. - h. Amanda Stroud experiences with Mr. Hall. The State objects to this
request based on the fact Amanda Stroud's hearsay statements could not be
used at trial. This is not a valid discovery objection for the same reasons as
noted above. See I.C.R.P. 26(b)(1).
3. Kathy Stroud.
a. Prosecutor Summaries. The State objects to this request on the basis of work
product. However, for the same reasons as note above, the State's work
product argument fails. See I.C.R. 16(b)(6) & I.C.R. 16(t)(1).
b. - c. Statements and photographs. The State has agreed to provide this
information if Mr. Hall informs them what he is missing.
4. Norma Jean Oliver. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
5. Video deposition. The State has agreed to provide Mr. Hall a copy of the video
tape deposition ofDr. Pablo Stuart.
D. Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement.
1. Field notes and logbooks. The State objects to this request on the grounds it is not
specific enough. Mr. Hall hereby limits his request at this time to the field notes
of Detective Greg Morgan, Detective Mark Ayotte, Officer Dave Smith, and
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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Detective Chip Morgan. Mr. Hall made a similar request in Hall I which this
Court granted in limited part. (Attachment 3, p.l6.) ("The prosecuting attorney
shall check relevant police files for notes not contained in reports regarding the
Henneman murder investigation.")
Field notes are used to memorialize what occurred in the field. The
practice of law enforcement officers is that they memorialize most, but not all, of
their notes taken in the field. It is established that field notes often contain
information not memorialized in police reports and sometimes contain
exculpatory information, not disclosed to the prosecutor. See e.g., Illinois Public
Act 93-065 (requiring disclosure offield notes to prosecutors in all capital cases);
see also United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir.l976) (holding that
under the Jencks Act, an officer's original interview notes with the suspect or
potential witness must be preserved or produced); Oregon State Bar, Indigent
Defense Task Force Report: Principles and Standards for Counsel in Criminal,
Delinquency, Dependency, and Civil Commitment Cases, Standard 2.6 - 7a
(counsel should request and secure "law enforcement notes (field notes)").
2. Unredacted Handwritten Notes. Mr. Hall withdraws request a. and the State
agrees to provide request b. and c.
3. - 6. Correspondence; FBI I-Drives; and Task Force Lead Assignments. Mr. Hall
withdraws these requests.
7. Prior Offenses. Mr. Hall withdraws these requests.
8. Media contact. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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9. Specific Reports, Documents & Recordings.
a. Arrest Report. The State objects to this request.
b. Crime scene video. The State has agreed to provide a copy of this video.
c. Idaho Power Video. The State, in its Response, indicates "there is no Idaho
Power video." However, this video is described in reports by both Detective
Morgan and Detective Ayotte. (Attachments 4,5.) As Detective Ayotte stated
in his report:
Det Morgan and 1...went to the Idaho Power building where we
met with the security officer. We were allowed to view the
security system digital recording files for the day in question.
We noted at appx 0245 hrs. (the clock on the system is appx one
hour off) two subjects walking onto the field of view of the
system. They appeared to cut across 13th St. walking S/E onto
or near the Idaho Power property.
The shot is a distance shot and does not show clear detail, it
however appears the subjects are male and female. One is taller
then [sic] the other. And they appear to be walking arm in arm
or very close together.
The security officer indicated they store the files for more than a
month, and agreed to maintain the files until we could attempt
to recover a copy. Det. Chip Morgan was assigned this task.
(Attachment 5.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the State's response there is no
Idaho Power video is inaccurate.
The evidence in this video, as described by Detectives Morgan and
Ayotte, directly contradicts the theory advanced by the State at trial.
Specifically, the State elicited testimony from Daryl Lady he saw Mr. Hall
with Ms. Hanlon on fifteenth and Idaho in the early morning of March I, 2003
and that Mr. Hall told Ms. Hanlon "Come on. Let's Go." (Tr., 10/4/07,
p.4362, Ls.5-7; p.4367, Ls.4-13.) The State, in its closing argument, used this
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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testimony to argue Mr. Hall had formulated a deliberate intention to kill Ms.
Hanlon. (Tr., 10/18/07, p.5618, Ln.5 - p.5619, Ln.l8.) However, Detective
Ayotte describes the individuals in the Idaho Power video as "walking arm in
arm or very close together" after the time Daryl Lady describes seeing Mr.
Hall and Ms. Hanlon. (Attachment 5.) Detective Morgan also describes in his
report how the individuals in the Idaho Power video "appear to be walking
close together..." (Attachment 4.) This evidence could have been used to
demonstrate that Ms. Hanlon was willingly walking with Mr. Hall.
d. Jason Vanderesch interview. The State does not object to this request. Mr.
Hall is missing disc two and request the State provide him with a complete
copy.
e. Crime Lab Activity. The State does not object to this request. Instead the
State requests clarification. Accordingly, Mr. Hall has attached the
documents where the 'Crime Lab Activity' electronic database is referenced.
(Attachment 6.) It appears from these documents to be a database created by
the State regarding chain of custody for various items associated with Boise
Police Crime Lab Activity.
f. Photo lineup. The State does not object to this request but instead directs Mr.
Hall to provide an "item number as listed in the State's discovery response."
Accordingly, Mr. Hall has reviewed the State's discovery response. He is
unable to clearly identify the photo lineup shown to Daryl Lady on March 10,
2003. Prosecutor item number 22 and 80 both reference photo lineups
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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however, Mr. Hall IS unsure if these are the lineups he IS requesting.
(Attachment 7.)
g. Attachment to lead sheet #50. The State does not object to this request but
asks for clarification. A copy of lead sheet #50 is attached as Attachment 8.
The notes on lead sheet #50 state "see attached crimestoppers"; however,
nothing is attached to the copy in discovery. A paperclip was photocopied on
the page. Mr. Hall would like a copy of the "attached crimestoppers."
h. Violent Criminal Apprehension Program. The State objects to this request.
10. DNA.
a. - b. CaDIS and NDIS. The State objects to these requests. Mr. Hall
conditionally withdraws this request based on the fact that the Court granted,
in part, a similar request in the Hall I post-conviction case, and the State
previously responded to the Court's order. (Attachment 3, p.l9.) (The
prosecuting attorney shall determine whether Petitioner's DNA was submitted
to or entered into the Idaho CaDIS or state-wide database in the 1990s, as
maintained by the Idaho State Police.") This request is withdrawn on the
condition and the assumption that the State's previous response fully complied
with the Court's order. The State's previous response is attached hereto for
the State's review. (Attachment 9.)
11. Rewards. Mr. Hall previously indicated to the State he would withdraw this
request. However, Mr. Hall subsequently learned that a testifYing witness, Kathy
REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES
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Stroud, may have made a claim on the reward offered in the underlying case.2
Mr. Hall requests all documentation relating to Kathy Stroud requesting a reward
for information provided in the Hanlon case. In fact, Mr. Hall made a similar
request in the Hall I case which the Court granted in part. (Attachment 3, p.l9.)
The State's response was limited to reward money paid in Hall I Henneman and
not Hall II Hanlon. Accordingly, Mr. Hall request information regarding any
reward money offered for assistance in the Hall II Hanlon case including claims
made on such reward.
12. Sex Offender Registration. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
13. Jury questions. The State does not object to Mr. Hall obtaining this information
from the Court record. However, this information is not currently part of the
official record.
14. Jail and prison records. Mr. Hall withdraws this request assuming the Court will
consider a renewed request following the completion of his independent
investigation should Mr. Hall determine it is necessary.
15. Washington records. Mr. Hall withdraws this request.
2 Alternatively, it is possible that Detective Smith made a claim for the reward on behalf of Ms.
Stroud. In any event, based on information provided to Mr. Hall's counsel following discussions
with the State, Mr. Hall respectfully gives the Court and the State notice that he will pursue this
request with the assumption that the State objects unless otherwise noted at the upcoming
hearing.
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DATED this 28th day of October, 2009.
MARKJ.A LE
~eadrunsel, cal C
\ ~LL Ll~.
NICOLE OWENS
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 28th day of October, 2009, served a true and correct
copy of the forgoing REPLY TO STATE'S SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S
DISCOVERY REQUESTS (HALL II) as indicated below:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
~U.S.Mail
Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
~~LEGOS
Administrative Assistant
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ATTACHMENT 1
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ISE POLICE DEPARTMEfltADA COUNTY SHERIFFSA':PARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT •
cm
12. Division
Co. Prosecutor0300-1030
~t;:;'~~J~~~il?l~~
Occurred 9. Time Occurred
3-1-03
He stated after they crossed ill front ofhhn he had proceeded towards home and he had not seen
them again.
On Saturday, 3-8-03, I met with Det. Smith at Cill. I was assigned Lead 78 which stated the
caller, Kathy Stroud of had been contacted by her daughter, Amanda Stroud. She had
reported that her daughter was a transient and was with a man named Eric Hall. She stated her
daughter had called her on Sunday, 3-2-03, and told her that Eric was really "freaked out" about
something he was involved in and had been hiding out ever since. Her daughter had asked her to
check out the Saturday and Sunday papers for something that might have happened. The caller
stated Hall had beaten her daughter in the past. She described Hall as 5'9" to 5'10'\ 180-190 lbs.,
dark hair, olive complexion, blue eyes with a tattoo of the Grim Reaper on his foreann. She
stated he commonly wore a dark colored sweat shirt and that he and her daughter usually ate at
the barbeque in Julia Davis Park on Sunday afternoons.
I called Stroud and asked her if she had additional infonnation. She stated that her daughter had
called her from a payphone and appeared to be scared about something Eric had been involved
in. She stated she wouldn't tell her where they were staying at. She stated she didn't take the
paper and didn't watch the news but had called a friend who had told her about the murder. She
stated she knew that Eric had beaten her daughter several times in the past.
I sent an e-mail to patrol which contained a brief synopsis of the lead and descriptions of the
Stroud and Hall. I attached photographs of them to the e-mail. I had found that both Stroud and
Hall were currently wanted on outstanding warrants. I learned that Hall had Failed to Register as
a Registered Sex Offender and was currently wanted for that and some misdemeanor warrants.
From the CRT, I learned that he had been arrested and found guilty ofarape by force in 1991. I
learned that the case was a Garden City arrest and the report would not be immediately available
since their records department was closed on weekends.
At approximately 2330 hrs., that night I was contacted by Sgt. Randy Roper, who stated his
officers had Stroud under observation and was requesting direction. I stated I would like to have
them both located if possible. He contacted me shortly afterwards and stated both Stroud and
Hall had been located and had been arrested.
On Sunday, 3-9-03 at approximately 1430 hrs., I began an interview ofAmanda Stroud at the
Ada Co. Jail. This interview was tape recorded on a concealed micro cassette (later review
revealed poor tape quality). Stroud stated that she and Hall had been living together on the streets
Reporting Officer I Serial I Datcfrime
Det. Greg Morgan 322 3-14-03
Supervisor Approving I Serial I Daterrune
Sgt. Tony Wallace 2963-14-03
BPD-002a-ADP 1994
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o U?50
/.-:1001156
  ARTM~A   I ' '  
   
. JOPiC: •.. ~ •.• ~:.E"H~;":)~~'~]'~1~:i~:?~~tf:~6*~J.i§: fitltr~;, ~f:%~\; ~lL; ... 
   occurr  
  
  
  CID 
                  
  
                  
              
                  
                 
                  
               
             11     
                 
                  
         
                 
                
                  
                   
              
                  
                  
                
              
                   
                 
        
                
                
               
        
                
               
                 
ti  i  I i l I t i  
     
  
i  i   rial! tct  
gl    
       
 Q 
..,:  
ATTACHMENT 2
001157
  
BoisE POLICE DEPART~TJADA COUNTY SHERIFF'.)EPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
Date Occurred
3-1-03 0300-1030 Co. Prosecutor
12. Division
eID
band out of his pocket and had eventually given it to Amanda but she had later lost it. Amanda
had told her mother that she had also seen an unusual ring that separated into three rings that
were interconnected that the suspect nad in his possession.
Det. Ayotte and I then drove and met with Kathy and Amanda at their residence at
approximately 1400 hIs. We attempted to interview Amanda on the front porch of their residence
but due to her brothers and stepfather who were working on a car with a radio playing loudly, we
asked that they accompany us to Police Dept. At approximately 1520 hrs., we began a "
second interview which was also taped. Present during the interview was Det. Ayotte, Amanda
and Kathy Stroud and 1.
Amanda Stroud was confronted ahout her knowledge and the withholding of information, She
stated that she was in love with Eric and was pregnant with his child. She agreed to be
completely truthful with us. She stated everything she had told us in earlier interviews was
truthful but stated that on the afternoon of 3-1-03, after they had woke up, Eric had pulled a
silver metal woman's watch from Iris pocket and looked at the time. She stated he told ber that he
had pulled the band from the watch. She stated he had later given ber the watch and she had lost
it but recalled that it had a phosphoIous dial that would light up after a flashlight had been shone
on it.
She stated she had also seen the suspect in possession of a silver ring. She stated the ring when
not worn separated into three .rings that were interconnected. She stated she had last seen it .on 3-
1-03 when he had been playing with it. She stated she didn't know what had happened to it.
Det. Ayotte showed the witness a photograph of the victim that had been obtained from Rhoda
Shennan. She stated she had seen her before and recalled that the victim had given ber a couple
of bucks one time in the 6th and Main area.
Supervisor Approving / Serial/DakJ'TUIIC
Sgt. Tony Wallace 296 3-14-03
Amanda then drew a sketch ofthe ring which appeared to be consistent with infonnation given
by Jeff Carlson and her friends. Carlson stated that the victim never took it offbecause her finger·
had swollen to the point she could not get it off her finger. We asked her what kind of boots the
suspect had been wearing on 3-1-03. She stated they were Lugz brand and had.been given to him
by her mother, when she and the suspect had been living with her. Kathy Stroud stated she
recalled the boots and stated she had purchased them as a gift for a former boyfriend and when
they had broken up, he had left them at the house. Kathy stated she was going to throw them
away but Eric had told her that they fit him and she had given them to him.
.,
.-------------------,------~---:::-----------,
BPD-Q02a-ADP 1994
nl~TRmUTION: Original- Records, Yellow - Follow-up, Pink -Crime Analysis
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~~STRICTOlEo:') .):2 :
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY tlFADA P.M··-"I4~_~ _
FEB 16 2007
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
(Capital Case)
J.D~AVARRO,~
Case No. SPOT0500lSVil.M.;J t
DEPUTY
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY
Respondent.
Petitioner,
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-------------~)
Petitioner's Motion for Discovery, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Discovery,
and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Discovery having been filed, hearing
having been held on January 10-12 and January 16, 2007, and the Court otherwise being fully
informed, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows':
I. Witnesses, Prospective Witnesses, and Other Persons of Interest.
A. Lisa Manora Lewis.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement, including Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to
Ms. Lewis, regardless of medium, and all reports and notes made by law
enforcement about Ms. Lewis, including those made by Scott Birch" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
said statements, summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or
Deputy Attorney General Birch possesses or has access to.
3. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to,
and reports or notes by, SRO Mike Barker" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose said statements,
summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or SRO Mike
Barker possesses or has access to.
I For ease of reference, the Court uses the same numbering system used by Petitioner in his
Motion for Discovery.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY
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B. Peggy Jean Colbert Hill.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement, including to Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to
Ms. Hill, regardless of medium, and reports and notes made by law
enforcement about Ms. Hill, including those made by Scott Birch" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
said statements, summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or
Deputy Attorney General Birch possesses or has access to.
3. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to,
and reports or notes by, SRO Mike Barker" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose said statements,
summaries, reports, and notes that either he possesses or SRO Mike
Barker possesses or has access to.
C. Patrick Bernard Hoffert.
1. Petitioner's request for "All reports and investigative notes regarding the
death of Patrick Bernard Hoffert, including but not limited to:
a. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Mr. Hoffert's suicide at
408 E. 51 st S1. #6, Garden City, Idaho, on September 25,2000.
b. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Garden City PD Incident
No. 01-2000-03006, whether generated by Garden City or other law
enforcement agencies"
is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any existing
requested items.
2. Petitioner's request for "Copies of all audio and video-taped interviews
conducted in connection with Mr. Hoffert's death, including but not
limited to the interviews of Verdell Jean StinnlRugger and Deirdre
Muncy" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any
existing requested items.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any writings attributed to Mr. Hoffert on the day
of his suicide, including but not limited to property collected by Garden
City Police Department. .. from the suicide investigation, including
'notebook wi notes from Hoffert,' property no. 12448" is GRANTED IN
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 2
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LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall inquire of the Garden
City Police Department and disclose any existing requested items.
4. Petitioner's request for "Results of any forensic testing conducted upon
the 1989 black Toyota, VIN JT4RN13P4K0005180, property no. 12455"
IS GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any existing
requested items.
5. Petitioner's request for "Coroner/ pathology notes and reports regarding
the death of Mr. Hoffert" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall inquire of the Ada County Coroner's Office and
disclose any existing requested items. The Court further ORDERS that
said discovery includes any reports, notes or other documents forwarded
to the Ada County Coroner's Office by the Garden City Police
Department, including, but not limited to the "notebook" purportedly
containing writings by Mr. Hoffert.
6. Petitioner's request for "Any DNA or other forensic profile developed on
Mr. Hoffert" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department to determine
whether such a profile/profiles were developed and, if so, shall disclose
such profile(s).
7. Petitioner's request for "Detective Allen's supplemental report on the
suicide scene" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose
any existing requested items.
D. Chris Hall.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Chris Hall is WITHDRAWN without
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
E. Christian Johnson.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "Any and all incentives to testify against Erick
Hall explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Mr. Johnson, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Mr.
Johnson" is DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 3
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(4. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is GRANTED IN PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall run and disclose a NCIC criminal records
check. Petitioner's request for juvenile criminal records is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.
5. Petitioner's request for "Documentation or summaries of all off-record
and/or ex parte conversations regarding Mr. Johnson's criminal history or
ongoing criminal proceedings" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.
6. Petitioner's request for "Documents or summaries of plea negotiations
related to the case for which Mr. Johnson made an appearance on or about
10/13/04" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon
further investigation.
7. Petitioner's request for "Any search warrant from any search and seizure
of Mr. Johnson" is GRANTED.
8. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole ... " is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.
F. Miriam Colon.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Colon, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Colon" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Detective Dave Smith and disclose any existing notes
made by law enforcement which were not reflected in reports disclosed to
trial counsel.
3. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.
G. Norma Jean Oliver.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is GRANTED
IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose any notes
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 4
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not previously provided regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health history from
his files in both the 2004 murder case and the 1991 rape case. The
remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Oliver" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall inquire of the Garden City Police Department and disclose any
existing requested items specific to the 1991 rape case.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, Ms. Oliver" is
DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for the "Transcript of hearing to release 1992
Presentence Investigation Report held on 10/28/03" is GRANTED,
provided that Petitioner shall provide the Court with further identifying
information, including the name of the judge presiding at said hearing.
5. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED IN LARGE PART.
However, the prosecuting attorney shall inquire of Ada County and
Payette County juvenile courts to determine what records, if any, exist.
6. Petitioner's request for "All documentation and recordings relating to Ms.
Oliver's arrest as a runaway on or about 12/04/91, including any
statements made to the arresting officers, jailor juvenile authorities, and
any dispatch or other recordings, including the entire juvenile criminal file
stemming from that arrest" is GRANTED IN PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall inquire of Ada and Payette County law enforcement
agencies as to the existence of police reports, recordings, and written
statements and provide existing police reports, recordings and written
statements to Petitioner. The remainder of Petitioner's requests are
DENIED.
7. Petitioner's request for "Information regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health,
competency, or veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists,
known by the prosecution in the underlying criminal case" is DENIED.
8. Petitioner's request for "Information regarding the investigation of the
reported rape of Ms. Oliver, and subsequent charging, arrest, plea
negotiations and plea entry [of] Petitioner in State v. Hall, Case No.
M9108836" is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as follows:
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 5
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a. Petitioner's request for "A complete transcript of the proceedings
including a transcript of the grand jury proceedings" is GRANTED.
Petitioner has already received a copy of said transcript.
b. Petitioner's request for "A 'contact sheet' of all photos taken of Ms.
Oliver after the alleged rape" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the extent he has possession of
the requested discovery.
c. Petitioner's request for "Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver
after the alleged rape and not submitted as an exhibit in Petitioner's
current case" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall disclose to the extent he has possession of the requested
discovery.
d. Petitioner's request for "The name of the person with whom Ms.
Oliver stayed at the Sands Motel on or about 12/04/91, after the
alleged rape and prior to her arrest as a runaway, and any
documentation of communication with that person" is DENIED.
e. Petitioner's request for "Any notes, memoranda or other documents
memorializing oral communications made during plea negotiations
held by the Ada County Prosecutor's office" is DENIED.
f. Petitioner's request for "All files created by or held by the Ada County
Public Defender's office related to State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836,
including documentation pertaining to plea negotiations" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.
g. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes, photographs, audio and
video recordings, including, but not limited to:
1. Tape-recorded statement made to the Garden City Police
Department (hereinafter "GCPD") by Erick Hall on or
about 12/04/91.
11. Tape-recorded statement made to GCPD by Norma Jean
Oliver on or about 12/04/91"
is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART to the extent that the prosecuting
attorney can obtain the requested discovery by inquiring of the Garden
City Police Department.
h. Regarding Petitioner's request for "Admission from the Ada County
Prosecutor that state discovery page numbers 120-138 were disclosed
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 6
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in discovery to defense counsel, as stated in the State's 'Infonnal
Discovery Letter' dated 01116/04, confmnation that the prosecutor's
office hand-writes discovery page numbers on the lower right comer
of each page turned over in discovery, and copies of said discovery
pages with such discovery page numbers clearly visible," the Court
WITHHOLDS RULING,
i. Petitioner's request for "All reports, notes and other documents made
by Dr. Lawrence Vickman, St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
regarding the examination and treatment of Ms. Nonna Jean Oliver in
or around December 1991" is GRANTED CONDITIONALLY.
Petitioner shall detennine whether S1. Alphonsus and/or Dr. Vickman
require a court order.
J. Petitioner's request for "Results of DNA or other forensic testing
conducted on vaginal and anal swabs and articles of clothing
belonging to Ms. Oliver" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The
prosecuting attorney shall search the 1991 rape case file for results of
testing conducted on the anal swabs and disclose existing results.
k. Petitioner's request for "Infonnation regarding Ms. Oliver's mental
health, competency, or veracity, regardless of whether documentation
exists, known by the prosecution in the underlying criminal case as
well as Case No. M9108836" is DENIED.
1. Petitioner's request for "All mental health, psychological and/or
psychiatric records, including all reports, notes and other documents,
held or created by Intennountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend,
counselor Margaret Farmer, and Bonnie Pitman for Ms. Oliver," is
GRANTED CONDITIONALLY. Petitioner shall detennine whether
Intennountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend, counselor Margaret
Farmer, and/or Bonnie Pitman require a court order. The requested
discovery materials shall be reviewed by the Court in camera to
detennine relevance to mental health conditions as they existed at the
time of Petitioner's sentencing.
m. With regard to Petitioner's request for "Social Security Income
records, including all application materials, ofNonna Jean Oliver," the
Court WITHHOLDS RULING until Petitioner provides the Court with
further infonnation.
H. Detective Daniel Hess.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Detective Hess is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 7
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1. Jay Rosenthal.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Mr. Rosenthal is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
J. April Sebastian. Petitioner made numerous discovery requests with resepect to
Ms. Sebastian, in particular as related to Ada County Case No. H0400228.
Petitioner clarified that Ada County Case No. H0400335 was not relevant, and
withdrew any requests insofar as they related to that case number. With respect to
the remaining claims, the Court rules as follows:
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report for
Case No. H0400335IM0401584" is WITHDRAWN.
4. Petitioner's request for "Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report,
including 'Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report' and any
document purporting to make 'rider' recommendations in Case No.
H0400228" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The Court will obtain
the PSI, conduct an in-camera review for relevant information, and release
a redacted version of the PSI and any addenda to Petitioner's counsel. The
Court FURTHER ORDERS that Petitioner's counsel may share
information contained in the redacted PSI with Petitioner; however,
counsel may not make copies for Petitioner without express permission
from the Court.
5. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to April Sebastian,
regardless of medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement
about Ms. Sebastian, from March 1, 2003 to present" is DENIED.
6. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED.
7. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including, but
not limited to, the documents specified in the Motion for discovery, is
DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 8
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(K. Michelle Deeo.
(
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "Documentation of initial contact between
Michelle Deen and the prosecuting attorney's office" is DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any and all incentives to testify against Erick
Hall explicitly or implicitly offered to, or requested by, this witness" is
DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Deen, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Deen, from March 2003 to present" is DENIED.
5. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is DENIED.
6. Petitioner's request for "All police reports, notes and recordings regarding
theft, breaking and entering, burglary or similar crimes stemming from
incidents reported by Erick Hall and/or Janet Hock against Michelle Deen
and/or Tommy Workman and to which law enforcement responded in or
around July 2001" is DENIED.
7. Petitioner's request for "Documents related to Ada County Case No.
H0200584," including
a. "Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda" is
DENIED.
8. Petitioner's request for "Documents related to Ada County Case No.
H0301398," as specified in the Motion for Discovery, is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation and upon
submission to the court of further identifying information.
9. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from the Idaho Department
of Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including,
but not limited to the documents specified in the Motion for Discovery is
DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 9
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1. Evelyn Dunaway.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED
without prejudice to renew the request upon providing further factual
basis.
2. Petitioner's request for "Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall
explicitly or implicitly offered to or requested by this witness" is
DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "All statements and summaries of statements to
law enforcement either made by or attributed to Ms. Dunaway, regardless
of medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Dunaway, from March 2003 to present" is DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for "A complete NCIC criminal record check,
including juvenile criminal records" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.
5. Petitioner's request for "All police reports, notes, recordings and witness
statements regarding a domestic dispute or incident between Evelyn
Dunaway and Erick Hall to which law enforcement responded in or
around March 2002" is DENIED without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.
6. Petitioner's request for "All reports and notes from Idaho Department of
Corrections and Idaho Department of Probation and Parole" including, but
not limited to, the documents specified in the Motion for Discovery, is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further
investigation.
M. Rebecca McCusker.
Petitioner's request for discovery related to Rebecca McCusker, as specified in
the Motion for discovery, is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon further investigation.
N. Dr. Glenn Groben and the Ada County Coroner's Office.
1. Petitioner's request for "All bench notes from the Lynn Henneman
autopsy, sexual assault kit and any other procedures performed or
observed by Dr. Groben or any other Ada County Coroner personnel" is
GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the
requested discovery.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 10
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2. Petitioner's request for "Any peer review, formal or informal, whether
internal or external to the Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any
documentation related thereto, of the autopsy performed on Ms.
Henneman, or confIrmation that no peer review was conducted" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's
agreement to provide the requested discovery insofar as the infonnation is
contained in a report. Reports prepared by Mr. Erwin Sonenberg and Ms.
Hoffman shall be included, if such reports exist.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made
by Dr. Graben" in the locations specified in the Motion for Discovery,
namely "At or near the body recovery scene," and "At or near the alleged
crime scene near the Main St. Bridge" is GRANTED, based on the
prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested discovery.
4. Petitioner's request for "Ada County Coroner's Office procedures for
body removal and preservation" is DENIED.
5. Petitioner's request for "Copies of the full body x-rays taken of Lynn
Henneman, and full disclosure of where, when and by whom the x-rays
were taken" is GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement
to provide the requested discovery.
6. Petitioner's request for "Any toxicology test results from Idaho labs; and
if none exist, then an explanation why testing was conducted by a Texas
laboratory, and a complete copy of the Texas report" is GRANTED, based
on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested
discovery.
7. Petitioner's request for "A list of all cases, regardless of jurisdiction, in
which Dr. Groben conducted autopsies wherein broad ligature
strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected
cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death, including specific
identification of those "other cases exactly like this" referenced by Dr.
Groben in his trial testimony" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.
8. Petitioner's request for "A list of all cases in which Dr. Graben testified
wherein broad ligature strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was
the cause, suspected cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death" is
DENIED.
9. Petitioner's request for "Reports and notes from all autopsies referenced in
preceding request no. 7" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon further investigation.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 11
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\10. Petitioner's request for "Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or
the Ada County Coroner with any agency or professional association
regarding his/its professional performance, qualifications or veracity" is
DENIED.
11. Petitioner's request for "Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all
photos of Ms. Henneman's body, including reenactment photographs" is
GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the
requested discovery.
12. Petitioner's request for "Microscopic slides and reports, notes, or other
documentation of "residual intact red blood cells" for the seven identified
scalp injuries, and specific identification of the number of sections taken
from each individual laceration and the results at each identified section"
is GRANTED IN PART. The prosecuting attorney shall provide the
requested reports, notes and other documentation. The Court FURTHER
ORDERS that counsel for Petitioner and the prosecuting attorney shall
confer further to establish a mutually agreeable chain of custody procedure
for the microscopic slides.
13. Petitioner's request for "Sex crimes kit protocol" is GRANTED, based on
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to inquire of the Ada County
Coroner's Office and provide such procedures if they exist.
14. Petitioner's request for "Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the
Henneman case regarding the following:
a. Reconstruction of ligatures
b. Depth of the scalp wounds
c. Fingernail clippings
d. Pubic hair combings
e. Head hair
f. Blood sample (tube)
g. The amount of force to break the humerous
h. Any subcutaneous examination of the left and right wrists and left
and right ankles as well as any other possible ligature sites
(Petitioner is in possession of Dr. Groben's report at page 3 which
describes a subcutaneous examination of Ms. Henneman's right
wrist and left arm only)"
is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall
provide the requested discovery if said discovery is contained in notes
which were not otherwise provided for in reports provided to trial counsel.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 12
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15. Petitioner's request for "List of videos that Dr. Groben watched that,
according to his testimony, demonstrated the length of time it takes a
choking victim to be rendered unconscious" is WITHDRAWN without
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
16. Petitioner's request for "Forensic pathology procedural manual currently
in effect as well as in effect in October 2000 for the Ada County Coroner's
Office" is DENIED.
17. Petitioner's request for "All materials presented, including PowerPoint
slides, used for the presentation given by Dr. Groben on the Henneman
homicide at the northwest pathologist meeting held in September or
October 2004" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.
18. Petitioner's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at
the direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of
Amanda Stroud" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon further investigation.
19. Petitioner's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at
the direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of
Kay Lynn Jackson" is DENIED.
20. Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Groben or Erwin Sonnenberg or their agents and other non-lay or
expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents" is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART. Based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement, he shall
provide notes as stated above with respect to request number I.N.14. The
remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.
21. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Groben's curriculum vita" is GRANTED,
based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide the requested
discovery.
22. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion
that no such billing records exist.
23. Petitioner's request for "Any applications by the Ada County Coroner's
office for accreditation with the National Association of Medical
Examiners ("NAME"), or any other accrediting association, and any
responses thereto" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. Based on the
prosecuting attorney's agreement, he shall inquire as to whether the
Coroner's Office was or was not accredited by NAME during the
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 13
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(Henneman autopsy through the time of trial and sentencing and disclose
that information. The remainder of Petitioner's request is DENIED.
O. Dr. Michael Estess.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess's files" is DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any reports or summaries of oral
communications made by Dr. Estess to the State in the instant case" is
DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Estess or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential
witnesses or their agents" is DENIED.
5. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess' curriculum vita" is DENIED.
6. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Estess' billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED.
P. Dr. Robert Engle.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents" is DENIED.
2. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Engle's files" is DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "Any reports or summaries of oral
communications made by Dr. Estess to the State in the instant case" is
DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between
Dr. Engle or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential
witnesses or their agents" is DENIED.
5. Petitioner's request for "Dr. Engle's billing records or invoices for the
instant case" is DENIED.
Q. Other Non-Lay or Expert Witnesses.
1. Petitioner's requests for "All correspondence between non-lay or expert
witnesses or their agents," as specified in Petitioner's Motion for
Discovery and during the hearing on that Motion is DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 14
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(R. Jean McCracken.
1. Petitioner's request for "Prosecuting attorney documents," as narrowed at
the hearing on the Motion for Discovery, is DENIED.
S. Amanda Stroud.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Amanda Stroud is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
T. Kathy Stroud.
Petitioner's request for discovery regarding Kathy Stroud is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
II. Prosecuting Attorney's Office
A. Miscellaneous documentation.
1. Petitioner's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized
during the State's opening statement" is GRANTED, limited to the one (1)
color portrait of Ms. Henneman shown during opening argument.
2. Petitioner's request for "A copy of the motion requesting an order
impaneling the grand jury, and a copy of the order as required under ICR
6.1 (b) and 1. C. § 19-1307" is GRANTED.
3. Petitioner's request for "A copy of any committee minutes on the drafting
ofthe death penalty jury instructions" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon further investigation.
4. Petitioner's request for "Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other
documents shown to the jury, including, but not limited to the "scale"
diagram roughly drawn and referenced in Mr. Hall's petition for post-
conviction relief' is GRANTED.
5. With respect to Petitioner's request for "Access to the original video
and/or audio tapes made during police custodial interrogation of
Petitioner," as clarified at the hearing to include those recordings made on
3/13/03, 3/29/03, and 4/1/03, the Court ORDERS the prosecuting attorney
to determine the location of said recordings. The parties shall determine
the best method of enhancing said recordings, after which the Court shall
enter an Order accordingly.
6. Petitioner's request for "Disclosure and access to any other audio and/or
video recordings involving Petitioner while in police custody and not
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 15
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(previously disclosed during the ooderlying criminal proceedings" is
DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's assertion that no additional
recordings exist.
7. Petitioner's request for "All documented communications, or summaries
of communications, by the prosecutor's office with the media, including
but not limited to press releases" is DENIED.
B. Discovery Materials.
1. With respect to Petitioner's request for "Documentation denoted by
asterisk (*) as identified in comments section of attached Appendix B,"
the Court WITHHOLDS RULING pending an attempt of the parties to
satisfy the request.
2. Petitioner's request for "State's 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, 10th, 12th and 15th Addenda
to Discovery Responses, and confirmation that the State's 16th Addenda to
Discovery Response was the last discovery response sent to defense
counsel" is GRANTED.
C. Electronic Mail.
1. Petitioner's request for "Copies of all e-mails between the Ada Coooty
Prosecuting Attorney's office and the Ada County Public Defender's
office regarding the Henneman case, the Hanlon case, or Erick Hall" is
DENIED, said request having been previously denied.
III. Law Enforcement Agencies
A. Field notes and logbooks.
Petitioner's request for "field notes and logbooks generated by any law
enforcement officer" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting
attorney shall check relevant police files for notes not contained in reports
regarding the Henneman murder investigation.
B. Correspondence.
Petitioner's request for "correspondence or summaries of corresponsence between
law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding the Henneman
murder investigation," is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request
upon review of the discovery addenda provided under Section II.B.2, above.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 16
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(C. Specific reports.
With respect to Petitioner's request for specific reports, the Court WITHHOLDS
RULING pending review of the discovery addenda provided under Section ILB.2,
above.
D. FBI I-drives.
Petitioner's request for "Copies of all reports, communications or files contained
on any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon
investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise field
offices" is DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's assertion that no
evidence was recovered by the FBI and there was no report from the FBI to local
law enforcement agencies.
E. Task force lead assignments.
Petitioner's request for task force "lead assignments" is GRANTED IN LIMITED
PART. Petitioner may, upon appointment, inspect the 3-ring binders containing
the lead sheets with follow up reports and/or notes in the possession of Detective
Dave Smith and located at the Clinton Street Detective's Annex of the Boise
Police Department. Petitioner may examine the information contained in said
binders and copy those pages Petitioner wishes to retain, at Petitioner's expense.
F. Miscellaneous reports and other documentation.
1. Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding all unsolved rapes,
attempted rapes, murders and attempted murders that took place in Ada
County from January 1995 to date" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon further investigation.
2. Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding any and all attempted
abductions taking place in or around the Greenbelt, from January 1995 to
date, including, but not limited to the following unsolved homicides," as
limited at the hearing and in subsection (a) of the Motion for Discovery to
"law enforcement reports and notes regarding the murder of Kay Lynn
Jackson" is DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding any and all attempted
robberies involving beating on or around the head and taking place in Ada
County from January 1995 to date" is DENIED.
4. Petitioner's request for "Any and all FBI reports containing 'profiling' of
the perpetrator in the Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders" is
DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 17
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(5. Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports or documentation regarding
the special light sources used, and where, when and by whom used" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon review of
pending discovery, specifically, police reports.
6. Petitioner's request for "Police reports regarding Petitioner's escape
history" is GRANTED, based on the agreement of the parties.
7. Petitioner's request for "Copy of all police reports and notes regarding
Ada County Case No. M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex
Offender case filed against Petitioner" is GRANTED, based on the
agreement of the parties.
8. Petitioner's request for "The name of the officer(s) who searched the Main
Street Bridge area" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon review ofpending discovery.
9. Petitioner's request for "All documented communications, or summaries
of communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not
limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew
the request upon review of pending discovery.
10. Petitioner's request for "Any reports identifying transients' involvement in
small fires reported at East Jr. High" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice
to renew the request upon review ofpending discovery.
II. Petitioner's request for "Documentation regarding the search for
bloodstains located at or near the Chart House parking lot and near the
Main Street Bridge" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the
request upon review ofpending discovery.
12. Petitioner's request for "Records for Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone
use from October 1, 2000 until service was terminated" is GRANTED.
The prosecuting attorney shall conduct another review of his files for such
documents and disclose such documents found.
13. Petitioner's request for "Any results from informal or formal testing
conducted for time and distance to walk relevant areas of the Greenbelt,
whether such testing was conducted by law enforcement personnel or
others" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon
review of pending discovery.
14. Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports, notes and statements related
to searches conducted along the Boise River between the DoubleTree
Motel and the Capital Street Bridge, including searches of the Main Street
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 18
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(bridge area on October 9, 2000" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to
renew the request upon review of pending discovery.
15. Petitioner's request for "Any and all reports, notes and statements related
to searches conducted by the FBI Salt Lake City-based 'Evidence
Recovery Team' along the Boise River near the Main St. bridge area on or
about 10/10/00, including documents relating to use of alternative light
sources" is DENIED for those reasons given with respect to request III.D,
above.
F. Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
1. Petitioner's request for "Legible, readable, and unredacted miscellaneous
documentation and other requested information identified in Appendix A
and attached thereto" is DENIED, based on the prosecuting attorney's
assertion that he provided his color copies to trial counsel and retained
only a black and white copy.
2. Petitioner's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's
DNA profile into the Idaho CaDIS database, or any local or state
database" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney
shall determine whether Petitioner's DNA was submitted to or entered into
the Idaho CaDIS or state-wide database in the 1990s, as maintained by
the Idaho State Police.
3. Petitioner's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's
DNA profile into the national NDIS database, or any national database" is
DENIED without prejudice to renew the request based upon the results of
request IILF.2, above.
4. Petitioner's request for "Copies of any reports and summaries of
communications or conversations bc:tween Cellmark, Idaho State Police
Forensics Laboratory, police agencies and/or the Ada County prosecutor's
office regarding the existence and/or DNA profile for another perpetrator
in the Henneman and/or Hanlon homicide cases," as limited at the hearing
to the Henneman case, is DENIED.
5. Petitioner's request for "Results of all comparisons made of Erick Virgil
Hall's DNA profile against any local, state, or national DNA database,
including the Idaho CaDIS and national NDIS databases" is DENIED
without prejudice to renew the request based upon the results of request
IILF.2, above.
6. Petitioner's request for "All DNA profile information developed or other
forensic testing conducted in connection with the murder of Kay Lynn
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 19
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Jackson and information related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in
that case" is DENIED.
7. Petitioner's request for "All DNA profile information developed or other
forensic testing conducted in connection with the death of Amanda Stroud
and information related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case"
is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based upon
further investigation.
G. All Documentation and Information Regarding Reward Money Offered For
Assistance In The Henneman and Hanlon Homicide Investigations Including
Claims Made On Such Reward.
Petitioner's request for documentation and information is GRANTED IN
LIMITED PART, based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion that only one
claim was made on the reward money, that the claim was made by the Boise
Police Department on behalf of another person, and that a private company
administering the reward money did not payout any reward money. The
prosecuting attorney shall provide the name of the person who made claim on the
reward money or the name of the person upon whose behalf the claim was made
by the Boise Police Department, and disclose the basis upon which the claim was
made.
H. Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration.
1. Petitioner's request for "Documentation from the Idaho sex offender
registry involving registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall" is
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney agreed to and
shall provide the relevant police reports. The remainder of Petitioner's
request is DENIED.
V. Miscellaneous Documents and Reports.
A. Miscellaneous
1. Petitioner's request for "Legible copy of all receipts from the Table Rock
Brewhouse associated with food and alcohol ordered and purchased by
Lynn Henneman on 09/24/00" is DENIED. Petitioner has access to the
receipts admitted as trial exhibits.
2. Petitioner's request for "Transcripts of all grand jury proceedings held in
connection with State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County No. H03006l4
(Hanlon)" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based
upon further investigation.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 20
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3. Petitioner's request for "Register of Actions for State v. Erick Virgil Hall,
Ada County Case Nos. H03006141M0302868 (Hanlon)" is
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request based upon further
investigation.
4. Petitioner's request for "Copies of all exhibits presented to Grand Jury No.
03-35 (Lynn Henneman)" is GRANTED, to the extent that the prosecuting
attorney possesses said exhibits.
5. Petitioner's request for "Copies of any and all written questions by jury to
the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel" is GRANTED. Madame
Clerk shall examine the Court's file and make copies of all notes from
jurors.
VI. IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail Records
A. Inmate Classification Manuals.
Petitioner's request for Idaho Department of Correction's inmate classification
manuals is DENIED. However, Petitioner may seek a Court order if moc will
not cooperate with Petitioner's investigation.
B. Safety Practices Manual.
Petitioner's request for "manuals, informal or formal policies, memoranda or
guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional officers or other
female employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or believed to be
sexually violent toward women" is DENIED. However, Petitioner may seek a
Court order if IDOC has the requested information but will not cooperate with
Petitioner's investigation.
VII. Depositions and Related Documentation Requiring Subpoenas
A. All members of the defense team and their agents.
Trial counsel Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr have been deposed. Petitioner's
request for the depositions of Glen Elam, Roseanne Dapsauski, and Rolf
Kehne are DENIED.
I. Petitioner's request for subpoena duces tecums for
"Documentation identifying the cases each trial team member
worked on from April I, 2003 through January 18, 2005" was
previously and is DENIED.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 21
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(2. Petitioner's request for "All e-mail correspondence between trial
team members and the prosecutor's office" was previously and is
DENIED.
B. Dr. Michael Estess
Petitioner's request to depose Dr. Michael Estess is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
VIII. Documents Requiring Subpoenas
A. Miscellaneous
1. Petitioner's request for "All files created by or held by the Ada County
Public Defender's office related to State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Case No.
M0302158IH0300423 (failure to register)" is WITHDRAWN without
prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
2. Petitioner's request for "An identification of the names of all cases that
each trial counsel handled while representing Petitioner including the case
names and dates that any of the cases went to trial, including an
identification of cases involving serious felony offenses of arson,
homicide (all degrees), rape, sodomy, kidnapping, burglary and robbery"
was previously and is DENIED.
3. Petitioner's request for "All Washington DSHS Division of Child Support
records pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean McCrackenlHall in Case
No. 70253" is GRANTED. Petitioner shall submit an order to the Court
which specifies that the need for records outweighs the need for privacy.
IX. Preservation of Physical Evidence.
Petitioner's requests that "all physical evidence collected in the underlying criminal
investigation be preserved in order to avoid the destruction of potentially exculpatory
materials" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, to the extent that the prosecuting attorney
has control over physical evidence, and based upon the prosecuting attorney's assertion
that law enforcement agencies and other public agencies would not destroy physical
evidence in a murder case.
X. Access to Hanlon Court Documents.
Petitioner's request for access to the "Hanlon court filelrecord" is WITHDRAWN
without prejudice to renew the request upon further investigation.
PETITIONER'S "APPENDIX A": The parties agree to further confer regarding documents
contained in Petitioner's Appendix A to the Motion for Discovery to determine whether
agreement can be reached.
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 22
001181
 
         
          
 
    
         
         
    
  
              
            
1        
        
             
          
             
         
         
     
           
          
            
            
     
           
            
             
            
            
     
      
           
         
           
             
    
    
PETITIONER'S "APPENDIX B": The parties agree to further confer regarding documents
contained in Petitioner's Appendix B to the Motion for Discovery to determine whether
agreement can be reached.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this I~ ~day of~ ,2007.
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Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge: 
 
(CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of GJ,,1'l .... , 2007, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REGA~COVERY by method
indicated below to:
MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE ID 83703
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR
BOISE ID 83702
U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
~Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
~Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
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ATTACHMENT 4
001184
  
)ISE POLICE DEPARTM./A~A COU.N)"V SHERIFF'. EPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT .'
3-1-03 0300-1030 Co. Prosecutor
Det. Ayotte and I, from a previous case, knew that Idaho Power has video surveillance cameras
situated on their building. One camera is positioned on the intersection of 13 th and Idaho. We met
with the security officer who played the digital system for us. At approximately 0245 brs., two
people were observed crossing the street from the intersection of 13th walking south on 13 th to
the area of 13th and Main. The people appear to be walking close together and one appeared to be
taller than the other. The camera is located on top ofthe building and~er detail could not be
seen.
Det. Ayotte and I were assigned several leads that we worked to their logical conclusion. (See
lead sheets for further detail)~ .
One lead of note wasLead 77, from caller Scott Hill. Mr. Hill was a co-worker of the victim's
". He stated he had worked an event at th and had checked with
his employees and had learned they had punched out at 0236 hrs. He stated he had left a few
minutes after that and had walked across the street to the parking garage, south of the Center on
the Grove. He stated he had parked his car on the 5th floor and found that the elevator wasn't
working and had to walk up the stairs to his car. He stated he had pulled out onto 13th going north
boUnd and had a green.light to .enter the intersection. He stated as he was starting to proceed
through, a group ofthree people walked in front ofhis car and he had to wait for them to cross
the street before proceeding through the intersection. He stated he observed that the person
closest to him was Cheryl Hanlon, who he recognized. He stated she was arm. in arm with a
person that appeared to be clean cut, approximately 519" or 5110" wearing a blue jacket. He stated
be didn't get a very good look at him becaUse he was concentrating on the victim. He stated he .
had considered honking his hom but decided against it since he was tired and knew that the .
victim would probably engage him in conversation. He stated he decided against it since he ~so
knew that the victim was not with her boyfriend that he·had met on other occasions. He estimated
the time as being very close to 0300 hrs., based on leaving after his employees had clocked out
and having to walk to the top ofthe parking garage. He stated neither the victim nor her
companions had looked at him.
He stated be believed the person she was walking with had feathered hair parted in the middle.
and described it as an 80ls type haircut called the "mullef'. He stated he bad not~y seen him
very well. He stated the.third person~ on a bicycle and appeared to be a street peIson. He
stated he bad a baseball cap on and had obviously dirty unkempt hair. He stated he was tall and
seemed to be to big for the bicycle he was riding.
RqJoniuc Oftic:er' Serial' Datcliuue
DeL Greg Morgan 322 3-14-03
s~Approving' Serial' DatdI""uDc
Sgt. Tony Wallace 296 3-14-03
In'D.OO2a.ADP 1994
DISTRIBUTION: Original- Records, Yellow - Follow-up, Pink - Crime Analysis'·
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ATTACHMENT 5
001186
  
I-.
BOISE POLICE DEPARa. _lENT/ADA COUNTY SHERIL S DEPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
03/01/03
She could tell that Jeffwas mad. She didn't hear all ofwhat was said but believed they were
arguing about leaving~'
When they left, .she can't say. why but believes they were going for diimer.
From 2230 hrs until 0100 Det. Iverson and I then went to all the bars along State St. asking
them to post the flyer that had been·developed. In some of the bars people indicated the victim I
looked familiar but none could say she had been in last night.
· We went off duty about 0100 hrs. 03/02103.
03/02103 1000 hrs. I returned to duty. I attended a briefing to update all officers assigned to the
investigation. Leads that had been developed were assigned.
One lead developed was thatthe victim was seen at about 0245 hrs.. Attempting toenter Elliott's
bar on Idaho. A composite of the subject with the victim and flyer was developed.
1200 hrs.· Det Smith received a phone call from a subject in the front lobby ofthe law
· enforcement building on Banister. I was informed the subject was talking with Pet. Smith about .
the homicide and 1.was directed to respond to Barrister and detain the subject. ' .
I re~nded and located the sUbj~ctwho Was still.on the phone in the lobby·talking with Det. '.
Smith. I contacted.the subject who was identified as Derrick Bilow and requested that he come'
to cm with me. He agreed to do so and I ti:~rted him uncuff~ in the front seat ofmy
unmarked police vehilce•.
During the trip from Barrister to.cm we had no conversation other then the fact I was taking him
· to talk with Det. Smith, ·and he pointing out his car parked in the front lot at Banister. .
After this subject was turned over to Det. Smith I went about handling the leads that were
assigned to me. . '
Det Morgan and I checked the victim's work place then went to the Idaho Power building where .
we met with the ~urity officer. We were allowed to view the security system digital recording
files for the day in question. .
!
\ ~Offi<:cr I Serial I DatdT"1IIlC . Supervisor Approviaa f Serial f Datdl'"1IDC
t' r .'\ Cl t·,., ~DET. MAYOTIE 348 ) 'v V' i ( U
~
.......
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BOISE POLICE DEPAh . ..lENT/ADA COUNTY SHER1. 'S DEPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
03/01/03 FILE
l
~.
We noted at appx 0245 brs. (the'clock on the system is appx one hour oft) two subjects walking
onto the field ofview ofth~ sYstem.. They appeared to cut across 13th St walking SIE onto or
near the Idaho Power property. . .
The shot is a distance shot and does not show clear detail, it however appears the subjects are
male and female..One is taller then the other. And they appear to be walking arm in arm or very
close together. ' '. " '
The security officerindicated they store the files for more then a month, and agreed to maintain
the files until we couid attempt to recover a copy. Det. Chip Morgan was assigned this task.
Appx 1725 hrs. I received acall from Phil the victim's brother. He indicated that he had been
talking with his mother and wanted to pass on some of.t they had talked about He didn't
know the value ofthe information but wanted to pass it along.
Phil indicated that his mother believed that the victim may have had some issues with Bill the
.. roommate, but she was not sure what they were or why.
They believed the victim is street smart, and would not have walked away with someone she
didn't know or f~l comfortable with. Had she been with someope other then Jeff it would have
been someone she was pot frigh~ed of
1735 hrs. I talked directly with Joyce bY phone. She wanted to know if the victim's PIU bad
.been recovered and where it is; She also indicated she had taiked with Jeff today:. . .
She indicated that slie knew Cheryl always kept her ID and money in her pocket when she went
out.
She indicated the family would hold a memorial service in Washington on Wednesday oftbis
week.
. .
1825 DetMorgan and I met with Jeffat his residence OJ '. He was shown the composite
ofthe subject thai was believ~ to have been with the victim at 0245 brs. He indicated it .didn't .
look like anyone he knew.
t<cpoItiaa Officer I Serial I Datdl'"1IIle
£T. MAYOTi'B 348
SupervisorAppvviDg I Scrial/D8tcllame
BPJ>.OO2a.ADP 1994
. . . . ..". 0 t,O ::18'
DISTRIBUTION:' Original- Records, Yenow - Follow-up,' Pink - Crime Analysis·~. ...,
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ATTACHMENT 6
001189
  
Cl"ime Lab Activity Primary LabTech: I I ComparisonTech: I I
o
o
~
~
c')
306409 2003 r.:.."
~",l)~/
~ ~~t~-lo'tr'~
~s ~~~.:\:~~g.U~~ Cn~~cbrcJ)d.~~
~\ :r: ...
Date: Activity: Results:
I 03/0212003 IIRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts & route copy to Det. Anderson. I
I 03/0212003 IIRec'd photos via cf card frm Holst - 'IMoreHlts & route copy to Det. Anderson. I
1 03/0412003 IIRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts & route copy to Det. Anderson.. I
I 03/0412003 IIRec'd Proc. req. from D. Smith - VHllltem(S) 3, 4, 5, & 6. I
I 0310612003 IIRec'd Proc. req. from G.Morgan • V ICheckbook cover. (S) WARD, JEFFREY ROBERT
I· 03/1112003 IIRec'd photos via cf card frm Carner IIMoreHlts only I
I 03/13/2003 IIRec'd (2) disks from Hilliard - VH IIMoreHlts only I
I 03/1412003 IIRec'd Proc. req. from Det. D. Smith I (S) M. HALL; Item #7, oral swab from Hall; Item #8, oral swab from Carlson.
I 07/1012003 IIProcesslng completed SH IHolst's request - Insufficient ridge detail developed. Evidence actually processed In
March but didn't wrap up until this date. No real reason.
I 0711 0/2003 IIProcesslng completed SH IMorgan's request - Negative. Evidence actually processed In March but didn't wrap up
until this date. No real reason.
I 01/23/2004 IIPhoto reqlHllliard for J.BennettsAC I (2)each disks copied (6 total)and routed to Jan Bennetts on 1123/04-BK
I 1210112005 IIInformation SH IReturned Items #6 (water bottle) and #11 (match book I think, hard to read) to Property.
Just cleaning out office.
I 0111712006 IIRcv'd evidence from state Lab JD IDet. L Anderson submitted shoe track photos to State Lab. Photo's were actually
.Jo f...retained @ State lab for their files, Just rcv'd enveloped w/chaln which contained the"",\.,~ - ,
I 0412512006 Illnfo only JD IPer Jan Bennets/ACpq would like me to find out what Property stili has on file & fax It to
Tracy SmlthlACPO. Old 4126/06.
I 04125/2006 IIEvldence info only JD ILocated the following Items in case file (all S&S): Smith's #1- Eric Hall's oral swabs,
#3E & 3G- Swabs from (V) thighs, 3A- reference blood stain for (V). SKH~2. Jeffery
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I 11/1312006 IIContlnued - I victim's thighs (this envelope was 5&5 by SERI - lab# M20030595.) and marked with a h . I _r::-
SERf sticker (M711606 with handwritten '2'). Evidence was placed Into the secured ~\-O'l~ -c::>
I 11/15/2006 II-E-vld-e-n-ce-fro-m-JD-s-10-126I-0-6-e-n-try--""" The evidence JD placed Into the 'out' area In secured Crime Lab refrigerator was ~\f'r \t"oo~~~.~~
transported to ACSO Property this date to be cold stored-BK
I 01/0312007 IILab Corp Information - BK II' called Megan Cleman with Lab Corp. She stated she would send a transport kit for the
SAK to be sent to them.
I 0110312007 II_Rev'_d..,:.p_ro_ce_s_sl_ng:;...-re..,:.qI_J_Be_n_n_ett_s_-B-,~ Jan Bennetts requested theSAKb9senftoLBbcorp (SERlsupposed to have done ttL\~ __ j.~S~~
that, but returned It to us Instead) for serology from fingernails, and defense request .~' ~~ \0,..~
I 0110412007 IIEvldence disposition - BK llper request by Jan Bennetts, Det. Smith's Item #1 (four oral swabs) were sent via I ~~'M'"0'
FedEx to SERI - tracking number 8431 67545675.
I 01/0412007 IIEvldence disposition - BK Ilper request by Jan Bennetts, the SAK was sent to Lab Corp via FedEx· tracking
number 8569 3418 6955.
I 01/0512007 lilab Corp Information - BK III received a call from Julie with Lab Corp. Julie advised they Just received our package
this date.
I 01/2412007 Illnfo only JD IDet. Smith, myself, B.K1nney, Jan BennetlslACPO, & Doug VarieiACPO met at
Property to go through evidence to establish chain of custody. Det Morgan responded \ ~
I 0112412007 IIRcv'd CF from B K1nney-BK 'IJan 5: 8737 through 8741. I
I 0210712007 IIRcv'd evidence from SRI JD Ilvla DHL. Det.Smlth Item#1-Er/c hall oral swabs. I
'co~ ~",~+l2C\~...~Jov~~~~· ~"
~~.~- ~-tS
I 02/0712007 IIEvidence Info only JD ITook Det.Smlth Item #1 & 3E· and 3G to ACSO-Property this date for cold storage. JD
I 0212012007 IIRcv'd evidence from LabCorp JD ISAK (S&S In box BK used) & a White sealed envelope. Had to open envelope to verify • n~_""ak'S~.,...So~
contents. It contained (2) yell~ envelopes said to contain ltem#3F-/nner thigh swabs. & ~1, ,,~,~.. • L \ ,11__ Jro9v?n
~-------- __.~~v~~,·~I 0212012007 IIEvldence Info cont. JD IOpened box containing SAK to view chain of custody (Had to cut thru seals on brown fIN' ~ ..t..l: ~~.
box In order to view SAK inside.) ~~ .- --_ .. 0
l---I 0312812007 IIEvidence Info JD IMeet wI D.VarieiACPO & checked out the following Items from Property: belt, left shoe, _L 4k I !''(..\\V2,')
Sierra Jeans, Black panties, black leggings, backpack, Nlke cap, Der t-shlrt, d-Jeans, d- LW(""~~~ \ c.ten&,~ .'",jiijIlIIIIIP"f
I 0312812007 IIEvidence Info cont. JD I from tree, blue coat, women's While undershirt, white sweatshirt, blk wallet w/contents, ~\~.~..(1~wl~
tree branch, clgg butts (#1A & 3A). All were re-packaged In clear plastic for court _ l"\._.
~________ Q~("o.l>\~•I 04/0512007 IIRcv'd evidence from ACSO-Propert ISKH-16- various paperslltems found In back pack. ACPO D.Varle requested this addU II • _. _,
Item be checked out of Property for court. Re-packaged 416 & placed In Locker#3. I\....~.~~NM~
I 0411612007 II-R-ele-a-s-ed-a-II-e-vl-de-n-ce-~-o-r co-urt-JD---'I to Sean O'Connor/ACPO this date. He will fill out a Property log[~L.·· -.·1 \n ~~t~lo~ (1..'Iowt*-
-Dc.w~. ~)
_~c
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ATTACHMENT 7
001192
  
11. Boise City Police Department Narrative
Supplement Report DR# 306-409 by Officer
Nicholls and Officer Nixon consisting of one
(1 age,.
19
009473001193
      
      
       
 
t)  
15. Boise City Police Department Supplement
Report DR# 306-409 by Detective Dave Smith
consisting of nine (9 a es,
Duplicate ofState's page number 83,
24-32
t)09474001194
      
       
vVL.L.,h)lCLHE,   
      
 
 
51. Boise City Police Department Property Invoice
and all items listed therein, DR# 306-409 by
Detective M. Ayotte and Detective Greg
Morgan with one 1 age,
107
009475
001195
       
        
      
  
 
 
53. Idaho State Police, Forensic Services Evidence
Submission Form by Detective Dave Smith
consistin ofone 1) a e,
108
009476
01\./\.
00119
       
      
 
 
71. Written Statement by Evelyn Dunaway
Reference DR# 208-655 consisting of two (2)
147-148
89. Garden City Police Department Incident Detail
Report DR# 03-00849 by Officer Strange
consisting of four (4) pages,
193-196
t)09477
001197
      
       
       
      
     
 
 
 
Sketch of Suspect dated March 7,2003,
consisting ofone (1) page,
t)09478
..~
001198  
  
127. Garden City Police Department Property
Invoice and all items listed therein, for Boise
CityDR# 035109 by Detective Stambaugh
with three (3) pages,
297-299
009479 "
'\
001199
      
        
     
  
 
  
 
133. Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Criminalistic Analysis Report, Affidavit, and
Shoe Print Analysis by Donna Meade
consistin of four 4 a es,
143. Fax Cover Sheet from Investigator Chris Rose,
Idaho Correctional Center, dated August 15,
2003, consisting of one (1) page,
310-313
334
1)09480 .:Jr001200
      
     
      
.. offoUT 
        
      
   
 
 
  
151. Certified Judgment of Convictions and related 585
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. M0202709, consisting of
six (6) pages, -copies ofjudgment provided,
other materials/documents available for
ins ection.
153. Certified Judgment ofConvictions and related 587
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. M0207995, consisting of
six (6) pages, -copies ofjudgment provided,
other materials/documents availablefor
inspection.
t)09481 $'001201
        
     
       
       
    
        
     
       
       
    
 
 
'" 
155. Certified Judgment ofConvictions and related
documents, which may include fmgerprint
cards, for Case No. M9102901, consisting of
seven (7) pages, -copies ofjudgment provided,
other materials/documents available for
inspection.
157. Certified Judgment of Convictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. HCR18094, consisting of
twenty-one (21) pages, -copies ofjudgment
provided, other materials/documents available
or inspection.
159. Certified Judgment ofConvictions and related
documents, which may include fingerprint
cards, for Case No. H9400534, consisting of
five (5) pages, -copies ofjudgment provided,
other materials/documents available for
ins ection.
589
591
593
163. Boise City Police Department News Release
"Homicide Victim Identified" consisting of two
(2) pages,
600-601
t)09482001202
       
     
       
       
    
       
     
       
      
    
       
     
       
       
    
       
      
 
 
 
 
 
165. Boise City Police Department News Release
"Homicide Investigation Continues: Detectives
Examine Tire Tracks" consisting of two (2)
Photograph Disc DR# 306-409, (2 of2), photos
ofErick Hall's personal items,
605-606
l)09483
001203
       
    
       
       
    
 
 
t)G9484001204 
197. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence 897
Receipt and Property Report signed by Jane
Davenport, dated 03/20/03, consisting of one
1
201. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence 901
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 03/17/03, consisting ofone (1)
203. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence 903
Receipt and Property Report signed by Jane
Davenport, dated 03/24/03, consisting ofone
1
205. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence 905
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 06/20/03, consisting ofone (1)
page,
009485
001205
        
       
  1     
        
       
       
        
       
      
        
       
       
 
 
207. Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Criminalistic Analysis Report, Shoeprint or
Tire track Analysis by Donna Meade consisting
of five 5) a es,
213. Idaho State Police Forensic Services Evidence
Receipt and Property Report signed by Mickey
Hall, dated 03/03/03, consisting of one (1)
pa e,
Duplicate of State's page numbers 612-614.
908-912
922
t)09486001206
/~ , - . 
      
     
       
  
       
       
       
      
 
 
 
231. Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Forensic Biology Report by Cynthia R.
Hall, including hand written notes,
consistin of six (6) pa es,
235. Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Forensic Biology Report DNA by DNA
analyst, Cynthia Hall, including
handwritten notes, worksheets, and other
materials, consisting of twenty-two (22)
a es,
1015-1020
1027-1048
t)09487
001207
      
      
     
V~A"'U",>U.u,,,-   
      
      
    
     
     
 
 
 
237. Videotape of security surveillance at
Jackson's Food Stores on 8th Street and
Fort, dated February 28, 2003, through
March 1, 2003, consisting of one (1) ta e,
241. Letter from Jan M. Bennetts to LabCorp
requesting statistical estimates for the
major profile calculations consisting of one
(1) pa e,
label J
1054
0094880120
      
       
      
   ,""V.u.CHLl 
        
     
      
  
 
 
267. Statistical Estimates from LabCorp by A.
Dwayne Winston and Meghan E.
Clement, dated October 14, 2004,
6th
Addendum
1180-1181
1)09489 .~
$~,001209
      
     
    
 
 
   
  
271. Photo copies of chain of custody
documents for property invoices logged in
under DR# 306-409, consisting of sixty six
(66) pages
Boise Police Department Property Invoice,
DR# 306-409 fronts and backs including
bar code supplements, consisting of twenty
seven (27) pages
File notes from LabCorp on resubmitted
evidence for testing, consisting of fifty-one
(51) pages
Updated NCIC for Zachary Bingham (aka
Spider), consisting often (10) pages
9th
Addendum
1185-1249
11
Addendum
1251-1277
13
Addendum
1279-1328
15
Addendum
1332-1341
tJ0949000121
     
      
       
  
     
      
      
   
      
      
  
      
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
283. Corrected transcript of interview with
defendant, (this transcript was provided to
the public defenders and should have been
forwarded)
285. Interview of Norma Jean Oliver, consisting
of two (2) compact discs (side A&B) (Ms.
Oliver may also have mental health
treatment at Intermo,untain Hospital in
Boise. However, the State does not possess
any ofthose records.)
009491
001211
      
      
       
 
       
        
      
     
       
    
 
287. Updated discovery log for State v. Erick 1399-1418
Hall, H0300624, consisting of twenty (20)
pages
289. Register of Actions for April Sebastian 1433-1436
HCR17972 and H0400228, consisting of
four (4) pages
()09492 \~001212
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RECEIVED
MAR 10 2007
STATEA~~PUBLlC E)c;;,FENOEF
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State BarNo. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. SPOT0500155
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE
DISCOVERY ORDER
Petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State ofIdaho, and makes the State's response to the Court's Order Regarding Discovery in
the above-entitled case. The State will use the numbering system that has been followed in the
original motion for discovery and now used in the Court's Order.
I(A)(2) Statements Made by Lisa Lewis to Scott Birch.
Scott Birch advises that he has no report or notes concerning any contact with Lisa
Lewis.
I(A)(3) Notes and Reports Made by SRO Mike Barker Concerning Lisa Lewis.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 1
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Officer Barker advises that he has no notes or reports of any contact with Lisa
Lewis.
I(B)(2) Statements Made by Peggy Jean Hill to Scott Birch.
Scott Birch advises that he has no notes or reports concerning any contact with
Peggy Jean Hill.
I(B)(3) Statements Made by Peggy Jean Hill to SRO Mike Barker.
Officer Barker confirms that he has no notes or reports of any contact with Peggy
Jean Hill.
I(C) Notes and Police Reports Concerning the Death of Patrick Hoffert.
The Garden City Police Department has informed the undersigned that the only
report they have in their file concerning the death of Patrick Hoffert is a report
written by Detective Stephen Bartlett. There are no other notes or audio or video
taped interviews. There is no "notebook with notes from Patrick Hoffert." There is
no report of any forensic testing done on a black Toyota vehicle. Garden City has
no pathology notes or reports concerning the death. Garden City has no DNA or
other forensic profile developed on Mr. Hoffert. There is no supplemental report
from Detective Allen on the suicide scene.
I(C)(4) Coroner's file on Patrick Hoffert.
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and has found that it contains the
coroner's report concerning the cause of death, certificate of death, a gross anatomic
description, a toxicological laboratory report, and the police report of Detective
Stephen Bartlett. Attached to Detective Bartlett's report are four handwritten pages,
apparently written by Patrick Hoffert. Copies of those four handwritten pages are
provided with this discovery response. There are also other miscellaneous papers in
the file, but nothing relevant to the petition for post conviction relief.
I(E)(4) An NCIC check on Christian Johnson.
We have run an NCIC check on Christian Johnson and it lists the following felony
convictions.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 2
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1. Burglary, Ada County, May 1988 - the defendant was sentenced to a period of
retained jurisdiction on a five year tenn.
2. Burglary, Ada County, November 1987 - the sentence was suspended and the
defendant was put on probation. The State is uncertain if this was a withheld
judgment.
1(E)(7) Information on the Execution of a Search Warrant at Christian Johnson's
Residence.
It does not appear from the police report of Detective Anderson that a search
warrant was executed on the Denver Street residence where Christian Johnson was
staying.
100(2) Notes Made by Law Enforcement Not Previously Disclosed, but Contained in
the Police File.
The State has again reviewed the law enforcement file and has found that one page
ofnotes that may not have been provided in discovery.
I(G)(l) Notes in the Erick Hall Rape File Relating to Norma Jean Oliver's Mental
Health History.
There are no notes in the prosecutor's file relating to Ms. Oliver's mental health
history.
I(G)(2) Statements or Summaries of Statements Attributed to Ms. Oliver Contained
in the Garden City Police File.
The Garden City Police Department has infonned the undersigned that the only
item they still have related to the 1991 rape case is the report of Detective Dan
Hess.
I(G)(3)
No incentives were given or offered to Ms. Oliver for her testimony.
I(G)(5) Juvenile Records in Ada and Payette Counties.
The undersigned has detennined that there was no Ada County prosecution of Ms.
Oliver in connection with her December 1991 runaway. An inquiry has been
made of Payette County and the undersigned has been infonned that no records
were immediately available to the clerk of the court in Payette. The clerk advised
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 3
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the undersigned that if any records could be found, the clerk would call. No call
was received.
I(G)(6) Police Reports Related to Ms. Oliver's December 4,1991, Runaway Charge.
The State has located a Boise Police report under DR #127-536, which details Ms.
Oliver's arrest for runaway on December 2, 1991, and DR #127-686, which
details her arrest for runaway on December 3, 1991. Those reports are provided
with this discovery response. A check with the Ada County Sheriffs Office
property division shows that no audiotapes or evidence of any kind were booked
into property as a result of those two arrests.
I (G)(8)(b)
There is no "contact sheet" of photos taken of Ms. Oliver as part of the 1991 rape
investigation.
I(G)(8)(c) Color Copies of All Photos Taken of Ms. Oliver.
Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver were provided to trial counsel
during the original case and are again being provided with this discovery
response.
I(G)(8)(g)
The Garden City Police Department has informed the undersigned that it has no
notes, photographs, or audio or video recordings contained in the file of the
investigation of the 1991 rape case.
I(G)(8)G) DNA Results from the 1991 Rape Case.
There is no indication that any DNA analysis was done in the 1991 rape case.
I(N)(I) Bench Notes from the Coroner's File on the Lynn Henneman Autopsy.
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and has determined that there are
some notes in the file that may not have been disclosed. The notes were probably
by Deputy Coroner Michelle Hoffinan.
I(N)(2) Peer Review of Coroner's Findings.
The undersigned is informed by the coroner's office that no formal peer review was
conducted and no report exists of any peer review.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 4
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I(N)(3) Notes Relating to "Body Recovery."
The undersigned has reviewed the coroner's file and found that some of the notes
referred to above appear to relate to the recovery ofLynn Henneman's body.
I<N)(5) Full Body X-Rays.
The coroner's office advises the undersigned that they do not have full body x-rays
ofLynn Henneman's body.
I(N)(6) Toxicology Test Results.
No other report exists in the coroner's file relative to toxicology results other than
what was provided in the original discovery. The Texas Laboratory is the
laboratory used by the coroner's office.
I(N)(ll) Photographs of Lynn Henneman's Body.
Digital photographs of Lynn Henneman's body have been previously provided to
the State Appellate Public Defender, who claim that they are unable to open the
CD's. The Prosecuting Attorney is willing to assist them in opening the CD's or
provide them with additional ones if the CD is defective.
I(N)(12) Microscopic Slides.
The State is willing to work with the State Appellate Public Defender to establish a
procedure for the transfer of microscopic slides to an expert for review when the
necessary information is provided to the State.
I(N)(13) Sex Crimes Kit Protocol.
The coroner's office advised that they use the sex crimes kit protocol that is
provided in the sex crimes kit itself. The coroner's office does not have a separate
protocol.
I(N)(14) Notes Regarding Certain Tests Conducted by the Coroner.
All reports and results of tests have been previously provided in discovery. A
review ofthe coroner's file did not show any additional notes or reports.
I(N)(21) Dr. Groben's Curriculum Vitae.
A copy of that vitae is provided with this discovery.
I(N)(23) Coroner's Office Accreditation.
The Ada County Coroner's Office is not accredited by the National Association of
Medical Examiners.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 5
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II(A)(4) PowerPoint Slides.
A copy of the PowerPoint slide program used during closing argument is provided
with this discovery.
II(A)(5) Access to the Original Video/Audiotapes.
The undersigned has located the original recordings of the defendant's three
interviews.
II(B)(2) Addendum to State's Discovery Response.
Copies of the State's First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ten, Twelfth and Fifteenth
Addendums are provided with this discovery response. The State confirms that the
Sixteenth Addendum was the last discovery response sent to defense counsel.
III(A) Field Notes and Log Books.
The undersigned has reviewed the Boise Police file and has found one page ofnotes
that the State is unable to say was previously provided in discovery.
III(E) Task Force Lead Assignments.
The Prosecuting Attorney and the Boise Police Department has granted access to the
three ring binders containing the Lead Sheets for review by the State Appellate
Public Defender. To the undersigned's understanding, that review has taken place.
III(F}(6} Police Reports Regarding the Defendant's Escape.
The police reports from the Prosecuting Attorney's file detailing the defendant's
escape from prison are provided with this discovery response.
III(F)(7) Police Reports Regarding the Defendant's Failing to Register as a Sex
Offender Charge.
Copies of the police reports detailing the defendant's charge as failing to register as
a sex offender are provided with this discovery response.
III(F)(12} Lynn Henneman's Cellular Telephone Records.
The Prosecuting Attorney has reviewed his file and determined that no cellular
telephone records are in the file and there is no indication that any cellular
telephone records were produced as part of the original investigation.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 6
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III(F)(2) Documentation Regarding DNA Evidence, Petitioner's DNA Profile.
The Prosecuting Attorney has conferred with the Idaho State Forensic Laboratory.
They have advised that the petitioner's DNA profile was not entered into the
statewide database in the 1990's.
III(G) Reward Money.
The Prosecuting Attorney has spoken to the agency who administered the reward
fund. That person has confirmed that no reward money was paid in connection
with the Henneman case. Boise City Detective Dave Smith requested of the
reward administrator that reward money be paid to Kathy Stroud, Amanda
Stroud's mother, for the information she originally provided concerning the
possibility that Erick Hall was involved in the Hanlon murder. The reward
administrator denied that claim and no other claim was made.
III(H) Documentation of Defendant's Sex Offender Registry.
The undersigned has complied by providing copies of police reports and other
documentation from the defendant's failure to register as a sex offender file.
V(A)(4) Copies of Grand Jury Exhibits.
It appears to the undersigned that the Grand Jury exhibits were provided to the
trial jury. No separate Grand Jury exhibits exist in the prosecution file.
IX Preservation of Physical evidence.
The Prosecuting Attorney has sent letters to each law enforcement agency
involved in the Lynn Henneman case requesting that any evidence in their control
continue to be maintained.
1li-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this JS day of March 2007.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor
me
; rosecuting Attorney
STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL), Page 7
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703 through the United States Mail, this J!Z.day ofMarch 2007.
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Case Annotations: 
Session: Neville103009 Division: DC Courtroom: CR501 
Session Date: 200911 0/30 Session Time: 08:36 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s): 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorney(s): 
Public Defender: 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court Interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0001 
Case Number: CVPC2008-3085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK 
Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant: 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Public Defender: 
2009110130 
00:00:0009:25:22 - Operator 
Recording: 
00:00:00 09:25 :22 - New case 
,STATE OF IDAHO 
00:00:1909:25:41 - General: 
1 
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Time stamp 
00:00:35 09:25:57 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
counsel for petitioner as well 
00:00:59 09:26:21	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Time set for further post conviction proceedings. State's Motion waiving 
00:01:21 09:26:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
atty/client privilege/ Pet's Mot for Prot Order/ Respondent's State's Motion 
00:01 :5509:27:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
for Discovery/ And Petitioner's Motion for Discovery. 
00:02:2309:27:45 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENl'{ETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts argued State's Motion waiving Atty/Client privilege. 
00:03:2409:28:46 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Request Court order waivor re: Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal. 
00:05:1609:30:38 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
Ms. Owens stated no objection to reviewing trial counsel's file. Re: 
00:06:1809:31:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
atty/client doctrine, propose waived as far as claims waived in 
00:07:3009:32:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
amended petition, any documents withheld, would document and can come to the 
00:08:2309:33:45 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
Court for in camera 
00:08:2809:33:50 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms.Bennetts argued if relevent to the claims entitled to documents, index 
00:09:05 09:34:27 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
would not give enough information. In regards to Utah case, have outlined 
00:09:35 09:34:57 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
objection to that procedure. That case not controlling to this Court. 
00:10:2809:35:50 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Procedure outlined is very cumbersome. Don't see how State can get documents 
00: 11 :08 09:36:30 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
in another way. If Court has to review in camera, 
00: 12:07 09:37:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court reviewed Pet's prot order as related to this motion. 
00:12:4309:38:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
Ms. Owens proposed that theCourt adopt the Uno procedure, but have backed 
00:13:11 09:38:34 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
away from that. The Court in Hall I didn't find complete waivor, but did as 
2 
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00:13:3909:39:02 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
far as all claims stated. Do not want to waive things that are not in the 
00:13:5809:39:20 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
amended petition 
00:14:11 09:39:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts stated would not know how if withheld documents are not part of 
00:14:4009:40:03 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
the claims without seeing them 
00:14:4609:40:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court responded. The Amended Petition is in excess of 180 pages. Bulk 
00: 17:2909:42:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
of petition is breach of duty or ineffective assistance of counsel.
 
00:18:3309:43:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Waiving atty client privilege is especially important. Court will find
 
00:19:0309:44:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
petitoner waived privilege. Limited to these post conviction proceedings.
 
00:19:5709:45:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court goes next to Pet's request for protective order.
 
00:21 :03 09:46:25 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
 
Mr. Ackley responded.
 
00:22:2609:47:48 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
 
May be something that believe should not be disclosed and need to provide
 
00:22:5609:48:18 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
 
mcamera
 
00:23:01 09:48:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court states if it relates to any or all breaches of duty, needs to be
 
00:23:3609:48:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
disclosed.
 
00:23:5309:49:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
 
00:24:0409:49:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court stated hypothetical question, and don't normally rule on
 
00:24:41 09:50:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
hypothetical. Mr. Ackley would have certain duties in following this Court's 
00:24:5609:50:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
orders. Going next to Mot for Prot Order
 
00:25:1609:50:38 - Other: Owens, Nicole
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Ms. Owens will hold back on prot order at this point. Have an agreement on 
00:26:0409:51 :26 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
this issue until such time as it may become more relevent. 
00:26:21 09:51 :43 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennetts concurred. A little premature. Facts not fully developed. 
00:27:23 09:52:46 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Operating without knowing what is fully there 
00:29:44 09:55:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will ask State to provide order granting Mot to waive atty/c1ient 
00:30:2309:55:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
privilege and also memoralize the Pet's Mot for Prot Order to be deferred 
00:30:50 09:56: 13 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
until such time it becomes reIevent. 
00:31 :58 09:57:20 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts concurred 
00:32:0509:57:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court goes to State's Mot for Discovery. 
00:32:2909:57:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennett's going back to sealed records from the Court on some hearings, 
00:33:01 09:58:23 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
on whether State can have access to those as well. 
00:33:5209:59:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Mr. Ackley stated in light ofCourt's ruling, would go to claims raised. 
00:34:31 09:59:52 - PlaintiffAttorney: Ackley, Mark 
Should be unsealed. 
00:34:37 09:59:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has granted Mot to waive atty/client privielege including the 
00:35:02 10:00:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
proceedings sealed by the Court. 
00:35:22 10:00:44 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Order unsealing those proceedings would be appropriate 
00:35:39 10:01 :01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would look for order on that as well. 
00:35:59 10:01:21 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennetts goes to Rspondent's Mot for Discovery, have agreed not to 
00:36:1910:01:41 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
litigate SAPD files as part of this at this time, premature, request Court 
4 
001227
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
00:36:39 10:02:00 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
defer ruling on that. Do have argument on trial counsel's files. Want to
 
00:37:10 10:02:32 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ'JNETTSIDOUG
 
review everything to be able to respond effectively
 
00:38:01 10:03:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Agree state should have access to trial counsel's files.
 
00:38:15 10:03:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court grants respondent's Mot for Discovery in part in so far as it reaches
 
00:39:07 10:04:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
trial counsels files. Defer re: SAPD files. Request order from Ms.
 
00:39:33 10:04:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Bennetts.
 
00:39:35 10:04:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Going next to Pet's Mot for Discovery first to request for depositions
 
00:40:45 10:06:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
State agrees to deposition ofRob Chastain and will grant that request.
 
00:41 :28 10:06:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Co-Counsel deposition of Deborah Kristal also agreed to and will grant that. 
00:41 :45 10:07:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Going next to investigator Gary Starkey, Pet. has withdrawn that request but 
00:42:03 10:07:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
may want to renew that later.
 
00:42:20 10:07:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court considers all motions timely made.
 
00:43:38 10:09:00 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Mr. Ackley responded, have scheduling order in this case so have timliness 
00:44: 16 10:09:38 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark
 
Issues.
 
00:44:19 10:09:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will consider any motion brought where the issue ofjustice takes us. 
00:45:29 10:10:50 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts requested denied without prejudice.
 
00:45:5810:11:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court just does not want to be in position where counsel states will withdraw 
00:46:24 10:11:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
it now if Court will consider later. Do not want to be in bargening position 
00:46:42 10:12:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
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Mr Ackley responded. 
00:47:51 10:13:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts responded, requested Court just deny without prejudice. Really 
00:48:14 10:13:36 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
need depo ofRob Chastain and Deborah Kristal first before decide if need 
00:48:4110:14:03 - State Attorney: VARIE, JANBENNETTS/DOUG 
further depositions. Counsel will be required in furture to make record on 
00:48:5910:14:21- State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
why further depositions would be necessary 
00:49:1410:14:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court's general sense now, with numerous ineffective assistance of 
00:50:12 10:15:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
counsel claims, depositions of trial counsel is necessary. Court agrees no 
00:51:5910:17:21	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
record at this point to depose the investigators. The Court will deny 
00:53:29 10:18:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
without prejudice to depose investigator Gary Starkey, going to mitigation 
00:53:57 10:19:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
specialists 
00:54:02 10:19:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Mr. Ackley responded. 
00:55:06 10:20:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court re: Bruce & James Whitman 
00:55:42 10:21:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Same argument 
00:55:4810:21:09 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Request Court deny without prejudice until further record established 
00:56:0410:21:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will deny for same reasons re: Bruce & James Whitman. Will be asking 
00:56:32 10:21 :54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
at end of this counsel who prevails orders on these matters. 
00:57:43 10:23:04 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
Ms. Owens argued trial counsel should disclose their caseloads, request 
00:58:26 10:23:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
subpoena to provide that information. 
00:58:44 10:24:05 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts objects, can inquire during deposition. Should not have to 
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00:59:07 10:24:29 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
document every case they worked on.
 
01 :00:28 10:25:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court notes ABA guidelines not binding on this Court. Very broad and not 
01 :01 :44 10:27:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
practical. Court will deny request for subpoena. Going to email
 
01:03:45 10:29:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
correspondence between trial counsel and experts
 
01:04:00 10:29:22 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Understand State does not object to this request.
 
01:04:5710:30:19 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEN1'lETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts concurred
 
01:05:0410:30:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will grant request for email correspondence
 
01:06:45 10:32:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded, will provide any emails
 
01:07:10 10:32:31 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will grant request for email correspondence between individual team 
01:07:43 10:33:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
members and trial counsel
 
01:07:57 10:33:20 - Operator
 
Stop recording: (On Recess)
 
01 :07:57 10:46:24 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
01 :07:57 10:46:24 - Record
 
,STATE OF IDAHO
 
01:08:16 10:46:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court goes next to prod. of documents, coroner's office, bench notes, 
01 :09:00 10:47:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
State has agreed to contact and inquire
 
01:09:1710:47:45 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts stated if don't exhibit will note, but don't want to provide
 
01:09:43 10:48:11 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
something that does not exhist
 
01:09:55 10:48:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs
 
01:09:58 10:48:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
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Court will grant, if they exhist. Peer review, fonnal or infonnal from 
01:10:2410:48:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Coroner's office or confinnation no peer review conducted 
01:10:4010:49:08 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Same as last will make the inquiry. 
01 :11 :3410:50:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will grant if they exhist
 
01:11:56 10:50:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Next items are notes and dictations made by Dr. Graben made at or near the 
01:12:19 10:50:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
body at the scene
 
01:12:2610:50:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\Il"-rETTS/DOUG
 
Concern is what may already be providing.
 
01: 12:45 10:51:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Crime scene video is about as close as can get to bench notes, it is
 
01: 13:16 10:51 :44 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
documented on the video, not sure what in addition to that they are asking 
01:13:33 10:52:01 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
for.
 
01:13:38 10:52:06 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Inquiring if anything further than what was done on the video.
 
01:14:05 10:52:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Grant in limited part, will inquire if anything exhists
 
01:14:23 10:52:51 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Curt will grant is such materials exhist and if separate and distinct from
 
01:14:53 10:53:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
bench notes. 
01:15:0910:53:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Copies of diagrams at time ofphysical examination and autopsy 
01:15:3210:54:00 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Same thing, autopsy report and photos were all provided. Will look if there 
01:16:0010:54:29 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
will provide
 
01:16:06 10:54:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court grants in limited part, to the extent they exhist and if not already
 
01:16:31 10:54:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
provided
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01 :16:34 10:55:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Complaints against Dr. Groben withdrawn,
 
01:16:53 10:55:21 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs
 
01:16:58 10:55:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
forensic pathologic manual that was in exhistence
 
01:18:24 10:56:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdrawn without prejudice
 
01:18:33 10:57:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
All notes recordings made at direction or by coroner's office on Amanda
 
01 :18:59 10:57:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Stroud
 
01:19:03 10:57:31 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdrawn
 
01:19:07 10:57:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
documentation ofDr. Groben and all agents
 
01:20:02 10:58:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
any correspondence or emai1s Dr. Groben would have with any witnesses.
 
01 :20:39 10:59:07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ'JNETTS/DOUG
 
object, broad, do not know if it even exhists. If copy in his file
 
01:21:5411:00:22 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
If State will check to see if anything in the file, that would be agreeable.
 
01:22:1411:00:42 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
To extent he has actual docment in a file. Not agreeing to go beyond a file.
 
01 :23:26 11 :01 :54 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Will limit to that
 
01 :23:33 11 :02:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Parties have agreed to see if Dr. Groben has anything in his file.
 
01:24:5611:03:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Copy of Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices
 
01:25:12 11:03:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Ms.Owens responded
 
01 :25:37 11 :04:05 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Dr. Groben stated Dr. Groben employee of Ada County so would not be invoices 
01 :26:02 11 :04:30 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
or billings.
 
01 :26: 17 11 :04:45 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
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If doesn't have billing records, but if State would agree to check 
01 :26:54 11 :05:22 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded
 
01:27:03 11:05:31 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
will withdraw based on no records exhist
 
01:27:15 11:05:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court will note withdrawn
 
01 :27:26 11 :05:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
any notes or reports or tests from Cheryl Hanlon case
 
01:28:04 11:06:32 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
believe may fall under same category, if testing exhists and not already
 
01 :28:25 11 :06:53 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
provided
 
01 :28:29 11 :06:57 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts stated don't believe Dr. Groben did independant testing. Other 
01 :29:27 11 :07:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
testing sent out to labs, but will look in Dr. Groben's file
 
01:29:43 11:08:11 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will have record reflect there is an agreement.
 
01:30:45 11:09:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded
 
01 :31 :06 11 :09:34 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Got a separate death certificate as well as record of death
 
01:31:52 11:10:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court inquried if there is a difference
 
01:32:04 11:10:32 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts stated will look for that.
 
01:33:0311:11:31-Judge:Neville, ThomasF.
 
Court going next to documents in prosecutor's office, illust. exhibits
 
01 :33:28 11: 11 :56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
withdrawn and power point exhibits also withdrawn.
 
01:33:5011:12:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
State has agreed to provide copy of powerpoint slides
 
01:34:21 11:12:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Going next to copies of emailsre:pleanegotiations.stipulations re: jurors 
01:34:4911:13:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
etc.
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01:34:52 11:13:20 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
State objects
 
01:35:0011:13:28 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Ms. Owens responded re: may be in trial counsel's files, but if State has
 
01:35:3711:14:04 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
copy and not in trial counsel, request copy.
 
01:35:49 11 :14:17 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts request Court deny until they view their files
 
01:37:5811:16:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
01:39:3911:18:07 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
01 :39:43 11:18:11 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\JNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded
 
01:40:28 11 :18:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts requested Ms. Owens look to see what they have first and ifit 
01:40:4611:19:14 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
looks like something missing can try to see if have anything. Request Court 
01:41:03 11:19:30 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
deny without prejudice
 
01:41:08 11:19:36 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court will deny without prejudice. Emails of significance
 
01:42:13 11:20:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Will have Ms. Bennetts look for obvious files aware of and then once
 
01 :42:55 11:21 :23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
have had review of trial counsel
 
01:43:15 11:21:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
file.
 
01:43:46 11:22:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court re: expert witnesses, shoe prints
 
01:44:13 11:22:41 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
State objects due to it being work product.
 
01:46:1411:24:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
01 :46: 16 11 :24:44 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Mr. Ackley responded,
 
01:47:4411:26:11 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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If have communications, why do need summaries 
01:47:5611:26:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: Ackley, Mark 
Mr. Ackley stated if have recorded statement, don't need summary. 
01:48:48 11:27:15 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts
 
01:48:57 11:27:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Request going beyond brady material
 
01 :49:06 11 :27:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennetts objects. Can refer counsel back to prosecutor page names that 
01 :50:53 11 :29:21 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
refer to some of this.
 
01 :52:55 11 :31 :23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court re: portion by agreement to be provided. The rest of it with all
 
01 :53:29 11 :31 :57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
expert witnesses. Court will deny the balance. Going to next to all
 
01 :55:00 11 :33:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
documented media and press releases
 
01:55:13 11:33:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdraw without prejudice
 
01 :55:20 11 :33:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Going to Gary Starkey's date of employment and what rape and homicide cases 
01 :55:39 11 :34:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
worked on while in prosecutor's office
 
01:55:4811:34:17 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdrawn
 
01:55:5411:34:21	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Documents relating to particular witnesses in prosecutor's office.
 
01:57:13 11:35:40 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Re: argument of Jeff Carlson
 
01 :59:22 11:37:49 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts objected
 
01 :59:31 11 :37:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
In exercise of discretion, the Court will deny. 2 C-A, Amanda Stroud written 
02:01 :27 11 :39:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
statements.
 
02:01:38 11:40:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Ms. Owens stated same argument
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02:01 :48 11 :40: 15 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\ll\fETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts concurs, same argument
 
02:01 :59 11 :40:26 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Summaries are the work product of prosecutor's office. In exercise of
 
02:02:41 11:41:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court's discretion, will deny. Going next to Ms. Stroud, statements and
 
02:03:1011:41:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
video made
 
02:03:2811:41:55 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BEJ\ll\fETTS/DOUG 
Will look to see what they are missing and re-copy what they have asked for. 
02:04:06 11:42:33 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
For that reason withdrawn
 
02:04: 13 11 :42:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
02:05:23 11:43:50 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdrawn as well
 
02:05:32 11:43:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded re: 2003 would not exhist, possible request of the
 
02:06:12 11:44:39 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
vendor that these calls may be found, but do not know what cost would be.
 
02:06:40 11 :45 :07 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Withdraw without prejudice
 
02:06:56 11 :45:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs
 
02:07:00 11 :45:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will note withdrawn. Going next to Amanda Stroud and Eric Hall sexual 
02:08:19 11:46:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
acts and aphyxiation.
 
02:08:35	 11 :47:02 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
response
 
02:09:21	 11 :47:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Information would have to lead to the liklihood of discoverable evidence.
 
02:09:51 11:48:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
response
 
02:10:32 11:48:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
Ms. Bennetts responded, some information was provided, can re-provide again, 
02:11 :38 11 :50:05 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG 
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but do object to work product. 
02:12:03 11:50:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
If provides the transcript and video
 
02:12:24 11:50:51 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
03/1 0/03 video
 
02:12:38 11:51:05 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
withdraw request
 
02:12:51 11:51:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
State will provide the audio of Amanda and transcript on this topic
 
02:13:38 11:52:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Written statements and statements made to or by Kathy Stroud.
 
02:14:4411:53:11	 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
some agreement reached, State has agreed to provide some photographs
 
02:15:04 11:53:31 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Request that counsel advise what they are missing
 
02:15:21 11:53:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Disagreements on the summaries.
 
02:15:47 11:54:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
With respect to portions left to the Court, as a matter of discretion deny
 
02:16:07 11:54:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
summaries, work product of the State. Norma Jean Oliver portion withdrawn 
02:16:52 11:55:18 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs
 
02:16:56 11:55:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Withdrawing Dr. Pablo Stewart
 
02: 17:07 11 :55:33 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs
 
02:17:1011:55:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Law enforcement field notes and log books
 
02: 17:25 11 :55:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Will look again and attempt to see if any further notes to provided.
 
02:17:55 11:56:22 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Previously provide Det. Smith and Vucinovich, provide again
 
02:18:45 11:57:12 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
agreement sufficient
 
02:18:52 11:57:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court cont'd
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02:19:4711:58:14 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Withdrew that request
 
02: 19:56 11 :58:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court cont'd
 
02:20:4611:59:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Do not know if one exhists, but will look again re: report on Kenneth Tiddle.
 
02:21:33 12:00:00 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court not aware of who this was
 
02:21:4612:00:13 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts stated was based on a lead
 
02:21 :59 12:00:26 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Will withdraw based on agreement
 
02:22:09 12:00:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Look and provide if exhists. Going to surveillance video of Cheryl Hanlon
 
02:23:22 12:01 :49 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
referenced in two diff. police reports
 
02:24:23 12:02:50 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennetts stated asked earlier on about a video from ID Power cameras. Do 
02:25:26 12:03:53 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
not exhist anymore. Confirmed they could not get a copy to play in court.
 
02:26:55 12:05:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
02:26:59 12:05:25 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Do not have recollection of why they were unable to locate copy
 
02:27:23 12:05:50 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
ID Power had agreed to maintain a copy. There was a prior case that ID Power 
02:29:16 12:07:43 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
had done that as well
 
02:29:28 12:07:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Asking State to provide something they never had
 
02:29:5012:08:17 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts stated officer's did make the attempt to get and don't recall if
 
02:30: 13 12:08:40 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG
 
it was taped over or what
 
02:30:21 12:08:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Ms. Bennetts stated had written a letter re: that video
 
02:30:54 12:09:21 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
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Ms. Bennetts will look for that letter and provide 
02:31: 13 12:09:40 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court will have State inquire ofDet. Ayotte go back to ID Power and
 
02:31:51 12:10:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
inquire again and have him ask did you ever have it, does it still exhist.
 
02:33:06 12:11:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Transcript and recordings of Jason Vanderesch, withdrawn. Copy of reievent 
02:33:55 12:12:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
portion of crime lab activity re: underlying case
 
02:34:18 12:12:45 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts stated may be missing a page and will provide again
 
02:34:35	 12: 13:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Photo line up shown to Daro Lady
 
02:35:34 12:14:01 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Ms. Bennetts responded. Provided
 
02:36:13 12:14:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Withdrawn based on agreement.
 
02:38:00 12:16:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Notes re: crimestopper memo
 
02:38:18 12:16:46 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Will look for that
 
02:38:28 12:16:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will show as withdrawn. Copies of violent apprehension program.
 
02:39:15 12:17:43 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
Apply to Henneman case
 
02:39:23 12:17:52 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
referenced in the Hanlon sentencing.
 
02:40:54 12:19:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Det. Dave Smith referred to it as 15 page document
 
02:41:1912:19:47 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
concurs, request information he was referencing to in his testimony
 
02:41:5012:20:18 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTS/DOUG
 
What is relevent too. Need basis for it is needed
 
02:43:02 12:21:30 - Other: Owens, Nicole
 
Ms. Owens will withdraw
 
02:43:18 12:21:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Documentation for reward money
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02:44:45 12:23:14 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
request information re: Hanlon case. 
02:45:31 12:23:59 - State Attorney: VARIE, JAN BENNETTSIDOUG 
Ms. Bennetts will check 
02:45:53 12:24:21 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
would like the documentation on that as well 
02:46:53 12:25:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court notes Ms. Bennetts will look for any documentation. 
02:48:07 12:26:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court going next to jury question 
02:48:39 12:27:07 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
withdrawn, 
02:48:5012:27:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Going next to visitation log at jail from all investigators and counsel 
02:49:38 12:28:06 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
withdrawn with prejudice 
02:49:56 12:28:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court notes child support records may have been withdrawn as well 
02:50:20 12:28:48 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
concurs 
02:50:24 12:28:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will request Ms. Owens provide orders where she prevailed as well 
02:50:53 12:29:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
as Ms.Bennetts 
02:52:32 12:30:59 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
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NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
(CAPITAL CASE)
Case No. CV PC 0803085
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN
STATUS OF COUNSEL
Respondent.
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate
Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby provides notice of change in the status of
his counsel. On April 27, 2010, Mr. Ackley will be leaving the SAPD and therefore will no
longer be representing Mr. Hall as lead counsel. Mr. Hall will continue to be represented by Ms.
Romero and Ms. Owens in these post-conviction proceedings.
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL 1
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DATED this \S1'v\ day of April, 2010.
NICOLE OWENS (
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
S !ANNON N. ROMERO
llieAppellate Public Defender
.. ulxo
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \~~ay of April, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL, as follows:
JAN BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
----K.- Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL 3
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
Capital Litigation Unit
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712 GRIGfNAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
(CAPITAL CASE)
Petitioner,
Respondent.
v.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-----------~)
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender, and provides notice that a hearing will be held for the purpose of
discussing scheduling matters in the above-captioned case. In coordination with the Court's
clerk, and by agreement of the parties, the hearing will be held on the 22nd day of April, 2010, at
9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville at 200 W. Front S1., Boise, Idaho.
NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING 1
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DATED this 15th day of April, 2010.
NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
NICOL OWENS
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall
2
001245
       
     
     
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of April, 2010 served a true and correct
copy ofthe attached NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING by the method indicated below:
JAN M. BENNETTS
DOUGLAS R. VARIE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI - J BLOCK
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
NOTICE OF STATUS HEARING
U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
~ Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
__ Hand Delivery
3
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Set~jAa-i: Neville042210
Session: Neville042210
Session Date: 2010/04/22
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue
Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s)
Case 10: 0001
Division: DC
Session Time: 08:35
Courtroom: CR502
Page 1
Case Number: CVPC0803085
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney:
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Public Defender:
2010/04/22
09:29:42 - Operator
Recording:
09:29:42 - New case
STATE OF IDAHO
09:30:07 - Other: Owens, Nicol
counsl for petitioner
09:30:17 - Other: Romero, Shannon
counsel for Petitioner
09:30:27 - Other: Varie, Douglas
counsel for State of Idaho/Respondent
09:30:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court notes here last October, thought there should of been
a order from that
09:31:07 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
hearing, but do not see one
09:31:14 - Other: Varie, Douglas
In the process of putting that together.
09:31:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court believes that was the only order that was forth coming
09:31:49 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Believe there were several orders but were all part of that
agreement
09:32:09 .- Other: Varie, Douglas
Believe can have to the Court by next week.
09:32:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
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Se,,'si-';: Nevi lle04 221 0
Court notes Change of Counsel.
09:33:17 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated he is going to Federal Defender's unit. S
tatus conference
09:33:34 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
for this reason for change in counsel, and to get caught up
on orders from
09:33:56 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
last October. Believe will need a change in the scheduling
order, probably
09:34:16 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
in the next 4-6 weeks
09:34:22 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts concurred.
09:36:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will set out to June 4, 2010 @ 9:00 a.m. Will tal
k about specific
09:36:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
timelines.
09:38:16 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded re: Ms. Romero's caseload will double w
ith his
09:39:10 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
departure.
09:41:19 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
Ms. Bennetts responded. Dates will need to be amended, depo
s were to be
09:42:33 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
completed by Apri126th and that schedule will need to be rev
ised.
09:42:49 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Inquired about replacement for Mr. Ackley.
09:43:04 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
States trying to get one handled, no deadline for closing.
Ms. Romero has
09:43:57 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
been 2nd chair in Abdullah and will go to first chair in tha
t case. Ms.
09:44:18 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Romero is also handling Dunlap case. In Hall, Supreme Court
is asking for
09:44:47 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
argument dates around end of August. That will impact a lot
of cases,
09:45:06 - Pers. Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
especially jury contact issue.
09:45:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will see counsel back on June 4th
09:45:30 - Operator
Stop recording:
Page 2
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A.M,----
APR 30 2010
J DAVID NAVARRO, CIBIk
• JANET L ELLI8
ByoePU'N
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jan Bennetts
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
ORDER REGARDING
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS
FOR DISCOVERY AND FOR
WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Case No. CV-PC-08-03085
Respondent.
Petitioner,
vs.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
--------------)
The Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege came before this Court for hearing on October 30, 2009. This Court after
considering the pleadings, hearing the arguments of both parties and being fully advised in
the premises hereby ORDERS as follows:
ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 1
-,
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1. Respondent's Motion for Discovery
The Respondent's Motion for Discovery is granted with respect to trial counsel's
files and materials. Petitioner shall produce or make available to Respondent's counsel
all of trial counsel's files and any other material related to trial counsel's representation of
Erick Virgil Hall to the extent that such materials are within Petitioner's possession
and/or control. This material and files shall be produced fully without any redactions,
deletions, or exceptions and shall include any and all material and files related to any
proceedings which were sealed by the Court. This Order also includes any and all files
and materials generated by attorneys assigned to represent Erick Virgil Hall trior to the ;/h1
appointment of Rob Chastain and Deborah Krist~when the case was handled by the Ada ;7~
County Public Defender's Office.
This Order also includes work product generated by trial counsel, including trial
counsel in the Ada County Public Defender's Office, during their representation of Erick
Virgil Hall.
Pursuant to agreement by the parties, this Court defers ruling on Respondent's
Motion for Discovery as it relates to the State Appellate Public Defender files until such
time as that issue is brought back before the Court.
2. Respondent's Motion for Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The Respondent's Motion for Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege is granted
with respect to any and all communications and work product between Erick Virgil Hall
and any trial counsel who represented him during any stage of the prosecution of the
ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 2
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underlying criminal case, designated as Ada County case number H0300624. This waiver
includes any communications and work product related to any proceedings which were
sealed by the Court.
This Court was also presented with Petitioner's Motion for a Protective Order
relating to the Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege. Based upon agreement of the
parties, the Court will defer ruling on this issue until it is brought back before this Court.
This Court's factual findings, analyses, and rulings as set forth on the record on
October 30, 2009, are hereby incorporated by reference herein. This Order does not
change or deviate from any previous ruling of the Court relating to matters previously
addressed unless expressly stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3o.f! day of(~. 2010.)
Thomas F. Neville
District Judge
ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND
FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (HALL), Page 3
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
1.S.B. # 4843 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 
NICOLE OWENS, 1.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
APR 30 2010 
J. DAVID NAvARRO. Clerk 
BJJANET L. ELLIS 
CEI'UtY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
.v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
)
)
)
)
) 
)
)
)
)
 
Case No. CVPC08-03085 
DISCOVERY ORDER
 
(Mall II) 
(CAPITAL CASE)
--------------) 
On October 30, 2009, a hearing was held before this Court, with argument heard from 
both parties, on the parties' respective motions for discovery as well as their responses and 
replies thereto. Being fully informed, the Court ruled from the bench. The Court's analysis and 
rulings during said hearing are incorporated herein by reference. This Discovery Order 
memorializes the Court's rulings regarding Mr. Hall's Motion for Discovery, filed August 17, 
2009. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 
1.	 DEPOSITIONS 
A.	 Members of the Trial Defense Team. 
1.	 Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of lead counsel Rob Chastain is 
GRANTED. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 1
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2.	 Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of co-counsel Deborah Kristal is 
GRANTED. 
3.	 Mr. Hall's request for the deposition of investigator Gary Starkey is 
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further 
investigation. 
4.	 Mr. Hall's request for the depositions of mitigation specialists Bruce and 
James Whitman is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request 
upon further investigation. 
B.	 Subpoenas decus tecum. 
1.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation identifying the cases that the 
individual trial team member worked on during the course of their 
representation" is DENIED. 
2.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All e-mail correspondence between the individual 
trial team member and other team members including their agents, such as 
expert witnesses" is GRANTED. 
3.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All trial counsels' email correspondence between 
the individual trial team member and the Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
and its agents" is GRANTED. 
II.	 PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
A.	 Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Coroner's Office 
1.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All bench notes from the Cheryl Hanlon autopsy, 
sexual assault kit and any other procedures performed or observed by Dr. 
Glenn Groben or any other Ada County Coroner personnel" is 
GRANTED, to the extent such materials exist and to the extent such 
materials are not duplicative of other materials to be provided by this 
order. 
2.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any peer review, formal or informal, whether 
internal or external to the Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any 
documentation related thereto, of Dr. Groben's opinions based on his 
examination and autopsy in the underlying criminal case, or confirmation 
that no peer review was conducted" is GRANTED, to the extent such 
materials exist and to the extent such materials are not duplicative of other 
materials to be provided by this order. 
3.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made 
by Dr. Groben at or near the body recovery scene" is GRANTED IN 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 2
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LIMITED PART, if such notes, reports, dictions or findings are separate 
and distinct from Dr. Groben's bench notes. 
4.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of any diagrams prepared at the time of the 
physical examination and autopsy" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART to 
the extent such information has not already been provided. 
5.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or 
the Ada County Coroner with any agency or professional association 
regarding hishts professional performance, qualifications or veracity" is 
WITHDRAWN. 
6.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all 
photos of Ms. Hanlon's body, including any reenactment photographs" is 
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon further 
investigation. 
7.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the forensic pathology procedural 
manual currently in effect as well as in effect in March 2003 for the Ada 
County Coroner's Office" is WlTHDRAWN without prejudice to renew 
the request upon further investigation. 
8.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the 
direction of the Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of 
Amanda Stroud" is WITHDRAWN. 
9.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. 
Groben or his agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential 
witnesses or their agents" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on 
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to check Dr. Groben's file for such 
information. 
10.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices 
for the instant case" is WlTHDRAWN. 
11.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any notes, reports, or results of tests in the Cheryl 
Hanlon case regarding the following: 
a.	 Reconstruction of ligatures 
b.	 Fingernail clippings 
c.	 Blood sample (tube) 
is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's 
agreement to inquire and provide if in existence. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 3
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12.	 Mr. Hall's request for the "Death Certificate of Ms. Hanlon from Ada 
County Coroner's office, signed by Glen Groben" is GRANTED IN 
LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to 
inquire and provide if in existence. 
13.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Ms. Hanlon's Record of Death from Ada County 
Coroner" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART, based on the prosecuting 
attorney's agreement to inquire and provide ifin existence. 
B.	 Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. 
1.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized 
during the State's guilt phase case (including opening statements and 
closing arguments)" is WITHDRAWN. 
2.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized 
during the State's sentencing phase case (including opening statements 
and closing arguments)" is WITHDRAWN. 
3.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other 
documents shown to the jury" is WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting 
attorney's agreement to provide this request. 
4.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney's office and the Ada County Public Defender's 
office regarding the Hanlon case, including but not limited to, stipulations 
regarding evidence, instructions, motions, and prospective jurors, as well 
as any plea negotiations" is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The 
prosecuting attorney has agreed to look through obvious files it is aware of 
for email communications with the Ada County Public Defender's office 
regarding the Hanlon case and provide the emails to Mr. Hall. 
5.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of 
communications, by the prosecutor's office with all expert witnesses, 
whether or not called at trial, including but not limited to the Ada County 
Coroner's Office. This request also includes any tests or results of 
examinations of the shoe prints found at the scene with shoes allegedly 
worn by Erick Hall at the time of Ms. Hanlon's death" GRANTED IN 
LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney has agreed to provide testing, 
data or results of any testing of the shoe prints in its possession. The 
remainder of Mr. Hall's request is DENIED. 
6.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of 
communications, by the prosecutor's office with the media, including but 
not limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice to 
renew the request upon further investigation. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 4
 
001255
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Gary Starkey's dates of employment and the 
names of the homicide and rape cases he worked on while employed by 
the Ada County Prosecutor's office" is WITHDRAWN without prejudice 
to renew the request upon further investigation. 
C.	 Documents in the Possession of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
Relating to Particular Witnesses. 
1.	 Jeff Carlson. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of 
statements made by Jeff Carlson regarding the nature and scope of 
the argument he had with Cheryl Hanlon on February 28, 
2003/March 1, 2003, and statements and summaries of statements 
made by any other individuals, regarding that argument" is 
DENIED. 
2.	 Amanda Stroud. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or 
investigator" is DENIED. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer" is 
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to 
provide statements which exist and are in the custody of the 
prosecuting attorney or their agents and which are identified by 
Mr. Hall as missing from the materials currently in possession of 
the SAPD. 
c.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All audio or video recordings, writings, or 
other mediums of communications made by Ms. Stroud and 
obtained by the prosecutor or law enforcement" is WITHDRAWN, 
based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide audio, 
video, writings, or other communications identified by Mr. Hall as 
missing from the materials currently in possession of the SAPD. 
d.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All law enforcement and prosecution 
investigative reports, notes, and files regarding the Amanda Stroud 
homicide investigation" is WITHDRAWN. 
e.	 Mr. Hall's request for the "March 9, 2003 recordings from Ada 
County Jail referenced in Affidavit for Search Warrant indicating 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 5
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Amanda Stroud called Kathy Stroud from Ada County Jail" is 
WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's statement such 
recordings do not exist. 
f.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All recorded conversations between Erick 
Hall and Amanda Stroud from the Ada County Jail as referenced in 
the Affidavit for Search Warrant, not notarized, signed on notary 
signature line by Judge Minder on April 17, 2003" is 
WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's statement such 
recordings do not exist. 
g.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any documentation in which Amanda 
Stroud indicates that she had engaged in consensual autoerotic 
asphyxiation with Erick Hall, or any other documentation 
indicating that Mr. Hall expressed any interest in asphyxiation 
during consensual sexual relations" is GRANTED IN LIMITED 
PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide a 
transcript and video of the March 10, 2003 interview of Amanda 
Stroud, if such exists. 
h.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Any documentation in which Amanda 
Stroud indicates that Erick Hall ever "blacked out" or experienced 
a mood change during sexual relations or when touched on the 
neck" is WITHDRAWN. 
3.	 Kathy Stroud. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or 
investigator" is DENIED. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer" is 
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to 
provide missing statements identified by Mr. Hall. 
c.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Photographs provided by Kathy Stroud to 
investigator Doug Traubel on March 5, 2007 showing brown shoes 
allegedly taken between November 11, 2002 and January 1,2003" 
is WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement 
to provide missing photographs identified by Mr. Hall. 
4.	 Norma Jean Oliver. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 6 
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a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "all written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of the prosecuting attorney or 
investigator, limited to such statements made following Mr. Hall's 
arrest for the Hanlon and Henneman murders" is WITHDRAWN. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "all written statements and summaries of 
statements made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of 
medium, in the presence of a law enforcement officer, limited to 
such statements made following Mr. Hall's arrest for the Hanlon 
and Henneman murders" is WITHDRAWN. 
5.	 Dr. Pablo Stewart. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for a "Copy of the video tape deposition of Dr. 
Pablo Stewart" is GRANTED, based on the prosecuting attorney's 
agreement to provide the deposition. 
D.	 Documents in Possession of Law Enforcement Agencies. 
1.	 Field notes and logbooks. Mr. Hall's requests for "all field notes and 
logbooks generated by any law enforcement officer in the course of the 
investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon homicides" is GRANTED IN 
LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall check relevant police 
files regarding the Hanlon murder investigation only, for notes not 
contained in reports regarding the Hanlon murder investigation and which 
have not already been turned over or are not the subject of other sections 
of this discovery request. 
2.	 Unredacted Handwritten Notes. 
Mr. Hall's request for "unredacted handwritten notes" is: 
a.	 WITHDRAWN as to Officer Brett Quilter; 
b.	 WITHDRAWN as to Officer Dave Smith; and 
c.	 WITHDRAWN as to Mark Vucinich, 
based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide these notes to 
Mr. Hall if they exists. 
3.	 Correspondence. 
Mr. Hall's request for "All correspondence or summaries of 
correspondence between law enforcement and other state and federal 
agencies regarding the Hanlon case homicide investigation" is 
WITHDRAWN. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 7
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4.	 FBI I-Drives. 
Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all reports, communications or files 
contained on any I-Drive of any FBI field office involved in the 
Henneman or Hanlon investigation, including, but not limited to the Salt 
Lake City and Boise field offices" is WITHDRAWN. 
5.	 Task Force Lead Assignments. 
Mr. Hall's request for "task force lead assignments" is WITHDRAWN. 
6.	 Miscellaneous Investigative Reports and Other Documentation. 
Mr. Hall's request for "Any and all FBI reports containing "profiling" of 
the perpetrator in the Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders" is 
WITHDRAWN. 
7.	 Prior Offenses. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for a "Copy of all police reports and notes 
regarding Ada County Case No. M0303573, the Failing to Register 
as a Sex Offender case filed against Mr. Hall" is WITHDRAWN. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Police reports regarding Ada County Case 
No. H9600534, the escape case filed against Mr. Hall" is 
WITHDRAWN. 
8.	 Media Contact. 
Mr. Hall's request for "All documented communications, or summaries of 
communications, by law enforcement with the media, including but not 
limited to press releases" is WITHDRAWN. 
9.	 Specific Reports. Documents. and Recordings. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the report of Officer Delgadillo 
regarding the arrest of Kenneth Tittle referenced in Officer 
Vucinich's report" is GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The 
prosecuting attorney will check the relevant records and provide if 
it exists. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the crime scene video, with audio, 
initially made by Craig Nixon referenced in Tr., Vol. IX, p. 4668" is 
GRANTED. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 8
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c.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the Idaho Power security camera 
footage of alleged appearance of Erick Hall and Ms. Hanlon" is 
GRANTED IN LIMITED PART. The prosecuting attorney shall 
request Detective Ayotte to inquire of Idaho Power whether the 
video still exists. If the video exists, the prosecuting attorney shall 
provide it to Mr. Hall. 
d.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the transcript and any recordings 
of interview of Jason Vanderesch conducted by Greg Morgan and 
Mark Ayotte" is WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting 
attorney's agreement to provide this material. 
e.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the relevant portion of the 
'Crime Lab Activity' electronic database referencing the 
underlying case" is WITHDRAWN based on the prosecuting 
attorney's agreement to provide Mr. Hall with the page he is 
mIssmg. 
f.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of the photo lineup shown to Daryl 
Lady on March 10, 2003 at 6:05pm" is WITHDRAWN, based on 
the prosecuting attorney's agreement to provide this photo lineup. 
g.	 Mr. Hall's request for "A copy of attachment to lead sheet #50" is 
WITHDRAWN, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to 
investigate provide this attachment if it exists. 
h.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of the Violent Criminal 
Apprehension Program" is WITHDRAWN. 
10.	 Documentation regarding DNA evidence. 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Mr. 
Hall's DNA profile into the Idaho CODIS database, or any local or 
state database" is WITHDRAWN on the assumption the 
prosecuting attorney complied with the Court's order to provide 
such information in Hall 1. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation relating to entry of Mr. 
Hall's DNA profile into the national NDIS database, or any 
national database" is WITHDRAWN. 
11. Rewards. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 9
 
001260
 
 
 
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Hall's request for "All documentation and infonnation regarding 
reward money offered for assistance in the Henneman and Hanlon 
homicide investigations including claims made on such reward" is 
GRANTED IN PART, based on the prosecuting attorney's agreement to 
provide all documentation regarding any reward money offered for 
assistance in the Hall II Hanlon case including claims made on such 
reward. 
12.	 Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration. 
Mr. Hall's request for "Documentation from the Idaho sex offender 
registry involving registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall" is 
WITHDRAWN. 
13.	 Miscellaneous Documents and Reports. 
Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of any and all written questions by jury to 
the court, any bailiff, or other court personnel" is WITHDRAWN. 
14.	 IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail 
Records. 
a.	 Mr. Halls request for "Copies of the Ada County Jail Visitation 
logs regarding trial counselor investigator visits to Mr. Hall" is 
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon 
further investigation. 
b.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of the Safety Practices Manual. 
Any and all manuals, infonna1 or fonna1 policies, memoranda or 
guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional 
officers or other female employees or volunteers and inmates 
classified as or believed to be sexually violent toward women" is 
WITHDRAWN without prejudice to renew the request upon 
further investigation. 
15.	 Documents Requiring Subpoenas 
a.	 Mr. Hall's request for "Copies of all Washington DSHS Division 
of Child Support records pertaining to Frank McCracken and Jean 
McCracken/Hall in Case No. 70253" is WITHDRAWN. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this day of April, 2010. 
DISCOVERY ORDER (HALL II) 10 
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JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
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NQ.- !31J~\<$< .:MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender A.M---­
State of Idaho MAY - 6 20\0
I.S.B. # 4843 
J DAYlD NAVARRO;Caerk 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 • By JANET '- EUl 
oePl1t'"NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Case No. CV PC 0803085 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER 
v.	 ) DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF 
) TRANSCRIPTS IN ALL POST­
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CONVICTION HEARINGS 
) 
Respondent.	 ) 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
-------------) 
Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate 
Public Defender's office (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby moves this Honorable Court to order that, 
without need for a separate order addressing each individual hearing, a transcript of any and all 
proceedings or hearings held in this post-conviction case be prepared by the Court Reporter at 
the conclusion of each hearing and be made part of the record in this case. Moreover, Mr. Hall 
asks that a copy of each hearing/proceeding transcript be provided to counsel for both parties. 
Information contained within these transcripts, and any statements by the prosecutor or 
this Court, are relevant to Mr. Hall's request for post-conviction relief. This motion is made 
pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and it is based upon all matters of record. 
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DATED this 6th day of May, 2010. 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document, MOTION FOR STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE 
PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ~ Hand Delivery 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ..,c Statehouse Mail 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail 
IMSI Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
)
) 
) 
) 
)
)
)
)
 
Case No. CV PC 0803085 .,.' 
STANDING ORDER DIRECTING
 
THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS
 
IN ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS
 
(CAPITAL CASE)
--------------) 
Motion having been made and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that as a matter of course, without need for a separate order 
addressing each individual hearing, a transcript of any and all proceedings or hearings held in this 
post-conviction case be prepared by the Court Reporter at the conclusion of each hearing and be 
made part of the record in this case. Once prepared, it is further ordered that a transcript of each 
hearing/proceeding be provided to counsel for both parties. 
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 DATED this 13'"'-day ofMay, 2010. 
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
STANDU'JG ORDER DIRECTU'JG THE PREPARATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, STANDING ORDER DIRECTING THE PREPARATION OF 
TRANSCRIPTS OF ALL POST-CONVICTION HEARINGS, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
SHANNON ROMERO 
SAPD 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE, ID 83703 
SUE WOLF 
COURT REPORTER 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
BOISE, IDAHO 
~tatehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
" Statehouse Mail 
_JJ.S. Mail 
7Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
~acsimile 
~and Delivery 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. RANDALL 
OEPUTY 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise,Id. 83702 
Telephone (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ) 
) Case No. CV PC 2008 3085 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION FOR AN ORDER 
vs. ) TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE 
) OF THE RECORD IN CASE NO. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for an Order taking judicial 
notice of the record as set out below. 
The State requests that this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d), issue an Order Taking 
Judicial Notice of the Clerk's Record, transcripts, pleadings, responsive pleadings, all 
pretrial and trial proceedings and documents that are part of the record, and including any 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE 
NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624 (HALL II) 1 
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and all filed or lodged documents in Case No. CR-FE-2003-0000624, the underlying 
criminal case, for the purpose of addressing the Petitioner's post-conviction claims. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(a) requires that, "[I]fthe application is not accompanied by 
the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the respondent shall file with its answer 
the record or portions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the application." 
Furthermore, in Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated, "we hold that prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the district 
court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is necessary to a 
determination 'on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record,' that 
there are no material issues of fact and that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction 
relief. I.C. § 19-4906(b)." 
The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal 
case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 767 (Ct. App. 1987), ajJ'd 115 
Idaho 315, 766 P.2d. 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
The State submits that taking judicial notice of the clerk's record, transcripts, and 
other documents, as noted above that are part of the record in the underlying criminal 
case, will be necessary for addressing the Petitioner's claims. 
DATED this til/V day of May 2010. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .2t Y day of May 20 I0, I caused to be 
served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for An Order Taking Judicial 
Notice of the Record upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
Name and address: State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
~ositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
 
class.
 
o	 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o	 By infonning the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o	 By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ 
Legal Assistant 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TAIQNG JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE 
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A.M._--­
MOLLY 1. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender JUN - 9 2010State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 J. DAVID NAVMPtJ, CIeItt 
By JANET L ews 
oEPUlYSHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders GRrGINAL 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,	 ) Case No. CV PC 0803085 
)
 
Petitioner, )
 
)
 
v.	 ) RENEWED MOTION TO 
) RELEASE REDACTED JUROR 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) QUESTIONNAIRES 
) 
Respondent.	 ) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State 
Appellate Public Defender (herein "SAPD"), hereby renews his Motion to Release Juror 
Questionnaires in the underlying criminal case, State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. 
H0300624, filed on March 26, 2008. Mr. Hall submits that the questionnaires must be 
made available to assess and support claims raised in his Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief, filed April 7, 2009 (herein "Amended Petition") regarding the 
effectiveness of his trial counsel in selecting his jury. This motion is based on Mr. Hall's 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses) to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 5, 6, 7, 
RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE REDACTED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 1 
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and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 19-2719 and 19-4901 et seq., Idaho 
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 23.1, and all matters of record. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COMPLETED JURY OUESTIONNAIRES MUST BE DISCLOSED TO
 
PROTECT MR. HALL'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
 
MEANINGFUL POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
 
A. Relevant Procedural Background 
Prior to voir dire in the underlying criminal case, prospective jurors were 
provided with a lengthy questionnaire which included questions about their knowledge of 
the law, the facts of Mr. Hall's case, and their views about the death penalty. In the 
course of completing the questionnaires, prospective jurors signed an oath and 
affirmation. (Tr.Vol.1 of 11, pp.44, 71.) This Court informed prospective jurors that the 
questionnaire would only be used by the Court and counsel. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.92.) 
Both this Court and the parties relied heavily upon the completed questionnaires 
to frame their in-person voir dire of the prospective jurors. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of 11 
- Vol. 8 of 11.) During the in-person voir dire, many of the prospective jurors reported 
that the questionnaire was confusing, overwhelming, or otherwise frustrating, and some 
jurors either left questions unanswered, or answered them incorrectly. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 
2 of 11, pp.36I, 440, 512-13, 566, 841; Tr. Vol. 3 of 11, pp.I978, 2037, 2045; Tr. Vol. 4 
of 11, p.2244; Tr. Vol. 70f 11, pp.3I47, 3173; Tr. Vol. 80f 11, p.3780.) Some 
prospective jurors revealed that the questionnaire itself triggered latent memories about 
the facts of the case, or other crimes associated with Mr. Hall. (Tr. Vol. 2 of 11, pp.I 061­
63, 1066.) 
RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE REDACTED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 2 
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During these post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall filed a Motion for Release 
Juror Questionnaires on March 26, 2008. This Court denied the motion without 
prejudice. Mr. Hall now renews his request and asks that the completed juror 
questionnaires be disclosed, subjected to the same redactions of jurors' names, dates of 
birth and places of birth, as were made in Hall I. Mr. Hall further agrees to redact the 
jurors' signatures. A copy of this Court's order relating to the jury questionnaires in Hall 
I is attached for ease of reference. (See Order Granting Access to Completed Juror 
Questionnaires, Erick Hall v. State ofIdaho, Case No. SPOT0500155.) 
B.	 The Completed Jury Questionnaires Must Be Disclosed To Protect Mr. Hall's 
Substantial Rights 
Mr. Hall has a statutory right to raise any factual or legal challenge to his 
judgment of conviction and sentence in these post-conviction proceedings. I.C. §19­
2719(3); I.C. §19-4901(4). Mr. Hall has just one opportunity to identify and raise these 
challenges. See I.C. § 19-2719(4)-(6); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700-01, 992 
P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 
(1991). To satisfy due process, this opportunity cannot be reduced to a mere formality. 
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where 
its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the 
dictates of the Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); 
see also State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing 
capital post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and 
state right to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful 
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). 
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Because this is a capital case, Mr. Hall is entitled to greater, not lesser procedural 
safeguards and protections. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing the "long line of cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital 
cases"); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27, (1991) (weighing the "special 
importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (discussing heightened protections in capital cases); Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a 
significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments"); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is 
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment"). 
Mr. Hall has challenged his conviction and sentence by alleging inter alia that his 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during jury selection, including when they 
agreed to excuse prospective jurors based solely on their questionnaire responses. See 
Amended Petition, pp.18-51 (Claim E, "Deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel 
during jury selection"). Mr. Hall must review and analyze the completed questionnaires 
to meaningfully assess trial counsels' performance, and to provide further support for his 
claims. In order to assess trial counsel's performance, Mr. Hall must have access to the 
completed questionnaires to see exactly what information trial counsel had at the time 
they were making crucial decision about jury selection. Mr. Hall's right to meaningful 
post-conviction proceedings will be rendered illusory ifhe is not given the opportunity to 
review all documents relevant to his claims and the points of error identified in his 
Amended Petition. Cf Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1964); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636, 428 P.2d 947, 
RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE REDACTED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 4 
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953 (1967) (holding that the inability to review a transcript of the defendant's 
arraignment precluded an effective appeal and violated due process). 
Mr. Hall is entitled to the completed questionnaires because they are necessary to 
evaluate the assistance his trial counsel rendered. See, e.g., Bellas v. Superior Court of 
Alameda County, 85 Cal.AppAth 636, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 380 (Ct. App 2000). In Bellas, 
after the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced, his attorney 
refused to comply with an order to return copies of the completed juror questionnaires to 
the court. Id. at 640. The attorney argued that he had highlighted and made notes on the 
questionnaires, and had otherwise relied on them for jury selection. /d. Therefore, the 
attorney believed the questionnaires were work product that needed to be preserved for 
potential use by defendant's counsel on appeal. Id. The district court disagreed and 
ordered the return of the completed questionnaires, basing its decision solely on its desire 
to protect "juror's privacy and confidentiality." Id. at 642. The district court then held the 
attorney in contempt for refusing to return the questionnaires to the court. /d 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals observed that "this case concerns 
continuing access to the content of juror questionnaires by defendant and defense 
counsel, and not simply access by the public." Bella, 85 Cal.AppAth at 646 (emphasis 
added); see also Zamudio v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.AppAth 24, 30, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 
(1998). The Court then found that the district court had erred in holding counsel in 
contempt where the defendant and his counsel were entitled to the jury questionnaires, 
which had potential value to appellate counsel in framing issues for an eventual appeal on 
the defendant's behalf, and which contained information that could be used to support 
decisions made by trial counsel during jury selection. Bella, 85 Cal.AppAth at 646-47. In 
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so holding, the Court recognized the desire of trial courts to protect jurors' privacy 
interests. Id. at 652. However, the Court prevailed upon trial courts to understand that 
"[n]o comprehensive offer of protection from public disclosure of information 
communicated on juror questionnaires is legally effectual where public access is 
mandated by the First Amendment." Id. 
Information gathered and relied up by the parties and the court for the purpose of 
assisting with capital jury selection, such as jury questionnaires, is crucial for post­
conviction and appellate counsels' review of trial counsel's performance injury selection. 
It has long been acknowledged that jury selection is a "critical stage" of a criminal trial. 
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989). In capital cases, this is particularly 
true because juries not only determine whether a defendant is guilty, they also determine 
whether a defendant, in light of the charged crime and the surrounding circumstances, 
should live or die. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find the aggravating factors or circumstances 
necessary for the imposition of the death penalty). Because juries play such a pivotal and 
critical role in the guilt and penalty phases of capital trials, it is imperative that post­
conviction counsel thoroughly investigate all potential claims related to jury selection. 
See Commentary to ABA Guideline 10.1 0.2 (advising of the importance and complexity 
of voir dire and jury selection process and warning counsel of the substantial time 
necessary); John H. Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir 
Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1209 & n.1 (2001) ("The conventional wisdom is that 
most trials are won or lost injury selection."). 
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Here, prospective jurors filled out and submitted completed questionnaires in 
order to assist the court and the parties with jury selection. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of 
11 - Vol. 8 of 11.) The questionnaires served as both an alternative and a supplement to 
jurors' oral disclosure of the same information in open court; thus, the questionnaires 
were a critical part of voir dire. After the completed questionnaires were submitted to the 
court and given to the parties, the parties stipulated to the removal of certain jurors based 
solely on their questionnaire responses. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol 1, 9/7/07, p.123, L. 21 - p. 
130, L.20.) The questions and answers in the questionnaires were also utilized by counsel 
and the court to promote discussion during oral voir dire. (See generally Tr. Vol. 1 of 11 
- Vol. 8 of 11.) Thus, Mr. Hall should be given the opportunity to know what trial 
counsel, the State and this Court knew when selecting a jury, in order to accurately assess 
and evaluate trial counsels' performance during jury selection. 
RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE REDACTED JUROR QUESTIONNAIRES 7 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant Mr. Hall's renewed motion for 
the release of the completed and redacted jury questionnaires, including the 
questionnaires of those potential jurors who were actually selected, those who were 
seated as alternates, those who were stricken for cause, those struck through the exercise 
of peremptory challenges, and those who were stricken by agreement of the parties. Mr. 
Hall asks this Court to employ the same redaction of juror information as in Hall I, with 
the additional redaction ofjuror signatures. 
Dated this ~~ay of June, 2010. 
S ANNONN. MERO 
eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
\l~u. 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this ~day of June, 2010, served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing RENEWED MOTION TO RELEASE JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRES as indicated below: 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 __ Hand Delivery 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL Statehouse Mail 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail 
IMSI Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS----­
Administrative Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICw:'iP.ISTRId'1••t~ 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A.FJt -6 2005 
J. DAVl&A'J.J!,.RRO.c~ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) .. _~ 
) CASE NO., SPOT050<ft..,-soEPulV' 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING 
v.	 ) . ACCESS TO COMPLETED 
) JURy QUESTIONNAIRES 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
___________~) (CAPITAL CASE) 
Motion haVing been made 'and the Court otherwise being sufficiently advised during a 
telephonic hearing held on .January 6, 2006, in-court hearings held on February 15 2006, and in 
part by stipulation of the parties 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R. 23.1 that the Ada County Jury Office 
custodian of the completed jury questionnaires, as assisted by this Court's staff, in Ada County 
Case No. H0300518, State v. Erick Hall, provide to Petitioner's counsel those questionnaires 
over which she has custody, as specified below: 
a.	 The custodian shall make copies of the questionnaires for only those prospective 
jurors who were passed or excused for cause, that is those brought into the court room 
for questioning or excused beforehand by stipulation; 
b.	 The custodian shall redact all names, addresses, phone numbers and information from 
which identity could be readily determined of the afore,mentioned prospective jurors; 
and 
. c.	 The custodian shall provide copies of the aforementioned questionnaires (as redacted) 
directlyto counsel for Petitioner or their agent forthwith. 
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,IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R. 23.1 that Petitioner's 
counsel· be provided copies of any jury questionnaires (as redacted) retained by or in the 
possession of the district court presiding in Ada County Case No. H03005l8, State v. Erick Hall, 
including the twenty-six page jury questionnaire (as redacted) specifically tailored for the 
death/life qualification process, as specified below: 
a.	 Petitioner's access to copies of the aforementioned questionnaires is limited to only 
those prospective jurors who were passed or excused fOf cause, that is those brought 
into the courtroom for questioning or excused beforehand by stipulation; 
b.	 The aforementioned questionnaires shall be redacted of all names, addresses, phone 
numbers, and information from which identity colild be readily determined. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to I.C.R. 23.1 that counsel for the 
Petitioner shall take measures to protect juror confidentiality and shall not relinquish possession 
ofany ofthe aforementioned questionnaires or otherwise provide copies to Petitioner. 
Dated this "ft1 day of Jilly, 2006. 
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
00510 
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CERTWICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of July, 2006, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING ACCESS TO COMPLETED JURY 
QUESTIONNAIRES by method indicated below to: 
MARK. ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
-LFacsimile -e.~ 
__Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
_"_ Statehouse M~ 
~ Facsimile - " 
__Hand Delivery 
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Session: Neville061110 Division: DC Courtroom: CR501 
Session Date: 2010/06/11 Session Time: 08:29 
Judqe: ~eville, Thomas F. 
Repo.rter-;~ Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s): 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s): 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s) 
Case ID: 0002 
Case Number: CVPC08-03085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL 
State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS 
Public Defender: 
2010/06/11 
11:18:11	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
11:18:11	 - New case
 
, STATE OF IDAHO
 
11:18:33	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Time aet for further status conference.
 
11:19:17	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court notes orders from prior hearing have been entered and 
sent out. Court 
11:19:38-	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
inquired about revised scheduling order.
 
11:19:48 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL 
Ms.	 Owens indicated that trying to hire new lead counsel and 
that might 
11:20:08	 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOL
 
happen sometime around July 12th.
 
11:20:34	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court· inquired about coming back after lead counsel hired. 
Will set August 
11:21:31	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
6, 2010 @ 10:30 a.m. Court notes new motions filed, Motion f 
or st,3.nding 
11:21:58 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
order,	 Court entered that order on May 15th, thereafter Sate 
filed Motion for 
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11:22:17	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Judicial notice by State, will enter that order as soon as g 
et out of Court. 
11:22~40	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court has renewed Motion to release redacted questionnaires. 
11:23:14 - General: 
Mr. V~rie stated have been working towards an agreement, wil 
1 try to work 
11:23:52 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS 
towards stipulation. 
11:23:59 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court stated did release redacted questionnaires in Hall I. 
11:25:33 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS 
Will work towards a resolution, if cannot reach agreement wi 
11 advise the 
11:25:53	 - State Attorney: VARIE, DOUGLAS 
Court. 
11:25:59·- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court: will take up on August 6th if haven't reached an agree 
ment 
11:26:19-	 Operator 
Stop recording: 
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• FILED Friday. June 11. 2010 at 11 :51 AM J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT 
f\~BY: 
'-YDeUCIefk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085Petitioner, 
vs.
 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE 
Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That a Status Conference has been set on 
Friday, August 06, 2010, at 10:30 AM, in the Ada County Courthouse regarding the 
above entitled matter. 
Dated this 11th day of June, 2010 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11th day of June, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to bemailed.postageprepaid.to: 
SHANNON ROMERO
 
NICOL OWENS
 
SAPD VIA EMAIL
 
JAN BENNETTS
 
DOUGLAS VARIE
 
ADA CO PROSECUTOR VIA EMAIL
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By' ~ ) V a !LY:.r..----"I 
. -=D:-e-p-u-\~:--:f:~rk~="":""""':=--='----
Notice of Status Conference 
23 
24 
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• • RECEIVED
 MAY 21 2010
 
Ada County Cieri< 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney : 
Jan M. Bennetts JUN 12 2010 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
J DAVID NAVARRO, CIIIkIdaho State Bar No. 4606 
• JANET 1-EW891 DEPUTY200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise,Id. 83702 
Telephone (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ) 
) Case No. CV PC 2008 3085 
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL 
vs. ) NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN 
) CASE NO. CR-FE-2003-0000624 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) (HALL II) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
THE COURT, having reviewed the State's Motion for an Order Taking Judicial Notice of 
the Record in case number CR-FE-2003-0000624, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premIses; 
IT IS HEllliBY ORDERED, that the Court will take judicial notice of the clerk's record, 
transcripts, pleadings, responsive pleadings, all pretrial and trial proceedings and documents that 
are part of the reqord, and including any and all filed or lodged documents in Case No. CR-FE­
2003-0000624, the underlyi~~~i~al case. 
DATED this J..L~_2mb. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE RECORD IN CASE NO. CR-FE­
2003-0000624 (HALL II), Page 1 
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J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
• By CARLY LATIMORE 
OEPUTY 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-08-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) STATE'S MOTION FOR 
) INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) SAPD CONFLICT 
) (HALL II) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and requests that this Court hold a hearing and to inquire 
into whether or not the State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD") has a 
conflict in representing the Petitioner in these post-conviction proceedings. 
The State inquired of Mr. Ackley, prior to his leaving the office of the SAPD, to 
determine if there were any conflict issues in this case. Although Mr. Ackley did not 
believe there were, the State prefers to address this issue now rather than later. The State 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL 11), Page 
1 
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hopes to avoid additional delays that would be caused were we to discover later that there 
is indeed a conflict. In addition, it is appropriate that a record be made at the district court 
level on this issue rather than attempting to address it at a later time during appellate 
proceedings. 
It is noteworthy that the SAPD did represent the Petitioner in the Hall I post­
conviction proceedings during the time that Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal 
represented the Petitioner in the present case, including during Mr. Chastain and Ms. 
Kristal's preparation for this case, the trial itself and the capital sentencing proceedings. 
The fact that the SAPD represented the Petitioner on another case may not in and of itself 
create a conflict. However, in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid 
unnecessary delays in these post-conviction proceedings, the State requests that this Court 
inquire of post-conviction counsel to ensure that there is no conflict. 
The State further requests that the SAPD disclose any correspondence, notes, 
documents and conversations members of the SAPD staff had with Erick Hall and/or trial 
counsel for Erick Hall prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on January 4, 
2008, on the Hall II case regarding matters that related to the Hall II case. The State 
understands that the SAPD represented the Petitioner in Hall I post-conviction 
proceedings during this time frame, and is not seeking communications, correspondence 
or documents related to Hall I, but only those regarding Hall II. The State wants to ensure 
that no conflict arose during the course of Hall II proceedings. 
The State contends that any of these conversations, documents, correspondence or 
notes that related specifically to the Hall II case prior to the SAPD appointment in the 
Hall II case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because the SAPD 
did not represent the Petitioner on Hall II during those time frames. Should the Court 
conclude otherwise, or should it become necessary to divulge confidential 
communications, the State requests that the Court inquire of the SAPD outside the State's 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL ll), Page 
2 
001289
-
 
• • ",' " 
presence on the record and review these documents en camera to determine whether these 
communications demonstrate that a conflict exists. In addition, it is entirely possible that 
this information would be relevant in responding to and addressing the Petitioner's post­
conviction claims. 
')f)A­RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .:2LL day of July 2010. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
~JfI~ 
J . Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .~ of-day ofJuly 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing State's Motion for Inquire into Possible Conflict was served on Mark 1. 
Ackley, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 
83703 in the manner noted below: 
o	 By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, ftrst 
class. 
o	 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o	 By informing the offtce of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
o	 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _ 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRE INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT (HALL 11), Page 
3 
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Session: ~eville080610 Page 1 
Ses;~on~ ~eville080610 Division: DC Courtroom: CR501 
Session Date: 2010/08/06 Session Time: 09:19 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s): 
Ellis,. Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s) 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0001 
Case Number: CVOC08-03085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Public Defender: 
2010/08/06 
10:42:41	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
10~42:41	 - New case
 
, STATE OF IDAHO
 
10:43:09	 - Other: Varie, Doug
 
here on behalf of State of ID
 
10:43:26	 - Other: Owens, Nicol
 
on behalf of Eric Hall
 
10:43:32	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court indicated the last time we were here was on June 1 
1, 2010. 
10:46:19	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court notes new lead counsel, Mr. Thomsen. Court stated tha 
t when we were 
10:46:41	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
last here, counsel were almost in agreement on redacted ques 
tionnaire. 
10:46:58-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts stated we are close, but in light of potential 
review of a 
10:47:15	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
conflict have kind of stalled
 
10:47:25 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Stated	 under orders of SAPD while independent counsel review 
for any possible 
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Session: ~eville080610	 Page 2 
10:48:00	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
conflict. Stated should be rapped up within the next 2-3 we
 
eks.
 
10:48:56	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court notes new filings in the court file. Ex Parte Motion
 
for possible
 
10:49:23	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
conflict under seal.
 
10:49:37	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Have,not seen that motion.
 
10:49:44	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court inquired if there was a reason why Court. should not sh
 
ow respondent's
 
10:50:16	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
counsel copy of this motion.
 
10:50:27	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
State's there is reason.
 
10:50:42	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court states the specific contents are not specific, are ver
 
y general, do not
 
10:51:03	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
see any harm or any compromise of Mr. Hall's position.
 
10:51:23	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
In light of State's motion last week, Ms. Owens and Ms. Benn
 
. etts spoke. If
 
10:53:01-	 Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Court~should release to State, was not specific enough to ca
 
use any
 
10:53:45	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
compromise.
 
10:53:47'- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court	 does not see it as harmful. Court would like to share 
it with the 
10:54:09	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
State.
 
10:54:12	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
If there are no specifics or facts in it, would not have is
 
sue, believe
 
10:54:29	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
there has been a waivor from Mr. Chastain & Ms. Kristal. Fa
 
irly broad
 
10:54:47-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
waivor. To that extent do not believe it would be a problem
 
Not asking for
 
10:55:07	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
conversations between SAPO and Mr. Hall.
 
10:55:44	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomsen stated their notice is in response to another ca
 
se in the
 
10:56:13	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
courthouse. This is in response to an issue in that case, a
 
nd the motion was
 
10:56:27	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
out of abundance of caution. Attorney's in SAPO were concer
 
ned, wanted this
 
10:56:56	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
looked at now rather than later. Do not want to be in posit
 
ion of creating
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Session: "Neville080610 
10:5~:19 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
further appellate issues later. 
10:57:52- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court inquired if can share a copy of this motion today with 
the state 
10:58:10	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomsen responded re: Ms. Romero's view
 
10:58:55	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will give the State copy of ex parte motion.
 
10:59:10	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court going next to SAPD's Ex Parte Motion under seal re 
: vacating stat 
10:59:50	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
conf. Court effectively already denied that motion since t 
he Court wanted 
11:00:13	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
to keep this stat conf on for today. Going next to the Stat 
e's M()tion, 
11:00:38	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
inquired if SAPD opposed
 
11: 00:46 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomsen stated would oppose.
 
11:00:57	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court inquired about even if in camera
 
11:01:15	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
would oppose at this stage
 
11:01:22	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court going back to ex parte motion provided to State this m 
orning. 
11:02:39	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Cburt notes first assertion with the Court requesting th 
at testing 
11:03:01	 - JUdge: Neville, Thomas F. 
information from Hall I be shared with trial counsel in Hall 
II. 2nd 
11:03:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
assertion	 of possible conflict with Ms. Swenson talking with 
trial counsel. 
11:04:17	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court does not see any detail or specifics of the contac 
t in assertion 
11:04:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
#2.	 Understand that Mr. Benjamin is reviewing the possible 
conflict and 
11:06:17	 .~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
will speak with Mr. Hall on whether any conflict would be wa 
ived. 
11:08:53	 -~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Cburt re: examination of conflict and Court making inqui 
rYe ~~n order for 
11:09:54 - JUdge: Neville, Thomas F. 
the	 Court to make this inquiry the State would need to know. 
The Court 
11:10:29 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
stated both sides should be allowed to respond. The Court c 
onsidering 
11:10:49	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
setting up hearing on the issue of conflict for the Court to 
Page 3 
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Session:'Nevi:le080610	 Page 4 
make inquiry. 
11:12:02	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
If Court finds there is conflict that the Court would need t 
o appoint counsel 
11:12:28	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
of Court's choosing. The Court does not have specific infor 
mation on the 
11:12:51	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
contact. Probably prudent of SAPD to appoint Mr. Benjamin t 
o conduct 
11:13:25	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
independent inquiry, but it is up to this Court to make inqu 
iry. The Court 
11:13:50~	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
does not have to bound by what Mr. Benjamin should determine 
The Court has 
11:14:53	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
a lot of regard for Mr. Benjamin. 
11:15:27	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The C0urt would like to set the State's Motion for Inquiry 
11:15:44	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Mr. Thomsen stated would oppose that, have motion to file, w 
hich basically 
11:16:05	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
states what Court just placed on record, agree that it is th 
e Court's 
11:16:20	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
decision. At this moment do oppose. Mr. Benjamin is the D 
e Facto counsel 
11:17:16	 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
when there are issues like this. Would like the Court to he 
ar from Mr. 
11:18:29	 ~ Pers. ~ttorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Benja'nin. Difference in this case and Judge Copsey's case i 
s that Mr. Hall 
11:19:09--	 Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
had another case with SAPD on it . 
11:20:32'- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has had high regard for SAPD's office. 
11:23:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The	 State's general notion to resolve this up front in' their 
motion, Court is 
11:24:20	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
on board with that. Court would like to set for hearing. W 
ould:like to keep 
11:24:36	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
this case moving. 
11:25:05	 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Recei'Jed notice for oral argument the first week of November 
on Hall I. 
11:25:30~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Cburt has August 26th at 2:30 p.m. 
11:26:16'-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
State is available 
11:26:22	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
concurs 
11:27:22-	 Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Should have something back from Mr. Benjamin by that date as 
001294
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Session; Neville080610	 Page 5 
•	 well •11:27:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court always happy to hear from Mr. Benjamin, but Court 
has to make its 
11:28:43	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
own inquiry. 
11:29:13	 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
11:29:36	 - Operator 
Recording: 
11:29:36	 - Record 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
11:30:05	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Do Not need to bring defendant in here 
11:30:50	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Would like to have a written waivor from defendant 
11:31:04	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would like to see written waivor 
11:31:48	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
May need to include Mr. Benjamin in that as well 
11:31:58	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Mr. Thomsen responded. 
11:32:05	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
If State intending to file a response, would like to set tim 
eline on that 
11:32:23-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
state will file by August 13th. 
11:32:41	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court-would be out of office on August 13th 
11:32:53	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Will file by August 16th then 
11:33:02	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Would like to have until August 20th to reply. 
11:33:14- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court	 will look for responses, if not going to file, request 
advise 
11:33:33	 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
001295
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
NO. RUIDState Appellate Public Defender A.M. {fl $0 P.M, _ 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 AUG - 6 2010 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 J. DAVID NAVARRO, ClerkNICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 By JANET L. ELLISDeputy State Appellate Public Defender	 DEPUTY 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 ORiGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
)
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) CASE NO. CVPC08-03085
 
)
 
Petitioner, )
 
v.	 ) RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION 
) FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE 
) SAPD CONFLICT (HALL II) 
STATE OF IDAHO, )
 
)
 
Respondent. )
 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
Counsel for Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through the State Appellate 
Public Defender's (SAPD) Office, responds to the State's Motion For Inquiry Into Possible 
SAPD Conflict. Counsel for Mr. Hall asks that the Court consider the Ex Parte Notice filed on 
June 29, 2010, and the subsequent Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing filed on 
June 27, 2010, as an anticipatory response to the State's request that "this Court inquire of post-
conviction counsel to ensure that there is no conflict." Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests 
that the Court wait until independent counsel has made a preliminary determination as to whether 
any conflict, either perceived or actual, does in fact exist. It is then incumbent on independent 
counsel, as well as undersigned counsel, to notify the court of any apparent conflict and to 
appropriately proceed with a hearing in order to determine the extent and nature of the conflict, 
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and whether an informed consent waiver can be obtained from Mr. Hall. However, as the State 
has also mentioned, in order to avoid future delays and in order to create a record prior to 
appellate proceedings, the SAPD agrees that clarification on the issue is warranted. In response 
to the State's other request, the SAPD must respectfully refuse to divulge or disclose any contact 
that any staff member or attorney had with Mr. Hall once an attorney-client relationship was 
formalized when the SAPD was initially appointed as post-conViction counsel after the 
Henneman trial (Hall I), regardless of the content of those contacts. That refusal is in keeping 
with the obligations imposed on counsel by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct since all 
communications are protected by attorney-client privilege, the work product rule, and rules of 
attorney-client confidentiality. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. Conflict Free Representation 
It is undisputed that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 
representation. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009), citing 
Woodv. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Idaho appellate courts have recognized a statutory 
right to post-conviction counsel for non-frivolous claims, as opposed to a constitutionally 
grounded right. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.2d 108, 1112 (2004); Plant v. 
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19­
4904. However, even in the absence of a constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho 
appellate courts have still acknowledged a petitioner's constitutional right to post-conviction 
representation unmarred by conflict. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230, 
233-234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to the 
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trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction counsel as 
a result of a conflict of interest."). 
It should be clear that the critical issue in identifying whether a conflict of interest exists 
lies in determining if the interests of counsel conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby 
compromising counsel's duty of loyalty. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) 
(recognizing that counsel who labors under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of 
loyalty to his or her client, which is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). The United 
States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between actual and theoretical conflicts of interest, 
finding that '''an actual conflict of interest' meant precisely a conflict that affected counsel's 
performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (emphasis in the original). That court held that "an 'actual conflict,' for 
Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's 
performance." Id. at 172 n.5. 
B. Standards of Professional Conduct 
However, in Idaho, counsel has an ethical and professional duty and responsibility to 
both his or her client and to the bar generally. Those duties are codified in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct (I.R.P.C. 2003). Attorneys have a duty to "act with commitment and 
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." 
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.3, Commentary [1]. Consistent with counsel's duty of zealous advocacy, counsel 
has an ethical duty not to represent a client if that representation "will be materially limited by a 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by the personal 
interests of the lawyer...." I.R.P.C. 1.7(a)(2). 
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The Rules of Professional Conduct require a two-step analysis when addressing conflicts: 
first, determine whether a concurrent conflict exists, and then, second decide whether 
notwithstanding the conflict, the lawyer may continue to represent the client. In relevant part, 
Rule 1.7 reads: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of 
interest exists if: 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client 
or a third person or by the personal interest of the lawyer, including family and 
domestic relationships. I.R.C.P. Rule 1.7(a).1 
And even where an "actual" conflict is found to exist, a lawyer 
... may represent a client if: 
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other 
proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. I.R.C.P. 
Rule 1.7(b). 
The commentary to the rule requires that attorneys spend considerable energy and effort in 
identifying possible conflicts. They suggest that "to determine whether a conflict of interest 
exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures." Rule 1.7, Commentary [3]. Mr. Hall's 
counsel has generally outlined to the Court ex parte the procedures undertaken by the SAPD. In 
I The Commentary to Rule 1.7 expounds on counsel's ethical duty with the following suggestion 
under "Identifying Conflict of Interest: Material Limitation." "Even where there is no direct 
adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to 
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially 
limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests.... The critical questions are 
the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will 
materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering 
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the 
client." Commentary [8]. 
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an abundance of caution and in order to avoid creating any future appellate issues the SAPD has 
retained independent counsel to review any possible conflicts to meet with Mr. Hall, and to 
advise him of any potential conflicts, appearances of conflict, and any future consequences, if 
any, that those issues might have on his potential claims for relief or on appeal. The SAPO has 
made all files, notes, and materials available to independent counsel. Counsel also has access to 
any of the staff or attorneys working at the SAPD, and current contact information for Ms. 
Swensen and Mr. Ackley. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that neither Paula Swensen nor Mark Ackley, post-
conviction counsel for Mr. Hall at the time of the Hanlon (Hall II) trial, currently work for the 
SAPD. The current state of Idaho law clearly indicates that even where one attorney currently 
employed by the same public defender office labors under a conflict, that conflict will not 
necessarily be imputed to all other attorneys in the same office. State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 
794, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (CLApp. 2007).2 The Court of Appeals explains in its reasoning that 
Public Defenders represent an otherwise unique situation in the world of legal representation 
where the "potential for conflict that exists in representation by members of a private firm does 
not exist" primarily because there is "no financial incentive," and where" 'the inbred adversary 
tendencies of [public defense] lawyers are sufficient protection.'" Id. at 793 (bracketed language 
in original). Consequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that "a per se rule imputing 
conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the 
2 In Cook, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed a case where one public defender at the Kootenai 
Public Defender was representing a defendant at trial and another attorney in the same office 
"had recently represented or was currently representing numerous of the state's witnesses in 
Cook's case." 144 Idaho at 787, 171 P.3d at 1285. Although the facts in the instant case do not 
involve a conflict of representation between multiple defendants or witnesses in a case involving 
Mr. Hall, the fact that even such a clear apparent conflict did not lead the Court of Appeals to 
impute the conflict to all other attorneys at the Public Defender's Office is telling. 
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conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively represent a client." Id. at 794. The 
holding in Cook was ultimately adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Severson, 147 
Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009). 
If there was any contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Swensen and trial counsel in 
Hall II that would amount to a theoretical or actual conflict, those would be personal conflicts 
limited to those attorneys. The conflict could only be considered as one of "personal interest" 
under I.R.P.C. Rule 1.7. According to Rule 1.10, personal interest conflicts ordinarily are not 
imputed to other lawyers in a law firm.3 Even if Mr. Ackley or Ms. Swensen were still 
employed at the SAPD, neither the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor current Idaho law would 
require the imputation of such conflict to current lead counselor co-counsel for Mr. Hall. 
Any subsequent inquiry into actions taken by post-conviction counsel could conceivably 
tum them into witnesses arguendo in post-conviction proceedings or future hearings. However, 
because both attorneys no longer work for or with the SAPD, in any capacity, their role as 
possible witnesses does not present any problem for the Court, or for the State. Rule 3.7 of the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial 
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness." I.R.C.P. 3.7 (a).4 This prohibition does 
3 The relevant language is found in Rule 1.lO(a): "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none 
of them shall knowingly represent a client when anyone of them practicing alone would be 
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition is based on a personal 
interest ofthe prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk ofmaterially limiting the 
representation ofthe client by the remaining lawyers in thejirm. (Emphasis added.) 
4 The Commentary to Rule 3.7 contemplates such a scenario under the heading "Conflict of 
Interest: In determining if it is permissible to act as advocate in a trial in which the lawyer will 
be a necessary witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a 
conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rule 1.7 or 1.9. For example, if there is 
likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, the 
representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7." I.R.P.C. 
Rule 3.7, Commentary [6]. Furthermore, "Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not 
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not apply in the instant case because neither Mr. Ackley nor Ms. Swensen will be in the position 
as Mr. Hall's advocate in any future pleading or court proceeding. In addition, their prior 
involvement would not taint Mr. Hall's arguments or pleadings because a final amended petition 
has not been filed in Hall II; and in fact, as of the filing of this response no depositions have been 
made or taken concerning Hall II in preparation of finalizing claims for post-conviction relief. 
C. Necessity for Further Judicial Inquiry 
Counsel for Mr. Hall admits that the ultimate responsibility of ensuring conflict-free 
counsel for the petitioner lies with the Court. "Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 
272-73 (1981). "Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with 
solicitude for the essential rights of the accused ... The trial court should protect the right of an 
accused to have the assistance of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98S.Ct. 
1173, 1179 (1978). That inquiry should necessarily reflect the same two-step analysis reflected 
in I.R.P.C. Rule 1.7. The Court should make an inquiry that is both "searching" and "targeted at 
the conflict issue." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003). If the 
court determines that an actual conflict exists, it then "must obtain the defendant's knowing and 
intelligent waiver to the conflict, or provide the defendant with the opportunity to seek new 
counsel." Id. 
disqualified from serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated in 
a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a)." Id., Commentary [7]. 
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D. Preference for Conflict Determinations to Be Made by Counsel and Justification for 
Ex Parte Filings 
It has also been suggested that trial courts necessarily rely on defense counsel's good 
faith and good judgment to determine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of 
interest exists or will likely develop in the course of their representation. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 347 (1980). The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct also suggest that "determining 
whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved." 
I.R.P.C. Rule 3.7, Commentary [6]. The same Rules also make it clear that an attorney's failure 
to faithfully comply to those established standards provide grounds for discipline. See I.R.P.C., 
Preamble [19].5 
The preference for defense counsel to make the determination as to the existence and 
effect of a conflict, in the absence of a judicial inquiry, is also underscored in the very nature of 
the attorney-client privilege and the fact that the SAPD actively represented Mr. Hall at the time 
he was on trial for the instant case (Hall II). In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 
1173 (1978), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the extent to which 
appointed counsel is required to make disclosures to the Court regarding the basis for conflict of 
interest. In Holloway, counsel had been appointed to represent three co-defendants at a joint 
trial. Counsel had made motions requesting that separate counsel be appointed because of 
conflicts of strategy and defense that had arisen after counseling with his three clients 
individually. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "as to presenting the basis for that claim in 
more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violating, by more disclosure, his duty 
5 The United States Supreme Court has noted that "when a considered representation regarding a
 
conflict in clients' interests comes from an officer of the court, it should be given the weight
 
commensurate with the grave penalties risked for misrepresentation." Holloway v. Arkansas,
 
435 U.S. 475,486,98 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (1978).
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of confidentiality to his clients." Id. at 485. However, the Court noted that their holding does 
not "preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's 
representation regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of the 
confidential communications of the client." Id. at 487.6 
II.	 THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PREVENTS DISCLOSURE TO THE STATE OF 
ANY COMMUNICATION WITH MR. HALL 
All contacts with Mr. Hall by attorneys or staff from the SAPD are covered by the 
attorney-client privilege, work product rule, and rules of attorney-client confidentiality. When 
Mr. Hall was tried before the Court for the murder of Ms. Hanlon, the SAPD had already formed 
an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hall. Consequently, all subsequent communication, 
regardless of its content, falls under the mandates of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
which prevent disclosure.7 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are unambiguous in its order that "a lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
6 The accompanying warning from the Supreme Court cautions about "a court's power to compel 
an attorney to disclose confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his 
client ... Such compelled disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when 
the disclosure is to a judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences ...." Id. at 487, 
n.ll. 
7 The attorney-client privilege may be the oldest recognized privilege in the Common Law, and 
has been recognized at least since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. See, e.g., Hartford v. Lee, 21 
Eng. Rep. 34 (Ch. 1577). And, as Wigmore notes, the privilege was virtually "unquestioned" 
even then. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2290, at 547 (3d ed. 1940). The attorney-client privilege 
encourages "'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promotes broader public interests in the observance If law and the administration of justice.'" 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998) (quoting Upjohn 
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981).) "The privilege encourages 
clients to make full disclosure to their lawyers, and a 'fully informed lawyer can more effectively 
serve his client.'" Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 356 (6thCir. 1998). It is not hyperbole to 
suggest that the attorney-client privilege is a necessary foundation for the adversarial system of 
justice. In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446,450 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the 
disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 (a). There is no informed consent 
from Mr. Hall permitting current counsel to divulge the nature or content of any communications 
with his counsel. The few exceptions to the rule are enumerated as follows: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to 
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a crime, including disclosure of 
the intention to commit a crime; 
(2) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(3) To prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted 
from the client's commission of a crime in furtherance of which the client has 
used the lawyer's services; 
(4) To secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these 
Rules; 
(5) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal 
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client 
was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation of a client; or 
(6) To comply with other law or a court order. I.R.C.P. Rule 1.6 (b). 
(Emphasis added.) 
None of the preceding exceptions apply, preventing the SAPD from disclosing any 
communication with Mr. Hall. The State argues that "these conversations, documents, 
correspondence or notes that related specifically to the Hall II case prior to the SAPD 
appointment in the Hall II case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because 
the SAPD did not represent the Petitioner on Hall II during those time frames." State's Motion 
for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict, p. 2. The argument is a gross misunderstanding of the 
attorney-client privilege since the Rules of Professional Conduct specifically refer not to the 
representation of a case, but to "representation of a client." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 (a).8 
8 Hopefully, counsel for the State would acknowledge that one would expect post-conviction 
counsel to discuss any open cases (particularly where both are capital cases) with their client, and 
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A brief analysis of the Rules of Professional Conduct layout the scope of "representation 
of a client" and mandate that an attorney adequately communicate with their client. The 
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities to the I.R.P.C. emphasizes that "as advisor, a lawyer 
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and 
explains their practical implications ... as an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's 
legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others." I.R.P.C., Preamble [2]. 
Elsewhere, "a lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the 
representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a 
client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law." Id. at [4]. "A lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves 
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their 
legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private." Id. at [8]. And finally, 
"a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." I.R.P.C. Rule 1.4(b).9 
Consequently, the SAPD objects to the disclosure of all privileged information to the 
State regardless of its relevance to the conflict issue. And the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct recognize a client's authority to circumscribe or prevent the disclosure of privileged 
particularly any impact that case and its outcome might have on current arguments in post­
conviction litigation or on appeal, and whether a client's fundamental rights in determining the 
strategy of his open case might affect any post-conviction claims or appeals. See lR.P.C. Rule 
1.2 (to plead guilty or not guilty, to testify, and whether or not to waive a jury). To not do so 
would be ineffective assistance of counsel, and at the very least in violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
9 The comments add that "the client should have sufficient information to participate 
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which 
they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so ... For example, when 
there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important 
provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement." IRPC Rule 1.4, Commentary [5]. 
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information and communication, subject to the narrow exceptions noted above. The 
Commentary to I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6 provides as follows: 
[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the 
absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information 
relating to the representation. See Rule l.O(e) for the definition of informed· 
consent. This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer 
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to 
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally 
damaging subject matter ... 
[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related 
bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work produce doctrine and the 
rule of confidentiality establishes in professional ethics. The attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in 
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce 
evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in 
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through 
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to 
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose 
such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. See also Scope. 
[4] Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to 
the representation of a client. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a 
lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected information but could 
reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person ... 
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity 
claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel the disclosure. Absent 
informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf 
of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law 
or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney­
client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse ruling, the 
lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent 
required by Rule 1.4.... 
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes 
specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to 
take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure 
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in 
connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner 
that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other person having a need 
to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be 
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sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6, 
Commentary [2],[3] [4],[13],[14]. 
In keeping with the mandates and spirit of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
undersigned counsel has chosen to submit all motions regarding any investigation into possible 
conflict by way of ex parte filings. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests that the Court take under consideration 
independent counsel's current open investigation into the existence and implications of any 
possible conflicts with prior attorneys at the SAPD, and deem the SAPD's efforts through 
independent counsel adequate until further representations can be made to the Court ex parte. 
Counsel for Mr. Hall recognize that this Court will always have the duty and power to order a 
future hearing in order to fully satisfy the Court that Mr. Hall is afforded conflict-free counsel, or 
that an informed waiver of such conflict could be obtained. The petitioner also requests that the 
Court deny the State's request for disclosure of correspondence, notes, documents and 
conversations between members of the SAPD staff and Mr. Hall as they are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 6th day of August, 2010. 
~~ 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Le d Counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
NICOLE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct 
copy of the attached RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE 
SAPD CONFLICT (HALL II) by the method indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ---X- U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 Statehouse Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ~ Hand Delivery 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALI..,
 
Defendant. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
Case No. CV PC 2008 3085 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
 
OF STATE'S MOTION FOR
 
INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE
 
SAPD CONFLICT
 
(HALL II)
 
--------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State ofIdaho, and submits this Memorandum in Support of the State's Motion for Inquiry 
into Possible State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD") Conflict. 
I. LAW 
"Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that 
there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest." Wood v. 
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Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). "Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know 
that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lopez, 139 
Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations omitted), citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 
(2003). "In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an 
affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably should know 
that a particular conflict may exist." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 (2009), rehearing 
denied (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "A trial court's failure to conduct an 
inquiry, under certain circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's 
conviction." ld. 
"In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential 
conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the record." ld. at 704. 
"The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, 
or concern. However, in determining whether a conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on 
representations made by counsel. A court may inquire into the facts, but is under no original or 
continuing obligation to do so." ld. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
"Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists. If 
the court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing and voluntary 
waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. If, on 
the other hand, the court concludes that a conflict of interest does not exist, the representations 
may continue without a waiver." ld. (internal citations omitted). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
1. Conflict of Interest 
Based upon the case law, this Court should engage in a two-step process to handle this 
potential conflict issue. First, this Court should conduct an inquiry on the record. It should be 
noted that in Severson, the trial court conducted a hearing on the record and gave both sides the 
opportunity to address the potential conflict. Id. at 705. Second, this Court will need to 
determine if a conflict actually exists and if a conflict does exist, then the Petitioner should be 
given the opportunity to either knowingly and voluntarily waive the conflict or acquire new 
counsel. 
This Court itself is required to make inquiry into the conflict. Accordingly, this Court 
cannot rely upon Mr. Benjamin's independent review. This Court must conduct its own inquiry 
on the record. 
2. Attorney-Client Privilege 
The second issue that runs parallel to the conflict of interest inquiry is the extent to which 
the State is entitled to obtain and explore communications and/or work product that are the result 
of communications the SAPD had with trial counsel about Hall II matters. Those 
communications may well be the subject of ineffective assistance of counsel claims the SAPD 
now alleges in this post-conviction proceeding. 
In the Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD 
Conflict, the Petitioner requests that appellate counsel not be required to divulge confidential 
communications. The communications the State should be entitled to explore are those 
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communications the SAPD had with trial counsel regarding Hall II matters - not communications 
related to Hall I matters.! 
At the outset, it is worth noting that the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct outline 
circumstances in which a "lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." I.R.P.C. 1.6(b). Two of those 
circumstances may apply in this case. The first applicable exception is as follows: "to establish 
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer's representation ofa client." Id at 1.6(b)(5). This section makes clear that disclosure 
may be necessary to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 
representation of a client. This proceeding is a proceeding in which the Petitioner is claiming 
that his trial counsel were ineffective during the course of their representation of him. Similarly, 
I.R.E. provides that there is no attorney-client privilege under the I.R.E. 502 "as to a 
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the lawyer's client or by 
the client to the client's lawyer." I.R.E. 502(d)(3). The second potentially applicable section is 
as follows: "to comply with other law or a court order." I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). This section may 
apply were the court to conclude disclosure is necessary in order to make inquiry into whether a 
conflict exists. 
1 The State presumes that the SAPD would not have communicated with the Petitioner about Hall II matters outside 
trial counsel's presence. 
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Furthermore, this Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client 
Privilege with respect to any and all communications and work product between the Petitioner 
and trial counsel who represented him during the prosecution of Hall II. 
To the extent that the SAPD communicated with trial counsel during preparations and/or 
trial in this case, the State is entitled to obtain that information in order to respond to the 
Petitioner's post-conviction allegations. The Petitioner's Response in many ways begs the 
question. If the SAPD had communications with trial counsel that trial counsel then used to 
inform their decision-making in this case, the State is entitled to inquire of trial counsel about the 
nature of those communications and whether those communications informed any of their 
decisions. For example, if the SAPD communicated with trial counsel about a particular issue 
and that issue is now the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State is entitled 
to explore those communications so the State may respond to the post-conviction allegation. The 
Petitioner cannot use the privilege as a sword and a shield. He cannot make allegations that his 
trial counsel were ineffective and at the same time claim that communications current counsel 
(SAPD) had with trial counsel during their representation cannot be used to respond to those 
allegations. 
The State is cognizant of the complexity of this issue because of the overlapping 
representation of the SAPD who represented the Petitioner on Hall I post-conviction proceedings 
during the time trial counsel represented the Petitioner in Hall II trial proceedings. However, the 
State should not be hamstrung from obtaining information that is critical for responding to post-
conviction claims. At a minimum, the State should be entitled to consult with trial counsel about 
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claims. 
Finally, if there is a question about whether the State is entitled to obtain certain 
information because of that information is privileged, this Court could make inquiry into those 
specific areas on the record outside the State's presence to ensure that the State is not obtaining 
information that is cloaked in the privilege. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this Court conduct its own 
inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1:{"T>day of August, 2010. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
~;1(~ 
J . Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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REPLY TO MEMORANDUM
 
IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE 
SAPD CONFLICT (HALL II)
 
(CAPITAL CASE) --------------~) 
Counsel for Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through the State Appellate 
Public Defender's (SAPD) Office, submits the following reply to the State's Memorandum in 
Support ofState's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
In so doing, Counsel for Mr. Hall desires to respond to the States Memorandum and address the 
nature of the Court's inquiry into any potential conflict, along with the importance of the 
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality, and to suggest to the Court three distinct paths of 
possible inquiry. 
I. Conflicts of Interest 
Counsel for Mr. Hall agrees in principle with the Court's standard of inquiry as outlined 
by the Court on August 6, 2010. The State, in its Memorandum, relies principally on State v. 
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Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), in arguing that the Court is under "an affirmative duty to 
inquire into the potential conflict." However, the standard set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Severson was developed specifically "because Severson objected to the conflict of interest at 
trial." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009). It is clear in reading Severson that the 
Supreme Court was particularly concerned about those cases where an objection by the 
defendant had been raised at the time of trial, necessitating an inquiry by the Court to' determine 
the nature of the conflict and whether a waiver could be obtained. I Counsel for Mr. Hall has 
already acknowledged the Court's "affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever 
it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist.' State v. Lovelace, 140 
Idaho 53, 60 (2003)." Severson, 147 Idaho at 703 (2009) (italics added). However, it is 
important to remember that in Severson, the defendant had raised an objection to the relationship 
his court-appointed attorney had with another attorney representing the mother of the decedent, 
Id. at 701. In the other case the Supreme Court cites, State v. Lovelace, the State had raised the 
objection as to a conflict because the defense attorney was running for the position of County 
1 The Supreme Court's particular concern is evidenced by its rather lengthy discussion as to the 
ramifications of a defendant making an objection to a possible conflict of interest with his own 
appointed counsel. In Severson, the defendant had filed a pro se motion to reinstate former 
counsel because the defendant "argued that the appointment of Mr. Frachiseur violated his right 
to be represented by conflict-free counsel." 147 Idaho 694, 701 (2009). The entire discussion 
about the standard of review, and the implications of a defendant making an objection at the time 
of trial, can be found at II (A)(2) in the opinion. Id. at 702 through 704. There the Court 
discusses at length the effect of whether a defendant makes an objection at the time of trial. 
"[O]nce a defendant raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is constitutionally 
obligated to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists. A court's failure to make a 
proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will result in the automatic reversal of the 
defendant's conviction. Because the trial court's duty to inquire after a defendant makes a timely 
objection is a separate and distinct obligation, a defendant in such circumstances need not show 
that an actual conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance." Id. at 703 (internal citations 
omitted). Also see FN8 and FN9. !d. at 704. 
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Prosecuting Attorney at the time of his original appointment.2 Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 59 
(2003). 
In the instant case, Mr. Hall has never raised an objection or concern with the Court. 
Instead, the SAPD filed a notice informing the Court of its own concern and of a desire to allow 
Mr. Hall to consult with independent counsel regarding the issue. The SAPD believed that 
consultation with an independent conflict attorney would provide Mr. Hall with the opportunity 
to take any appropriate action they deemed necessary, including a motion for change of counsel, 
without interference from the SAPD. Although it is well recognized that the ultimate assurance 
of conflict-free counsel and the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment falls upon the Court, Counsel 
for Mr. Hall believe that the necessity for a thorough inquiry is triggered by an objection by the 
defendant, or specific information already known to either the Court or the District Attorney 
giving rise to a potential conflict. A general concern, as expressed in the State's original Motion 
for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict, does not establish sufficient grounds for a fishing 
expedition into counsels' communications with Mr. Hall. See State's Motion for Inquiry Into 
Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II), p. 1, ~2. The very purpose of the SAPD selecting independent 
counsel to advise Mr. Hall was with the intent of allowing Mr. Hall to determine whether he 
wanted to bring a potential conflict to the Court's attention without interference from the SAPD. 
An expression of that desire can only be made by Mr. Hall under the advice ofMr. Benjamin.3 
2 It should also be noted that in Lovelace, although the prosecution originally moved to have 
counsel disqualified on the basis of his current campaign, Lovelace subsequently consented and 
waived any potential conflict of interest. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 58 (2003). Lovelace later filed 
a motion to proceed pro se and asked that his appointed counsel be dismissed "due to a possible 
future conflict of interest." Id. at 59. 
3 See discussion in the following paragraph. It is clear that part of the reason the Courts have 
been concerned in providing a thorough and searching review of the conflict, which will 
withstand appellate review, is that the defendant must be provided with the type of inquiry which 
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As the State indicates in its own Memorandum, the Idaho Supreme Court has determined 
that: 
[i]n order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the 
potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the 
record. The court 'must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's 
dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern.' However, in determining whether a conflict 
exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on representations made by counsel. A 
court may inquire further into the facts, but 'is under no original or continuing 
obligation to do so.' Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted, italics added). 
Counsel is aware that neither the Court nor the State should necessarily be satisfied with 
representations made by the SAPD as to the nature of any potential conflict since the SAPD first 
raised the issue; however, counsel also believes that representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as 
independent conflict counsel, should not suffer the same skepticism and would certainly allow 
the Court to rely on his representations. The State's assertion in its Memorandum that "this 
Court cannot rely upon Mr. Benjamin's independent review" stands in stark contrast to the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Severson. See Memorandum, p. 3, ~2. 
II. Attorney-Client Privilege 
Counsel for Mr. Hall has already addressed at length the absolute importance of the 
attorney-client privilege in its Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
Conflict (Hall II). See Part II. However, counsel for Mr. Hall asserts that the State has not 
demonstrated any legitimate interest or authority in participating in any subsequent hearing 
regarding the existence of a conflict where confidential communications may be revealed. The 
State is entitled to all correspondence and documents in possession of the SAPD from 
Ms. Krystal and Mr. Chastain. The State has already been offered all of those documents. It is 
will "ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern." Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 
1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991), adopted by Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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not disputed that many of those materials necessarily waive any attorney-client privilege that 
Mr. Hall would have had with trial counsel. If given the opportunity to depose Ms. Krystal and 
Mr. Chastain, the State will also have an opportunity to conduct the same. 
Where privileged or confidential communications between the SAPD and Mr. Hall are 
called into question, the inquiry as to an existence of a conflict is for the Court to decide. As 
previously cited, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (lRPC), Rule 1.6 indicates that counsel 
should take all steps to limit the distribution of any confidential communications: 
[13] A lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client by a court or by another tribunal or governmental entity 
claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel to the disclosure. Absent 
informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on 
behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by 
other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by 
the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law. In the event of an adverse 
ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to 
the extent required by Rule 1.4. Unless review is sought, however, paragraph 
(b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the court's order. 
[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes 
specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to 
take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure 
adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made 
in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a 
manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons 
having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other 
arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. 
Commentary to IRPC, Rule 1.6 (emphasis added). Consequently, counsel for Mr. Hall objects to 
the release of any privileged or protected information to the State. 
Such request for privileged communications would not be unlike the State seeking to 
depose opposing counsel. This issue was most directly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50 (2004), and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). In those cases, 
the Supreme Court developed a three-prong test to determine the appropriateness of deposition 
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of opposing counsel. First, it must be shown that there is no means to obtain the information 
other than deposing opposing counsel; second, the information sought must be relevant and not 
privileged; and third, the information must be crucial to the preparation of the case-or in this 
case in the State's preparation to defend Mr. Hall's post-conviction claims. See Dunlap v. State, 
141 Idaho 50, 65 (2004); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 107-08 (1998). The State cannot meet 
any of the three required showings in this case. In addition, counsel for Mr. Hall reserves the 
right to request that any documents or communications eventually disclosed to the Court be 
under a protective order pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(c). 
III. Three Suggested Paths of Inquiry 
Counsel for Mr. Hall asks that the Court inquire of Mr. Benjamin at the Hearing 
scheduled for Thursday, August 26, 2010, as to Mr. Hall's desire to file a motion for inquiry into 
a potential conflict. If it is Mr. Hall's desire to proceed, then the SAPD would have no reason to 
object to a "thorough and searching" inquiry by the Court. In the event that the Court determines 
that further inquiry is warranted, Mr. Hall respectfully suggests three distinct alternatives. First, 
counsel for Mr. Hall would request that if the Court chooses to conduct such an inquiry, that it 
rely on the representations provided by Mr. Benjamin. Second, the Court has already made some 
indication that additional counsel may be required to advise Mr. Hall. In that event, the SAPD 
would respectfully request that the Court recognize that the SAPD has taken the appropriate 
actions in contracting with Mr. Benjamin, and has satisfied its obligation to Mr. Hall in providing 
independent counsel to advise him as to his options. Any additional counsel appointed by the 
Court, would be at the expense of Ada County, and should be considered as court-appointed 
counsel to Mr. Hall, with a limited scope of representation. Third, if the Court determines that 
representations by counsel would not be sufficient to satisfy the Court's obligation, then counsel 
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for Mr. Hall advises the Court that Mr. Hall would reserve the right to file a motion for 
disqualification of His Honor for the very limited purpose of that inquiry. 
A. The Court May Rely on the Representations of Mr. Benjamin as Conflict Counsel 
Once the SAPD identified involvement between its own post-conviction attorneys and 
trial counsel on Hall II (Hanlon), the SAPD decided out of an abundance of caution to contract 
with independent counsel for the purpose of determining if a conflict exists. Because the SAPD 
recognized that any evaluation of the nature and quality of the conflict made by its own attorneys 
would be compromised, the SAPD contracted with Conflict Counsel to evaluate the 
communications and independently advise Mr. Hall of the potential conflict and any rights he 
might have as a result. Mr. Benjamin was contracted by the SAPD as "counsel to Mr. Hall" and 
not as counsel to advise the SAPD. The SAPD has given Mr. Benjamin full access to attorney 
and client files regarding Mr. Hall's cases, and all communications with Hall II trial counsel. 
Any subsequent communications between the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin have been solely limited 
to providing him information regarding the scope of his inquiry and the reason for the inquiry. 
The process used by the SAPD in selecting Mr. Dennis Benjamin as conflict counsel was 
the exact same process used by the SAPD in selecting conflict counsel for appellate cases 
originally assigned to the SAPD for direct appeal or post-conviction representation where a 
conflict is identified. The Legislature has provided that the SAPD select and compensate 
conflict counsel in such cases. Idaho Code §19-871 provides as follows: 
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties 
required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state 
appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be 
compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender. 
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.. Here, the SAPD identified a situation in which it believed it was unable to adequately advise 
Mr. Hall. Consequently, the SAPD arranged for counsel and has assumed the financial 
responsibility for such an assignment. 
The selection of such conflict counsel is not unlike the procedure used at the trial level by 
the Ada County Public Defenders Office. In fact, Hall II was just such a case at trial. Originally, 
Mr. Hall was assigned attorneys from the Ada County Public Defenders Office for both the 
Henneman and Hanlon murders. Once Mr. Hall was convicted and sentenced for the murder of 
Ms. Henneman, concerns were raised about the ability of the Ada County Public Defenders to 
continue to represent Mr. Hall once a post-conviction petition was filed alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel against the Ada County Public Defenders Office and Mr. Hall waived his 
attorney-client privilege with those attorneys. Consequently, Mr. Chastain and Ms. Krystal were 
appointed to act as conflict trial counsel for Mr. Hall on the instant case. The Court did not 
participate in the selection of trial counsel and instead allowed Mr. Trimming and the Ada 
County Public Defenders to fulfill that function, as is common practice in such cases where the 
Public Defender will be responsible for payment. 
To question the independence of the conflict counsel appointed by the SAPD, would 
necessarily call into question the independence of all conflict counsel used by the SAPD in any 
case where the SAPD determines that a conflict exists. In fact, in those cases where conflict 
counsel is normally appointed the SAPD has already determined the presence of an actual 
conflict which disqualifies the SAPD from providing adequate representation to a defendant. In 
the instant case, the SAPD has contracted with conflict counsel solely to determine whether or 
not a conflict actually does exist and to advise the defendant of his rights if an actual conflict 
does exist. To call into question the independence of conflict counsel and his ability to 
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detennine and advise as to the nature of a conflict, would necessarily call into question the 
independence of conflict counsel where an actual conflict has already been identified. 
B. The Court May Appoint Independent Counsel to Conduct a Review and Advise Mr. Hall at 
the Court's Expense 
If the Court, for any reason, were not satisfied by the representations and investigation 
undertaken by Mr. Benjamin, the Court certainly has the discretion to appoint independent 
counsel, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence (hereinafter IRE) 706, which pennits the court to 
appoint experts. However, in criminal cases and certain types of civil cases, the cost of the 
expert is "payable from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions . 
.." IRE 706(b). As this is a post conviction case, and Mr. Hall is indigent, the cost of this expert 
would be borne by the county as outlined in I.C. §19-4904. 
When indigent petitioners file post conviction petitions, I.C. §§ 19-4904 and 19-860 
require the county to bear the cost of expenses in that post conviction case. While the SAPD 
recognizes that pursuant to I.C. §19-87l(d), the SAPD has statutory responsibility to represent 
capital client in post conviction, and concomitantly to pay for the costs incurred as part of that 
representation, the SAPD believes that they have satisfied that statutory burden by contracting 
with Mr. Benjamin. The cost of yet another independent counsel's services would not be a cost 
incurred by the SAPD, but would instead be a cost incurred by the district court requiring those 
services. When the SAPD incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual agreement between 
the SAPD and the expert or conflict counsel. 
If the Court were to appoint separate counsel to review the record and to provide advice 
to Mr. Hall, in addition to that already provided by Mr. Benjamin, such services would amount to 
expert opinion regarding the nature and extent of the conflict, and the various options available 
to Mr. Hall. The relevant statute can be found in I.C. §19-860(b): 
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If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney 
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district 
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his 
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for 
which for which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the 
amounts so prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with 
regard to the complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant 
considerations. 
In appointing such an attorney, the Court would be selecting an attorney other than the public 
defender and in defining the scope of representation would "determine the direct expenses 
necessary to representation." Thus, pursuant to I.e. §19-860(b) Ada County would then be 
responsible for the remuneration of such legal services. That representation would have to be 
sufficiently limited to the scope of an investigation into any potential conflict, and advising Mr. 
Hall, as his court-appointed attorney, as to what the ramifications may be and in making a 
decision whether such a conflict should be waived. 
Additionally, pursuant to I.C. §19-871, no determination has yet been made that the 
SAPO is unable to carry out the duties required in the Act; indeed, the SAPO remains counsel of 
record for Mr. Hall on both his post conviction case and the appeal from the judgment of 
conviction and Notice of Imposition of Death. Therefore, until an actual conflict is identified 
and a waiver of that conflict is not obtained, the SAPO is able, and willing to execute its 
statutory and constitutional obligations to Mr. Hall. 
C. A Judicial Inquiry Before a Different Judge Where Potential Bias or Prejudice Would be 
Removed 
If the Court determines that a full judicial inquiry or in camera review of specific facts 
and communications were necessary, Counsel for Mr. Hall would file a motion for 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPO CONFLICT 10 
001326
.  
e
.'
 
disqualification for cause for the limited purpose of that review or hearing.4 The necessity for 
such a disqualification would not be based on an argument that this Court is biased or prejudiced 
for or against Mr. Hall, under I.C.R. 25(b)(4), but in order to avoid future disqualification under 
the same section at subsequent proceedings were the Court to review documents that would 
contain privileged communications between Mr. Hall and counseLs The Court should ask that 
the case be reassigned to another judge for the purpose of determining the presence of a conflict 
and in obtaining an adequate waiver from Mr. Hall if necessary.6 Such a cautious approach 
would allow the Court to avoid the unpleasant prospect of being privy to otherwise confidential 
and protected communications that could inevitably effect future rulings or sentencings by the 
Court. 
IV. Conclusion 
Counsel for Mr. Hall respectfully requests the Court to take under thoughtful 
consideration Mr. Benjamin's assessment and evaluation of the existence of any potential 
conflict of interest. The Court may rely on those representations, particularly where the 
4 Although the Supreme Court has recently suspended Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a)4, the rest of the 
rule, including I.C.R. 25(b)(4),(c) and (e), remains in effect. See In re: Suspension of Idaho 
Criminal Rule (fCR.) 25(a), Order Suspending Rule, issued July 23, 2010, by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
S The need for frankness cannot be overemphasized in conducting a thorough and adequate 
investigation into the existence of any conflict. However, the United States Supreme Court has 
cautioned that care should be taken to curb "a court's power to compel an attorney to disclose 
confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client ... Such 
compelled disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure 
is to a judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences ...." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 
U.S. 475, 487 (1978). 
6 The process would not be unlike that used occasionally by the courts in asking a "money 
judge" to make certain limited rulings. For instance, in Dale Shackelford's capital case in Latah 
County, the district court judge presiding over Mr. Shackelford's jury trial and sentencing 
appointed a money judge to handle requests for expert assistance and make other funding 
decisions. (State of Idaho v. Dale Shackelford, Case No. CR-00-00260, Order appointing 
"money judge.") 
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defendant has raised no objection. In the event that the Court requires further inquiry, Counsel 
asks that such an inquiry be assigned to a separate judge for review, and that the State be barred 
from those proceedings, where they have established no interest in the nature of those 
communications which are clearly protected under attorney-client privilege and confidentiality. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 20th day ofAugust, 2010. 
{L~~ 
IAN H. HOMSON 
Lea Counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
NICOLE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT 12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct 
copy of the attached REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT by the method indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 ~ Statehouse Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
JAN BENl\TETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ~ Hand Delivery 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE SAPD CONFLICT 13 
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Sessi~n: 
, .. \ Neville082610 
Page 1 
Session: Neville082610 Division: DC Courtroom: CR501 
Session Date: 2010/08/26 Session Time: 10:25 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s): 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s) 
Probe Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s) 
Case ID: 0004 
Case Number: CVPC08-03085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: ST OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
Public Defender: 
2010/08/26 
15:07:11	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
15:07:11	 - New case
 
, ST'OF IDAHO
 
15:07:27	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Time set for further hearing.
 
15:11:32	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts argued inquiry should be taken. Argues there i 
s basis for Court 
15:13:17	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
to make inquiry
 
15:13:24 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Mr.	 Thomson responded. Mr. Benjamin here and the Court can 
inquire of Mr. 
15:19:27	 - Pers. Attor~ey: THOMSON, IAN
 
Benjamin
 
15:19:36	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court's limited question is if any objection to the Cou 
rt making inquiry 
15:20:17	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
Mr. Thomson responded.
 
15:22:09	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court responded.
 
15:22:27	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Not enough specificity in the State's motion. No objection 
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to the Court 
15:23:03	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
inquiring, willing to concede the Court has to be satisfied. 
Would request 
15:24:-10	 '- Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
the Court inquire of Mr. Benjamin who has reviewed the file 
and spoke with 
15:24:27	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
defendant to inquire if he has an objection, and if not, the 
n would object to 
15:24:52	 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
further inquiry 
15:24:57-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts responded. 
15:26:18	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
The Court has to be satisfied and don't believe the Court ca 
n rely on a 
15:26:34	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
statement or conclusion. Inquiry would need to be on the re 
cord 
15:27:19	 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Mr. Thomson responded re: the Court may rely on statements 0 
f counsel 
15:27:49	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts notes defendant waived his right to be here tod 
aye ­
15:28:39	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has a duty to inquire. The Court has carefully co 
nsidered argument 
15:29:42 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
of counsel on both sides. 
15:30:14	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will grant State's motion for inquiry of possible 
conflict of SAPO. 
15:30:30- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court needs to decided proper scope. 
15:34:3~	 .~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Mr. Thomson responded without a waivor or an order, not allo 
wed to disclose 
15: 36: 01 '. ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
anything further re: nature of conflict. 
15:36:15	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court stated dd not understand case was conflicted out t 
o Mr.(Benjamin 
15:36:35'-	 Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Limited purpose of advising Mr. Hall on what action he shoul 
d take. 
15:37:47	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court inquired of State's view of inquiring of Mr. Benja 
min 
15:38:00	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts sees conflicting a case to new counsel, may nee 
d further 
15:39:17	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
information 
15:39:30	 ~ Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Mr. Thomson responded 
15:40:06 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
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Ms. Bennetts requested brief moment to think through th~s fu 
rther 
15:40:29	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court unclear whether Mr. Benjamin would be taking witne 
ss stand. 
15:41:15 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
Mr.	 Thomson stated did not want to leave impression that Mr. 
Benjamin would 
15:41:38	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
be taking over case. He would only be making representation 
s to the Court 
15:41:56 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN 
not as a witness. 
15:42:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The	 Court will take 10 minutes recess 
15:42:29	 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
15:58:23	 - Operator 
Recording: 
15:58:23	 - Record 
, ST OF IOAHO 
15:58:35	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
responds on behalf of SAPO, Mr. Benjamin is there on behalf 
of the conflict 
15:59:48	 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
issue~ SAPO is counsel of record unless a conflict is found 
16:00:13	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms. Bennetts states appreciates explanation. Would be appro 
p. to talk to Mr. 
16:00:41 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Benjamin	 and inquire what he was tasked to do. Court has to 
inquire and make 
16:00:55 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
a	 record. Until we hear further of Mr. Benjamin, it is hard 
to see if this 
16:01:27	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
needs to go further 
16:01:46	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court if Mr. Benjamin bound by atty/client privilege, no 
t sure how 
16:03:05	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
helpful this would be. Court only aware that trial counsel 
had cOntact with 
16:03:36·-	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
SAPO, not sure of anything further beyond that and whether t 
here really is a 
16:03:56	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
conflict, need to know the basis. 
16:06:03	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would like the SAPO to supplement the notice and file 
by Monday an 
16:06:27	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
amended notice that gives the Court something specific that 
gives "the basis 
16:06:42	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
for a conflict. 
16:08:07 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
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Court will set over to September 1, 2010 @ 2:00 for further 
inquiry. 
16:12:04	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will wait to hear from Mr. Benjamin until after th 
e Amended Notice 
16:12:28	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
filed. 
16:13:04	 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
Mr. Bourne stated at some point the Court i~ going to need t 
o know where 
16:13:36 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
advice	 was given. If the SAPO claiming they gave advice and 
trial counsel 
16:14:29 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
followed	 that advice and now claim ineffective assistance of 
counsel for 
16:14:43	 - State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
following that advice. 
16:15:11	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
Ms. Huskey responded re: not placing add'l information that 
could place Court 
16:15:57	 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
in awkward position, that is why Mr. Benjamin was called in 
to keep Court 
16:16:21	 .~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
neutral and isolated and protected for level of appellate re 
view. Feel 
16:16:42- Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
cannot provide the add'l information Court is inquirng, woul 
d have to inquire 
16:17:01-	 Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
of Mr. Benjamin. Request that at this point to be able to d 
efer to Mr. 
16:17:49	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
Benjamin on this issue. 
16:18:16	 '- Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court's understanding that Judge Copsey concluded there was 
a conflict based 
16:18:33	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
on the filings made. The Court is not at that point, so una 
ble to make a 
16:18:49	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
finding. 
16:20:32	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court responded 
16:22:00	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
In order for the Court to determine if there is a conflict, 
believe this has 
16:22:22	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY 
to come from Mr. Benjamin 
16:22:30 ;- State Attorney: Bourne, Roger 
The state views that differently 
16:22:41	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The SAPO stated this notice filed in June and there must hav 
e been something 
16:23:02	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
there to file that notice that cause the SAPO to hire Mr. Be 
njamih to look at 
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16:23:18	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
the possible conflict. The SAPO still should have a basis f
 
or filing that
 
16:23:39	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
notice.
 
16:25:08	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
Mr. Thomson responded
 
16:25:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The	 Court willing to hear from Mr. Benjamin but would like a 
basis for what 
16:26:22	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
triggered the notice of conflict
 
16:26:36	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
Mr. Thomson responded. Believe the Court is turning to the
 
wrong attorney
 
16:28:01	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court stated would be more pursuaive if SAPO was out of
 
case and Mr.
 
16:28:18	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Benjamin was making that argument
 
16:28:57	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
Don't 'believe case needs to conflicted out unless there is
 
a conflict, and
 
16:29:15	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
we don't know that yet.
 
16:29:49	 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
 
Ms. Huskey responded
 
16:30:50-	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court would at least like some bench marks on what it is tha
 
t caused the
 
16:31:15	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
notice of possible conflict.
 
16:32:50- Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
 
inquired if Mr. Benjamin would be allowed to file an objecti
 
on fo~ disclosing
 
16:33:1~	 - Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
 
that
 
16:33:22	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court'did not want to go that route
 
16:33:52	 ~ Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
 
Inquired if Court could inquire of Mr. Benjamin if he would
 
object to SAPO
 
L16:34:13	 Other: HUSKEY, MOLLY
 
filing an Amended Notice
 
16:34:24	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court belives there is a basis or not a basis. Court wo
 
uld like to know
 
16:35:13	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
what the concern is. Court does not mind having something f
 
iled by Mr.
 
16:36:11-	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Benjamin as well.
 
16:37:07	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
Mr. Thomson stated there was no preliminary concern by SAPO
 
to believe there
 
16: 37 : 26,- Pers . Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
is a conflict, was merely on abundance of caution with thing
 
s that happened
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16:37:43	 - Pers. Attorney: THOMSON, IAN
 
in the Abdullah case.
 
16:38:13	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will see the parties next wednesday at 2:00 p.m.
 
16:38:32	 - Operator
 
Stop recording:
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
.\10, ---==_State Appellate Public Defender ~..M. ~ 'Forl::State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
AUG 3,0 2010 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
ByJANETL.EW8Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders OEPUTY 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 ORIGiNAL
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CVPC08-03085 
) 
v. ) AMENDED NOTICE OF 
) POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
Undersigned counsel for the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, at this Court's request, hereby 
provides notice of previous contact between post-conviction counsel from the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office (SAPD) and Mr. Hall's trial counsel. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Hall was found guilty in connection with the rape, kidnapping and killing of Lynn 
Henneman in October of 2004 in Ada County Case Number CR-FE 2003-0000518. As a result 
of his conviction of first degree murder, Mr. Hall received a sentence of death. Thereafter, the 
SAPD was appointed to represent Mr. Hall, and that case has since been designated "Hall I." 
Mark Ackley and Paula Swensen were the attorneys at the SAPD assigned to represent Mr. Hall 
in Hall I. While the SAPD was representing Erick Hall in Hall I, the above-captioned case 
against Mr. Hall involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon was proceeding in the district court where 
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 1 
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Mr. Hall was represented by Deb Kristal and Rob Chastain. That case involving the death of 
Cheryl Hanlon has since been designated "Hall II." 
During their representation of Erick Hall in Hall I, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen retained 
experts and filed original and amended petitions on his behalf with this Court. During the course 
of Hall I's post-conviction case proceeding, the case against Mr. Hall in Hall II was also moving 
forward at the trial level, where Mr. Hall was represented by Deb Kristal and Rob Chastain. 
Due to the overlap between some of the experts and testing in Hall I and Hall II, this 
Court encouraged the SAPD to cooperate with Mr. Hall's trial counsel in Hall II by sharing 
testing results and expert reports, in an effort to preclude duplication of efforts and unnecessary 
expenditure of scarce resources. The SAPD did cooperate with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing 
testing and expert information obtained in Hall I. 
In light of lengthy delays caused by conflict concerns in an unrelated case, and out of a 
desire to avoid any similar delays in the post-conviction litigation of Mr. Hall, counsel from the 
SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict ofInterest with the Court on June 29, 2010, 
informing the Court of contacts between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen and Mr. Hall's trial 
counsel. On August 3, 2010, the State filed a related Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
Conflict. On August 6, 2010, this Court heard from both sides regarding the Ex Parte Notice and 
the State's Motion for Inquiry, and ordered the following: (1) that the State be provided with a 
copy of the Ex Parte Notice filed by the SAPD on June 29, 2010; (2) that both the State and 
counsel for the Petitioner file memoranda in support of their respective positions; and (3) that all 
parties return for further hearings on August 26, 2010. The Court was informed that the SAPD 
had contracted with Dennis Benjamin to handle that matter, and that he would be advising 
Mr. Hall. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 2 
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At that hearing, undersigned counsel opposed the State's Motion for Inquiry and stated 
that Mr. Benjamin was present in order to address the Court as to the status of his investigation 
and representation of Mr. Hall for the limited purpose of determining whether a further inquiry 
was necessary. This Court subsequently asked that the SAPD file an Amended Notice of 
Possible Conflict, stating the type and extent of contact that gave rise to the original Notice of 
Possible Conflict of June 29. 
During the period between the appointment of Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain and the 
sentencing of Mr. Hall in Hall II, there were numerous contacts between trial counsel and post­
conviction counsel. Over the course of several months those contacts included the following: 
emailsbackandforth,primarilybetweenMr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal; phone calls between 
Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain; meetings on at least two occasions where all 
attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with staff at the SAPD in order to facilitate or 
arrange the exchange of information regarding testing and experts. Given the SAPD's recent 
vigilance and sensitivity to conflict concerns, the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict was filed 
due to the extent of the communications between counsel. 
Since Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain were involved in all communications with the SAPD 
regarding Hall II, and Mr. Hall has waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to his trial 
counsel, the content and nature of those communications have already been made available to the 
State by providing complete access to trial counsels' files. In addition, if the State desires to 
inquire further, Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain would be free to discuss those matters in person. 
Because Mr. Hall has not waived any privilege or confidentiality with the SAPD, any further 
disclosure as to the specific content of those communications should be directed at 
Mr. Benjamin. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 3 
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DATED this 30th day of August, 2010. 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Lead counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
" 
NICOLE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Erick Virgil Hall 
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of August, 2010 served a true and correct 
copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST by the 
method indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 ~ Statehouse Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
-­
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ~ Hand Delivery 
AMENDED NOTICE OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST 5 
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Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA# 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock AUG ~ 0 ?em 
Boise, Idaho 83701 J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cll,};-'!(208) 343-1000 By E. HOLMES 
u:?t;-:'Y(208) 345-8274 (f) 
Attorneys for Petitioner as to the Conflict ofInterest Issue Only 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
ERICK HALL, ) NO. CV PC 2008-03085 
) 
Petitioner, ) LIMITED NOTICE OF 
) APPEARANCE 
vs. ) 
) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, )
 
)
 
Respondent. )
 
---------------) 
Dennis Benjamin of the firm Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP enters a limited 
appearance as attorney for petitioner as to the conflict of interest issue on ly. 
'\jl--. 
DATED this~ day of August, 2010. 
DeJAV\'3~ ,~
 
Dennis Benjamin \ 
1· LIMITED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
ORIGI~JAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on th~ay of August, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be: 
&'mailed 
faxed 
hand delivered 
to:	 Roger Bourne 
Jan Bennetts 
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ian Thomson
 
Nicole Owen
 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
 
Boise, ID 83707
 
2· LIMITED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
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Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA# 4199 NO. --::::-:'~
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP "ILlA.M 13,
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock AUG 3 0 '010 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 J. DAVID NAVARRO, CIQr~; 
ByE. HOLMEe(208) 345-8274 (£) D::::PUTV 
Attorneys for Petitioner as to the Conflict of Interest Issue Only 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
ERICK HALL, ) NO. CV PC 2008-03085 
) 
Petitioner, ) NOTICE OF FILING 
) UNDER SEAL 
vs. ) 
) 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, )
 
)
 
Respondent. )
 
---------------) 
Please take note: The Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin is attached under seal hereto. 
DATED this~~dayof August, 2010. 
u~~
 
Den';;is Benjamin 
I· NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL OR\G\NAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~1d'ayof August, 2010, I caused a tme and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be: 
(C mailed 
faxed 
hand delivered 
to: Roger Bourne 
Jan Bennetts 
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorneys 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ian Thomson
 
Nicole Owen
 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
 
Boise, ID 83707
 
~~~---Dennis Benjamin 
2· NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL
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iA. 
Session: Neville090110 Division: DC Courtroom: CR501 
Session Date: 2010/09/01 Session Time: 13:02 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s) 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s) 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
-~-----------------------------;---------------------"l 
Case ID: 0002 
Case Number: CVPC08-03085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE 
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN 
2010/09/01 
14:37:13	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
14:37:13	 - New case
 
, STATE OF IDAHO
 
14~37:44	 - Other: BOURNE, ROGER
 
here on behalf of State with Doug Varie
 nd Jan Bennetts 
14:38:02	 - Other: Benjamin, Dennis
 
States has filed a Notice of Limited App
 arance for the Conf 
lict Issue as 
14:38:24	 - ·Other: Benjamin, Dennis
 
well.
 
14:38:36	 - Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Notes for record Petitioner does not wan
 to be here for the 
se hearings 
14:39:40	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court notes several documents filed by M . Benjamin on Augus
 
t 30th.
 
14:40:18	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Ms. Bennetts stated did see all of those
 
14:40:36	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court inclined to ask State for add'l fi ing or brief from t
 
he State,
 
14:41:22	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
inquired how long that hearing would tak
 
14:41:40 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
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..t e	 eI 
Ms.	 Bennetts believed it would take 3 weeksabOU~ 
14:42:56	 - Pers. Attorney: OWENS, NICOLE
 
Believes may run through most of Septemb r
 
14:43:17	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
Court will request State's response by 0 tober 4th and then
 
hearingon October
 
14:43:48	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
19, 2010 ~ 1:30 p.m.
 
14:44:09	 - Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomson inquired what would all happ n on October 19
 
14:44:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. t 
The co.urt has granted the motion for inq iry, hearing on the 
19th. 
14:45:18	 ~ Public Defender: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Inquired if Court would be ok with filin a written outline
 
14:46:57	 ~ Judge: Neville, Thomas F. L
 
Court will request written outline of su~gested procedures b
 
y the 12th I
 
14:47:43-	 Operator ' 
g 
-- .. __ sto,,-recOrdin , ---------..- --- ---. -- .. ~._- ­1 -­
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NO'] , FILED 
A.M {)- ~ 0 P.M._-­
OCT 04 2010 
J 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) .Case No. CV-PC-08-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) INOTICE OF FILING UNDER 
) SEAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
--------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and gives Notice that the State has filed the State's Response to SAPD's 
Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin under seal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this If1':=. day of October 2010. 
IGREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
~J111xMdC
 
J . Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL (HALL II), Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1f' day of October 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL was served on Ian Thompson, Deputy 
State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 and Dennis 
Benjamin, 303 W. Bannock St. Boise, Idaho 83702 in the manner noted below: 
.~ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at 
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 
~ By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _
 
NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL (HALL m, Page 2 
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R E CE I v E D STATE OF IDAHO 
IN CHAMBERtFFICE OF HE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
OCT 12 2010 
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
DISTRICT ,IUDGE 
October 12, 2010 
Judge Thomas F. Neville 
200 W. Front Street, 5th Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
Re: Conflict Inquiry in Hall II 
Dear Honorable Judge Neville, 
In deciding how to proceed with a conflict inquiry'l it appears that there are four distinct 
routes that the Court may take in satisfying its obligation. First, the Court could make an inquiry 
of Mr. Benjamin, placing on the record the efforts he has made and his evaluation and 
consultation with Mr. Hall. Second, the Court could follow the model established by Judge 
Copsey in the case of Azad Abdullah and decide to appoint Mr. Hall yet another attorney, at the 
county's expense, to review the privileged files and counsel Mr. Hall as to any possible conflict 
issues. Third, the Court could determine that there must be an ex parte in camera review of 
documents in order to determine for itself whether there is a conflict. And finally, the Court 
could order that the SAPD hand over the contents of its files and order that privileged 
communications be disclosed to the State and be subject to examination in an adversarial 
hearing. In order to fully explore those options, I will address them one at a time. 
First, the Court may rely on the representations o~ Mr. Benjamin and accept the advice 
given to Mr. Hall on his evaluation of whether a conflict eDdsts. The SAPD made an attempt to 
avoid the need of a full-blown hearing by contracting with Mr. Benjamin to act as conflict 
counsel for Mr. Hall for the limited purpose of assessing the conflict issue. I believe that if the 
Court were to hear from Mr. Benjamin, on the record, his representation and analysis would 
Slale Appcllate PulJlic Defcndcr
 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
 
Boise, ID 83703
 
Telephone: (208) 334-2712 FAX: (208) 334-2985
 
001349
~---R--E~CE-I-V-E-D---'  F I  
 
 
i
t t e e e  
 
l3 ise.  
 
, . 
accomplish the exact same function as did Mr. Roark in the case of Mr. Abdullah before the 
Honorable Judge Copsey. 
I believe that Mr. Benjamin would be able to establish the following: (l) Mr. Benjamin 
contracted with the SAPD as counsel to Mr. Hall for the specific purpose of evaluating whether 
any conflict exists, and advising Mr. Hall on how he should proceed; (2) Mr. Benjamin has not 
had any contact with the SAPD regarding his investigation into the matter, or his advice to Mr. 
Hall, beyond obtaining materials necessary to his review; (3) Mr. Benjamin's communications 
with Mr. Hall fall under the attorney-client privilege, and consequently, he has not divulged that 
information to anyone, including the SAPD; (4) Mr. Benjamin was granted complete access to 
the SAPD client file with Mr. Hall for both Hall I and Hall II, including all attorney notes from 
Mr. Hall's counsel during the period in question, and all documentation relating to any 
communication between the SAPD attorney and staff and Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal; (5) Mr. 
Benjamin also had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Ackley, Ms. Swensen, Mr. Chastain, and 
Ms. Kristal; and (6) according to his affidavit he does not believe a conflict exists in having the 
SAPD continue to represent Mr. Hall and has advised his cl~ent accordingly. 
Such a path should satisfy the Court that a searching and independent inquiry has been 
made into the issue. In addition, this path would be the least expensive and least intrusive. The 
SAPD notified the Court in June that it was concerned with the amount of interaction between 
the SAPD staff and Mr. Hall's trial counsel during the leap up to the trial in Hall II. Knowing 
that the conflict issue had significantly delayed Mr. Abdullah's proceedings, we attempted to 
speed up the process and avoid the need for court-appointed counsel to conduct what we 
considered to be the inevitable. Mr. Benjamin's review did require several weeks and included a 
fairly exhaustive review of correspondence notes. The SA\PD has already contracted to pay for 
the conflict work being done by Mr. Benjamin, at no cost to Ada County. In addition, relying on 
Mr. Benjamin's representations would avoid the problematic issue of asking yet another attorney 
to act as counsel to Mr. Hall, creating yet another protected attorney-client relationship between 
Mr. Hall and another attorney. 
I suggest that relying on the assistance of Mr. Benjamin would allow for a similar process 
to that established by Judge Copsey. (For Your Honor's consideration I have enclosed with this 
letter a copy of the transcript from Mr. Abdullah's conflict inquiry, conducted by Judge Copsey 
on April 23, 2010.) In the case of Mr. Abdullah, the Coutt appointed Mr. Roark as counsel to 
2
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Mr. Abdullah. That appointment was as counsel to Mr. Abdullah, and was never considered an 
independent investigator for the Court. Mr. Roark reviewed the client's files and all of the 
materials that he subsequently requested to review. Conse~uently, he appeared before the Judge 
to make representations as to what efforts had been undertdken and what advice he had provided 
to Mr. Abdullah. It was then through the privileged counsel provided by Mr. Roark that Mr. 
Abdullah made a knowing and voluntary waiver of any conflict that may have been identified. 
Mr. Benjamin's representation would accomplish the same thing by avoiding the need for an 
identical inquiry being made by a similarly situated attorney, but this time at the county's 
expense. 
Second, the Court certainly has the prerogative and ,power to appoint counsel to Mr. Hall 
in order to assess any possible conflict issue and to advise him as to how to proceed. This would 
be the same route taken by Judge Copsey in the case of Mr. Abdullah. However, the only 
noticeable difference between such a court appointment and the reliance on Mr. Benjamin's 
work would be whether the SAPD or the Court had selected the attorney to be contracted. If the 
Court chooses to contract such an attorney, our position would be that such an appointment 
would be at county expense since our office has already paid for the exact same service being 
provided. It is worth noting that the fact that the SAPD selected Mr. Benjamin as conflict 
counsel should not be any different from the normal procedure in cases where there are conflicts. 
Both at the trial and appellate level the Ada County Public Defender or the SAPD is generally 
charged with not only selecting a conflict attorney but also paying for those services. 
The third option for the Court would be to order a judicial inquest into the contents of 
privileged SAPD files. Such an order would be a piercing of the attorney-client privilege and 
would expose Mr. Hall and the SAPD to unprotected breaches of any confidentiality. If the 
Court were to order that the SAPD produce files that are protected under the attorney-client 
privilege, in order for the Court to evaluate the existence of any conflict, the SAPD would most 
likely file a motion requesting a recusal by Your Honor and asking that a separate judge review 
the documents and make a determination of the conflict issue. Such a request would ensure that 
the Court would be insulated from any possible prejudice or conflict (real or perceived) in 
making decisions regarding either of Mr. Hall's pending c~ses post-conviction cases, or in any 
3
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future decisions made by the Court. It would also be requested that such an inquiry be conducted 
ex parte, since the State can offer no justifiable interest to participate in the Court's investigation. 
The purpose of the investigation would be to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted with 
respect to Mr. Hall's case and whether such a conflict could be waived. To make the State a 
party in a proceeding that could determine its own adversary would be tantamount to allowing 
the State to help select opposing counsel. 
The State's most recent response suggests that the Court itself must conduct an inquiry 
into the conflict issue. However, the State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible 
Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, is replete with speculation. Although there are 
countless suggestions of what might be the case, none of it is founded in either reason or based 
on fact. Such is the very definition ofa fishing expedition. 
The final option would be for Your Honor to order that the SAPD produce attorney-client 
files and turn them over to the State as part of discovery in preparation for an adversarial hearing 
on the conflict issue. To allow the State to enter into priv~leged files for the ostensible purpose 
of rooting out possible conflict, would simultaneously graIilt the State the opportunity to search 
those files for all other information relevant to the underlying litigation. It is impossible to grant 
the State access to privileged information "for a limited purpose." Any privileged information, 
once it is released, will never again enjoy the protections of privilege-it is akin to trying to put 
the genie back in the bottle. If the Court were to pursue such a path, the SAPD would counsel 
with Mr. Hall concerning his rights to file an interlocutory appeal contemplated by Commentary 
No. 13 to Rule 1.6 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
We acknowledge that the Court has a serious duty to ensure that Mr. Hall is represented 
by conflict-free counsel. We also acknowledge that the Court has a wide array of options in 
determining how that duty can be met. In consideration of that duty, we would respectfully 
request that Your Honor also take into consideration and weigh the following factors: (1) the 
avoidance of additional and unnecessary delays, (2) the con~ervation of limited County and State 
resources, (3) the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and (4) a concerted effort to avoid 
creating any future or unnecessary conflicts with the Court. We suggest that the first option laid 
out in this letter would both satisfy the Court's obligation while at the same time take into 
4
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account these other important factors. Consequently we would request that Your Honor order an 
ex parte hearing where Mr. Benjamin could testify, on the record, as to the actions he has taken 
and the determinations he has made in reviewing the SAPD's files with Mr. Hall. Such a hearing 
would provide the Court with ample opportunity to question Mr. Benjamin in order to determine 
whether any conflict can be identified on behalf of Mr. Hall. 
s~cerelY, 
~~ 
Ian H. Thomson 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Enclosure 
Transcript in the case of Abdullah v. State, April 23, 2010 
cc:	 Jan Bennetts, Ada County Prosecutor 
Mr. Dennis A. Benjamin, Esq., Nevin, Benjamin & McKay 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
 
IAZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, ) DOcket No. 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant,) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. CV-PC-05-21802 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
--------------) 
TRANSCRIPT ON A~PEAL
 
Hearing Date: April 23, 2010
 
Appealed from the District Court of the
 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
 
the County of Ada, in the City of Boise 
Honorable Cheri cL Copsey 
District Court JUdge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate PUb~ic Defender· 
Boise, Idaho 
Attorney for Appellant 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho ~ 
~~ 
,~~ 
Attorney for Respondent ~,,~ 
Q.~G .~.~
 ~ ~ ~~~ ~~Y:01.:.,~ ~<r('f('fitot,.~Q~ <oi~~COf;-'~\j~\) 
Reported by 
Melanie L. Gorczyca 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter #729 
Registered Professional Reporter 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, ) Docket No. 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant,) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. CV-PC-05-21802 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
Received from Melanie L. Gorczyca, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Registered 
Professional Reporter, of the above-entitled action, 
and lodged with me this 1st day of June 2010. 
J. David Navarro
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
MA1llEYJ.THIf;S~' 
Deputy Cler~ . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, ) Case No. CV-PC-05-21802 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
)
)
)
) 
)
)
)
) 
-------------) 
WAIVER HEARING 
Held on April 23, 2010
 
Before the Honora~le Cheri C. Copsey
 
District Court Judge
 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
The Roark Law Firm 
R. KEITH ROARK 
409 North Maih 
Hailey, ID 83333 
For the Defendant: . 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
SHAWNA DUNN 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
, 
Reported by 
Melanie L. Gorczyca 
Certified Shorthand Reporter #729 
Registered Professional Reporter 
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15 MOLLY J. HUSKEiY 
StiS" Appellate Public: D6teftder 
16 Bobe, Idaho 
Atto;rney fO;r Ap~l!tllan.t 
LAWRUCB G. N.\SD£)J 
Attorney Gener.l
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9 WAIVER HEARING 
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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
2 ) Docket No. _
 
3 )
 
Petitioner-Appellant,)
 
4 )
 
V$. ) Case No. CV-PC-OS-21802
 
5 )
 ST~TE OF IDAHO,
 
AZAD HAll ABDULLAH, 
6 
RespOndent. ) 
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10 Received from Melanie L. Gorczyca, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Registered 
11 ! Professional Reporter, of the above-entitled action, 
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17 J. David Navarro 
Clerk of the District Court 
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23 
Depu ty Clerk 
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4 
1 THE COURT: Before we get to the heart of 
2 the matter, I want to make sure everyone got a copy 
3 of the letter that Mr. Abdullah sent to me. 
4 MS. DUNN: The State did, Your Honor. 
5 Thank you. 
6 MR; ROARK: I did, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Abdullah, I want to remind 
8 you that anything you send to me I have to turn over 
9 to everybody else. Okay? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the 
11 affirmative.) 
12 THE COURT: Otherwise It Is what they call 
13 an ex parte communication. So Just so you know, If 
14 you write me anything In the future, everybody gets a 
15 copy. An right? 
16 TH E DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the 
17 affirmative.) 
18 THE COURT: Now I do want to address a 
19 couple of things In the letter so that I can answer 
20 some of your questions because I think they are 
21 legitimate questions. And then what we will do Is, 
22 Mr. Roark, I will then ask you to kind of layout -­
23 without divulging any advice that you have given or 
24 any of your findings, to layout sort of the process 
25 and to at that point Indicate to me whether you feel 
1 of 7 sheets Page 1 to 4 of 28 
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5 
1 that Mr. Abdullah has sufficient information and has 
2 been given the opportunity to be prepared to decide 
3 whether he can waive any conflict that might exist. 
4 Okay? 
5 MR. ROARK: Yes. 
S THE COURT: So, Mr. Abdullah, you asked a 
7 couple of questions and I am going to answer those. 
8 Now obviously the decision to either waive the 
9 conflict or not is yours. It can't be made by any 
10 attorneys, friends, family. It is really your 
11 decision. 
12 You have indicated you want to know what 
13 would happen If you don't waive the conflict and you 
14 get new counsel and you wanted to know whether that 
15 person would be allowed to modify or add additional 
16 post-conviction claims. 
17 And I know the State Is not going to like 
18 this. But if you do get new counsel, I think it's 
19 only fair to allow that individual to review the 
20 record and determine whether they believe additional 
21 daims or any modification of claims should be filed. 
22 And so what I would do Is give that person 
23 the opportunity to revIew everything. And It Is 
24 obviously going to take them -- they are going to 
25 have a lot of material to look at. And If they feel 
7
 
1 SAPO, which you can do, then -- I'm sorry. Let me
 
2 start that over again. I have to get this right.
 
3 If you dedde that you want me to appoint
 
4 new counsel and you say, "I am not waiving the
 
5 conflict,· then the process that I would use Is this.
 
6 First, obviously If you want to hire someone
 
7 yourself, you can hire anybody you want. That's up
 
8 to you. You could, of course, decide to represent
 
9 yourself. I would recommend against that. If you
 
10 decide that you are even thinking about it, I want 
11 you to let me know so that we can schedule a hearing 
12 and I can explore that with you because I really 
13 think it is a very bad Idea. The third possibility 
14 is that I would order the SAPO to -- what I would 
15 have them do is provide me a list of attorneys who 
18 are qualified by the Supreme Court to represent an 
17 individual like you on a capital case in 
18 post-conviction and in that list, I would want them 
19 to Indicate whether they have ongoing contracts. In 
20 other words, these are people who are willing to 
21 contract with the SAPD to be conflict counsel. And 
22 then -- and With their qualifications. 
23 And then what I would do Is schedule a 
24 hearing and ask those Individuals who are Interested 
25 in actually taking the work to appear in court with 
• 6 
1 -- and it's up to them -- they want to add or modify 
2 or delete any of the dalms that have been flied, 
3 then I will allow them to tile a motion; and most 
4 likely, assuming there's a good basis for it, I would 
5 all4>w them to do so, because I think It's only fair, 
S If ~ou get new counsel, that they have the 
7 opportunity to make that determinatIon. So the 
8 answer to the -- I guess the short answer to the long 
9 question is that yes, I WOUld. 
10 Now with respect to the SAPO, I would not. 
11 And the reason I wouldn't is that they have been 
12 working on this case for six years. They have gone 
13 through a number of amendments. I don't see any 
14 reason that -- because even though I know Mr. Ackley 
15 is leaving, essentially the same team has been in 
16 place for some time and so I would require them to 
17 proceed along the lines that we have already been 
18 proceeding. And I am now -- at this point, I have 
19 read all of the Amended Petition, I have read all of 
20 the responses and so I am pretty familiar with what 
21 everybody has alleged. 
22 Now you asked about the process. A couple 
23 of things. You will have a couple of options today. 
24 If you decide not to waive the conflict -- excuse me 
25 -- ,f you decide to waive the conflict and keep the 
8 
1 you present so that you can hear the discussion. And 
2 I would inquire of each of them a couple of things. 
3 One, do they have the time to devote to your case. 
4 Because It is not a -- this is a difficult case and 
5 there's a lot of material. And so -- and I know Mr. 
6 Roark has put a lot of time into this. 
7 And then I would also inquire and make sure 
8 we don't get ourselves In-the same position we are in 
9 now, to make sure there are no conflicts. That is 
10 going to be a very probing inquiry, very important, 
11 because as now, I read all the material. 
12 It is clear to me that there are a number 
13 of attorneys here In the state who participated in 
14 one form or another In this trial, therefore, they 
16 would likewise be disqualified. I can think of some 
16 w'1ere they ended up ghostwriting material, where they 
17 aqually did that. And that is the basis of actually 
18 on~ of your claims is that you didn't know that was 
19 happening. So I would have to make sure that they 
20 dl~ not participate with the Toryanskls In the trial 
21 of this case because I don't want to go down that 
22 path again. 
23 So you would be present, but I would have 
24 to make the decision as to who would be appointed and 
25 -- because when we appoint at pUblic expense, it's 
Page 5 to 8 or 28 2 of 7 sheets 
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1 the Judge's responsibility to make that call. The 
2 only thing I can do is assure you, Mr. Abdullah, that 
3 I am going to be very careful to make sure they don't 
4 have a conflict, that they are very qualified to take 
5 this on and that they have the time to do it because 
6 I don't want you to have someone who Is not going to 
7 devote the time to It that it needs to have done. 
8 Okay? Does that answer your questions? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. NoW, to me, I am 
12 not going to hear argument from anyone else because 
13 this Is really about Mr. Abdullah. So, Mr. Roark, a 
14 couple of months ago, I gave you a task. And I want 
16 to make It very clear on the record and I want to 
16 make sure you agree with me. You and I have had no 
17 conversations. Is that correct? 
18 MR. ROARK: That is absolutely correct. 
19 THE COURT: Everything that has occurred 
20 between you and I have been copied to all counsel. 
21 MR. ROARK: That Is correct, as well, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Now If you can kind 
24 of layout -- and what I want to tell you Is that 
26 ultimately I am going to have you do an actual 
11 
1 look at that end and the light of the tunnel. I am 
2 starting to be too old to even think about being here 
3 for a long time. 
4 So I want to make sure that there's enough 
6 of a record so that any future court proceedings, 
6 they know exactly what happened. And I've tried to 
7 do that throughout thIs case. I've kept jUst about 
8 every piece of paper I can possibly Imagine. 
9 So with that in mind -­ and I also want any 
10 depOSitions that you took also to be filed under 
11 seal, Just for the record. So if you can layout 
12 process-wise what you did. I've already determIned 
13 there Is a conflict. I have not determined the 
14 extent of the conflict. I have not made any 
16 determinations because I have not done the 
16 Investigation. 
17 I will note that the SAPO did ask me to 
18 actually conduct a target Investigation. Because of 
19 where we were procedurally, I decided I wasn't even 
20 going to respond to that. The reason I decided not 
21 to do my own Investigation Is that makes me part of 
22 this process and I don't want to be in the position 
23 of either Inadvertently or even on purpose learning 
24 anything about any attomey-cllent involvement, any 
26 discussions between the parties. I don't want to be 
10
 
1 written document that is going to layout what you
 
2 didi, including what advice you gave. That Is going
 
3 to be sealed, under Rule 32, from the Court, as well
 
4 as ~II counsel. And I want you to file two copies.
 
I 
5 An{j the reason I want you to file two copies -- well, 
6 at ~hls point, one copy. If Mr. Abdullah decides he 
7 wants me to appoint new counsel, then I want that new 
8 counsel to be able to have access to that material so 
9 that that person can examIne It, with the mind-set of 
10 whether they are going to have additional 
11 post-conviction claims. 
12 But the bottom line here Is -- and if he 
13 stays with the SAPD, then It Is going to remain 
14 sealed. And the purpose behind that is to provide a 
16 very clear record for any other successive Petitions, 
16 appeals, habeas, whatever may occur in the future, so 
17 that there's a clear record of what Mr. Abdullah knew 
18 when he made this decision, what he was advised and 
19 what material he reviewed. 
20 I hope you agree with that way of handling 
21 It. I I want to make sure we have a record. Because, 
22 aSlwe all know, unfortunately, these kInds of cases, 
23 qulite frankly, have lives of their own and long after 
24 I ~m probably dead, somebody will be working on this 
25 b~use now I am going to be 63, so I am starting to 
12
 
1 in that position. I want to make sure that I remain
 
2 in the position I am supposed to remain In, which Is
 
3 as the neutral judge and not really looking beyond
 
4 that. So I have -- that Is the reason that I chose
 
6 not to do my own Investigation. I certainly could
 
6 have. There's some case law that suggests that it Is
 
7 okay. But the process I have used has also been
 
8 approved, at least by the Court of Appeals, by way of
 
9 comment on a case that I was actually involved with
 
10 called State versus Lopez, where I also had someone 
11 advise the person. So that is the reason that I have 
12 done that. 
13 Now with that In mind, Mr. Roark, If you 
14 want to tell us, you know, what you did, but nothing 
16 a~out any advice. 
16 ~ MR. ROARK: Certainly, Your Honor. May it 
17 pi ase the Court -- and I may not be encyclopedic in 
18 m~ recitation of what I have done In this case, nor 
19 even necessarily chronological, but I will attempt to 
20 do that. 
21 I began my InqUiry, of course, wIth a 
22 consideration of this Court's order appointing me to 
23 this POSition. I then reviewed the response by the 
24 SAPO to this Court's inquiry regarding the conflict 
25 and also reviewed the memorandum from the Ada County 
3 of 7 sheets Page 9 to 12 of 28 
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1 Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Shawna Dunn, 1 held in regard to what had been discovered and what 
2 responding to SAPO involvement with trial and 2 the implications were. 
3 pretrial and tried to at that point review all of the 3 I also, because a Petition and Application 
4 documentation upon which the conflict was based, to 4 fori Interlocutory Appeal was filed in this case, read 
6 the extent that such documentation exists. 5 thC!t Petition and the materials submitted thereWith, 
6 I then undertook to review In detail, and 6 as Well as the rather comprehensive response filed by 
7 as chronologically as I could, the Petitions that 7 the Attorney General's Office to that Petition or 
8 have been filed, first the Petition for 8 that application for Interlocutory relief, Which was 
, Post-conviction for Relief and then a series of 9 Ultimately, of course, denied. 
10 amended petitions, so that I could track, to the 10 THE COURT: See, I didn't even know that it 
11 extent possible, the evolution and the refinement of 11 had been denied. Nobody has told me anything. 
12 the issues presented to the Court for post-conviction 12 MR. ROARK: Well I think actually it may 
13 relief and concluded that Inquiry with what has been 13 have been withdrawn. 
14 styled the Rnal Amended Petition for Post-conviction 14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 Relief that was filed with this Court on the 29th of 16 MR. ROARK: I then took, in February of 
16 August 2008. And this is the document that extends 16 this year, the depositions of Molly Huskey, Kimberly 
17 approximately 400 pages. 17 Simmons and Mark Ackley. Those depositions were 
18 Once that had been completed, I did have 18 transcribed and the transcription of the depositions 
19 previously two less-than-comprehensive phone 19 were provided to Mr. Abdullah. During one of our 
20 conversations with Mr. Abdullah. I met with him then 20 meetings lasting two, two and-a-half hours, we 
21 at the Idaho State Penitentiary where he Is 21 discussed in detail the material that was contained 
22 Incarcerated. We held four such meetings over the 22 within those depositions. 
23 course of time between my appointment and today's 23 i I also read and reviewed in its entirety 
24 date so that I could discuss With him, as my work 24 th¢ deposition of Kim Toryanskl, giving particular 
25 progressed, what I had discovered, what opinions I 26 at\1ention to those portions of the deposition of Ms. 
15 16 
1 Toryanski that dealt specifically with advice, 1 in this case. 
2 counsel, assistance she had received from attorneys 2 I also declined to Inquire of this Court or 
3 outside her office, including, of course, 3 to offer an opinion as to what this Court's policy 
4 partlcular1y those conversations or e-mail exchanges 4 might be, In the event that Mr. Abdullah chose not to 
5 with members of the team from SAPO. 5 waive the conflict and subsequent counsel felt it 
6 I also received from Ms. Huskey's office 6 appropriate to ask this Court for leave to amend, one 
7 their Policy and Procedures Manual and the Policy and 7 more time, the Petition. But I believe that the 
8 Procedures Manual for the Capital Utigation Unit, 8 Court has thoroughly answered those questions; and to 
9 both of which I have reviewed. I haven't read It In 9 the extent that they bear upon Mr. Abdullah's 
10 their entirety, but I have reviewed as regards to 10 decision, I am sure his dedsion will reflect that. 
11 policies that may touch upon the matters that we 11 Now I have given him adVice as to what I 
12 confront in this particular case. 12 consider to be the extent of the conflict. I have 
13 Each time I met with Mr. Abdullah, we 13 pr"9vided him with adVice as to whether or not I 
14 discussed precisely what it was the Court was 14 thought that the conflict was reflected in any 
16 concerned With; we reviewed the case law; we reviewed 16 ~empt or failure by the SAPO to vigorously litigate 
16 in detail the implications of waiving the conflict, 16 th~se Issues that might be implicated by the 
17 as well as the implications of declining to do so. 17 cohfllct. 
18 The Court actually answered this afternoon 18 I have also discussed with him what, If 
19 a question that Mr. Abdullah has had for a 19 any, implications may be involved in this case, as 
20 significant period of time, which I felt to be beyond 20 far as expert witness testimony or .even fact 
21 the scope of what this Court had ordered me to do. 21 testimony might be concerned at the time this case 
22 So I have never prOVided him with any adVice as to 22 goes to trial. So I feel that Mr. Abdullah has had 
23 what process this Court would employ, in the event 23 the benefit of such adVice as I could offer in those 
24 that successive counsel was reqUired. As I say, I 24 areas. 
25 felt that was beyond the charge which was given to me 25 I met with Mr. Abdullah personally for the 
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1 last time last week and we discussed again at length 
2 the nature of the conflict, the extent to which that 
3 conflict may have debilitated the SAPD's Office, the 
4 extent to which the SAPD's Office had declined or 
6 neglected to vigorously pursue issues principally 
8 involving those areas of communication with the 
7 Toryanskis that had occurred and what Mr. Abdullah 
8 would be facing, in terms of either exercising or 
9 failing to exercise his right to waive. 
10 I believe, based upon another lengthy 
11 conversation that we had yesterday via phone, that 
12 Mr. Abdullah Is now satisfied that he has received 
13 all of the legal and practical advice, for that 
14 matter, necessary for him to make an informed 
15 decision. I have emphasized that the decision he 
16 makes is irreversible; that this Court will not 
17 permit him and no appellate court would permit him to 
18 waive the conflict and then assert it at a later 
19 date. 
20 THE COURT: Which was the Court's concern. 
21 MR. ROARK: Yes. And he fully understands 
22 that fact. So I believe, Your Honor, that Mr. 
23 Abdullah Is prepared, at least in terms of the 
24 services that I have trIed to render to him, to make 
26 his decision and to announce that decision to the 
19 
1 him go back in the holding cell and, Mr. Roark, you 
2 can talk to him. When he Is ready to come in, let me 
3 know. 
4 MR. ROARK: Absolutely. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
8 THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. 
7 (Whereupon, there was a break in the 
8 proceedings from 1:23 to 1:35 p.m.) 
9 THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. District 
10 Court is again In session. 
11 THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr. 
12 Abdullah, are you ready to go forward then? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: All right. And you've had 
15 further discussion with Mr. Roark? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. You don't have to stand 
18 up, If you don't want to. I just want to ask you 
19 whether you have reviewed all of the material that 
20 Mr. Roark provided you. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, Judge. 
22 THE COURT: You did. Before you tell me 
23 what your decision Is, has anyone pressured you or 
24 threatened you or tried to get you to make a 
25 decision? 
18
 
1 Court this afternoon.
 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Roark.
 
3 MR. ROARK: And I will follow up with -­
4 THE COURT: A report.
 
5 
, 
MR. ROARK: -- a more thorough report in
 
6 writing.
 
7 THE COURT: Right. And then I want to
 
8 emphasize again when you send that in, I want it
 
9 under seal and I want the top part of it to have a
 
10 caption and show that it is under seal, even from the 
11 Co~rt; that no court personnel, including the Judge 
12 willi open that, because that's not -- it is not going 
13 to happen. And then put a signature line for myself 
14 to sign under yours to show nIt is SO ordered," If 
15 you would do that. 
16 MR. ROARK: I will. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And 
18 thank you for the thoroughness of your report. 
19 Mr. Abdullah, before we proceed, I know 
20 that you are upset. If you want to take a few 
21 minutes, if you want to talk to Mr. Roark one more 
22 time, that would be fine. That's up to you. Would 
23 you like to do that? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Please. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Why don't we let 
20 
1 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Because it has to be 
3 your decision. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I understand. 
5 I THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Roark can't make the 
6 decision for you. Your prior -- your counsel can't 
7 make the decision. It has to be your decision. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
9 THE COURT: All right. And so the question 
10 I have for you is do you want to waive the conflict 
11 an~ keep the SAPD or do you want to have me appoint 
12 new counsel? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I do not waive the 
14 conflict. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You want me to 
16 appoint new counsel then? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
18 
! 
THE COURT: Okay. And that is your 
19 decision? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. I note that the 
22 SAPO's office is present. I am going to Issue an 
23 act~al written Order, but I am going to order the 
24 SAPO's Office to contact the people with whom you 
25 normally contract for conflict. They have to be 
5 of 7 sheets Page 17 to 20 of 28 
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1 capital certified. They also have to be -- before I 1 affidavit that we could submit via an exhibit. The 
2 start running through the names, I want to make sure 2 SAPO simply has no funds to contract with any 
3 that you have spoken to them to make sure that they 3 attorney to represent Mr. Abdullah until July one of 
4 would be willing to accept an appointment. And then 4 this year. 
6 what I would like you to do is provide me that list 5 i THE COURT: What we are going to do is I am 
6 with a resume of each of them and then I will 6 gOing to issue an Order and if you have to go and 
7 schedule a hearing at which I would ask those parties 7 find funds someplace, you are going to have to find 
8 to -­ maybe a series of hearings In which they would 8 them. The reason that I do that, Ms. Huskey, Is, in 
9 appear. I would ask them to appear (n court to make 9 my view, it Is the SAPO's Office that created this 
10 sure that they don't have any conflict and to make 10 problem, not Mr. Abdullah. He did not create this 
11 sure that they have the time to actually devote to 11 prOblem. The SAPO's Office, through its actions, 
12 Mr. Abdullah's case. And you are? 12 created this problem that brought us to this 
13 MS. HUSKEY: I am Molly Huskey, Your Honor. 13 position. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Huskey. 14 So it may be that we actually don't get 
16 MS. HUSKEY: If I could, there would be two 15 anyone on board until July 1, so maybe it will be a 
16 issues that we -- and I apologize for my voice today. 16 moot issue. But since you don't have anybody on 
17 THE COURT: That's all right. 17 cOliltract -- you said there's only really one that is 
18 MS. HUSKEY: We only have three individuals 18 death penalty qualified -- then what I am going to do 
19 on contract; only one of them is capital qualified, 19 Is I do have the list and I will send out a letter 
20 Dennis Benjamin. 20 that goes to all of them and they will be paid for by 
21 THE COURT: And he Is disqualified. 21 the SAPO by order of this Court because I don't have 
22 MS. HUSKEY: And that's basically what I 22 anybody else to make them pay. The Court doesn't 
23 was going to apprise you of. The second Issue, Your 23 have the money and, as I said, Mr. Abdullah doesn't 
24 Honor -- and we have Mr. Josh Tewalt from the 24 have the funds. So you are going to take it out of 
26 Department of Anancial Management or I have his 25 your office budget. That is the bottom line. 
23 24 
1 MS. HUSKEY: Your Honor, then I would like 1 you can certainly file those affidaVits. But in my 
2 to make a record. I have copies of Mr. Tewalt's 2 View, with an Indigent defendant, the mere fact that 
3 affidavit or I can call him as a witness. But I can 3 you have funding problems is not sufficient to excuse 
4 tell you right now that the State Appellate Public 4 yo~ from the responsibility of providing him with an 
5 Defender's Office has approximately, with projected 5 attprney. 
6 spending, $5,000 remaining In Its budget to get us 6 So what I am going to do is send out Orders 
7 through until June 30 of this year. 7 and also letters to all people on the capital list 
8 THE COURT: Then you are going to have to 8 and find out what their conflicts are. We will 
9 go to the legislature and see If you can get 9 schedule a hearing, have them come in and explain to 
10 additional funding. 10 the Court If they have the time and if they do, then 
11 MS. HUSKEY: I have preViously spoken with 11 I am going to end up appointing them. 
12 Mr. Tewalt about that. There is no constitutional 12 MS. HUSKEY: If I may, Your Honor, two 
13 method or process by which we can obtain additional 13 additional questions. One, we will seek 
14 funding before July l. 14 interlocutory appeal from this order on the -­
16 THE COURT: Well you are going to have to 15 THE COURT: What will be your standing? 
16 find a way to do it. 16 MS. HUSKEY: Our standing is -­
17 MS. HUSKEY: Then, Your Honor -­ 17 i THE COURT: You no longer represent Mr. 
18 THE COURT: Because he has a Sixth 18 Abdullah. 
19 Amendment right to counsel and like I said, it is the 19 MS. HUSKEY: Our standing, Your Honor, is 
20 SAPO's fault that we are at this point. It is not 20 that this Court has ordered us to do something that 
21 the Court's fault. It is not the State's fault. It 21 Is legally impossible for us to comply with. 
22 really Is your fault that we are here. So you are 22 THE COURT: Then you can file a separate 
23 going to have to find a way. As I indicated, there's 23 actfon because I don't think you can file It wIthIn 
24 a good possibility that we won't actually have 24 this case. 
26 anybody appointed until July first, but that -- and 25 MS. HUSKEY: Definitely, Your Honor. Who 
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1 will be representing Mr. Abdullah between now and the 1 
2 time In which counsel Is appointed? 2 
3 THE COURT: I think what I am going to do 3 
4 is continue Mr. Roark in that position. He hasn't 4 
5 completed all of his actions and so we are going to 6 
6 go ahead and have him continue in that. Is that 6 
7 acceptable to you, Mr. Roark? 7 
8 MR. ROARK: It Is. 8 
9 THE COURT: So that If he has any Questions 9 
10 during this period of time -- but, obviously, nothing 10 
11 else is going to be happening In this case until we 11 
12 get new counsel on. 12 
13 MS. HUSKEY: So am I to understand then the 13 
14 Court is denying our request that this Court stay 14 
16 that order pending an inter1ocutory appeal? 16 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Huskey, I appoint counsel. 16 
17 Mr. Abdullah has refused to waive the conflict that 17 
18 exists after a full advice. You are no longer 18 
19 representing him in that capacity. That's the bottom 19 
20 line. And I had a problem, quite frankly, with an 20 
21 interlocutory appeal because at that point, 21 
22 everything was stayed. I had a problem with that 22 
23 because I didn't -- in reading the repeal, I didn't 23 
24 see that this was anything that Mr. Abdullah was 24 
26 requesting. But I don't see any basis for an 25 
interlocutory appeal. What you are complaining about 
is that the Court is going to be ordering you to 
provide him with legal counsel and you claim that you 
can't do that. That has nothing to do with this 
case. 
MS. HUSKEY: And then thirdly, Your Honor, 
when you issue your final written Order, as I 
understand it, the process is that we would sort of 
provide you with a list of individuals and then the 
Court would select. But under Idaho Code 19-869, 
choice of conflict counsel Is left to the discretion 
of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. So 
if you would just clarify that in your written Order 
as well. 
THE COURT: I will make it very clear 
because at this point, I think you also have a 
conflict. 
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I want to make sure that 
Mr. Abdullah gets a conflict-free counsel and that is 
the Court's responsibility. 
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What we 
I will do Is stand In recess. Mr. Roark, you will 
i provide the additional material. In the meantime, if 
ze 
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1 he has any questions, you can answer those questions 
2 until you are relieved. 
3 MR. ROARK: I Will, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. 
5 THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. 
6 (Whereupon, the above proceedings concluded 
7 at 1:43 p.m.) 
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Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Session: Neville101910 • Division: DC 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s) 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Public Defender(s): 
Probe Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s) 
Case ID: 0001 
Case Number: CVPC08-03085 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Public Defender: 
2010/10/19 
13:45:17	 - Operator
 
Recording:
 
13:45:17	 - New case
 
, STATE OF IDAHO
 
13:45:46	 - Other: OWENS, NICOL
 
for Erick Hall
 
13:45:59	 - Other: Benjamin, Dennis 
here on behalf of Erick Hall on conflict issue only. 
13:46:34	 ~ Other: Varie, Doug
 
on behalf of State of Idaho
 
13:46:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court	 notes last proceeding in September and documents filed 
with the Court. 
13:47:53	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court notes letter from SAPO summarizing what they believe a 
re the Court's 
13:48:25	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F . 
. options with a copy of a transcript from the Abdullah case. 
Court notes this 
13:48:42-	 Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
was received in chambers rather than filed.
 
13:49:00	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
Mr. Thomsen stated letter states argument that would help Co 
urt to make it 
13:49:33 Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN 
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Sessi~n: Nevillel01910 Page 2 
,	 . 
clearer. Would like the letter part of the	 record and in th•e file. Can 
13:50:52	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
provide copy to the court reporter, jUs
 did not want to hav 
e to argue all 
13:51:09	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
statements made in the letter
 
13:51:29	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomsen stated Mr. Chastain and Ms.
 Kristal's files will 
be open for the 
13:52:01	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
State to view. Defendant waived that p ivilege.
 
13:52:45	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Ms. Bennetts stated before conflict iss e, believe Mr. Ackle
 
y was going to
 
13:53:26	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
copy of those files but when conflict arose there was issue
 
on whether these
 
13:54:00	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
files were privileged.
 
13:54:58	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Believe that SAPO is stating now that th State has to copy
 
the files and pay
 
13:55:16	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
for those out of State's budget where in past SAPO used to c
 
opy them and
 
13:55:34	 ~ State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
provide.
 
13:55:56	 ~ Other: Owens, Nicol
 
stated in past on another case the State copied what they wa
 
nted and paid
 
13:56:32	 - Other: Owens, Nicol
 
for that.
 
13:56:38	 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
 
The Court requested counsel continue to ork on that issue.
 
13:57:10 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
Ms.	 Bennetts responded re: letter dated ctober 12th. There 
are some 
13:58:09	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
differences between this case and the Ab ullah case. There
 
were identifiable
 
13:58:25-	 State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
conflicts in Abdullah, Mr. Benjamin stat ng there is no conf
 
lict. One issue
 
13:58:50	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
is whether the experts might be a confli
 
13:59:22	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Mr. Roark appointed by the Court in Abdu
 
14:02:06 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN 
14:09:14	 - Plaintiff Attorney: THOMSEN, IAN
 
Mr. Thomsen responded regarding distinct·on between this cas
 
e and Abdullah.
 
14:,12:40	 - Other: Benjmin, Dennis
 
Believes there is not a conflict of inte est that would aris
 
e
 
14:17:46	 - State Attorney: BENNETTS, JAN
 
Ms. Bennetts responded.
 
14:21:44 Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC~ nI~ IRJ4ii)~ 
A.M P.M. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TfIE COUNTY qj~7 2010
 
J. 
E1y-~~~~ll4ii~ir::::. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION
 
AND ORDER
 
APPOINTING KEITH ROARK AS
 
INDEPENDENT CONFLICT COUNSEL
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon on October
 
22, 2004 (Hallll). In the period of time during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was represented
 
by the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and appeal of his
 
conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and first-degree murder ofLynn Henneman (Hall ij. In his Hall IT
 
amended post-conviction petition, filed in this case on April 7, 2009, the Petitioner alleged that his trial
 
counsel in the Hall IT case provided ineffective assistance of cqunsel.
 
Molly Huskey is the State Appellate Public Defender. rhe Deputy State Appellate Public 
Defenders who have been assigned to represent Mr. Hall over time include Paula Swensen, Mark 
Ackley, Nicole Owens, Shannon Romero, and, more recently, Ian Thompson. (Throughout, the term 
"SAPD" is used to refer to the office in general and not a specific person). On September 15, 2009, in 
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connection with the capital post-conviction proceedings in Ada County Case No. CV-PC-2005-00308, 
Judge Cheri Copsey held that the SAPD had a conflict of interest in its representation of that Petitioner 
because attorneys in the SAPD's office, including Molly Huskey and Mark Ackley, provided advice to 
trial counsel in the underlying case during the trial phase and then subsequently filed claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the post-conviction proceeding. Judge Copsey appointed 
independent conflict counsel to advise that Petitioner regarding the conflict. 
On June 29,2010, the SAPD in this case filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest. 
In that notice, the SAPD claimed that it "cooperated with trial counsel in Hall IT by sharing testing and 
expert information obtained in Hall f' and further admitted that at least some of the attorneys in that 
office formerly assigned to this case "may have had contact with trial counsel and that contact may 
present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall." The Ex Parte Notice 
also informed the Court that the SAPD had conducted an internal review and had selected attorney 
Dennis Benjamin to "independently evaluate the conflict" and to advise the Petitioner whether or not the 
conflict should be waived. In the Ex Parte Notice, the SAPD did not admit or deny that it had a conflict 
in this case. 
Meanwhile, without having received notice of the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, the Respondent­
State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hallll) on July 30, 2010. In that Motion, 
the State claimed that it had contacted Mark Ackley prior to his departure from the SAPD's office and 
inquired whether there was a conflict in this case, and that Mr. Ackley represented to the State that he 
did not believe that there was a conflict. The State filed its Motion for Inquiry "in an abundance of 
caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays in these post-conviction proceedings." 
The Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict 
(Hallll) on August 26,2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After granting the State's motion, 
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the Court's first action in furtherance of an inquiry was to instruct the SAPD to supplement its Ex Parte 
Notice ofPossible Conflict to include the factual basis for the iSAPD's conclusion that there was a 
possible conflict. The Court noted that the Ex Parte notice was vague, referring only to "contact" 
between the SAPD and the Petitioner's trial attorneys. In order to facilitate its inquiry, the Court 
requested further details about such contact and asked specific~lly for information regarding whether the 
SAPD had given advice to the Petitioner's trial attorneys. 
In response to the Court's instruction, the SAPD filed its Amended Notice of Possible Conflict 0 
Interest on August 30, 2010. That document reiterated that there were "numerous contacts between trial 
counsel and post-conviction counsel" during the trial phase. However, the Amended Notice only 
provided the Court with details about the methods by which the contact occurred (email, telephone and 
meetings) and did not provide any information about the substance of the conversations or disclose 
whether the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel, despite this Court's specific request. 
The Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin was also filed on August 30, 2010. In his Affidavit, Mr. 
I
 
Benjamin stated that he had been hired by the SAPD "to deterrhine whether they have a conflict of 
interest in representing Erick Hall and to advise Mr. Hall of my findings." Mr. Benjamin stated both 
factual and legal conclusions in his Affidavit. Those conclusions, in the order listed in his affidavit, 
were that: (1) there is no conflict of interest; (2) it is clear that the SAPD lawyers decided to not give 
advice to trial counsel due to a concern over creating a conflict of interest; (3) one of the former SAPD 
lawyers gave advice to trial counsel; (4) that advice does not c~ate a conflict of interest because the 
result was favorable to Mr. Hall; (5) even if the former SAPD lawyers had a conflict of interest, it would 
not be imputed to Mr. Hall's current SAPD attorneys. Mr. Benjamin did not disclose which of the 
former SAPD lawyers gave advice or give any information about the substance or subject of that advice. 
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On September 1, 2010, the Court held a Status Conference and invited counsel to submit further 
briefing on this matter. The State filed its Response to SAPDiAmended Notice of Possible Conflict and 
Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin (Hall IT) on October 4,2010. On October 12,2010, the SAPD submitted 
a letter to the Court. A hearing was held on October 19, 2010: 
DISCUSSION 
Procedural safeguards are particularly important in a case where, as here, the Petitioner is facing
 
the death penalty. "The death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence
 
must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense."
 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Furnishing one such safeguard,
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 provides for the mandatory appointment of counsel for post-conviction
 
proceedings after imposition of the death penalty.
 
Every defendant has the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450
 
U.S. 261, 272-73 (2003). In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court
 
has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it "knows or reasonably should
 
know that a particular conflict may exist." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278,285 (2003).
 
Accordingly, having received notices of concern about a possible conflict of interest from the State as
 
well as from the SAPD, this Court granted the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible Conflict of
 
Interest (Hall IT).
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2 requires that counsel appointed to capital defendants in a post­

conviction proceeding be someone other than trial counsel. This requirement is necessary in order for
 
the defendant to obtain an objective assessment of trial counsel's performance. Porter v. State, 139
 
Idaho 420, 423, n.2, 80 P.3d 1021, 1024, (2003). Similarly, if the SAPD was giving advice to trial
 
counsel, they may be unable to assess objectively trial counsel's performance with respect to those
 
matters for which they gave advice.
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In his Affidavit, Mr. Benjamin stated that communication between the SAPD and the Petitioner's 
trial lawyers concerning this case could result in a conflict of interest if advice was given; the trial 
lawyers took the advice; and the advice turned out badly for Mr. Hall. That is but one of many examples 
ofhow a conflict could arise in a situation where post-conviction counsel was involved in formulating 
strategy at the trial level. A conflict could arise from failing to bring a viable claim in the petition for 
ineffective assistance of counsel in an area where advice was given. A conflict could arise from bringing 
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel ifthe SAPD's advice on that topic was taken by trial 
counsel. Additionally, even if the advice was not taken by trial counsel, the simple fact that trial counsel 
consulted with experienced lawyers at the SAPD's office maypresent a defense to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation oflaw and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable" as ineffective assistance of counsel. Knowles v. 
Mirzayance, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009)(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,690 (1984)). 
If claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were brought in any area where the SAPD offered 
advice to trial counsel, the State may wish to call the SAPD attorneys that gave the advice as witnesses 
in order to show that trial counsel's actions were part of a strategic choice made after careful 
investigation. There are still more ways in which a conflict could arise, but the Court will not list them 
all here. The Court's present duty is to inquire to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted in 
representing the Petitioner in this case where his very life is literally at stake. 
Structure of the Inquiry 
This Court has carefully considered how to structure the inquiry. In State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694, 215 P3d 414 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the inquiry requirement 
...a trial court's examination of the potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should 
be conducted on the record. The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the 
defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or concern. However, in determining whether a conflict 
exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on the representations made by counsel. A court may 
inquire further into the facts, but is under no original or continuing obligation to do so. 
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Id. at 704, 215 P.3d at 424 (internal quotes and citations omitted). In its letter dated October 12, 
2010, the SAPD urged the Court to rely on the representations of counsel. However, the SAPD has not 
made any representations to the Court except that contact occurred between the SAPD and trial counsel 
and that contact may present a possible conflict. That represetiltation was made in June in the Ex Parte 
Notice. The SAPD opposed the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Halln) and 
even after the motion was granted, the SAPD declined to provide the Court with further details when 
asked at the hearing on August 26, 2010. Instead, the SAPD referred all questions from the Court to Mr. 
Benjamin, including questions about what events prompted the SAPD to file the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest and to retain Mr. Benjamin. When specifically instructed by this Court to 
supplement the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest with details about whether the SAPD 
gave advice to trial counsel, the SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest which 
was silent on that issue. 
The SAPD contacted Mr. Benjamin about this matter before filing the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest. At different times the SAPD has l compared its view of what Mr. 
Benjamin's role should be, or is, to that of conflict counsel at trial, and to independent counsel appointed 
by the Court. However, neither description is particularly apt.· The comparison to independent counsel 
appointed by Judge Copsey after determining that the SAPD was conflicted in that case is inapt because 
that attorney was selected and appointed by the Court and not the SAPD. The comparison to conflict 
counsel at trial is inapt because conflict counsel is unnecessary and typically not assigned until after 
counsel determines that they are conflicted in a particular matter. Here, the SAPD has not offered an 
opinion whether a conflict exists, and has thus far declined to respond to this Court's repeated requests 
to state the factual basis for the filing of the Ex Parte Notice. Instead of being forthcoming and candid 
with the Court about the facts in this case, the SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague 
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possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and defer all 
questions to Mr. Benjamin even though he represents the Petit~oner and not the SAPD. 
It is important to note that the SAPD has not requested leave to withdraw from representing the 
Petitioner. Neither has it turned over the entire case to Mr. Behjamin. Rather, the SAPD asserts that Mr. 
Benjamin is counsel for Mr. Hall on the conflict issue only and that it remains counsel for Mr. Hall for 
all other issues in this case. As counsel for the Petitioner, the SAPD has the duty to act in the best 
interest of its client, a capital defendant with a fundamental constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. 
Additionally, Idaho Rule ofProfessional Conduct 3.3 requires candor toward the tribunal. There are 
instances when a lack of disclosure may constitute an affirmati~e misrepresentation. See I.R.P.C. 3.3 
cmt. 3. For these reasons, the SAPD's refusal to answer questions about the factual basis for the filing 
I
 
of the vague Ex Parte Notice is of great concern to this Court. As demonstrated by recent events in the 
Payne post-conviction case, the SAPD has demonstrated that, even in the face of an inquiry into whether 
the SAPD is conflicted, it can be forthcoming and candid when it so chooses. Nevertheless, the 
performance of the SAPD in this case has been markedly diffel1ent. 
This Court has carefully considered the representations made by Mr. Benjamin and will continue 
to consider those representations throughout the inquiry. The etourt holds Mr. Benjamin in high regard 
professionally and personally, and respects his efforts to date. However, the question of whether a 
conflict actually exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel. This Court does not believe that its 
duty to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry would be sati~fied in this case by simply accepting the 
opinions ofcounsel regarding whether a conflict exists without any disclosure of the factual bases for 
that opinion. While the Court mayor may not eventually reach Ithe same conclusion as Mr. Benjamin 
about whether a conflict exists, this Court is presently lacking the factual background necessary to reach 
any conclusion. 
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The Court has given both the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin several opportunities to come fOlWard 
voluntarily with the details of the communications between the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel. In each 
instance, counsel has chosen not to voluntarily disclose the details of those communications. This is so 
I
 
even though communications between the SAPD and trial counsel about this case are not privileged 
because the SAPD had not yet been appointed to this case when the communications occurred; 
furthermore, Mr. Hall waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to trial counsel when he made 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Lacking voluntary disclosure, one option the Court has considered in order to gain the factual
 
background necessary to determine whether the SAPD is conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall is to
 
order an in camera review of SAPD files. However, the SAPD did represent the Petitioner on the Hall I
 
post-conviction case during the time frame in which these communications occurred and the Court is
 
unaware ofthe extent to which the contact between the SAPD and trial counsel for Hall II intermingled
 
discussions about Hall I and Hall II, and the Court does not wish to expose itself to privileged
 
information concerning Hall I.
 
Appointment of Independent Conflict Counsel 
This Court's first duty is to determine whether a conflict exists, and the Court is presently lackin 
enough facts to make that determination. Having considered a number of ways to structure the inquiry, 
and being mindful of the attorney-client privilege issues in this case, the Court hereby appoints R. Keit 
Roark as independent conflict counsel. Mr. Roark is private counsel certified by the Idaho Supreme 
Court as qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial and in post-conviction and appellate death 
penalty cases. Mr. Roark will represent the Petitioner and shall conduct an inquiry into whether 
conflict exists. As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and 
searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to 
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its appointment to represent the Petitioner in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case. Mr. Roark is 
authorized to take depositions in furtherance of his inquiry qf anyone he considers necessary including 
but not limited to, if appropriate in his view, the SAPD or Dennis Benjamin. 
Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, Mr. Roar 
shall present his findings to this Court, keeping in mind the attorney-client privilege issues involved i 
any intertwining of the Hall I and Hall II cases. Independent counsel may submit his report to the Co 
in affidavit format, to be followed by a hearing. Specifically, the Court requests a report on the 
following issues: (1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if so, the general nature of the conflict; (3) the facts 
surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4) whether independent counsel believes that such conflic 
may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office. The report shall at all times consider the attorney-clien 
privilege issues implicated by the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall on the Hall I post-conviction and 
appeal. 
If independent counsel finds it appropriate to prepare a further report detailing the extent of the 
conflict and other issues that should not be presented to the Court, he may file such a report under seal 
thus providing a record for review should there be any subsequent post-conviction petitions. Should the 
Court conclude that there is a conflict of interest, Mr. Roark will advise the Petitioner regarding suc 
conflict and any waiver of the conflict. 
Other issues 
In its letter dated October 12, 2010, the SAPD state~ that, in the event of the appointment 0 
independent counsel, "our position would be that such an appointment would be at county expense since 
our office has already paid for the exact same service being provided." This position is not well-take 
for several reasons. 
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First, if there is a conflict in this case, it is a result of actions taken by the SAPD. Second, 
appointment of independent counsel may not have been neces~ary had the SAPD been more forthcoming 
in this case in order to provide the Court with a factual basis on which to make a determination. Third, 
the SAPD has not provided the "exact same service." Mr. Benjamin was chosen by the same office tha 
is potentially conflicted in this matter, and did not have the authority to depose. He is closely aligned 
with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a portion of his 
income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office. Although the Court holds 
Mr. Benjamin in high regard, he is not this Court's choice or independent counsel and would not have 
been this Court's choice of independent counsel had the SAPD consulted with the Court before choosin 
him. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871 provides that counsel for indigent defendants shall be compensate 
out of the budget of the state appellate public defender when tbe state appellate public defender is unable 
to carry out its duties due to a conflict of interest or any other reason. For the foregoing reasons, the cost 
of independent conflict counsel appointed by this Court shall be borne by the SAPD. 
Respondent-State seeks guidance from this Court whether it is free to discuss with Hall II trial 
counsel conversations held in the presence of the Petitioner where the SAPD was also present. 
Additionally, the Respondent-State has inquired whether it is free to discuss with Hall II trial counsel 
conversations held with the SAPD whether or not the Petitioner was present. The State is not free to 
hold such discussions at this time, but may raise the issue again following the submission of independen 
counsel's report. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this .J:L~ay Of~ ,2010. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ~~ay ofDtr:edet2010, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
Ian H. Thomson 
Nicole Owens 
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln 
Boise, ID 83703
 
Tel: (208) 334-2712
 
Fax: (208) 334-2985
 
Jan M. Bennetts 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Tel: (208) 287-7700
 
Fax: (208) 287-7709
 
Dennis A. Benjamin
 
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
 
303 W Bannock St
 
PO Box 2772
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Tel: (208) 343-1000
 
Fax: (208) 345-8274
 
R. Keith Roark
 
ROARK LAW FIRM
 
409 NMain St
 
Hailey, ID 83333
 
Tel: (208) 788-2427
 
Fax: (208) 788-3918
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY JAN 10 2011 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
I.S.B. # 4843	 By JANET EWS 
DEPUTY 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 ORiGINAL 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
) 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) CASE NO. CVPC08-03085 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
v.	 ) MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
) MEMjORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER 
ISTATE OF IDAHO, )
 
)
 
Respondent. )
 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
Undersigned counsel for the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, having received this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel 
(hereinafter "Memorandum Decision and Order") as a result of its inquiry into any possible 
conflict of interest regarding the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), now files this timely 
Motion to Reconsider that order under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure II(a)(2)(B). Counsel for 
Mr. Hall is also filing a Motion for Permission to Appeal together with this motion, in an attempt 
to abide by the fourteen-day deadline for filing impos1d by both the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule II(a)(2)(B), and Idaho Appellate Rul¢ 12(b). Mr. Hall	 incorporates the 
arguments and caselaw contained in his Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
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Mr. Hall asks this Court to reconsider the findinJs and conclusions in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order in light of the additional information, and argument included in this motion. 
I 
Namely, Mr. Hall asks the Court to revise its holding with regards to the following findings and 
orders: (1) whether the SAPD has been candid and I forthcoming with the Court while 
investigating any possible conflict; (2) whether the SAPD has been willing to share information 
concerning contacts when no attorney-client privilegel prevents that release; (3) whether 
appointing Mr. Roark to act as conflict-counsel for Mr. Hall is any different than the work 
i 
already performed by Mr. Benjamin; (4) whether any further conflict inquiry is justified in light 
of the information now before the Court; and (5) whether the State should be permitted to contact 
and inquire of trial counsel (Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal) about their communications with the 
SAPD. 
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Earlier Proceedings and Evidence of SAPD and Trial qounsel Contact 
Mr. Hall was found guilty in connection with the rape, kidnapping and killing of Lynn 
Henneman in October of 2004 in Ada County Case Numl1er CR-FE-2003-0000518. As a result 
of his conviction of first degree murder, Mr. Hall received a sentence of death. Thereafter, the 
SAPD was appointed to represent Mr. Hall, and that case has since been designated "Hall I," 
SPOT Case No. 05-00155 in post-conviction. While the SAPD was representing Erick Hall in 
I 
Hall I, the case against Mr. Hall involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon was proceeding in the 
district court where Mr. Hall was represented by Rob Cfhastain and Deb Kristal. That case 
involving the death of Cheryl Hanlon, representing the above-captioned matter, has since been 
designated as "Hall II," Case No. CV PC 08-03085 in post~conviction. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISI<j>N AND ORDER 2 001380
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For a period of several months after receiving his first death sentence, Mr. Hall was 
represented by two sets of attorneys, the SAPD-eonstih,!lting his appellate and post-conviction 
! 
counsel in Hall I-and Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal-who were his trial attorneys on Hall II. 
Consequently, Mr. Hall had an established attorney-client relationship with both sets of 
attorneys, independent from his representation by the otper. During that time, counsel at the 
! 
SAPD was undertaking investigation and preparation of his post-conviction claims in Hall I at 
the very same time that his trial attorneys were preparing for a guilt and mitigation phase in Hall 
II. Both sets of counsel were appearing before this Court puring 2006 and 2007, litigating issues 
relevant to their respective cases. 
On numerous occasions, this Court and the State heard multiple representations by both 
attorneys at the SAPD and from Mr. Chastain, that a certain amount of information sharing was 
I 
being contemplated between post-conviction counsel and trial counsel. This information was 
never the result of an investigation by the Court or by the State, and was frequently brought up 
by counsel in order to inform the Court of the progress and developments in their investigation. 
. I 
On several occasions, counsel sought guidance from the Court as to the extent of information 
sharing that should be allowed, and also requested input from the State as to whether there were 
any objections. In some instances, the Court even encour~ged or permitted such cooperation by 
counsel. 
As early as July 5, 2006, Mr. Ackley (then at the SAPD) indicated to the Court that, "I 
think the reason for that is because trial counsel separated Idocuments they thought were relevant 
to the Hanlon case and gave that to conflict counsel, I think, Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal, 
and then gave us some files. And in the course of reviewing Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain's 
files we have confirmed that." Case No. SPOT 05-00155, ITr. 7/5/06, p. 141, Ls. 17-22, attached 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 3 001381
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hereto as Appendix 1. Mr. Chastain also referred to somel collaboration and cooperation with the 
SAPD in seeking information and testing for the Mr. Hall. Specifically, both trial counsel in 
I 
Hall II and the SAPD filed similar motions in September 2007, leading to the following 
exchange: 
COURT: ... Another unrelated subject, Motion for Fragile-X Blood Test filed
 
September 27, last week, by Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal. ...
 
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, as I understand-I don'~ know ifthe SAPD has filed a similar
 
motion, but it's-we only need one sample, I think. But it's-this was-as the Court
 
may recall, Doctor Meracangus (sic) came up while we were picking a jury.
 
COURT: Yes.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: This was as a result of, I guess, some ofhis findings and his
 
suggestion.
 
COURT: Okay.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: And so we filed this contemporaneously with SAPD.
 
COURT: Yes, I should have said, because I'm aware of-in fact, I have a copy of the
 
motion here from the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, which are the petitioners
 
in the postconviction relief for the last murder casF. They also have filed a motion here
 
and I have access to it somewhere here. And I haven't had a chance to see if there is any
 
difference, but it is intended to be the same motion.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
 
Case. No. CV PC 08-03085, Tr. 10/2/07, p. 3980, Ls. 16-18; p. 3981, Ls. 13-p. 3982, Ls. 7, 
I 
attached hereto as Appendix 2. Later on March 1, 2007, in his motion to withdraw as counsel 
Mr. Chastain mentions that there had even been meetings along with the SAPD attorneys, 
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it really came to a head during meetings held out at the 
penitentiary between Ms. Kristal, myself, certain of our experts. The State Appellate 
Public Defender was there.... 
In essence--in essence, called me a liar. He said that I didn't hear what I heard. And we 
tried to rectify that. Ms. Kristal and a member of the SAPD went out two days later to try 
to make sure that yes, that was what was said, that we had 
[....] 
COURT: When was the meeting at the penitenti¥y that you spoke about where there 
was-
MR. CHASTAIN: In the last 10 days. I don't know that I can tell you. The 14th• 
COURT: the 14th of February? 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
COURT: Of20077 I 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. And then Ms. Kristal went back two days later.
 
COURT: So just literally 14 days ago.
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MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, sir.
 
COURT: Fifteen days ago.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor.
 
COURT: And she went back two days after that.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: It may have been a couple of days later than that. There were some
 
transport issues. But she--don't quote us on the two days later, but-­
Case. No. CV PC 08-03085, Tr. 3/1/07, p. 18, Ls. 6-9, 16-20; and p. 21, L. l6-p. 22, L. 9, 
attached hereto as Appendix 3. 
Mr. Chastain also indicates, in a hearing where both Mr. Chastain and Mr. Ackley were 
present together, along with the State, that the trial attorneys would be sharing information with 
the SAPD. 
MR. CHASTAIN: [...] I-we spoke with the testing people. The-the MRI part of the
 
exam has been completed. However, the physician that's going to read it will not do that
 
until next week.
 
In terms of sharing it with the State Appellate Public Defender, we're glad to do that. We
 
don't see any conflict or any-any conflict of interest in-in doing that.
 
We don't know what the results are, don't know what-what they're going to show. We
 
can't promise that we're going to, necessarily, use those in our-in mitigation phase,
 
until we speak with the professionals.
 
But in terms of saving money, time, and effort, we're glad to-to share those-those
 
tests, and those results, with Mr. Hall's appellate lawyers.
 
COURT: Now, it-was it just an MRI?
 
MR. CHASTAIN: It was a PET scan.
 
[....]
 
COURT: But you're-okay. That answers the first question. You're willing to share
 
this with petitioner's Counsel on the postconviction matter.
 
MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely.
 
COURT: Okay. Does the State have any objection to that being shared?
 
MR. BOURNE: No, sir.
 
MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, in both cases.
 
COURT: Okay. All right. But I-I presume, from this-this renewed motion, as
 
entitled, that you're looking for much more than a PET scan; is that-is that fair to say?
 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
 
COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard in support ofthe motion?
 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, thank you....
 
Case. No. SPOT 05-00155, Tr. 2/16/07, p. 44., L. 17-p. 45, L. 9; p. 46, L. 13-p. 47, L. 6, attached 
hereto as Appendix 4. In following up to that February 16, 2007, hearing, the SAPD filed a 
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related Order to Transport Petitioner No Later Than February 26, 2007 for Radiological and 
Serological Testing, attached hereto as Appendix 5. As part of that order, the SAPD submitted 
an attached email from Mark Ackley to Janet Ellis and Roger Bourne. In that email.Mr. Ackley 
had indicated to all parties that the request for the results to be sent directly to Dr. Merikangas 
was "a reference to our agreement to share these tests with the Hanlon defense team." !d. at p. 4. 
The longest discussion concerning the extent of cooperation between the SAPD and the 
Hanlon trial team appears in a discussion between Mr. Ackley and the Court on June 15, 2007, 
where Mr. Ackley seeks the Court's guidance on how continued exchange of information should 
be handled. 
MR. ACKLEY: And so any directive that the Court can give us, I'm just going to 
continue to err on the side of filing matters under seal. 
Along that line, we were speaking to trial counsel on the Hanlon case, Deborah Kristal 
and Rob Chastain; and they were going to join our motion for the Dodd-for the release 
ofthe Dodd information that I mentioned earlier. 
COURT: The serial rapist murder in Washington state? 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes. And I actually hesitated. I chose not to give to them what we 
actually submitted under seal because it was submitted under seal. So I guess­
COURT: They have already filed just today-
MR. ACKLEY: Oh. Did they? 
COURT: -a motion for discovery on that issue. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. Great. 
[....] 
COURT: And I think you have done it correctly. 
MR. ACKLEY: okay. And I will continue that. 
As we receive confidential information through the course of our investigation or through 
Court orders, and if it's relevant, say, to the mitigation case in the Henneman case, it 
would clearly seem from our perspective to be relevant in the Hanlon case. Are we free 
to share that with trial counsel if we inform them of the confidential nature or the manner 
in which we acquired this information in the Hanlon case? 
COURT: Well Jan Bennetts, who is prosecuting the so-called Hanlon case, the second 
capital case that hasn't yet-that was spectacularly unsuccessful in getting a jury for here 
after eight long days, I think she should be asked as well. 
My sense is that-and I don't speak for Ms. Bennetts, obviously. But my sense is that 
she would think that was fair, at least to make them aware and that they need to ask this 
Court for something and-such as they did today in the document that they filed vis-a-vie 
Mr. Dodd today for specific discovery . .. I would rather have that information 
known to trial counsel before that than after. And so that's what my general sense 
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is of what should happen. But it-so it's kind of a rebuttable presumption thinking yes, 
probably that information should be shared, but I think Ms. Bennetts needs to be in 
the loop and they may need to make a specific request, just like they have today. 
Case. No. SPOT 05-001155, Tr. 6/15/07, p. 27, L. 19-p. 28, L. 13; p. 29, L. 7- p. 30, L. 7 ; p. 30, 
Ls. 15-22 (emphasis added), attached hereto as Appendix 6. 
B. The SAPD Filings in the Context ofAbdullah v. State 
Although the SAPD has made passing reference to the unrelated proceedings involving 
Judge Copsey, counsel for Mr. Hall cannot overemphasize the impact the conflict inquiry in that 
case had on the deliberations and filings made in the above-captioned matter. Consequently, as a 
full explanation of that impact, Mr. Hall now files a Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice 
(hereinafter "Motion for Judicial Notice "). In particular, the Court should note that attorneys, 
including Ms. Owens and Ms. Romero were positioned at the SAPD to have been assigned 
counsel to the cases ofboth Mr. Hall and Mr. Abdullah. See Motion for Judicial Notice. 
In the matter ofAbdullah v. State, after the Judge inquired as to whether contacts between 
the SAPD and trial counsel gave rise to any conflict, the SAPD filed its own representations that 
upon review no conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C. Although the State did 
not contest that finding, the Court, nevertheless, entered a finding that a conflict did exist and 
that "the SAPD had a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah." Motion for Judicial Notice, 
Exhibit D. Only after that finding did Judge Copsey then appoint Mr. Roark to act as an 
independent counselor to Mr. Abdullah. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit F. In that case, the 
SAPD had been asked to make a representation as to the existence of the conflict, and even in 
spite of that representation the court then found to the contrary and appointed separate counsel. 
It was not until May 7, 2010, that Mr. Abdullah finally waived the conflict and the SAPD was 
reappointed to represent him. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit J. 
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C. The Ex Parte Notice and Subsequent Proceedings 
On June 28, 2010, the SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest 
(hereinafter "Ex Parte Notice") under seal, which indicated that due to the extent of contact 
between staff at the SAPD (representing Petitioner in post conviction proceedings on Hall I) with 
trial counsel (representing Petitioner at trial in Hall II), the SAPD became concerned of the 
appearance of a possible conflict of interest. The SAPD contracted with Dennis Benjamin, to act 
as Mr. Hall's attorney, to review those contacts and to advise Mr. Hall as to any possible conflict 
which he could identify. The SAPD asked the Court to reschedule and vacate an upcoming 
hearing, pending the resolution of the conflict issue. In that order the "SAPD did not admit or 
deny that it had a conflict in this case." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2, Ls. 15-16. 
On August 3, 2010, without having seen the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, the State filed a 
Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "State's Motion for 
Inquiry"). In that motion the State asked that the Court inquire as to whether there was any 
conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Hall, due to the cooperation with trial counsel and 
also requested that the SAPD be ordered to disclose any correspondence, notes, documents and 
conversations with Mr. Hall or trial counsel "prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on 
January 4, 2008, on the Hall II case regarding matters that related to the Hall II case." State's 
Motion/or Inquiry, p. 2. According to the State, these documents "would not be protected by the 
Attorney-Client Privilege." Id. 
The SAPD filed a Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD Conflict 
(Hall II) (hereinafter "Response") on the same day of the originally scheduled status conference, 
August 6, 20 10. In that Response, the SAPD requested that the Court wait in ruling on the 
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State's motion until Mr. Benjamin could finish his review of the issue. This would allow the 
Court to have a representation from Mr. Hall's attorney (Mr. Benjamin) as to whether any 
conflict existed, and if so the nature and extent of that conflict before conducting a targeted 
inquiry and determining whether a waiver would be necessary. In the Response, Mr. Hall 
addressed the applicable Standards of Professional Conduct, and counsel's duty to make conflict 
determinations. See discussion, Response at 3-7. The SAPD represented that in order to fulfill 
that obligation the SAPD had contracted with conflict counsel in order to advise Mr. Hall on any 
potential conflict and any possible consequences a conflict might have. The Response also 
emphasized the fact that the two attorney in question at the SAPD, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen, 
were no longer at the office and that this dramatically effected any evaluation of whether Mr. 
Hall's current counsel would be compromised in the event a conflict was found. See discussion, 
Id. 6. The Response suggested that the Court had no duty to undertake an inquiry until it was 
had information which would provide a basis to believe that a conflict may exist, and that in the 
absence of Mr. Hall or the State raising a specific issue, the Court should rely on conflict counsel 
to make those representations. See discussion, Id. at7-9. 
The SAPD noted that all communications with Mr. Hall were protected by either the 
attorney-client privilege, work product rule, or notions of attorney-client confidentiality, and that 
the Rules of Professional Conduct "specifically refer not to the representation of a case, but to 
'representation of a client.' I.R.P.C. Rule 1.6(a)" Response, p. 10. Consequently, the SAPD was 
legally and ethically prevented from sharing the contents of those communications with either 
the State or the Court. The SAPD asked in conclusion that the Court "take under consideration 
independent counsel' current open investigation into the existence and implications of any 
possible conflicts with prior attorneys at the SAPD, and deem the SAPD's efforts through 
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independent counsel adequate until further representations can be made to the Court." Response, 
p.13. 
At the previously scheduled hearing of August 6th, in light of the State's motion, the 
Court disclosed the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice to the State, asked the State to reply to the SAPD's 
Response by August 16th , and gave the SAPD an opportunity to file a subsequent answer by 
August 20th • The Court also asked the parties to return on August 26th, for a further hearing.) 
The State filed a Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "Memorandum in Support") on August 16,2010. The State 
simply reiterated that the Court's examination of any potential conflict must be thorough and 
searching and that the State would be entitled to explore all SAPD communications with Mr. 
Hall or trial counsel in order for the State may respond to any post conviction claims. 
Memorandum in Support, p. 5. The State also made the argument that the attorney-client 
privilege does not apply where the communications of the SAPD had to do with Hall II matters 
(as opposed to Hall I). See discussion, Id. at 3-4. 
On August 17, 2010, the State filed another motion for inquiry into a conflict with the 
SAPD on an unrelated capital case before this Court. See State's Motion for Inquiry Into 
Possible Conflict with the State Appellate Public Defender, in Darrell Edward Payne v. State of 
Idaho, Case No. CV PC 2010-11137, Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit K. 
The SAPD filed a Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into 
Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) (hereinafter "Reply"), on August 20, 2010. In the SAPD's 
Reply, counsel for Mr. Hall pointed out that targeted inquiries by the Court are generally raised 
) Because no transcript has been prepared for the hearings referred to in this Motion, the 
representations are in accordance with counsel's best recollection. Counsel defers to the Court's 
memory or notes where there may be differences of opinion, until a proper transcript can be 
prepared, if necessary. 
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by the defendant (like in State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009», or by the specific allegations 
by the State (like in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003». Reply, p. 2. Here, Mr. Hall had 
never raised any concern with the Court, and the State's Motion for Inquiry did not include any 
infonnation that would lead one to believe that a conflict did exist. "The SAPD believed that 
consultation with an independent conflict attorney would provide Hall with the opportunity to 
take any appropriate action they deemed necessary." Reply, p. 3. The SAPD acknowledged that 
the Court should not necessarily be satisfied with the SAPD's own representations as to the 
nature of any potential conflict since we first raised the issue, "however, counsel also believes 
that representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as independent conflict counsel, should not suffer 
the same skepticism and would certainly allow the Court to rely on his representations." Id. at 4. 
In response to the State's assertion that they would be entitled to explore trial counsel's 
communications, the SAPD agreed. Id. at 4-5 ("The State is entitled to all correspondence and 
documents in possession of the SAPD from Ms. Krystal [sic] and Mr. Chastain. The State has 
already been offered all of those documents. It is not disputed that many of those materials 
necessarily waive any attorney-client privilege that Mr. Hall would have had with trial 
counse1."). However, the SAPD maintained that post conviction counsel was required to 
continue to assert the attorney-client privilege that existed between the SAPD and Mr. Hall, 
which has never been waived, with regards to the SAPD's own documentation. See discussion 
Id. at 5-6. 
The Reply raised three possible courses the court could take, but suggested that the Court 
rely on the representations of Mr. Benjamin as conflict counse1. The SAPD cited its statutory 
obligation to provide Mr. Hall with counsel where the SAPD believes that they are unable to 
carry out its duties. See discussion of Idaho Code §19-871, Id. at 7-8. ("Here, the SAPD 
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identified a situation III which it believed it was unable to adequately advise Mr. Hall. 
Consequently, the SAPD arranged for counsel and has assumed the financial responsibility for 
such an assignment." Id. at 8. "[T]he SAPD has contracted with conflict counsel solely to 
determine whether or not a conflict actually does exist and to advise the defendant of his rights if 
an actual conflict does exist." Id.) The SAPD made the argument that by contracting with Mr. 
Benjamin, it had satisfied its statutory obligation under I.e. §19-871 (d), and argued that if 
another attorney was appointed by the Court, then any such appointment would be in 
contravention of §19-871 and would fall under I.C. §19-860(b). See discussion in Reply, pp. 9­
10. If a second attorney was appointed to investigate a conflict, that attorney would be engaged 
as an advisor to the court and the County would incur the related expenses under I.C. §19-4904 
and §19-860. /d. at 9. 
At the hearing held on August 26, 2010, the SAPD opposed the State's motion for an 
inquiry into the conflict, without hearing from Mr. Benjamin. Although Mr. Benjamin was 
present in court, he was not allowed to address the Court with his findings or make any 
representations about his own inquiry into the conflict and consultation with Mr. Hall. The 
Court granted the State's motion, but made no final determinations as to the scope or type of 
proceeding it would follow. Instead, the Court requested that the SAPD file an Amended Notice 
of Possible Conflict of Interest by August 30, 2010, and scheduled another hearing for 
September 1, 2010. 
The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (hereinafter 
"Amended Notice") on August 30, 2010. In the Amended Notice, the SAPD represented that 
attorneys and staff had cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert 
information obtained during the course of post-conviction proceedings in Hall I, and that the 
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Court had encouraged certain sharing of infonnation at that time. Amended Notice, p. 2. The 
SAPD also noted that there had been numerous contacts between trial counsel and post­
conviction counsel at the SAPD, which included ..emailsbackandforth.primarily between Mr. 
Ackley and Ms. Kristal; phone calls between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain; 
meetings on at least two occasions where all attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with 
staff at the SAPD in order to facilitate or arrange the exchange of infonnation regarding testing 
and experts." !d. at 3. It was reiterated that "since Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain were involved 
in all communications with the SAPD regarding Hall II, and Mr. Hall has waived the attorney­
client privilege with respect to his trial counsel, the content and nature of those communications 
have already been made available to the State by providing complete access to trial counsels' 
files. In addition, if the State desires to inquire further, Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain would be 
free to discuss those matters in person." Id. 
The final suggestion by the SAPD in the Amended Notice is that "disclosure as to the 
specific content of those communications should be directed at Mr. Benjamin," who had been 
contracted by the SAPD to represent Mr. Hall on the conflict issue. Id. In that vein, Dennis 
Benjamin filed a Limited Notice of Appearance with this Court on August 30, 2010. In 
conjunction with his notice of appearance, he filed the Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin on the same 
day. Mr. Benjamin indicated in his affidavit that he had been hired to determine whether the 
SAPD has "a conflict of interest in representing Erick Hall and to advise Mr. Hall of my 
findings. In this matter, my client is Mr. Hall." Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin, ~5. He indicated 
that he had conducted an extensive and thorough investigation of the record, including the post­
conviction petitions, attorney-client files, copies of correspondence, and SAPD notes. Id. at ~7. 
He also interviewed most of those involved (including Paula Swenson, Mark Ackley, Robert 
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Chastain, Deborah Kristal, Michael Shaw, and Gary Starkey). Id. Mr. Benjamin made 
representations to the Court that in his estimation and professional judgment no conflict between 
Mr. Hall and the SAPD exists.2 Id. at ~l O. In addition, he had informed his client of that finding 
and advised him accordingly. Id. at ~5. 
At the conflict hearing on September 1,2010, the Court noted that he had received the 
additional filings by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin. In response the Court requested that the State 
file any additional brief in response to those filings by October 4, 2010, and scheduled a hearing 
for October 19,2010. The Court also allowed the SAPD to submit to the Court, by October 12, 
2010, a letter including its suggestions to the Court how it should proceed with its inquiry. 
The State filed their State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice ofPossible Conflict and 
Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin (hereinafter "State's Response"), under seal, on October 4, 2010. 
The State persisted in its position that they should be entitled to receive SAPD correspondence 
and communications with trial counsel. State's Response, p. 3. It also expressed a reluctance to 
inquire with trial counsel about any communication with the SAPD or advice that may have been 
given. See Id. at 2. In addition, the State argued that "SAPO counsel cannot make ineffective 
2 It is worth noting that Mr. Benjamin makes the representation that in his evaluation the "SAPO 
did not give trial counsel advice on how to proceed in Hall II." Id. at ~1O. And that "with one 
exception ... it is clear that the SAPD lawyers decided to not give advice to trial counsel due to 
a concern over creating a conflict of interest." Id. at ~ll. Mr. Benjamin goes on to explain that 
there was one instance of advice given to trial counsel by the SAPO, that the trial lawyers took 
that advice and that the result was favorable to Mr. Hall. Id. at ~12. In explanation, Mr. 
Benjamin indicates that "there is no claim in the Amended Petition that trial counsel were 
ineffective for taking this action. Further, there is no legal basis for SAPO to challenge that 
decision in the post-conviction proceedings because the result was favorable to Mr. Hall. Thus, 
this single piece of advice does not create a conflict of interest under Rules of Professional 
Conduct." Id. 
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assistance of counsel claims and at the same time be potential witnesses regarding those same 
claims.,,3 Id. at 3. 
The remainder of the State's Response is filled with "[e]xamples of scenarios where a 
potential conflict could arise.,,4 Id. at 4. However, there was no evidence presented by the State 
that any of their scenarios were founded in materials in possession by the State, in either the Ex 
Parte Notice or the Amended Notice submitted by the SAPD, or in the Affidavit of Dennis 
Benjamin. The State's "concern is that neither the State nor this Court know the content of all 
the material [Mr. Benjamin] reviewed or the content of all of the interviews he conducted. 
Therefore, neither the State nor the Court can compare the nature of the material and the 
conversations with claims made in the Amended Petition. Without the content, the Court is 
unable to decide the conflict question." State's Response, p. 7. The State characterizes the 
August 30th filings by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin, by concluding that "[t]here is no substance 
to any of the conclusory statements. There is no record upon which this Court can base a ruling. 
Nor is there a record upon which an appellate court could base a decision." Id., p. 10 (citation 
omitted). However, the State admitted that "it makes sense for this Court to conduct an inquiry 
3 The State never addresses in any of its filings how any communication by or with Mr. Ackley 
or Ms. Swensen, who are no longer at the SAPD, would make any person currently representing 
the petitioner at the SAPD a witness. See petitioner's discussion of Mr. Ackley and Ms. 
Swensen as potential witnesses in Response at pp. 6-7. 
4 "A conflict could arise if the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel on a particular issue and now 
the SAPD raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on that issue, claiming that trial 
counsel did not do what the SAPD advised them to do." Id. at 4; "a conflict could arise if 
communication the SAPD had with trial counsel involved strategy, even if the SAPD did not 
give 'advice' per se." Id. at 5; "what if the SAPD created expectations with the Petitioner about 
how this case would proceed during trial counsel's representation of the Petitioner and this 
expectation that was created led to a breakdown in the Petitioner's relationship with trial 
counsel?" Id. at 6; and "What if the SAPD advised or suggested things to the Petitioner about 
this case in the absence of trial counsel?" Id. 
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of Mr. Benjamin and detennine if this Court is satisfied that his review was searching and 
thorough." Id., p. 10. 
On October 12, 2010, Ian Thomson, counsel for Mr. Hall at the SAPD, submitted an 
argument prior to the October 19th hearing by way of a letter including the different possible 
courses of action in any inquiry taken by the Court (hereinafter "Letter "). Along with that letter, 
the SAPD included a transcript of the record from the transcript in Abdullah v. State, on April 23, 
2010. Case No. CV PC 05-00308, Tr. 4/23/10, attached hereto as Appendix 7. At the hearing on 
October 19, 2010, undersigned counsel asked that the letter and transcript be admitted as part of 
the record in lieu of lengthy oral argument and the Court granted that request. The SAPD argued 
that the Court ought to rely on the representations found in the Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin, 
when considering whether a more specific and targeted inquiry ought to take place. The SAPD, 
agreed with the State and suggested that the Court should inquire ofMr. Benjamin on the record. 
See Letter, at pp. 1-2 ("I believe that if the Court were to hear from Mr. Benjamin, on the record, 
his representation and analysis would accomplish the exact same function as did Mr. Roark in 
the case of Mr. Abdullah before the Honorable Judge Copsey.") "Such a path should satisfy the 
Court that a searching and independent inquiry has been made into the issue. In addition, this 
path would be the least expensive and least intrusive." Id. at p. 2. And finally, "Mr. Benjamin's 
representation would accomplish the same thing by avoiding the need for an identical inquiry 
being made by a similarly situated attorney, but this time at the county's expense."s Id., p. 3. 
S The SAPD also noted that there were three other conceivable alternatives: (l) the Court could 
alternatively appoint another attorney to evaluate the conflict, noting that doing so would be 
imprudent and inappropriate.; (2) the Court could order a judicial inquest and order that all 
privileged files be turned over to the Court for its own review of the conflict; noting that such an 
order would likely precipitate a motion asking for a separate Judge; and (3) the Court could order 
the SAPD to tum over to the State all privileged materials, noting that such a step would likely 
lead to an appeal of such an order. See discussion in Letter, pp. 3-4. 
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The SAPD's recommendation took into consideration the Court's need to consider "(1) the 
avoidance of additional and unnecessary delays, (2) the conservation of limited County and State 
resources, (3) the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and (4) a concerted effort to avoid 
creating any future or unnecessary conflict with the Court." !d., p. 4. 
At the October 19,2010, hearing the Court did not hear from Mr. Benjamin, and did not 
inquire any further into the nature and content of the Amended Notice or the Affidavit ofDennis 
Benjamin. The Court did not issue an oral decision, and instead notified the parties that a 
decision would be issued in writing. 
D. The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on December 27, 2010. In that 
Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court makes several factual findings and conclusions of 
law. The Court found that "the SAPD did not admit or deny that it had a conflict in this case" in 
the Ex Parte Notice filed on June 29,2010. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 2, Ls. 15-16. 
It also indicates that after the filing and several court dates, the Court instructed the SAPD to 
disclose "further details about such contact and asked specifically for information regarding 
whether the SAPD had given advice to the Petitioner's trial attorneys." Id. at 3. The Court also 
found that the Amended Notice only provided the Court with details about the methods by which 
the contact occurred, and "did not provide any information about the substance of the 
conversations or disclose whether the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel, despite this Court's 
specific request." Id. The Court, however, later admitted that the Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin 
(filed on the same day as the Amended Notice) states that one of the former SAPD lawyers gave 
advice to trial counsel. See Id., p. 3. 
II. ARGUMENT 
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Counsel for Mr. Hall requests this Court incorporate by reference all arguments already 
made in the submissions and filings referenced herein, including those in the Motion for 
Permission to Appeal.6 
Mr. Hall asks this Court to reconsider various findings and orders contained in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order. Namely, Mr. Hall asks the Court to now reconsider its 
several holdings and determine that: (1) the SAPD brought the conflict attention to the Court as 
soon as it realized that there might be an appearance of conflict in light of the Abdullah case, and 
has been candid and forthcoming with the Court while investigating any possible conflict; (2) 
the SAPD has been willing to share information concerning contacts when no attorney-client 
privilege prevents that release; (3) appointing Mr. Roark to act as conflict-counsel for Mr. Hall is 
no different than the work already performed by Mr. Benjamin, and will lead to additional 
expense and delay; (4) no further conflict inquiry is justified in light ofthe information presently 
before the Court; and (5) the State should be permitted and encouraged to inquire of trial counsel 
(Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal) about their communications with the SAPD in order to resolve 
any doubts as to the existence of a conflict in the most expeditious manner. 
A. The SAPD Has Been Candid and Forthcoming With the Court 
In its attempt to be as forthcoming as possible with the Court-by raising the issue in the 
first place-the SAPD has unintentionally led this Court to believe that it is somehow hiding 
information from the Court. It is clear, after reading the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order, that in retrospect, the SAPD's error was in projecting onto this Court its experience in the 
Abdullah case. Mr. Hall acknowledges that, as the issue is framed by the Court, the SAPD's 
6 To the extent that the Court must take judicial notice of the record in the case of Hall I, we ask 
that this court take judicial notice of those transcripts for this purpose. 
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actions since its filing of the Ex Parte Notice could be seen as evasive. However, if placed in its 
proper context, the facts show the contrary. 
The SAPD has been very concerned with its candor and willingness to fully disclose all 
non-privileged information to the Court during the course of its conflict review. In fact, the 
evidence shows that the SAPD shared with the Court the fact that it had been communicating and 
sharing information with trial counsel at the time those contacts were occurring. In addition, it 
was the SAPD who first brought to the Court's attention that it believed a conflict review was 
necessary in this case, and was neither responding to the State's motion or an inquiry made by 
the Court. Due to its recent experience in the Abdullah case, the SAPD chose to allow that 
conflict review to be conducted by a contracted conflict attorney. As a result, the SAPD felt 
constrained in making an explicit representation to the Court as to whether a conflict existed, and 
instead believed that the review and analysis provided by the conflict attorney would satisfy the 
Court's wishes. 
During the course of the SAPD's representations in post-conviction proceedings on Hall 
I, the SAPD did cooperate with Mr. Hall's trial counsel on the instant case. Those contacts were 
never hidden from the court or the State and references were repeatedly made to those contacts 
by Mr. Ackley and Mr. Chastain. See generally discussion supra. at I(A). It is evident that on 
multiple occasions, the fact that information from discovery and investigation was being shared 
in both directions between the SAPD and trial counsel. In addition, Mr. Ackley, even went so 
far as to ask the Court for guidance as to whether the SAPD was appropriately handling the 
exchange of that information. See Motion for Judicial Notice, Case No. SPOT 05-001155, Tr. 
6/15/07, p. 27, L. 19-p. 28, L. 13; p. 29, L. 7- p. 30, L. 7; p. 30, Ls. 15-22. During that period 
the SAPD never attempted to hide from the Court any communications it had with trial counsel, 
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and never evaded questions posed to it by the Court. These contacts represent many of the very 
same contacts that have been raised by the SAPD in its Ex Parte Notice. 
In June of 2010, the SAPD had recently undergone a painstaking and lengthy conflict 
inquiry in another case, which was precipitated by only a few contacts between trial counsel and 
the SAPD prior to any attorney-client relationship being formed between the SAPD and that 
petitioner. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit D. It should be noted that the Abdullah conflict 
inquiry occurred several years into the post-conviction proceedings, and only months before an 
evidentiary hearing on the final amended petition for post-conviction relief. Because of the 
devastating nature of the Court's findings and the lengthy delay and expense that the 
investigation caused, the SAPD was extremely sensitive to the effect that such an inquiry might 
have on its other cases. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit G. It also believed that any conflict 
issues should be resolved as soon as possible. 
Counsel for Mr. Hall made the decision to undertake a more complete conflict review of 
the instant case. That review was in accordance with the obligations found in the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. Logically, the SAPD believed that the appearance of conflict 
with Mr. Hall was possible given the recent finding in the case of Mr. Abdullah. In that case, 
the SAPD had already conducted its own review and determined in response to the Court's 
inquiry that no conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit C. Even though the State 
had no reason to dispute the SAPD's determination in its own memorandum, Judge Copsey 
nevertheless made a finding that an actual conflict existed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 
D. The appointment of Mr. Roark was made after the Judge had already made a preliminary 
determination that a conflict existed, and the Court asked Mr. Roark to advise Mr. Abdullah as to 
how he should proceed. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit F. It should be clear that such a 
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finding of a conflict, in direct opposition to the finding made by counsel could have a significant 
impact on the attorney-client relationship and any existing relationship of trust. 
Mr. Abdullah eventually waived the conflict and the SAPD was reappointed to represent 
him on May 7, 2010. Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit J. Ultimately, the SAPD determined 
that in order to be as forthcoming and transparent as possible with the Court, it would file an Ex 
Parte Notice informing the Court that a conflict review was underway and that a conflict 
attorney had been arranged for Mr. Hall. In its attempt to notify the Court that more time was 
necessary in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion that no conflict existed, and to vacate an 
upcoming status date, the SAPD unintentionally precipitated a full-scale judicial inquiry into the 
existence of a conflict. 
It cannot be overlooked that if the SAPO were attempting to evade the Court, or hide 
information from the Court regarding any contacts between the SAPD and trial counsel, the 
SAPD would never have filed the Ex Parte Notice on its own. The State did not file anything 
raising the issue until almost six weeks later. Furthermore, ifthe SAPO was concerned about the 
State or the Court discovering the actual nature and contents of the communications Mr. Ackley 
and Ms. Swensen had with trial counsel, the SAPD would not be as insistent that the State 
contact and discuss those very questions with Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal. 
The statutory charter of the State Appellate Public Defender makes it clear that "should 
the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act because of 
a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate public defender shall arrange for 
counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public 
defender." Idaho Code §19-871. 
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The Court makes repeated reference in its Memorandum Decision and Order that the 
SAPD has refused to make any determinations as to whether a conflict actually exists. The 
SAPD has refrained from making such a representation in order to insulate itself from allegations 
of bias or that its judgment is compromised. In the Court's eyes, this wariness may have been 
unwarranted and could be seen as the primary mistake of the SAPD in handling the inquiry as it 
has. However, the SAPD did not want to advise Mr. Hall as to whether a conflict existed, only 
to have that representation contradicted by another attorney or the Court, as happened in the 
Abdullah case. Instead, the SAPD, in contracting with Mr. Benjamin, was willing to "live or 
die" by his evaluation and whatever course of action he and Mr. Hall decided to take. 
When the Court ordered on August 26, 2010, that an Amended Notice of Possible 
Conflict should be filed to answer questions regarding the nature of the contact between the 
SAPD and trial counsel, the SAPD was under the impression that its Amended Notice in 
conjunction with the Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin would satisfy the request made by the Court, 
and was not under the impression that the answer to the Court's question must come from the 
SAPD itself. In addition, the SAPO did not want to appear, by making representations as to the 
conflict issue, that it was in collusion with Mr. Benjamin or using his determination to bolster its 
own evaluation. The Court, however, does not find whether the Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin 
sufficiently provides those details that were requested by the Court, or whether the Amended 
Notice was considered in conjunction with the affidavit to have satisfied the Court's request. 
From the very beginning, the SAPO has shared with the Court that there was contact with 
trial counsel in order to share and facilitate information helpful to Mr. Hall. In addition, as soon 
as it became clear to the SAPD, in light of the Abdullah case, that there might be a specter of 
conflict raised in this case, the SAPD immediately filed its Ex Parte Notice to the Court. It then 
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arranged to provide Mr. Hall with conflict counsel in order to make a determination of whether a 
conflict exists. The SAPD refrained from interfering in that investigation, or making any 
representations itself as to whether a conflict existed in order to avoid an appearance of further 
bias. For all of these reasons, the Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Order 
and find that the SAPD has been diligent in its handling of the issue and candid with the Court. 
B. The SAPD Has Been Willing to Share Information with the Court Whenever There is No 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
The Court characterizes the SAPD's actions through these proceedings in the following 
way, "[i]nstead of being forthcoming and candid with the Court about the facts in this case, the 
SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire 
outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and defer all questions to Mr. Benjamin even though 
he represents the Petitioner and not the SAPD." Id. at 6, L. 24 - 7, L. 2. In relationship to that 
finding, the Court does not recognize that an attorney-client privilege existed between the SAPD 
and Mr. Hall at the time of the communications in question. Instead, the Court intimates that the 
SAPD's lack of disclosure "may constitute an affirmative misrepresentation." Id. at 7, L. 9. 
In the same breath the Court makes reference to the post-conviction of Payne v. State, 
and suggests that the SAPD "can be forthcoming and candid when it so chooses. Nevertheless, 
the performance of the SAPD in this case has been markedly different." Id. at 7, Ls. 14-15. 
Again, the Court fails to make a finding as to whether an attorney-client privilege was ever 
asserted by the SAPD in either the Abdullah or Payne case, and draws no distinction between the 
facts underlying the SAPD's representation of Mr. Hall in this case. It is left to be assumed that 
the Court sees the nature of the relationship between the SAPD and Mr. Hall in this case at the 
time there was contact with trial counsel is indistinguishable from the facts in Mr. Payne and Mr. 
Abdullah, where no attorney-client privilege existed at the time there was contact with either Mr. 
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Hall or trial counsel, respectively. 7 The Court additionally finds that it has given the "SAPD and 
Mr. Benjamin several opportunities to come forward voluntarily with the details of the 
communications between the SAPD and the Hall II trial counsel." Id. at 8, Ls. 1-2. 
As the Court knows, the Payne case involved contacts between the SAPD and Mr. Payne 
during a time after sentencing relief had been granted and the SAPD no longer represented Mr. 
Payne. Those contacts were never protected by an attorney-client privilege, and the SAPD never 
asserted any privilege or notion of confidentiality.8 Likewise, the communications between the 
SAPD and the Toryanskis in the case of Mr. Abdullah, were not protected by any privilege since 
the SAPD did not represent Mr. Abdullah at the time he was awaiting trial. See Motion for 
Judicial Notice, Exhibit C, Addendum B. Those documents had come to the attention of the 
court due to their submission by the SAPD in the final amended petition of Mr. Abdullah. 
Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A. 
Here, the SAPD has repeatedly stated that the only reason it cannot share with the State 
and the Court the contents of its attorneys' files is because an attorney-client relationship existed 
between the SAPD and Mr. Hall at the time the communications were taking place. See 
discussion in Response at pp. 9-13, and in Reply at pp. 4-6. 
The SAPD maintains the position that the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality is 
just that-a prohibition on divulging any information by an attorney in regards to any 
7 The only specific finding made in this respect is the comment that "the SAPD did represent the 
Petitioner on the Hall I post-conviction case during the time frame in which these 
communications occurred and the Court is unaware of the extent to which the contact between 
the SAPD and trial counsel for Hall II intermingled discussions about Hall I and Hall II, and the 
Court does not wish to expose itself to privileged information concerning Hall I." Id. at 8, Ls. 
11-15. It is left to the reader to draw the conclusion that the Court believes that no privilege or 
attorney-confidentiality exists where the communications are related to one's client, but not 
specifically related to the case to which an attorney has been appointed. 
8 The notes of those hearings are also unavailable to petitioner, but may be produced if requested 
to render any decision. 
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representation of that client. It is not, as both the Court and the State seem to believe, an 
attorney-case privilege, where protections only attach when the material or communications have 
to do with a specific case.9 The Rules of Professional Conduct clearly refer not to the 
representation of a case, but to "representation of a client." LR.P.C. Rule 1.6(a). 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court notes that the SAPD "can be 
forthcoming and candid when it so chooses." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 7, L. 14. In 
light of the clear distinction between the present case and the cases of Mr. Abdullah and Mr. 
Payne, where no attorney-client privilege was asserted, Mr. Hall asks the Court to reconsider its 
finding that the SAPD's performance "in this case has been markedly different." Id. at p. 7, L. 
15. Instead, Mr. Hall asks that the Court find that there was an attorney-client privilege between 
Mr. Hall and the SAPD during 2006 and 2007, and that consequently all attorney files and notes 
are protected under the joint notions of privilege and confidentiality. In the event that the Court 
agrees, it should be underscored that the nature and content of those communications would still 
be available to all parties through the emails and files of Rob Chastain and Deb Kristal, with 
whom Mr. Hall has already waived his privilege. 
C. The Appointment of Keith Roark is Unnecessary, Duplicative, and Will Not Accomplish 
Anything that Cannot Be Provided by Mr. Benjamin 
The Court finds that the representation of Mr. Benjamin is unsatisfactory and does not 
meet the needs of the Court in determining whether a conflict exists in this case. In light of the 
fact that the Court has not attempted to ask follow-up questions or Mr. Benjamin, or authorized 
him to depose, if necessary; the Court has not fully exhausted the benefit of Mr. Benjamin as 
9 The Court finds in its Memorandum Decision and Order that "communications between the 
SAPD and trial counsel about this case are not privileged because the SAPD had not yet been 
appointed to this case when the communications occurred". Id. at 8, Ls. 3-5. However, the 
Court does not find that there was no attorney-client privilege between the SAPD and Mr. Hall, 
but only as related to information on Hall II. 
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conflict counsel in this case. Instead, the Court's appointment could be construed as attorney-
shopping. 1O The Memorandum Decision and Order contains no findings that specifically call 
into question the independence or adequacy of Mr. Benjamin's representations to the Court. 
Instead, the Court simply relies on the solitary fact that "he is closely aligned with the SAPD in 
that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a portion of his income is 
dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office." Id. at 10, Ls. 5-7. The SAPD 
admitted in prior filings that the appointment of additional counsel would be within the 
prerogative and discretion of the Court, but that presupposed that the Court would provide a 
sufficient reason as to why Mr. Benjamin's representation did not, or could not, satisfy the Court. 
It also noted that the Court would be responsible for any costs associated with additional counsel. 
If the Court deems that Mr. Benjamin is compromised in his evaluation of the conflict 
and in his representation of Mr. Hall, for the sole reason that he frequently works as conflict 
counsel for the SAPD, then the Court must also acknowledge that such a ruling calls into 
question every conflict appointment made by a public defender in the State of Idaho. This would 
include every time a conflict attorney is appointed to represent a criminal defendant by the State 
Appellate Public Defender in their appeals, because the SAPD did not consult with the Court of 
Appeals or the Supreme Court first. Likewise, the Court's finding allows for any judge to 
question the independence of a conflict attorney appointed by a public defender at the trial level, 
unless such an appointment is made with prior consultation of the trial judge. The process used 
in selecting Mr. Benjamin is the same process used by the SAPD in selecting conflict counsel for 
any of its many conflicts. To the extent that the Court is finding that Mr. Benjamin is not 
10 The Court admits that Mr. Benjamin "is not this Court's choice of independent counsel and 
would not have been this Court's choice of independent counsel had the SAPD consulted with 
the Court before choosing him." Id. at 10, Ls. 8-10. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 26 001404
 
• • 
sufficiently independent from the SAPD because he is being paid for his services by the SAPD, 
it cannot go without noting that the same will hold true for Mr. Roark pursuant to the Court's 
order. If the Court is suggesting that Mr. Benjamin's independent representation of Mr. Hall 
may be compromised in an effort to please the SAPD so that future conflict contracts may be 
forthcoming, such a tenuous argument can be made of every conflict attorney selected by a 
public defender. 
Furthermore, appointing Mr. Roark as conflict counsel does not even find precedence in 
the case ofAbdullah v. State. There, Judge Copsey had already made a finding that a conflict, in 
fact, existed and was removing the SAPD and appointing Mr. Roark to advise Mr. Abdullah as to 
the ramifications of such a conflict, and whether he should waive the conflict. Id. at~· 13. Here, 
the Court has not yet made a determination that a conflict exists, but is interfering with the 
attorney-client relationship that already exists between Mr. Hall and the SAPD, and Mr. Hall and 
Mr. Benjamin. 11 Likewise, in the Abdullah case, no conflict attorney had already provided the 
evaluation and counsel sought by the Court when Mr. Roark was appointed. 
Under the Court's order, there are two primary distinctions between the services rendered 
already by Mr. Benjamin and those requested of Mr. Roark. First, Mr. Benjamin was appointed 
by the SAPD to represent Mr. Hall in this matter. See Affidavit ofDennis Benjamin at ~ 5. The 
Court appears to be appointing Mr. Roark, ostensibly to represent Mr. Hall, but also requires 
II It should be noted that in another case where Judge Copsey appointed "conflict counsel" to 
advise a defendant as to whether to waive a conflict, there was already a presumptive conflict. 
See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (2003). There, trial counsel had brought it to the Judge's 
attention that he had previously represented the victim in the case eleven years prior, and that the 
victim's mother had worked for the trail attorney at the time. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 257. The 
Court chose to appoint a public defender to advise the defendant of a possible waiver and the 
Court of Appeals found that the procedure had adequately protected the defendant's rights. !d. at 
259. In that case, the facts certainly give rise to the appearance of an actual conflict under 
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.9: Duties to Former Clients. No such finding is present here. 
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certain disclosures and actions to be taken by Mr. Roark pursuant to the Court's order. And 
secondly, Mr. Benjamin was not authorized to depose in this matter and the Court has extended 
that authorization to Mr. Roark. Mr. Hall notes that the Court has not inquired of Mr. Benjamin 
as to whether he would find it helpful to depose anyone he interviewed in making his evaluation. 
That difference could certainly be remedied without requiring separate counsel to come in and 
start the investigation from the beginning. 
But there is a third critical distinction, because it is also uncertain as to whether Mr. 
Roark will be able to perform the same function as Mr. Benjamin. In the case of Mr. Benjamin, 
because he was provided a waiver from Mr. Hall on the matter, Mr. Benjamin had access to all 
of the SAPD files and communications and was able to perform an extensive review of the 
relevant files. See Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin at ~~ 5 and 7; and Notice for Release of 
Information. Because the SAPD would not release attorney-client files to anyone without a 
release from Mr. Hall, no guarantee can be made that Mr. Roark will have access to the same 
information or that Mr. Hall will cooperate with Mr. Roark. The SAPD could envision a 
scenario in which Mr. Roark would be left to review the exact same information now available to 
the State and the Court-the files of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, along with the public record, 
and the statements of anyone willing to speak with Mr. Roark regarding the possible conflict. 
Furthermore, the Court's order makes no mention of the implications that the purported 
attorney-client privilege established between Mr. Hall and Mr. Roark may have on his ability to 
satisfy the court's request. And in fact, the order is silent as to whether Roark should consult 
with or advise Mr. Hall on the matter, but is only specific as to the information being requested 
by the Court. Instead, only if "the Court conclude that there is a conflict of interest, Mr. Roark 
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will advise the Petitioner regarding such conflict and any waiver of the conflict." Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 9, Ls. 17-18. 
The Court orders that the SAPD should pay for Mr. Roark's services to the Court. Three 
reasons are given: first, any conflict that may exist are due to the SAPD's own actions; second, 
Mr. Roark's appointment may not have been necessary had the SAPD been more forthcoming; 
and third, Mr. Benjamin has not provided the "exact same service" which is being sought by the 
Court in appointing Mr. Roark. Id. at 10, L. 4. The Court questions Mr. Benjamin's 
independence from the SAPD because "he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and 
therefore, a portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that 
office." Id. 
In establishing a procedure to appoint "conflict counsel," this Court erroneously relied 
upon Idaho Code § 19-871 for its authority to order the SAPD to compensate "conflict counsel" 
from the SAPD budget. Specifically, because there is not a conflict in Mr. Hall's case and 
because Mr. Roark is an expert attorney appointed by the Court to conduct its inquiry and report 
to the Court regarding whether a conflict exists, Idaho Code § 19-871 does not require the SAPD 
to pay for Mr. Roark. When the SAPD incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual 
agreement between the SAPD and the expert. No such arrangement or contract exists between 
the SAPD and Mr. Roark. 
Idaho Code §19-871 provides as follows: 
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties 
required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state 
appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be 
compensated out ofthe budget ofthe state appellate public defender. 
Comparatively, Idaho Code §19-860(b) states: 
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If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney 
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district 
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his 
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for 
which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the amounts so 
prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with regard to the 
complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant considerations. 
In this case, the Court has selected an attorney other than the public defender and in 
defining the scope of representation, "determined the direct expenses necessary to 
representation." Thus, pursuant to I.C. 19-860(b) Ada County, not the SAPD, is responsible for 
the remuneration for Mr. Roark's services. Additionally, pursuant to I.e. §19-87l, no 
determination was made by the SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the 
Act. The SAPD's statutory obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be 
compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" is triggered by the 
SAPD's inability to carry out its duties. Absent an inability to carry out its duties, the SAPD has 
no obligation to pay for alternate counsel. Here, the SAPD has already arranged to provide Mr. 
Hall with that service and has entered into a contract with Mr. Benjamin to that effect. 
Pursuant to these provisions, it is within the power of the SAPD to decide who it will 
contract with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do 
so. The SAPD's power and ability to contract with outside counsel is dependent on having 
sufficient funds to so contract. See Appendix 8 {Affidavit ofJosh Tewalt, p.2, ~ 16 ("That all 
state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any contract is subject to sufficient 
appropriation from the Legislature[.]"); p.3, ~ 21 ("That any contract currently initiated by the 
SAPD would not have the guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations[.]"). 
The SAPD's budget is wholly dependent upon an annual appropriation of funding from the Idaho 
State Legislature. See IDAHO CaNST., art. VII, § 13 {"No money shall be drawn from the 
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treasurer, but in pursuance of appropriations made by law."). "An appropriation in this state is 
authority of the Legislature given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers to 
apply a specified sum from a designated fund out of the treasury for a specified object or demand 
against the state." Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102, 204 P. 1066, 1067 (Idaho 
1922). Presently there is no money allocated to pay for Mr. Roark's services. See Appendix 11. 
Because Mr. Benjamin has already provided the same services the Court requests of Mr. 
Roark, and the Court has been unable to show why Mr. Benjamin's work as conflict counsel 
should not be relied upon, the Court should reconsider its appointment of R. Keith Roark. To 
appoint Mr. Roark where no preliminary determination of a conflict has been found, and where 
independent advice has already been given to Mr. Hall is unprecedented, unnecessary and 
extraordinarily wasteful in paying for the same service twice. Consequently, the Court should 
consider inquiring ofMr. Benjamin as to whether he would like to depose any witnesses. 
D. No Further Inquiry Is Justified at This Time 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court summarizes the proceedings leading 
up to its decision and concludes that "this Court is presently lacking the factual background 
necessary to reach any conclusion." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 7, Ls. 25-26. Mr. 
Hall submits that the Court does not have sufficient information to continue the conflict inquiry 
at the present time. 
In summary, the Court received an Ex Parte Notice from the SAPD that the office had 
undertaken a conflict review of Hall II, because of the various contacts that the Court was 
already well aware of during the period that both the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel represented 
Mr. Hall. The Court was informed that the SAPD had arranged and contracted with Mr. Dennis 
Benjamin to advise Mr. Hall in determining whether there was a conflict, and in the event that 
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there was, how to proceed. The State subsequently filed a motion indicating that they had 
previously inquired of Mr. Ackley as to whether there was a conflict, and he had stated that there 
was not. See State's Motion at p. 1. ("The State inquired of Mr. Ackley, prior to his leaving the 
office of the SAPD, to determine if there were any conflict issues in this case. Although Mr. 
Ackley did not believe there were, the State prefers to address this issue now rather than later."). 
Neither the State, nor the Court, has found any contact between the SAPD and Mr. Chastain and 
Ms. Kristal beyond the general cooperation and exchange of information which had been brought 
to the attention of the court back in 2006 and 2007. Once Mr. Benjamin was appointed, Mr. 
Benjamin was provided a limited waiver of his attorney-client privilege with the SAPD in order 
to grant him full access to all relevant files and documents at the SAPD. See Authorization for 
Release ofInformation, attached hereto as Appendix 9. After conducting a review of those files 
and correspondence, he counseled with Mr. Hall and advised him that although he found one 
instance where the SAPD had offered advice to trial counsel, since it was adopted by trial 
counsel and turned out favorable to Mr. Hall, there was no conflict. Further, he stated that the 
contacts had occurred between Mr. Chastain, Ms. Kristal, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen-none 
of whom are currently at the SAPD. Consequently, in his evaluation there was no conflict. In its 
order, the Court does not articulate any other specific facts that substantiate further inquiry into 
the matter. 
The Court has placed considerable emphasis on the court's "affirmative duty to inquire 
into a potential conflict whenever it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict 
may exist.' (citation omitted)" Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4, Ls. 14-15. However, 
the order seems to abdicate this duty to Mr. Roark, by not only asking Mr. Roark to provide the 
court with information, but asking Mr. Roark to also report his determinations of law, including 
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"whether a conflict exists," "if so, the general nature of the conflict," and "whether independent 
counsel believes that such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office.,,12 !d. at 9, Ls. 
8-11. 
The SAPD maintains, that the specific and targeted inquiry required by the Courts should 
correspond to the quality and content of the information raising the possibility of a conflict. The 
Court should recognize its obligation to inquire as a continuum, where an ever greater inquiry 
and concern is warranted when more problematic facts are available to the court. In cases like 
State v. Severson 13 , 147 Idaho 694 (2009), State v. Lovelace14, 140 Idaho 53 (2003), or State v. 
Lopez15, 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003), where actual facts are presented to the Court that give 
rise to a clear potential for conflict, the Court is required to at least inquire as to whether an 
actual conflict exists. Here, no such facts are available. And, in fact, the Court's sole basis for 
granting the State's Motion for Inquiry on August 26, 2010, was the fact that it had received 
"notices of concern about a possible conflict of interest from the State as well as from the 
SAPD." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4, Ls. 16-17. 
The Court also found that "[i]f claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were brought in 
any area where the SAPD offered advice to trial counsel, the State may wish to call the SAPD 
attorneys that gave the advice as witnesses in order to show that trial counsels' actions were part 
of a strategic choice made after careful investigation." Id. at 5, Ls. 13-16. The Memorandum 
12 The Court expresses some frustration with the fact that the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin
 
includes similar conclusory statements, and noted that the affidavit included legal conclusions.
 
See Memorandum Decision and Order at p. 3.
 
13 Where trail counsel worked with another attorney who "had represented [the victim's] mother
 
in a civil suit that was directly related to the criminal case." 147 Idaho at 701.
 
14 Where the appointed attorney was running for county prosecutor at the time of representation,
 
subsequently won the election and was removed after being sworn in. 140 Idaho at 59.
 
15 Where trial counsel had brought it to the Judge's attention that he had previously represented
 
the victim in the case eleven years prior, and that the victim's mother had worked for the trail
 
attorney at the time. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 257.
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• • 
Decision and Order is silent on whether a conflict created by making the attorneys in question, 
Mr. Ackley and Ms. Swensen, witnesses to these proceedings would therefore be imputed to the 
entire office of the SAPD. The finding, however, seems to indicate that it would since it 
necessitates a further inquiry by the Court, whereas if no such claim could be imputed to the 
entire SAPD, then no further inquiry would be necessary. 
The SAPD has done everything within its power to provide Mr. Hall with sufficient 
opportunity to raise a conflict issue with the SAPD by providing him with an independent 
conflict counsel. In addition, the SAPD has offered the notes, files, and communications of trial 
counsel for the State to review, in order to gauge the nature and content of all documented 
communications with the SAPD and suggested that the State be allowed to interview and inquire 
of trial counsel regarding the same issue. In the absence of such facts, the Court should be 
satisfied that no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Hall. 
E. There is No Reason that the State Should be Prevented From Inquiring ofTrial Counsel 
In the final paragraph of its order, the Court denies the State its request to "discuss with 
Hall II trial counsel conversations held in the presence of the Petitioner where the SAPD was 
also present." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10, Ls. 15-16. As has been repeatedly 
suggested by the SAPD, there is one simple way to circumnavigate the attorney-client privilege 
and notions of confidentiality asserted by the SAPD-inquire of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, 
whose privileged communications and files have already been waived by Mr. Hall. All of those 
documents have been repeatedly offered to the State for their review. Given the fact that there is 
an easy remedy to discover any advice that trial counsel received from the SAPD during their 
representation of Mr. Hall, it makes little sense as to why the Court would prohibit the State from 
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inquiring of trial counsel about those issues, but instead prefer a lengthy and expensive 
investigation by yet another attorney in the case. 
Mr. Hall asks the Court to sincerely reconsider its order to prohibit the State from 
contacting and inquiring about any advice that may have been tendered by the SAPD during the 
lead up to the trial in Hall II. It would present the path of least resistance, accomplish the 
Court's desire by providing the Court with specific facts by which it could make its ultimate 
determination, and only inconvenience Mr. Chastain and Ms. Krista!. 
C. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons submitted, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this court to reconsider the 
several holdings and orders in its Memorandum Decision and Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 10th day of January, 2011. 
jc~B~ 
Ian H. Thomson 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
VJJiuo 
Nicole Owens 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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Page 138 
7, at the top is No.6. I've indicated to Counsel that 
I will inquire as to whether or not police reports 
still exist in No.6 there. 
TIIE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOURNE: And I've agreed on No.8, still on 
page 7 there. 
TIIE COURT: Yes. You've agreed to-­
MR. BOURNE: Number 8(a) -- oh, wait a second. 
Yes, I agree, but that will require the Court's order, 
of course, because that's a grand jury transcript, but 
it is okay with me if the grand jury transcript -- I 
think I may have one, and if the Court gives the go 
ahead, I'll just make a copy. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOURNE: 8(b), the photographs. I'll make 
Counsel a copy of the photographs, and I'll check to 
see if there is any negatives. 
Actually, "b" and "c" are about the same. It 
is just all photographs, but I agreed to give them the 
photographs. 
And then "g" -- 8(g), I will inquire of Garden 
City Police whether there are any tape recorded 
statements still in existence from that 1991 case. 
Then we take up again at page 13, it looks 
like. Page 13 refers to the notes and files and other 
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Page 140 
MR. BOURNE: F(6) and F(7) for the police reports 
from the sex offender case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOURNE: And No. 12, on page 22, so we are at 
F(l2) now -­ are Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone-­
THE COURT: Records? 
MR. BOURNE: It is her usage on her telephone after 
she became missing on September 24th, 2000. What I 
agreed to do is to see if we ever had those, or if we 
still have her telephone usage records. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOURNE: And then, page 23. It is number "g" 
there on page23. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BOURNE: I just agreed to make inquiries about 
reward information. I just don't know the answer to 
any of that. I don't have any documents, but I agreed 
to look into that, and then I will tell Counsel what I 
find out, and we can decide what should be released. 
THE COURT: You're thinking -- you're going to 
inquire whether there, for example, might have been an 
airline employee reward or something -­
MR. BOURNE: Yeah. I just don't know anything 
about the rewards, and I told him I would find out if a 
reward was even offered. I just don't know that. 
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things from Dr. Groben and the Ada COWlty Coroner's 
Office. There is not very much that _. well, about all 
I can say about that is that I've agreed to inquire 
with the Coroner's Office on all of these things to see 
what is available, and what we can release, and that 
Counsel and I will work out all the details of that 
after I find out what is available. 
Did I get that right? 
MR. ACKLEY: Pretty much. 
MR. BOURNE: Then page 18. On page 18,No.4,we 
agreed to get copies of the PowerPoint slides used by 
the Prosecutor's Office during the closing arguments of 
that case, of both the guilt and penalty phases. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry. So it is actually page 18, 
miscellaneous? 
MR. BOURNE: Yes, and it is just No.4. 
THE COURT: A(4)? 
MR. BOURNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BOURNE: And number 21 -- on page 21, I mean. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOURNE: No.6, are the police reports for 
the -- Mr. Hall's -- Erick Hall's escape. I'll try and 
get him copies of those reports. 
THE COURT: And that is F(6)? Thank you. 
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Page 141 
I think they are going to do some follow up on 
some other ones, but that is where my notes leave off. 
Is that it? 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes. There were some other informal 
ones that we discussed like, we are going to take 
responsibility to identify specific documents in the 
possession of the Idaho Department ofCorrections, by 
name, for Mr. Bourne -- and there are a couple of other 
areas. 
I should also add that there have been 
attempts by both myself and Mr. Bourne in the past to 
try to work out other discovery issues. For instance, 
there are some materials that were disclosed in 
discovery during the underlying criminal case, which 
just didn't show up in trial counsel's files when he 
turned them over to us. And I think the reason for 
that is because trial counsel separated documents they 
thought were relevant to the Hanlon case and gave that 
to conflict cOWlsel, I think, Rob Chastain and Deborah 
Kristal, and then gave us some files. And in the 
course ofreviewing Ms. Kristal and Mr. Chastain's 
files we have confirmed that. 
Those requests are actually a big part ofthis 
motion for discovery, and I think we will be able to 
work that out, ifwe ever find the time. Because I 
35 (Pages 138 to 141) 001417
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1 courtroom down here this afternoon at 1: 30. I denied 1 underlying data, things of that nature and have the 
2 that. When asked for an explanation for my denial, I 2 opportunity to speak with whatever expert might be 
3 did not respond. I wanted that of record. 3 presented, that -­
4 Logistics of the bus route. These are 4 THE COURT: In advance of testimony? 
5 unrelated wave top issues here, just sort of stream 5 MS. BENNETTS: Yes, in advance. And I 
6 of consciousness. 6 understand it's only if we get to mitigation. And 
7 But I've spoken to Marji Shepherd and I 7 counsel has assured me that that is correct. 
8 understand that the bus contractor is out of Boise. 8 MR. CHASTAIN: That is correct, Your Honor. 
9 The bus will go back to Boise every night and will 9 THE COURT: All right. Now this is asking 
10 start from Boise early in the morning and it will 10 the Ada County Sheriffs Office to do a blood drop 
11 come first to the Bliss Sinclair station. 11 and to provide that -- and to take care of the 
12 JURY COMMISSIONER: First to Gooding. 12 transmittal of it to the lab in Denver. 
13 THE COURT: First to Gooding to the 13 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, as I understand -­ I 
14 fairgrounds, which are just about a mile north of 14 don't know if the SAPO has filed a similar motion, 
15 town here on Route 46. And the people from Wendell 15 but it's -­ we only need one sample, I think. But 
16 will have to drive up. They will be given mileage 16 it's -- this was -­ as the Court may recall, Doctor 
17 for that and they will be picked up at the Gooding 17 Meracangus (ph) came up while we were picking a jury. 
18 fairgrounds. And that will be the first stoP.. 18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 And then the second stop will be back on 19 MR. CHASTAIN: This was as a result of, I 
20 Highway 26 to Bliss at the Sinclair station. The 20 guess, some of his findings and his suggestion. 
21 people from Hagerman and Bliss will have to assemble 21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 there. So there will be two stops. 22 MR. CHASTAIN: And so we filed this 
23 Madam jury commissioner is going to discuss 23 contemporaneously with SAPO. 
24 with them the timing of that and their desires about 24 THE COURT: Yes. I should have said, 
25 snacks and meals and having a hot meal waiting for 25 because I'm aware of -­ in fact, I have a copy of the 
3980 3982 
1 them in Ada County before -­ something like 8:30 in 1 motion here from the State Appellate Public 
2 the morning. 2 Defender's Office, which are the petitioners in the 
3 JURY COMMISSIONER: That is correct, sir. 3 postconviction relief for the last murder case. 
4 THE COURT: Have you had that conversation 4 They also have filed a motion here and I 
5 yet? 5 have access to it somewhere here. And I haven't had 
6 JURY COMMISSIONER: I've been speaking with 6 a chance to see if there is any difference, but it is 
7 the jury about that just a few minutes ago and we are 7 intended to be the name motion. 
8 going to wait now until we see who is actually 8 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
9 empaneled to maybe -­ 9 THE COURT: And Mr. Bourne of your office 
10 THE COURT: Make those choices. 10 represents the State in that matter. It's 
11 JURY COMMISSIONER: Yes. Exactly. 11 represented in the motion itself that he has no 
12 THE COURT: But you have a cORtract for 12 objection. 
13 snacks and the bus going and coming. 13 MS. BENNETTS: I believe that was correct. 
14 JURY COMMISSIONER: I do. 14 THE COURT: I'll get to those Orders as 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Another 15 soon as I can. I haven't had an opportunity to 
16 unrelated subject, Motion for Fragile-X Blood Test 16 examine them or sign them yet because I wanted to 
17 filed September 27, last week, by Mr. Chastain and 17 discuss them all with you. 
18 Ms. Krista!. I have had the occasion to read the 18 MS. KRISTAL: I don't remember what the 
19 motion. Has the State had access to the motion? 19 motion says, but the testing takes about two or three 
20 MS. BENNETTS: Yes, Your Honor. 20 weeks, once they get the blood. 
21 THE COURT: Is there objection? 21 THE COURT: So it needs to happen soon. 
22 MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, with the 22 MS. KRISTAL: Right. 
23 understanding that the trial would not be delayed; 23 THE COURT: Okay. I will make it a 
24 that the State would have an opportunity to review 24 priority. 
25 any expert opinions, documents, written documents, 25 MS. KRISTAL: Thank you. 001420
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put forth? In other words, you said that he has a 
strong view of how to defend this case and what the 
defense should be. What is his defense? 
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, to some extent, we 
are relying on some of the comments that come under 
Rule 1.16. 
THE COURT: Of the Rules of Professional 
I Responsibility? 
• MR. CHASTAIN: Professional Responsibility.
 
) And I can further say that our investigation of Mr.
 
I Hall's proposed defense did not bear it out. We
 
Z cannot independently corroborate or support what his
 
I defense is.
 
~ THE COURT: Can you tell me what his 
J defense is? 
I MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, oh, I am not sure I 
, can, other than to say it is completely at odds with 
things that we know to be true from the scientific 
testing we have done, our review of his interviews, 
our review of the State's eVidence and our own
 
investigation. It is not a defense that has any
 
substance.
 
THE COURT: So his defense is in conflict 
with testing results and other things that you know 
17 
, MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. 
t THE COURT: -- to be true. 
I MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. 
~ THE COURT: So his defense would be totally 
• countered off everything you know and you are not 
~ able to corroborate anything that would underlie his 
~ defense. 
l MR. CHASTAIN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Is -- do you feel that hiS 
apparent lack of trust for you and Ms. Kristal and 
his unhappiness with you and Ms. Kristal have to do 
With the defense he would have you take and approach 
he would have you take to defending him and how that 
-- and not to anything else? 
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I think his distrust 
of us and his lack of confidence in our services 
stems from that, is that we don't see the case the 
same way he does; that his interpretation of what the 
evidence shows is diametrically opposed to what our 
evaluation of the case tells us and what we believe 
the jUry is going to believe. 
THE COURT: Let me -- you've had this case 
for a little bit over two years. And earlier, did 
the conflict -- when did the conflict become 
apparent, In other words, to the point where you felt 
18 
1 he didn't trust you and was very unhappy about the 
2 approach you were taking? And I think you said in 
3 your affidavit that there's a complete breakdown in 
4 communication. When did that complete breakdown in 
5 communication occur? 
6 MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, it really came to a 
7 head during meetings held out at the penitentiary 
8 between Ms. Kristal, myself, certain of our experts. 
9 The State Appellate Public Defender was there. 
10 And it was simply manifested by -- I 
11 attended one -- I attended that meeting. Ms. Kristal 
12 attended it. And when we met with Mr. Hall the next 
13 day, we tried to talk with him about it and he 
14 toUllly denied -that certain things Were ever said, 
15 that certain advice was ever given. 
16 In essence -- in essence, called me a liar. 
17 He said that I didn't hear what I heard. And we 
18 tried to rectify that. Ms. Kristal and a member of 
19 the SAPO went out two days later to try to make sure 
20 that yes, that was what was said, that we had -­
21 THE COURT: Said by whom? 
22 MR. CHASTAIN; Various people that were 
23 there. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Gotch ya. 
25 MR. CHASTAIN: I can't give you what the 
19 
1 advice -­ you know, what the ramifications were, but 
2 Mr. Hall essentially denied it all. 
3 And there has been tension all along. Mr. 
4 Hall has had his view of how the case should go 
5 forward. We felt we could work around that. We felt 
6 there was a chance to resolve the case successfully 
7 and favorably in his behalf. That is not going to 
8 happen now. 
9 Mr. Hall is committed to go to trial. And 
10 we believe that, frankly, that the course he wants to 
11 take and that he will take when he takes the stand 
12 will utterly ensure that a second death penalty will 
13 be imposed. 
14 It's such a course that -- and we made no 
15 bones about it with Mr. Hall that this case, unique 
16 as it is, and being a second death penalty case for 
17 this -- for the same defendant, that, you know, this 
18 isn't something that a jury is going to look at like 
19 you would a nickel and dime burglary or auto theft, 
20 something like that. The stakes are way too high. 
21 And so when I told the State that we filed 
22 this motion knowing the consequences -­ we know what 
23 it costs the State and the Court to get ready, to 
24 gear up for a case like this. We know what it takes 
25 to be prepared for trial. 
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1 And Ms. Kristal and I, you know, frankly, 
2 are otherwise prepared for trial, except that our 
3 presentation would be completely at odds with what 
4 Mr. Hall is going to say and how he wants it 
5 presented; and as a result, I can't in good 
6 conscience tell the Court that I can be an effective, 
7 trusted counselor to Mr. Hall when I am not. 
8 And we tried to the very last instant to 
9 get a reasonable resolution for Mr. Hall. He has 
10 rejected that. That's his right. He made that 
11 clear. 
THE COURT: So there was an offer from the 
13 State, which you presented to him. 
14 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And from a great distance, my 
16 guess is that that offer may have taken the death 
17 penalty off the table and that was presented in an 
18 offer to -- through you to your client from the 
19 State. 
20 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: And he has rejected that. 
22 MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely. 
23 THE COURT: And he has rejected that, 
24 having heard your advice that there is a high 
25 likelihood of conviction and imposition of the death 
12 
21 
1 penalty in this case. 
2 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: So knowing that he could have 
4 taken -­ pled gUilty to certain whatever -­ whatever 
5 charges and that the death penalty, were taken off the 
6 table and that there's high likelihood if he goes to 
7 trial in this case with the death penalty on the 
8 table, that he will be convicted and the death 
9 penalty will be awarded by a jury, he has still 
10 turned all of that down. 
11 MR. CHASTAIN: He has categorically 
12 rejected the offer; and the offer is no longer on the 
13 table, Judge. That is part of what the discussions 
14 were in the week. The State has removed that offer 
15 from the table at this time. 
16 THE COURT: When was the meeting at the 
17 penitentiary that you spoke about where there was -­
18 MR. CHASTAIN: In the last 10 days. I 
19 don't know that I can tell you. The 14th. 
20 THE COURT: The 14th of February? 
21 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Of 2007? 
23 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. And then Ms. Kristal 
24 went back two days later. 
25 THE COURT: So just literally 14 days ago. 
1 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Fifteen days ago. 
3 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: And she went back two days 
5 after that. 
6 MR. CHASTAIN: It may have been a couple of 
7 days later than that. There were some transport 
8 issues. But she -­ don't quote us on the two days 
9 later, but -­
10 THE COURT: I have the sense that Mr. Hall, 
11 based on our last time being here together on the 
12 27th day of February '07, was unhappy about this 
13 Court's decision to have him housed starting -­
14 full-time housed at the jail. That Mr. Hall was not 
15 happy with that and did not wish to be housed at the 
16 jail and made available for that. That was my sense 
17 from a distance, Did that play into this? 
18 MR. CHASTAIN: He has told us that before, 
19 Judge. That's a minor -­ that's a minor issue in the 
20 bigger scheme of things. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. CHASTAIN: But I will state for the 
23 record he preferred to be housed at the prison and 
24 transported back. He told us that. He would rather 
25 
23 
1 THE COURT: Sure. Okay. What is it that 
2 -- specifically that the defendant feels that you 
3 should have done, which you have not done? Can you 
4 say that? 
5 MR. CHASTAIN: I don't know what he thinks 
6 that is possible. He has given us instructions, 
7 which we have endeavored to carry out, in terms of 
8 locating witnesses, having evidence examined. And 
9 that has occurred over the course of more than a 
10 year, all of which haven't panned out. And-­
11 THE COURT: So at this point, what is it 
12 that he feels you should have done that you didn't 
13 do? 
14 MR. CHASTAIN: I think you would really 
15 have to ask Mr. Hall because we have endeavored to do 
16 everything that we can. 
17 He asked us to file -- I guess I could say 
18 he has asked us to file a motion to suppress his 
19 videotaped interview. We have not done that. We 
20 don't see any legal grounds for that. 
21 He did ask us to file a motion to change 
22 venue. We have done that. That has not been argued 
23 yet. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MR. CHASTAIN: I mean it's -­
of 16 sheets Page 20 to 23 of 66 
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District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
in and for the County of Ada 
ERICK VIRGIL HA~L, ) Case No. SPOT05-00155 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-----------------) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Held February 16, 2007, before
 
Hon. THOMAS F. NEVILLE, District Court Judge
 
A P PEA RAN C E S 
For the State 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
By: Mr. Roger Bourne 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 287-7700 Fax (208) 287-7709 
For the Defendant 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
By: Mr. Mark Ackley 
Ms. Paula Swensen 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 Fax (208) 334-2985 
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1 And so, that's why we thought it was 1 
2 useful to have everybody in the courtroom at once, 2 
3 to -- to talk about this matter. 3 
4 SO,I just wanted to bring that to the 4 
5 Court's attention, so that we could all be I 5 
6 thinking about it, when we're thinking about what 6 
7 should be done next. 7 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 8 
9 Mr. Chastain, I -- I know you've been 9 
10 invited here, and I appreciate your presence here. 10 
11 You're defending your client, Mr. Hall, in a 11 
12 matter that's ongoing, that's set for status 12 
13 conference, here, at -- 13 
14 MR. CHASTAIN: 11:30. 14 
15 THE COURT: -- 11:30. I don't know whether 15 
16 you know whether or not testing was accomplished. 16 
17 MR. CHASTAIN: It was, Judge. I -- we spoke 17 
18 with the testing people. The -- the MRI part of 18 
19 the exam has been completed. However, the 19 
20 physician that's going to read it will not do that 20 
21 until next week. 21 
22 In terms of sharing it with the State 22 
23 Appellate Public Defender, we're glad to do that. 23 
24 We don't see any conflict or any -- any conflict 24 
25 of interest in -- in doing that. 25 
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1 We don't know what the results are, 1 
2 don't know what -- what they're going to show. We 2 
3 can't promise that we're going to, necessarily, 3 
4 use those in our -- in mitigation phase, until we 4 
5 speak with the professionals. ' 5 
6 But in terms of saving money, time, 6 
7 and effort, we're glad to -- to share those -- 7 
8 those tests, and those results, with Mr. Hall's 8 
9 appellate lawyers. 1 9 
10 THE COURT: Now, it -- was it just an MRI? 110 
11 MR. CHASTAIN: It was a PET scan. 11 
12 THE COURT: PET scan. 12 
13 MR. CHASTAIN: I'm not using the right 13 
14 medical terminology. 14 
15 THE COURT: Okay. It was a PET scan? 15 
16 MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 16 
17 THE COURT: And that's -- that has been 17 
18 conducted now? 18 
19 MR. CHASTAIN: It is done and -- 19 
20 THE COURT: But it won't be read until next 20 
21 w~k? 21 
22 MR. CHASTAIN: Well, it's done, but it -- 22 
23 the test results have to be read by a -- by a -- a 23 
24 person who's trained.to do that. And that -- the 24 
25 doctor who's going to do that isn't available this 25 
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week, so. We understand it's going to happen 
Monday. 
THE COURT: And who do you understand that 
to be, the doctor that's going to do that? 
MR. CHASTAIN: Judge, I didn't bring that 
information. 
THE COURT: But is it an MD -­
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- radiologist or somebody? 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHASTAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: But you're -- okay. That 
answers the first question. You're willing to 
share this with petitioner's Counsel on the 
postconviction matter. 
MR. CHASTAIN: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Does the State have any objection to 
that being shared? 
MR. BOURNE: No, sir. 
MS. BENNETTS: No, Your Honor, in both 
cases. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. But I -- I 
presume, from this -- this renewed motion, as 
Page 47 
entitled, that you're looking for much more than a 
PET scan; is that -- is that fair to say? 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to be heard 
in support of the motion? 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes, thank you. 
I'd first like to address a matter 
that the Court made reference to, and that is the 
CVof 
Dr. Marikangas. That was attached to an original 
affidavit. 
THE COURT: 1-­
MR. ACKLEY: I think the Court-­
THE COURT: I've got an old file here, from 
a June, 2006 -­
MR. ACKLEY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: -- filing. I do -- I have 
located the motion. That's what -- part of what I 
was doing in there, is looking for the right file. 
MR. ACKLEY: If I could just briefly 
explain. The second affidavit, which is part of 
this renewed motion, incorporated, I believe in 
its entirety, the original affidavit. And so, 
that's why I think that language is in there about 
the attached CV. 
11 (Pages 44 to 47) 
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[N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA L DlS;.ucr OF J!'fMj.~<b__ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNl V OF ADA 
f .....i 16 t007 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) ~~~ Case No. SPOT050')155 _A  
Petitioner, ) 
) ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
v. ) PETITIONER NO LATER THAN 
) FEBRUARY 16, 14107 FOR 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) RADIOLOGICAL AND 
) SEROLOGICAL TESTING 
Respondent. ) 
(Capital Case)
------------>
 
The maner having come before the Court on Petitioner's Rene-v:ed Motion for Medical 
Testing and good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), 
transport Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, no later than February 26. 2007, to Intermountain Medical 
Imaging, 2929 E. Magic View Drive, Meridian, Idaho, 83642, teleph;>ne 367-8222, for the 
purpose of completing the following radiological and serological tests, 30; noted in the attached 
requisitions for radiological and blood testing signed by Dr. James Merikalgas: 
(a) (functional) MRI scans of the brain, with and without cllntlaSt; 
(b) X-Ray of the cervical spine; 
(c) VDRLIRPR blood testing; 
(d) T3, T4, n, and TSH blood testing; 
(e) 5 hour glucose tolerance testing; and 
(f) blood test for syphilis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT at the conclusion of the appointment, the 
Petitioner shall be returned to the custody of the IDOC; 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETITIONER NO LATER mAN 
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND 
SEROLOGICAL TESTING~/ 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Intennountain Medkal Imaging forward the 
results of the testing only to Dr. James Merikangas at 4938 Hampden Lane, #428, Bethesda, 
Maryland 20814, to be kept by him in accordance with the privileges a:tendant to doctor/patient 
and anorney/client unless otherwise requested by Petitioner. through hh attorneys of record, and 
as otherwise agreed by his attorneys during the hearing held February 16.2007. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of the Coun s~rve a copy hereof upon 
the IDOC. and Intennountain Medical Imaging, forthwith and certify to t'le same. 
Dated this-.--tb~yof ~ ,2007. 
HONO~NEVILLE 
District Judge 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT PETmONER NO LATER THAN 
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND 
SEROLOGICAL TESTING 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this b... day of February, 20()", I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO TRANSPORT PEmIONEI~ NO LATER THAN 
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND 
method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOlSE~ID837Q3 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3]9] 
BOISE, ID 83702 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING 
2929 E. MAGIC VIEW DRIVE 
MERIDIAN, ID 83642 
DENNIS DEAN 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
P.O. BOX 83720
 
BOISE, ID 83720-0018
 
FAX NO.: 327-7480
 
WARDEN JOHN HARDISON 
IDAHO MAXIMUM SECURITY INSTInJTION 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, ID 83707
 
FAX NO.: 334-4896
 
SEROLOGICAL TESTING by 
U.s. HaJl 
Statehouse Mail
--I- Facsinile 
__ Hand >elivery 
U.S. l\lail 
>0- Stateh.)use Mail 
~ Fac:sinile 
__ Hand I>elivery 
U.s. Mail 
Stateh< use Mail 
Fac:simile 
__ Hand I'clivel)' 
U.S. Mul 
StatehoJSe Mail 
-:J- Fac:simi Ie 
__ Hand D::livery 
U.S. MEil 
StatehOtlse Mail 
~ t"BC:iimi. c 
. Hand Dt:livery 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT PEmlONER NO LATER THAN 
FEBRUARY 26, 2007 FOR RADIOLOGICAL AND 
SEROLOGICAL TESTING 
3 
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Janet Ellis 
From: Marl( Ackley [rnackleyOsapd.state.id.us] 
Sent: Friday, February 16.20074:00 PM 
To: Janet Ellis; Roger Bourne 
Cc: Paula Swensen 
Subject: 53723 
Attachment.: 53726.POF; 53723.do: 
Janet & Roger, 
Attached is the proposed order for medical testing, as well as the 1equisitions by Dr. 
Merikangas referenced in the proposed order as an attachment. My records reflect that 
these requisitions were previoulsy filed as Attachment A to our original motion for 
testing. 
I tried to mirror the Hanlon order re: PET scans, but deviated as follows: 
• I thought attaching Dr. Merikangas's requisitions to the order would be helpful 
based on my telephone calls this afternoon with both Intermountain Medical 
Imaging who will conduct the radiological tests (MRl and X-rays) and draw blood 
to be sent to their lab of choise for blood testing (IDX Patholugy). After discussing 
the tests (and the costs) with the folks over there, it seemed that the requisition fonn 
attached is a standard form they are most comfortable with and will facilitate the 
testing. If the Court decides to revise the order and remove thl~ attachment, we have 
no objection. 
•	 In the second "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED," we included language that the tests 
should be sent directly to Dr. Merikangas. This was pursuant to prior conversations 
with Dr. Merikangas for the purpose ofexpediting his review. Also in that 
paragraph, it says in part that Dr. Merikangas shall hold the te:its unless requested 
by his attorneys as agreed at the hearing held today; this is an ference to our 
agreement to share these tests with the Hanlon defense team. Again, if the Court 
decides to revise the order for greater clarification, then we ha':e no objection. 
• Finally, we drafted a courtesy certificate ofservice, which incl.ldes service 
to Dennis Dean and the Warden; inclusion of them by name was at the request of 
IMSI based on a call to them this afternoon. 
Mark 
""z",;;"""""'''­Jot
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Docket No. 35055 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant,) 
) 
Vs. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
---------------) 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Hearing Date: June 15, 2007 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Ada, in the City of Boise 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
District Court Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
Boise, Idaho 
Attorney for Appellant 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
 
Attorney General
 
State of Idaho
 
Attorney for Respond~!l..., "', -', ~ ...-,n,~ r;;.="
.' ~ '. "v.) t ! t'__•. ~ 
,., .'. u , ~ ~ 'U L' & 
\-'\';',':.,........I'\... ,~" fl ,;',~lolO....., "I" . ,W
• '~ 
FEE 20 2009 
S·:/,TEAPPELLP·JE 
" ,'"" 1"'. -,- c: t , i,' I;:R 
. ~'.' ~', i, ..... t- ~. '_ .­
Reported by 
Melanie L. Gorczyca 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter #729 
Registered Professional Reporter 
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And I speak -- for instance, we receive 
PSIs all the time, for instance, in appellate 
records. And in this case, we received some juvenile 
records. We're asking for medical records. We've 
received jury questionnaires and so we've -- grand 
jury transcripts. And the list goes on in terms of 
that. And I guess I'm trying to err on the side of 
caution. I hope the Court will see that ultimately, 
when Ms. Swensen addresses the jury contact issue, 
that there is an appreciation from our side in terms 
of privacy interest as well. 
But my point is simply that in the future, 
is there a particular protocol that the Court would 
like us to follow when submitting motions under seal? 
I know that either I myself or someone from 
our office contacted, I believe, Janet; and very 
helpful in giving us some direction. I think maybe I 
tried to contact Mr. Bourne about that too. 
And so any directive that the Court can 
give us, I'm just going to continue to err on the 
side of filing matters under seal. 
Along that line, we were speaking to trial 
counsel on the Hanlon case, Deborah Kristal and Rob 
Chastain; and they were going to join our motion for 
the Dodd -- for the release of the Dodd information 
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that I mentioned earlier. 
THE COURT: The serial rapist murder in 
Washington state? 
MR. ACKLEY: Yes. And I actually 
hesitated. I chose not to give to them what we 
actually submitted under seal because it was 
submitted under seal. So I guess -­
THE COURT: They have already filed just 
today -­
MR. ACKLEY: Oh. Did they? 
THE COURT: -- a motion for discovery on 
that issue. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. Great. 
THE COURT: And I saw that document earlier 
this afternoon on a piece of paper from their office 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- in that case. And madam 
clerk asked me if your -- showed it to me and asked 
me if it related to this and I said it might, but I 
don't know yet because I read the name and I said I 
don't even recognize the name of this gentleman as 
being one that I have even heard as -- you know, in 
one of 300 prospective witnesses in this case. I 
don't even remember it being on that list. And so I 
001439
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said we will have to see what we hear and I thought 
might hear something today. And so you are closing 
the loop for me. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: So they are now seeking it. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I think you have done it 
correctly. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. And I will continue 
that. 
As we receive confidential information 
through the course of our investigation or through 
Court orders, and if it's relevant, say, to the 
mitigation case in the Henneman case, it would 
clearly seem from our perspective to be relevant in 
the Hanlon case. Are we free to share that with 
trial counsel if we inform them of the confidential 
nature or the manner in which we acquired this 
information in the Hanlon case? 
THE COURT: Well Jan Bennetts, who is 
prosecuting the so-called Hanlon case, the second 
capital case that hasn't yet -- that was 
spectacularly unsuccessful in getting a jury for here 
after eight long days, I think she should be asked as 
well. 
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My sense is that -- and I don't speak for 
Ms. Bennetts, obviously. But my sense is that she 
would think that was fair, at least to make them 
aware and that they need to ask this Court for 
something and -- such as they did today in the 
document that they filed vis-a-vie Mr. Dodd today for 
specific discovery. 
Mr. Bourne, arguably you are a supervisor 
of the entire Criminal Division, including Ms. 
Bennetts. Maybe you could just chat with her on the 
fact that that question has been asked of me. I 
can't speak for Ms. Bennetts. I suspect that she 
might think that that was fair for you to share 
information. I would rather have the case not yet 
gone to a guilt phase trial; I would rather have that 
information known to trial counsel before that than 
after. And so that's what my general sense is of 
what should happen. But it -- so it's kind of a 
rebuttable presumption thinking yes, probably that 
information should be shared, but I think Ms. 
Bennetts needs to be in the loop and they may need to 
make a specific request, just like they have today, 
with respect to Mr. Dodd in the H03 case, the case 
that's -- and then we will see where that goes. 
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. 
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1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT
 4 
OF THE STATE OF IOAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 1 THE COURT: Before we get to the heart of2
 
2 the matter, I want to make sure everyone got a copy
 3 
AZAD HAll ABDUUAH, ) Case No. CV-PC-OS-21802 3 of the letter that Mr. Abdullah sent to me. 4 )
 
Plaintiff, )
 4 MS. DUNN: The State did, Your Honor. 5 )
 
vs. )
 5 Thank you.6 )
 
STATE OF IDAHO, )
 6 MR. ROARK: I did; Your Honor. 7 )
 
Defendant. )
 7 THE COURT: Mr. Abdullah, I want to remind8 
----------) 
8 you that anything you send to me I have to turn over9 WAIVER HEARING
 
9 to everybody else. Okay?
10 Held on April 23, 2010 
Before the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey 10 THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the11 District Court Judge 
11 affirmative.)12 APPEARANCES 
12 THE COURT: Otherwise It Is what they call13 For the Plaintiff: 
The ROark Law Firm 13 an ex parte communication. So Just so you know, if14 R. KEITH ROARK 
409 North Main 14 you write me anything In the future, l!Verybody gets a 
15 Halley, 10 83333 
15 copy. All right? 
16 For the Defendant: 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 16 THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head In the 
17 SHAWNA DUNN 
200 West Front Street 17 affirmative.) 
18 Boise, 10 83702 
18 THE COURT: Now I do want to address a 
19 
19 couple of things in the letter so that I can answer 
20 20 some of your questions because I think they are 
21 21 legitimate questions. And then what we will do Is, 
22 22 Mr. Roark, I will then ask you to klnd of layout -­
23 
Reported by 23 without divulging any advice that you have given or 
24 Melanie ... Gorczyca 
Certified Shorthand Reporter #729 24 any or your ftndlngs, to layout sort of the process 
25 Reolstered Professional Reporter 25 and to at that point Indicate to me whether you feel 
1 of 7 sheets Page 1 to 4 of 28 001446
 
 
-
t I!
aA.D I I. , : l> l( t. . ____  
,
l
'r .
l 
_ __ _ _ __ _ _ l
i 9
tl"i OUJ:  
u i S a
i:!l
C  
OI
orl
t. .s
fes:lligfUll
" RI  
JI
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ------ - - -----)
 
ID
L
Oi
 
-
____ 
- -------- - - - -------) 
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ev
-
f i i
       
6 
e­
. . 
5 
1 that Mr. Abdullah has sufficient information and has 
2 been given the opportunity to be prepared to decide 
3 whether he can waive any conflict that might exist. 
4 Okay? 
5 MR. ROARK: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: So, Mr. Abdullah, you asked a 
7 couple of questions and I am going to answer those. 
8 Now obviously the decision to either waive the 
9 conflict or not Is yours. It can't be made by any 
10 attorneys, friends, family. It Is really your 
11 decision. 
12 You have indicated you want to know what 
13 would happen if you ~on:t waive the c~>nflict and you 
14 get new counsel and you wanted to know whether that 
16 person would be allowed to modify or add additional 
16 post-conviction claims. 
17 And I know the State is not going to like 
18 this. But if you do get new counsel, I think it's 
19 only fair to allow that individual to review the 
20 record and determine whether they believe additional 
21 daims or any modification of claims should be filed. 
22 And so what I would do is give that person 
23 the opportunity to review everything. And It is 
24 obviously going to take them -- they are going to 
26 have a lot of material to look at. And If they feel 
7
 
1 SAPO, which you can do, then -- I'm sorry. Let me
 
2 start that over again. I have to get this right.
 
3 If you dedde that you want me to appoint
 
4 new counsel and you say, "I am not waiving the
 
5 conflict, D then the process that I would use is this.
 
6 first, obviously if you want to hire someone
 
7 yourself, you can hire anybody you want. That's up
 
8 to you. You could, of course, decide to represent
 
9 yourself. I would recommend against that. If you
 
10 decide that you are even thinking about it, I want 
11 you to let me know so that we can schedule a hearing 
12 and I can explore that with you because I really 
13 think it is a very bad Idea. The third possibility 
14 is that I would order the SAPO to -- what I would 
15 have them do is prOVide me a list of attorneys who 
16 are qualified by the Supreme Court to represent an 
17 individual like you on a capital case in 
18 post-conviction and in that list, I would want them 
19 to Indicate whether they have ongoing contracts. In 
20 other words, these are people who are willing to 
21 contract with the SAPO to be conflict counsel. And 
22 then -- and with their qualifications. 
23 And then what I would do Is schedule a 
24 hearing and ask those individuals who are interested 
25 in actually taking the work to appear in court with 
1 -- and it's up to them -- they want to add or modify 
2 or delete any of the dalms that have been filed, 
3 then I will allow them to file a motion; and most 
4 likely, assuming there's a good basis for it, I would 
6 allow them to do so, because I think It's only fair, 
8 if you get new counsel, that they have the 
7 opportunity to make that determination. So the 
8 answer to the -- I guess the short answer to the long 
9 question Is that yes, I would. 
10 Now with respect to the SAPO, I would not. 
11 And the reason I wouldn't is that they have been 
12 working on this case for sIx years. They have gone 
13 through a number of amendments. I don't see any 
14 reason that -- because even though I know Mr. Ackley 
15 is leaving, essentially the same team has been in 
16 place for some time and so I would require them to 
17 proceed along the lines that we have already been 
18 proceeding. And I am now -- at this point, I have 
19 read all of the Amended Petition, I have read all of 
20 the responses and so I am pretty familiar with what 
21 everybody has alleged. 
22 Now you asked about the process. A couple 
23 of things. You will have a couple of options today. 
24 If you decide not to waive the conflict -- excuse me 
26 -- if you decide to waive the conflict and keep the 
8 
1 you present so that you can hear the discussion. And 
2 I would inquire of each of them a couple of things. 
3 One, do they have the time to devote to your case. 
4 Because it is not a -- this is a difficult case and 
5 there's a lot of material. And so -- and I know Mr. 
6 Roark has put a lot of time into this. 
7 And then I would also inquire and make sure 
8 we don't get ourselves In the same position we are in 
9 now, to make sure there are no conflicts. That is 
10 going to be a very probing Inquiry, very important, 
11 because as now, I read all the material. 
12 It is clear to me that there are a number 
13 of attorneys here in the state who participated in 
14 one form or another In this trial, therefore, they 
15 would likewise be disqualified. I can think of some 
16 where they ended up ghostwriting material, where they 
17 actually did that. And that is the basis of actually 
18 one of your claims is that you didn't know that was 
19 happening. So I would have to make sure that they 
20 did not participate with the Toryanskis in the trial 
21 of this case because I don't want to go down that 
22 path again. 
23 So you would be present, but I would have 
24 to make the decision as to who would be appointed and 
25 -- because when we appoint at public expense, It's 
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1 the Judge's responsibility to make that call. The 
2 only thing I can do is assure you, Mr. Abdullah, that 
3 I am going to be very careful to make sure they don't 
4 have a conflict, that they are very qualified to take 
5 this on and that they have the time to do it because 
6 I don't want you to have someone who Is not going to 
7 devote the ttme to It that It needs to have done. 
8 Okay? Does that answer your questions? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Thank you, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Now, to me, I am 
12 not going to hear argument from anyone else because 
13 this Is really about Mr. Abdullah. So, Mr. Roark, a 
14 couple of months ago, I gave you a task. And I want 
16 to make It very clear on the record and I want to 
16 make sure you agree with me. You and I have had no 
17 conversations. Is that correct? 
18 MR. ROARK: That is absolutely correct. 
19 THE COURT: Everything that has occurred 
20 between you and I have been copied to all counsel. 
21 MR. ROARK: That Is correct, as well, Your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Now If you can kind 
24 of layout -- and what I want to tell you is that 
26 ultimately I am going to have you do an actual 
11 
1 look at that end and the light of the tunnel. I am 
2 starting to be too old to even think about being here 
3 for a long time. 
4 So I want to make sure that there's enough 
6 of a record so that any future court proceedings, 
6 they know exactly what happened. And I've tried to 
7 do that throughout this case. I've kept just about 
8 every piece of paper I can possibly Imagine. 
9 So with that in mind -- and I also want any 
10 depositions that you took also to be filed under 
11 seal, Just for the record. So if you can layout 
12 process-wise what you did. I've already determined 
13 there Is a conflict. I have not determined the 
14 extent of the conflict. I have not made any 
16 determinations because I have not done the 
16 investigation. 
17 I will note that the SAPD did ask me to 
18 actually conduct a target Investigation. Because of 
19 where we were procedurally, I decided I wasn't even 
20 going to respond to that. The reason I decided not 
21 to do my own Investigation Is that makes me part of 
22 this process and I don't want to be in the position 
23 of either Inadvertently or even on purpose learning 
24 anything about any attorney-client involvement, any 
26 discussions between the parties. I don't want to be 
10 
1 written document that is going to layout what you 
2 did, including what advice you gave. That Is going 
3 to be sealed, under Rule 32, from the Court, as well 
4 as all counsel. And I want you to file two copies. 
6 And the reason I want you to file two copies -- well, 
6 at this point, one copy. If Mr. Abdullah decides he 
7 wants me to appoint new counsel, then I want that new 
8 counsel to be able to have access to that material so 
9 that that person can examine It, with the mind-set of 
10 whether they are going to have additional 
11 post-conviction claims. 
12 But the bottom line here is -- and jf he 
13 stays with the SAPD, then It is going to remain 
14 sealed. And the purpose behind that is to provide a 
16 very clear record for any other successive Petitions, 
16 appeals, habeas, whatever may occur in the future, so 
17 that there's a clear record of what Mr. Abdullah knew 
18 when he made this decision, what he was adVised and 
19 what material he reViewed. 
20 I hope you agree with that way of handling 
21 it. I want to make sure we have a record. Because, 
22 as we all know, unfortunately, these kinds of cases, 
23 quite frankly, have lives of their own and long after 
24 I am probably dead, somebody will be working on this 
25 because now I am going to be 63, so I am starting to 
12
 
1 in that position. I want to make sure that I remain
 
2 in the position I am supposed to remain in, which is
 
3 as the neutral judge and not really looking beyond
 
4 that. So I have -- that Is the reason that I chose
 
6 not to do my own Investigation. I certainly could
 
6 have. There's some case law that suggests that it Is
 
7 okay. But the process I have used has also been
 
S approved, at least by the Court of Appeals, by way of
 
9 comment on a case that I was actually involved with
 
10 called State versus Lopez, where I also had someone 
11 adVise the person. So that Is the reason that I have 
12 done that. 
13 Now with that in mind, Mr. Roark, If you 
14 want to tell us, you know, what you did, but nothing 
15 about any advice. 
16 MR. ROARK: Certainly, Your Honor. May It 
17 please the Court -- and I may not be encydopedic in 
18 my recitation of what I have done In this case, nor 
19 even necessarily chronological, but I wlll attempt to 
20 do that. 
21 I began my InqUiry, of course, with a 
22 consideration of this Court's order appointing me to 
23 this position. I then reviewed the response by the 
24 SAPD to this Court's inquIry regarding the conflict 
25 and also reviewed the memorandum from the Ada County 
3 of 7 sheets Page 9 to 12 of 28 001448
Oi
OW
i
v
vi
I
 
 
I  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ju
i
i
cl
i
u
i
--
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
13 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, Shawna Dunn, 
responding to SAPD Involvement with trial and 
pretrial and tried to at that point review all of the 
documentation upon which the conflict was based, to 
the extent that such documentation exists. 
I then undertook to review In detail, and 
as chronologically as I could, the Petitions that 
have been filed, first the Petition for 
Post-conviction for Relief and then a series of 
amended petitions, so that I could traCk, to the 
extent possible, the evolution and the refinement of 
the issues presented to the Court for post-conviction 
relief and concluded that Inquiry with what has been 
styled the Anal Amended Petition for Post-conviction 
Relief that was filed with this Court on the 29th of 
August 2008. And this is the document that extendS 
approximately 400 pages. 
Once that had been completed, I did have 
previously two less-than-comprehensive phone 
conversations with Mr. Abdullah. I met with him then 
at the Idaho State Penitentiary where he is 
Incarcerated. We held four such meetings over the 
course of time between my appointment and today's 
date so that I could discuss with him, as my work 
progressed, what I had discovered, what opinions I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
15 
Toryanski that dealt specifically with advice, 
counsel, assistance she had received from attorneys 
outside her office, including, of course, 
particularly those conversations or e-mail exchanges 
with members of the team from SAPO. 
I also received from Ms. Huskey'S office 
their Polley and Procedures Manual and the Policy and 
Procedures Manual for the Capital Utlgatlon Unit, 
both of which I have reviewed. I haven't read it in 
their entirety, but I have reviewed as regards to 
policies that may touch upon the matters that we 
confront in this particular case. 
Each time I met with Mr. Abdullah, we 
discussed precisely what It was the Court was 
concerned With; we reviewed the case law; we reviewed 
in detail the implications of waiving the conflict, 
as well as the Implications of declining to do so. 
The Court actually answered this afternoon 
a question that Mr. Abdullah has had for a 
sIgnificant period of time, which I felt to be beyond 
the scope of what this Court had ordered me to do. 
So I have never prOVided him with any advice as to 
what process this Court would employ, in the event 
that successive counsel was reqUired. As I say, I 
felt that was beyond the charge which was given to me 
14 
1 held In regard to what had been discovered and what 
2 the implications were. 
3 I also, because a Petition and Application 
4 for Interlocutory Appeal was filed in this case, read 
5 that Petition and the materials submitted therewith, 
6 as well as the rather comprehensive response filed by 
7 the Attorney General's Office to that Petition or 
8 that application for Interlocutory relief, which was 
9 ultimately, of course, denied. 
10 THE COURT: See, I didn't even know that it 
11 had been denied. Nobody has told me anything. 
12 MR. ROARK: Well I think actually it may 
13 have been Withdrawn. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. ROARK: I then took, in February of 
16 this year, the depositions of Molly Huskey, Kimberly 
17 Simmons and Mark Ackley. Those depositions were 
18 transcribed and the transaiptlon of the depositions 
19 were provided to Mr. Abdullah. During one of our 
20 meetings lasting two, two and-a-half hours, we 
21 discussed in detail the material that was contained 
22 within those depositions. 
23 I also read and reviewed in its entirety 
24 the deposition of Kim Toryanski, giving particular 
25 attention to those portions of the deposition of Ms. 
16 
1 in this case. 
2 I also declined to InqUire of this Court or 
3 to offer an opinion as to what this Court's policy 
4 might be, in the event that Mr. Abdullah chose not to 
5 waive the conflict and subsequent counsel felt it 
6 appropriate to ask this Court for leave to amend, one 
7 more time, the Petition. But I believe that the 
8 Court has thoroughly answered those questionSj and to 
9 the extent that they bear upon Mr. Abdullah's 
10 decision, I am sure his decision will reflect that. 
11 Now I have given him advice as to what I 
12 consider to be the extent of the conflict. I have 
13 provided him with advice as to whether or not I 
14 thought that the conflict was reflected In any 
15 attempt or failure by the SAPD to Vigorously litigate 
16 those issues that might be implicated by the 
17 conflict. 
18 I have also discussed with him What, If 
19 any, Implications may be involved in this case, as 
20 far as expert witness testimony or .even fact 
21 testimony might be concerned at the time this case 
22 goes to trial. So I feel that Mr. Abdullah has had 
23 the benefit of such advice as I could offer in those 
24 areas. 
25 I met with Mr. Abdullah personally for the 
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1 last time last week and we discussed again at length 1 Court this afternoon. 
2 the nature of the conflict, the extent to which that 2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Roark. 
3 conflict may have debilitated the SAPD's Office, the 3 MR. ROARK: And I will follow up with -­
4 extent to which the SAPD's Office had declined or 4 THE COURT: A report. 
5 neglected to vigorously pursue issues principally 5 MR. ROARK: -­ a more thorough report in 
6 involving those areas of communication with the 6 writing. 
7 Toryanskis that had occurred and what Mr. Abdullah 7 THE COURT: Right. And then I want to 
8 would be facing, in terms of either exercising or 8 emphasize again when you send that in, I want It 
9 failing to exercise his right to waive. 9 under seal and I want the top part of It to have a 
10 I believe, based upon another lengthy 10 caption and show that it is under seal, even from the 
11 conversation that we had yesterday via phone, that 11 Courtj that no court personnel, including the Judge 
12 Mr. Abdullah Is now satisfied that he has received 12 will open that, because that's not -­ it is not going 
13 all of the legal and practical adVice, for that 13 to happen. And then put a signature line for myself 
14 matter, necessary for him to make an informed 14 to sign under yours to show "It is so ordered,· If 
15 decision. I have emphasized that the decision he 15 you would do that. 
16 makes is irreversiblej that this Court will not 16 MR. ROARK: I will. 
17 permit him and no appellate court would permit him to 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And 
18 waive the conflict and then assert it at a later 18 thank you for the thoroughness of your report. 
19 date. 19 Mr. Abdullah, before we proceed, I know 
20 THE COURT: Which was the Court's concern. 20 that you are upset. If you want to take a few 
21 MR. ROARK: Yes. And he fUlly understands 21 minutes, if you want to talk to Mr. Roark one more 
22 that fact. So I believe, Your Honor, that Mr. 22 time, that would be fine. That's up to you. Would 
23 Abdullah is prepared, at least in terms of the 23 you like to do that? 
24 services that I have tried to render to him, to make 24 THE DEFENDANT: Please. 
26 his decision and to announce that decision to the 25 THE COURT: All right. Why don't we let 
19 20 
1 him go back in the holding cell and, Mr. Roark, you 1 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
2 can talk to him. When he Is ready to come in, let me 2 THE COURT: Okay. Because it has to be 
3 know. 3 your decision. 
4 MR. ROARK: Absolutely. 4 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I understand. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Roark can't make the 
6 THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. 6 decision for you. Your prior -- your counsel can't 
7 (Whereupon, there was a break In the 7 make the decision. It has to be your decision. 
8 proceedings from 1:23 to 1:35 p.m.) 8 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
9 THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. District 9 THE COURT: All right. And so the question 
10 Court is again In session. 10 I have for you is do you want to waive the conflict 
11 THE COURT: Please be seated. Mr. 11 and keep the SAPD or do you want to have me appoint 
12 Abdullah, are you ready to go forward then? 12 new counsel? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 13 THE DEFENDANT: I do not waive the 
14 THE COURT: All right. And you've had 14 conflict. 
15 further discussion with Mr. Roark? 15 THE COURT: All right. You want me to 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 appoint new counsel then? 
17 THE COURT: Okay. You don't have to stand 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
18 up, if you don't want to. I just want to ask you 18 THE COURT: Okay. And that is your 
19 whether you have reviewed all of the materIal that 19 decision? 
20 Mr. Roark provided you. 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, Judge. 21 THE COURT: All right. I note that the 
22 THE COURT: You did. Before you tell me 22 SAPD's office is present. I am going to Issue an 
23 what your decision Is, has anyone pressured you or 23 actual written Order, but I am going to order the 
24 threatened you or tried to get you to make a 24 SAPD's Office to contact the people with whom you 
25 decision? 25 normally contract for conflict. 'rhey have to be 
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1 capital certified. They also have to be -- before I 1 affidavit that we could submit via an exhibit. The 
2 start running through the names, I want to make sure 2 SAPO simply has no funds to contract with any 
3 that you have spoken to them to make sure that they 3 attorney to represent Mr. Abdullah until July one of 
4 would be willing to accept an appointment. And then 4 this year. 
5 what I would like you to do is provide me that list 5 THE COURT: What we are going to do is I am 
6 with a resume of each of them and then I will 6 going to issue an Order and if you have to go and 
7 schedule a hearing at which I would ask those parties 7 find funds someplace, you are going to have to find 
8 to -­ maybe a series of hearings in which they would 8 them. The reason that I do that, Ms. Huskey, Is, In 
9 appear. I would ask them to appear In court to make 9 my view, it is the SAPO's Office that created this 
10 sure that they don't have any conflict and to make 10 problem, not Mr. Abdullah. He did not create this 
11 sure that they have the time to actually devote to 11 problem. The SAPD's Office, through its actions, 
12 Mr. Abdullah's case. And you are? 12 created this problem that brought us to this 
13 MS. HUSKEY: I am Molly Huskey, Your Honor. 13 position. _ 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Huskey. 14 So It may be that we actually don't get 
15 MS. HUSKEY: If I could, there would be two 15 anyone on board until July 1, so maybe it will be a 
16 Issues that we -­ and I apologize for my voice today. 16 moot issue. But since you don't have anybody on 
17 THE COURT: That's all right. 17 contract -- you said there's only really one that is 
18 MS. HUSKEY: We only have three individuals 18 death penalty qualified -­ then what I am going to do 
19 on contract; only one of them is capital qualified, 19 is I do have the list and I will send out a letter 
20 Dennis Benjamin. 20 that goes to all of them and they will be paid for by 
21 THE COURT: And he Is disqualified. 21 the SAPD by order of this Court because I don't have 
22 MS. HUSKEY: And that's basically what I 22 anybody else to make them pay. The Court doesn't 
23 was going to apprise you of. The second Issue, Your 23 have the money and, as I said, Mr. Abdullah doesn't 
24 Honor -­ and we have Mr. Josh Tewalt from the 24 have the funds. So you are going to take it out of 
25 Department of Financial Management or I have his 25 your office budget. That is the bottom line. 
23 24 
1 MS. HUSKEY: Your Honor, then I would like 1 you can certainly file those affidaVits. But In my 
2 to make a record. I have copies of Mr. Tewalt's 2 view, with an Indigent defendant, the mere fact that 
3 affidavit or I can call him as a witness. But I can 3 you have funding problems is not sufficient to excuse 
4 tell you right now that the State Appellate Public 4 you from the responsibility of providing him with an 
5 Defender's Office has approximately, with projected 5 attorney. 
6 spending, $5,000 remaining in Its budget to get us S So what I am going to do is send out Orders 
7 through until June 30 of this year. 7 and also letters to all people on the capital list 
8 THE COURT: Then you are going to have to 8 and find out what their conflicts are. We wI/I 
9 go to the legislature and see if you can get 9 schedule a hearing, have them come in and explain to 
10 additional funding. 10 the Court if they have the time and if they do, then 
11 MS. HUSKEY: I have preViously spoken with 11 I am going to end up appointing them. 
12 Mr. Tewalt about that. There is no constitutional 12 MS. HUSKEY: If I may, Your Honor, two 
13 method or process by which we can obtain additional 13 additional questions. One, we will seek 
14 funding before July 1. 14 interlocutory appeal from this order on the -­
15 THE COURT: Well you are going to have to 15 THE COURT: What will be your standing? 
16 find a way to do it. 16 MS. HUSKEY: Our standing is -­
17 MS. HUSKEY: Then, Your Honor -­ 17 THE COURT: You no longer represent Mr. 
18 THE COURT: Because he has a Sixth 18 Abdullah. 
19 Amendment right to counsel and like I said, it is the 18 MS. HUSKEY: Our standIng, Your Honor, is 
20 SAPO's fault that we are at this point. It is not 20 that this Court has ordered us to do something that 
21 the Court's fault. It is not the State's fault. It 21 Is legally impossible for us to comply with. 
22 really is your fault that we are here. So you are 22 THE COURT: Then you can file a separate 
23 going to have to find a way. As I indicated, there's 23 action because I don't think you can file It wIthin 
24 a good possibility that we won't actually have 24 this case. 
25 anybody appointed until July first, but that -- and 25 MS. HUSKEY: Definitely, Your Honor. Who 
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1 will be representing Mr. Abdullah between now and the 1 
2 time in which counsel is appointed? 2 
3 THE COURT: I think what I am gOing to do 3 
4 is continue Mr. Roark in that position. He hasn't 4 
5 completed all of his actions and so we are going to I) 
6 go ahead and have him continue in that. Is that 6 
7 acceptable to you, Mr. Roar1<? 7 
8 MR. ROARK: It Is. 8 
9 THE COURT: So that if he has any questions 9 
10 dUring this period of time -- but, obviously, nothing 10 
11 else is going to be happening in this case until we 11 
12 get new counsel on. 12 
13 MS. HUSKEY: So am I to understand then the 13 
14 Court is denying our request that this Court stay 14 
16 that order pending an interlocutory appeal? 15 
18 THE COURT: Ms. Huskey, I appoint counsel. 16 
17 Mr. Abdullah has refused to waive the conflict that 17 
18 exists after a full advice. You are no longer 18 
19 representing him in that capacity. That's the bottom 19 
20 line. And I had a problem, quite frankly, with an 20 
21 interlocutory appeal because at that point, 21 
22 everything was stayed. I had a problem with that 22 
23 because I didn't -- in reading the repeal, I didn't 23 
24 see that this was anything that Mr. Abdullah was 24 
26 requesting. But I don't see any basis for an 25 
interlocutory appeal. What you are complaining about 
is that the Court is going to be ordering you to 
provide him with legal counsel and you claim that you 
can't do that. That has nothing to do with this 
case. 
MS. HUSKEY: And then thirdly, Your Honor, 
when you issue your final written Order, as I 
understand It, the process Is that we would sort of 
proVide you with a list of individuals and then the 
Court would select. But under Idaho Code 19-869, 
choice of conflict counsel is left to the discretion 
of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office. So 
if you would just clarify that in your written Order 
as well. 
THE COURT: I will make It very clear 
because at this point, I think you also have a 
conflict. 
MS. HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I want to make sure that 
Mr. Abdullah gets a conflict-free counsel and that Is 
the Court's responsibility. 
MS, HUSKEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What we 
will do is stand in recess. Mr. Roar1<, you will 
prOVide the additional material. In the meantime, if 
1 
27 
he has any questions, you can answer those questions 
2. 
2 until you are relieved. REPORTER'S C£R'I'1:FICA'1'E 
3 MR. ROARK: I will, Your Honor. STA'TE OF IDAHO 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. COUNry OF ADA 
5 
6 
THE BAIUFF: All rise, please. 
(Whereupon, the above proceedings concluded 
1, M. GORCZY'C'&, cert.if1ed Shorthand Reporter and 
Re;istered Professional Ile:portPlr r do hereby cert.ify. 
7 at 1:43 p.m.) Tha.t I am the court. reporter whe took tha 
8 px:oceeding!l had in the above-entitled action in 
9 
10 
11 
12 
10 
11 
12 
13 
machine shDrthllnd and thereafter wa.s redUced int<l 
typewriting under my direction; a.nd 
That 't.he foregoiN1 Reporter'a Tum.script l;ontaiM 
.. full, T-rue and accurate record of the proceedings 
hlld in the abo\Je and fore.goiN1 cause, which 1HI.s heel'd 
13 14 in Boi:le,. Idaho. 
14 1~ ttl WITNESS iiHEREOF, I M\Je hee-unto ~et my hand 
15 
16 
16 
17 
,. 
thb 1i!lt day of June 201D. 
17 M. Gorczyca, CSR. 9PR 
18 20 
19 21 
20 
21 
22 
23 
22 
23 
25 
24 
26 
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STATE
 
COUNTY
 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
OF IDAHO 
OF ADA 
I, M. GORCZYCA, Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Registered Professional Reporter, do hereby certify: 
That ! am the court reporter who took the 
proceedings had in the above-entitled action in 
machine shorthand and thereafter was reduced into 
typewriting under my direction; and 
That the foregoing Reporter's Transcript contains 
a full, true and accurate record of the proceedings 
had in the above and foregoing cause, which was heard 
in Boise, Idaho. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 
this 1st day of June 2010. 
M. Gorczyca, CSR, RPR 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
IAN THOMSON 
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit 
I.S.B. # 5888 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
CASE NO. SPOT 0500308
 
AFFIDAVIT OF
 
JOSHTEWALT
 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
County of Ada. ) 
Josh Tewalt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1.	 I am employed by the State ofIdaho, Division ofFinancial Management 
(hereinafter, DFM); 
2. That I have been employed with DFM since June, 2008; 
3.	 I have been the financial analyst for the Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender (hereinafter, SAPD) since 2009; 
4. I am currently the financial analyst for the SAPD; 
5.	 That I am familiar with the codes, regulations and other rules that govern 
the financial dealings of state agencies; 
6.	 That I am familiar with the SAPD's FY2011 actual budget and the 
SAPD's FY2012 budget; 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 1
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7.	 That the budget year for FY2011 began on July 1, 2010 and will end on 
June 30, 2011; 
8.	 That the SAPD's FY2011 budget was $1,954,800, which was a 10.25% 
reduction as compared with the FY2010 budget; That from the Operating 
expenses, the SAPD hires contract attorneys to handle conflict cases and overflow 
cases when the SAPD caseload is too high for the Appellate Unit attorneys; 
9.	 That in FY2011, the SAPD had only $85,000 for non-capital conflict 
contracts; 
10.	 That this amount was insufficient and so for FY2011, the SAPp is 
seeking, and the Governor has approved, a supplemental appropriation in the 
amount of $86,500 to cover shortfalls in those existing contracts; 
11. That the Legislature has not yet approved the Supplemental Request; 
12.	 That the $86,500 supplemental was requested for, and is specifically 
designated, for existing contract shortfalls in the Appellate Unit, as outlined 
above; 
13.	 That because of the budget shortfalls, and because of fixed costs in the 
operating expenses, for example, rent, telephone and data lines, the SAPD has 
scheduled three (3) furlough days to date during Fiscal Year 2011; 
14. Any additional furlough dates have not yet been ruled out; 
15.	 That the SAPD requested an $180,500.00 FY2011 Supplemental 
Appropriation to be used in capital cases, and requested this amount as an on­
going request for the SAPD budget, but that request was not approved by the 
Governor and therefore it is unlikely that it would be funded by the Joint Finance 
and Appropriations Committee of the Legislature; 
16.	 That all state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any 
contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the Legislature; 
17.	 That any remaining money in personnel cannot be "moved" to cover 
operating expenses without the permission ofDFM and David Fulkerson, (State 
Financial Officer); 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 2
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18.	 That currently, the SAPD would not be pennitted to move any remaining 
personnel money into operating because any unspent money would have to be 
reverted to the State to help offset any budget shortfalls for FY2011; 
19.	 That the SAPD does not have the legal authority to "carryover" personnel 
money from one fiscal year to another; any unspent personnel money, absent 
consent from DFM to move to cover operating expenses, must be reverted to the 
General Fund at the end of the FY2011 Budget Year; 
20.	 That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the 
. guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations; 
21.	 Thus, the SAPD has no money in the FY2011 budget to cover an 
additional contract for conflict services in Erick Hall v. State ofIdaho; 
22. That the SAPD's FY2012 budget recommendation is $2,040,200; 
23.	 That the FY2012 budget recommendation is broken down as follows: 
$1,613,700 in personnel costs, $426,500 for operating costs, and $0.00 for capital 
outlay; 
24.	 That the FY2012 operating expense must cover fixed costs like rent 
(approximately $78,000 for FY20l2), data and telephone lines (approximately 
$20,000), and legal research ($34,000); 
25.	 That given those fixed expenses, the SAPD has only $123,000 to cover all 
other operating expenses not listed above; 
26.	 That until the final FY2012 is approved by the Joint Finance and 
Appropriation Committee, the SAPD does not know the amount of the FY2012 
Appropriation except that it will not exceed the above numbers and could, in fact, 
be less than the above numbers; 
27.	 That in light of the above, DFM would recommend against entering any 
additional contracts for legal services in FY2012, as such contracts may not be 
sufficiently funded and there is no mechanism to assure the contract is sufficiently 
funded; 
28. Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 3 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ICY"" day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy
 
ofthe foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: ,A../.7 fh~(0:J J ~t:-It-e£..eTf'J,.r-7
 
s-=-_ .. ~-C---- /. 1_ -­
 
- ;" -----... < -­
EVAN SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
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State Appellate Public Defender •
• 3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 (208) 334-2985 (fax) 
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
I, Erick Virgil Hall, do hereby authorize the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) to release 
whatever records or information in their possession to Dennis Benjamin of the firm Nevin, Benjamin, 
McKay & Bartlett so that he may determine the nature and extent of a potential conflict of interest in my 
case, CV PC 080 3085. This release of information/records includes, but is not limited to, handwritten 
notes from any current or former SAPD staff member, typewritten notes, electronic mail, transcripts, and 
pleadings. 
This document also authorizes Mr. Benjamin to discuss otherwise confidential information with my prior 
counsel, Mark J. Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, as well as any current members of the SAPD staff as he 
deems appropriate, and to communicate the results of his inquiry to me. 
I understand that the purpose of this disclosure is to assist my legal representative, Dennis Benjamin, in 
determining the nature and extent of a potential conflict of interest and to advise me accordingly regarding 
whether I should or should not waive any conflict as identified by Mr. Benjamin. I understand that 
authorizing the release of this information is voluntary and that I can refuse to sign this authorization. I 
understand that I may inspect or obtain a copy of the information to be used or disclosed. 
I understand that this authorization will automatically expire one (l) year from the date signed unless 
revoked sooner. I understand that I have the right to revoke this authorization at any time by notifying my 
attorney in writing. I understand that revocation will not apply to· information that has already been 
released in response to this authorization. 
A photo or faxed copy of this authorization and request for release of information shall be deemed to be 
of the sarrie full force and effect as an original. 
Date of Birth:  Dated: /1 s - /tJ 
SS#:  Client:_~_ '__1/_._::zW/_ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of June, 2010. 
-/71~__ 
........."...
 
,., S f,~ Not~o
.,' ,.,]. Hif b.~«
 
.... ~y Residing III Boise, Idaho
 .••••?\flJ4L,
l ~,. ,," "'" My commission Expires: 10/0412011:....: v~ O~~~"IlY--. s.s
::B ~_•.'''' I 
: .... ,""'0: 
" P\l"~ ./~ i ~ .,~~~-.. ~~. ,ft'),• ••••••·oG 'v fI.... .,~ "#'A O.~ ....
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender JAN 10 2011 
State of Idaho CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ClerkI.S.B. # 4843 ByJANETEWS 
DEPUTY 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender ORiS\NAL
 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV PC 080 3085 
) 
v. ) MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
) APPEAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
) 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby moves this Honorable Court for 
pennission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel 
(hereinafter, "Memorandum Decision and Order", filed December 27,2010.) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The procedural history of the litigation of a possible conflict of interest is lengthy and set 
forth in Mr. Hall's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (hereinafter, "Motion 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 1 
001461
 
~~----~~~~~-­FI.ED ll:. ~V1 A...IIIIM'-___ -'P.MI--fo~~!?::II'Ol;· .... - ,__ 
 
 
 
 
• • 
to Reconsider"), filed concomitantly with this motion, and need not be repeated here. Mr. Hall 
hereby incorporates by reference the entirety of his Motion to Reconsider, including the procedural 
history. Mr. Hall believes that he has raised genuine points for clarification and alternate avenues. 
of action in his Motion to Reconsider and is filing the instant motion solely out of a need to 
preserve his right to pennissive appeal should this Court deny his Motion to Reconsider. It is not 
Mr. Hall's intention to in anyway diminish his desire for reconsideration by filing the instant 
motion. However, should the Court deny his Motion to Reconsider Mr. Hall reserves the right to 
amend this motion for pennissive appeal to include any further findings of this Court. Indeed, Mr. 
Hall believes that as things currently stand, an appeal, prior to completion of these post-conviction 
proceedings, is necessary to protect his substantial rights. 
MOTIVATION FOR FILING 
The instant case represents the third time in the last year the SAPO has found itself 
litigating the issue of whether it has a conflict of interest in representing one of its capital clients in 
post-conviction proceedings. (See, Motion to Reconsider, p.5) Until this issue arose in Mr. 
Abdullah's case, case SPOT0500308, the SAPO had never faced this question. Now it seems the 
State will be automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are 
facts to support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPO represents. l 
In addressing this issue in Mr. Abdullah's case, the SAPO represented to the district court 
that it had reviewed the record and made a detennination there was nothing in the unsolicited and 
minimal pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel that would give rise to a potential or 
1 Allegations of a conflict of interest raised by the State should be reviewed with extreme caution. 
See, Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) ("[T]he Government may seek to 
'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a particularly able defense 
counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts... must take it into consideration along with all of the 
other factors which infonn" a decision involving an alleged conflict of interest.) 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 2 
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actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. Despite this assertion, the district 
court detennined that an unspecified conflict of interest existed. Thereafter the district court 
appointed counsel outside the SAPD to investigate and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding whether he 
should waive the unnamed conflict at the SAPD. Mr. Abdullah motioned the Idaho Supreme Court 
for pennission to appeal the issue of whether an actual conflict of interest existed in his case. The 
Idaho Supreme Court declined to grant pennission to appeal. The appointment of conflict-counsel 
and the subsequent investigation by conflict-counsel resulted in great delay in Mr. Abdullah's post­
conviction proceedings and burdensome expense to the SAPD. 
Wishing to avoid the same delay and overwhelming cost, the SAPD in this case attempted 
to learn from its experience in Mr. Abdullah's case and detennined it should hire independent 
counsel to investigate the record, decide if a conflict existed, advise Mr. Hall, and make unbiased 
representations to this court. Indeed, the SAPD in this case, without any direction from the Idaho 
Supreme Court, detennined that this was the best course of action to take in order to protect Mr. 
Hall's rights and give him an option to raise the issue of conflict and to expedite the proceedings. 
However, as the record indicates, this conflict inquiry has been lengthy and has resulted in the 
SAPD being particularly unsure of how to proceed. 
Thus, the SAPD seeks clarification by the Idaho Supreme Court as to the proper procedure 
to be followed in detennining whether a conflict of interest exists, not only in the instant case but in 
future cases, as this issue is now routinely being raised in all capital post-conviction cases. 
At its core, this case deals with both the nature and scope ofthe SAPD's statutory duty to 
provide competent appellate and post-conviction representation to capital defendants, and the 
circumstances under which a district court may interfere with the SAPD's representation of 
indigent capital clients. 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 3 
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ARGUMENT
 
Permissive Appeal From This Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark To Conduct A Further
 
Inquiry And Ordering The SAPD To Pay For His Representation Where The SAPD Has Already
 
Paid For An Independent Contract-Attorney To Conduct The Very Same Inquiry Presents A
 
Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of
 
Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of
 
These Post-Conviction Proceedings
 
A.	 Introduction 
The SAPD moves for permission to appeal the district court's order requiring it to pay for 
conflict counsel to represent Mr. Hall and to conduct the same inquiry already conducted by 
independent counsel hired by the SAPO. Moreover, because independent counsel and counsel at 
the SAPD have determined that no conflict of interest actually exists and because the State and this 
Court cannot provide a factual basis warranting further inquiry, there is nothing to support 
appointment of additional counsel by the Court. Finally, because the SAPD has already arranged 
for counsel to perform the duties outlined by this Court for its expert attorney to perform, and 
because the SAPO cannot pay for the Court appointed expert attorney due to budgetary limits 
which stem from the Idaho Legislature's failure to allocate sufficient funds to the SAPO, resolution 
of this issue is necessary to protect Mr. Hall's substantial rights. 
B.	 This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney 
Where An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The Very Same Inquiry 
This Court Has Ordered Involves A Controlling Ouestion Of Law As To Which There Are 
Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 12, a request for permission to appeal must be made to the district court 
prior to filing a motion for permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Permission for an 
interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 4 
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appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." 
I.A.R. 12(a). 
1.	 This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed 
Attorney Where An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The 
Very Same Inquiry This Court Ordered Involves A Controlling Question Of Law 
This Court has appointed Keith Roark to independently review the record and conduct 
investigation as to whether the SAPD is conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall. Prior to Mr. 
Roark's appointment, the SAPD, out of an abundance of caution, hired Denis Benjamin to conduct 
and independent review of the record, investigate, and advise Mr. Hall on whether a conflict of 
interest exists. The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital post-
conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to 
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where the SAPD has already contracted 
with and paid for independent counsel to conduct the same review and investigation. This is a legal 
question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Rudell v. 
Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983). 
2.	 There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's 
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where 
An Independent Contract-Attorney Has Already Performed The Very Same Inquiry 
This Court Ordered 
Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem 
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference. "The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel includes a correlative right to representation free from conflicts of interest." Lewis v. 
Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). It must be established the defendant's counsel actively 
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represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (Dunlap III) (citing State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967 
P.2d 702, 712 (1998». As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the 
duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these 
basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of 
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only 
when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of 
interest. 
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.l991); see also People ex rei. Woodard v. Dist. 
Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985) ("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of 
speculation or conjecture...."). 
Although it is well recognized that the ultimate assurance of conflict-free counsel and the 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment falls upon the Court, the necessity for a thorough inquiry is 
triggered by an objection by the defendant, or specific information already known to either the 
Court or the District Attorney giving rise to a potential conflict. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 
(2009). A general concern by the State or Court does not establish sufficient grounds for a fishing 
expedition into counsels' communications with their client. Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 
1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or 
.	 ")conjecture... 
1.	 There Is Not A Valid Basis For The Court's Failure To Accept Mr. 
Benjamin's Assertion That A Conflict Of Interest Does Not Exist In The 
SAPD's Continued Representation Of Mr. Hall 
In Mr. Hall's case, there is not a valid basis for this Court to decline to accept the 
representations made by Mr. Benjamin that a conflict of interest does not exist. Indeed, this 
Court's reasoning for not accepting Mr. Benjamin's representations include the facts that Mr. 
Benjamin is "not this Court's choice of independent counsel" and the fact that "he is closely 
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aligned with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD and therefore, a 
portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with that office." 
(Memorandum Decision and Order, p.lO, Ls. 4-11.) However, these arguments do not justify the 
appointment of yet another attorney to conduct the same evaluation already performed by 
Mr. Benjamin. 
This Court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order appointed Mr. Roark as "independent 
conflict counsel" and charged Mr. Roark with the duty to provide a report to the Court on four 
separate issues: "(1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if so, the general nature of the conflict; (3) the 
facts surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4) whether independent counsel believes that 
such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9, 
Ls.7-11.i 
Mr. Benjamin was hired by the SAPD to review all the material in Mr. Hall's case, 
determine if the SAPD was conflicted in its representation of Mr. Hall, and to advise Mr. Hall on 
the matter. (See, affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed on August 30,2010). In fact, Mr. Benjamin's 
role as "independent conflict counsel" mirrors that of Mr. Roark's. The only difference between 
the two is that the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin while the Court appointed Mr. Roark. The Court 
takes issue with the fact that Mr. Benjamin is routinely hired by the SAPD to perform conflict 
work. However, this does not evidence a motive for forming a biased opinion but is instead the 
normal procedure in selecting outside counsel. This is true both at the trial and appellate level - the 
2 It is particularly important to note that this Court did not require Mr. Roark to report on the facts 
of this case should Mr. Roark determine a conflict does not exist. This is true even though the 
Court indicates that its duty to inquire further into the facts of Mr. Hall's case is a result of the lack 
ofdisclosure of facts by the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin even though they hold the opinion no conflict 
exists. (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.8, Ls. 1-3; p.6, L. 24 - p.7, L.2.) 
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Ada County Public Defender or the SAPD is generally charged with not only selecting a conflict 
attorney but also paying for those services. 
The Court's rejection of Mr. Benjamin's work and its appointment of Mr. Roark to perform 
the same work is attorney shopping by the Court. It is generally recognized that forum shopping is 
disfavored. Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 806 (1977). This is because litigant's efforts to find a 
particularly sympathetic forum and manipulate the system in their favor should not be rewarded in 
a judicial system that attempts to treat everyone with equality. [d. The same principles apply in 
this instance. Simply because Mr. Benjamin is not this Court's choice of counsel does not mean 
the Court can engage in attorney shopping where it has not been demonstrated that Mr. Benjamin's 
evaluation was flawed warranting a repeat of his efforts by another attorney. 
II.	 The District Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark Interferes With Mr. 
Hall's Right To Choice of Counsel 
The attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. It is fundamental 
that once the attorney-client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards 
aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. 
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The 
constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to 
rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the 
accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has 
established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that relationship is no less 
inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n.5 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude recognition of an indigent 
defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent 
defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has 
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developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 881 (Colo. 
2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over a period of seven years in a 
complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 
216, 222 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989) ("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent 
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate than if 
counsel is retained."). 
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order undermines the attorney-client relationship 
between Mr. Hall and the SAPO. Where the SAPO hired Mr. Benjamin and he has asserted that 
there is no conflict of interest, the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order sends a message to 
Mr. Hall that the SAPO's advice and guidance cannot be trusted and that Mr. Benjamin's advice 
and guidance similarly cannot be trusted. For this Court to force substitute counsel upon Mr. Hall 
for the primary purpose of investigating Mr. Hall's lawyers, further undermines that relationship. 
Mr. Hall recognizes that if a conflict truly threatens to compromise either the adequate 
representation of a defendant or the institutional interest in rendering a just verdict, a trial judge has 
both a duty to conduct an inquiry and the discretion to appoint separate counsel if necessary. See 
State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the district court 
"appointed separate counsel, a public defender, to inquire into the conflict, determine if it was 
subject to waiver, and to advise Lopez thereon.") However, because appointment of separate 
counsel constitutes an interference with an established and on-going attorney-client relationship, 
"[m]easures of this kind could be justified, if at all, only upon a substantial showing of necessity. 
Nothing in the record indicates the existence at trial of a potential conflict between [Mr. Hall] and 
[his] attorneys warranting interference with the [] established attorney-client relationships." Knix v. 
State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Alaska App. 1996). 
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This Court has appointed Mr. Roark, and has preemptively authorized Mr. Roark to conduct 
depositions of Mr. Abdullah's current lawyers. (See, Memorandum Decision and Order, p.9, Ls. 1­
3.) (Specifically noting that "Mr. Roark is authorized to take depositions in furtherance of his 
inquiry of anyone he considers necessary including but not limited to, if appropriate in his view, the 
SAPD or Dennis Benjamin.") (Emphasis added.) This Court's order is based on the unwarranted 
belief that the SAPD has acted neither with candor nor in good faith in response to this Court's 
inquiry regarding the purported conflict of interest, in violation of the SAPD's ethical obligations. 
Deposing Mr. Hall's current lawyers will inevitably and unnecessarily reveal confidential 
infonnation covered by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Such an 
extreme intrusion into the current, on-going attorney-client relationship, without justification, 
cannot be countenanced. 
Absent an actual conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, this Court's interference with 
the attorney-client relationship violates Mr. Hall's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, his 
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unnecessarily delays these proceedings. 
C.	 This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has 
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State Has Not Presented Any 
Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts Necessary To 
Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law 
The record before this Court demonstrates that a conflict of interest does not exist in the 
SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall. In fact, Mr. Benjamin has conducted an independent 
review of the record and detennined that there is not a conflict of interest. The State has not 
presented any factual support that would require this Court to engage in any inquiry into whether a 
conflict of interest exists. Moreover, this Court cannot point to any factual basis that would result 
in a requirement that the Court conduct further inquiry into a conflict of interest. 
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1.	 This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has 
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State Has Not Presented 
Any Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts 
Necessary To Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law 
This Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order finds that it is "lacking enough facts to 
make [the] determination [of whether a conflict exists.]" (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8, 
Ls. 18-19.) This Court also finds that it is "presently lacking the factual background necessary to 
reach any conclusion." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.7, Ls. 25-26.) Additionally, the only 
factual assertion contained in the record is that of Mr. Benjamin indicating a conflict of interest 
does not exise. Moreover, the State has not presented any factual basis warranting further inquiry 
into whether a conflict exists. The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital 
post-conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to 
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where there are no facts indicating 
further inquiry is warranted and where the only facts before the Court indicate a conflict does not 
exist. This is a legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public 
interest. See Rudell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983). 
2.	 There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's 
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where 
Mr. Benjamin Has Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist. Where The State 
Has Not Presented Any Evidence Of A Conflict. And Where The Court Does Not 
Have The Facts Necessary To Support Further Inquiry 
Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem 
from case law cited in ·the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
3 Attached to the Motion for Reconsideration filed concurrently with this Motion is the affidavit of 
Nicole Owens, one of Mr. Hall's attorneys at the SAPD. In her affidavit Ms. Owens makes the 
assertion that the SAPD does not have conflict of interest in its representation of Mr. Hall. This is 
the first time the SAPD has spoken on the matter. 
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Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference. 
Arguably, by informing the Court that the SAPD had hired Mr. Benjamin to determine whether 
a conflict of interest existed, the SAPD raised a specter of conflict. However, the motivation 
behind informing the Court of the SAPD actions in the June 28, 2010, Ex Parte Notice ofPossible 
Conflict of Interest (hereinafter "Ex Parte Notice") under seal, was to inform the Court the SAPD 
was evaluating the conflict, vis-a-vis Mr. Benjamin. Once Mr. Benjamin indicated a conflict of 
interest did not exist the inquiry should have stopped. This is especially true where the Court and 
the State failed to present any additional information a conflict of interest existed. 
D.	 This Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The SAPD Has 
Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry Now Ordered By The 
Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To Do So Presents A Controlling 
Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion 
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order finding that the SAPD is obligated to pay for 
the Court's appointed expert attorney is incorrect. Specifically, the SAPD has already fulfilled its 
statutory obligation to provide conflict free counsel to Mr. Hall through its hiring of Dennis 
Benjamin. Moreover, to order the SAPD to pay for this Court's attorney expert where the SAPD 
has demonstrated it does not have the funds to do so is improper. 
1.	 This Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The 
SAPD Has Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry 
Now Ordered By The Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To 
Do So Presents A Controlling Question OfLaw 
The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital post-conviction 
proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to independently review 
the record and conduct investigation, at SAPD expense where the SAPD has already paid for this 
service and where the SAPD has demonstrated it cannot pay for another identical inquiry. This is a 
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legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Rudell 
v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983). 
2.	 There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's 
Order Requiring The SAPD To Pay For Conflict Counsel Where The SAPD Has 
Already Paid An Independent Attorney To Conduct The Same Inquiry Now Ordered 
By The Court And Despite The SAPD's Demonstrated Inability To DQ So 
Substantial grounds for difference ofopinion regarding this controlling question of law stem 
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
Conflict and the Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict, which are incorporated here by reference. 
The SAPD moves for permission to appeal this Court's order requiring it to pay for conflict 
counsel to represent Mr. Hall. The SAPD's statutory obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent 
defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" is 
triggered by a conflict of interest or any other reason which renders the SAPD unable to carry out 
its statutory duties. Because the SAPD cannot pay for conflict counsel due to budgetary limits 
which stem from the Idaho Legislature's failure to allocate sufficient funds to the SAPD, and 
because a finding of conflict has not been made, resolution of this issue is necessary to advance 
Mr. Hall's underlying post-conviction case. 
1. This Court's Order Exceeds Its Jurisdiction 
This Court ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel of the Court's choosing to 
investigate and report to the Court about the existence of a conflict. Despite being informed by the 
SAPD it had no budgetary resources to pay for Court appointed conflict counsel, this Court 
disregarded the information and nevertheless ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel to 
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represent Mr. Hall. In so doing, this Court has effectively defeated the legislature's intent in 
creating the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund, and has exceeded its jurisdiction. 
In March of 1998, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, which sets 
forth the qualifications for appointed counsel in capital cases. I.C.R. 44.3. That same year, the 
Idaho Legislature created the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD. See Hon. George R. 
Reinhardt III, Recent Developments in the Law Applicable to Capital Cases and Criminal Appeals 
by Indigents, 42 Advocate 7 (June 1999); Idaho Code § 19-869(1). The legislature codified its 
intent in creating both the capital crimes defense fund and the SAPD. With respect to the capital 
crimes defense fund: 
The establishment of a capital crimes defense fund by the counties of the state for 
the purpose of funding the costs of criminal defense in cases where the penalty of 
death is a legal possibility is hereby authorized. . .. Membership in the fund shall 
be voluntary, as determined by resolution of the board of county commissioners 
of the respective counties of the state. 
The services of the state appellate public defender as provided in section 19-870, 
Idaho Code, shall be available only to those counties participating in the fund. 
I.e. § 19-863A(1),(5). Similarly, with respect to the SAPD: 
The legislature recognizes that the cost of legal representation of indigent 
defendants upon the appeal of their criminal convictions, particularly convictions 
for first-degree murder, is an extraordinary burden on the counties of this state. In 
order to reduce this burden, provide competent counsel but avoid paying high 
hourly rates to independent counsel to represent indigent defendants in appellate 
proceedings, the legislature hereby creates the office of the state appellate public 
defender. 
Idaho Code § 19-868. While the establishment of criteria for the appointment of defense counsel to 
represent indigent defendants in capital cases, along with the creation of the SAPD and the capital 
crimes defense fund, helped to alleviate the financial burdens faced by counties struggling to pay 
for the prosecution and defense ofboth capital and complex criminal cases, these same acts also had 
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the effect of consolidating appellate and post-conviction indigent defense representation in a single 
office of the SAPD. 
When the legislature created the SAPD office, it categorized the office as a department of 
self-governing agencies within the executive branch, with the State Appellate Public Defender 
being appointed by the Governor, on the advice and consent of the Senate. I.C. §19-869(1)-(2). The 
legislature also identified the powers and duties of the SAPD and his or her office, including but not 
limited to the representation of indigent capital defendants in post-conviction relief proceedings in 
the district court, and on direct appeal. See I.C. § 19-870(a),(d) In addition to these duties, the 
legislature vested the SAPD with the power to "contract with private attorneys to provide 
representation on a case-by-case basis when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources," 
I.C. § 19-870(3), and to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the 
budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" in circumstances where the SAPD is "unable to 
carry out the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason[.]" I.C. 
§ 19-871. 
Pursuant to these provisions, it is within the power of the SAPD to decide who it will 
contract with to provide legal representation to indigent clients when the SAPD is unable to do so. 
The SAPD's power and ability to contract with outside counsel is dependent on having sufficient 
funds to so contract. See Appendix A (Affidavit of Josh Tewalt, p.2, ~ 16 ("That all state contracts 
must contain a clause that indicates that any contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the 
Legislature[.]"); p.3, ~ 21 ("That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the 
guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations[.]"). The SAPD's budget is 
wholly dependent upon an annual appropriation of funding from the Idaho State Legislature. See 
IDAHO CaNST., art. VII, § 13 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasurer, but in pursuance of 
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appropriations made by law."). "An appropriation in this state is authority of the Legislature given 
at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers to apply a specified sum from a 
designated fund out of the treasury for a specified object or demand against the state." Blaine 
County Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102,204 P. 1066, 1067 (Idaho 1922). 
Alternatively, if this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is construed to be a claim 
against the state, such a claim must be examined by the Board of Examiners, which consists of the 
governor, secretary of state and attorney general. See IDAHO CaNST. art. IV, § 18. The Idaho 
Constitution prohibits any claim against the state being "passed upon by the legislature without first 
having been considered and acted upon by said board." Id. In interpreting the role of the Board of 
Examiners in relationship to the legislature, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Board of 
Examiners "must determine whether the claim is in proper form, properly certified by the state 
auditor, and within the scope of the enactment providing the appropriation and payable therefrom." 
Jewett v. Williams, 84 Idaho 93, 114, 369 P.2d 590, 603 (1962). If there is no legislative 
appropriation to pay "the item for which a claim has been submitted, then the board of examiners 
may recommend or refuse to recommend that it be submitted to the succeeding session of the 
legislature for payment." Id. In contrast, if the claim amount is "fixed or settled by lawful contract, 
or by authority of the department of a state agency, or other person authorized by law to fix the 
same, the board exercises only a ministerial function in examining and approving the claim for 
payment after having determined that the claim is proper as to form, certification and chargeability 
against the appropriation." Id. 
Because there is no appropriation from which to draw to fulfill this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order, the Court's order constitutes a claim which must be submitted to the Board of 
Examiners, which then may determine whether to refuse the claim or recommend that it be 
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submitted to the 2012 legislature for payment. In either event, there is no appropriation available 
that would permit the SAPD to negotiate the compensation for counsel, and no appropriation for 
conflict counsel to be compensated out of the budget of the SAPD. 
As a result of the absence of an appropriation by the legislature to fund the district court's 
order, the court's order is in excess of its jurisdiction and is an attempt to defeat the legislative 
intent in creating both the SAPD office and the capital crimes defense fund. See cf In re: State v. 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 143 Idaho 695, 152 P.3d 566 (2007) (State was 
required to pay costs/fees of special master appointed by the district court in her discretion, where 
Idaho Code §12-118 provides that when the State is a party and costs are awarded against it, a 
warrant must be drawn against the general funds to pay such costs, but the district court cannot 
identify the source of funding for such costs and cannot issue a writ of execution for the payment to 
ensure such payment). 
11.	 The District Court Rests Its Authority to Identify and Select "Conflict Counsel" for 
Mr. Hall on An Erroneous Application ofIdaho Code § 19-871 
In establishing a procedure to appoint "conflict counsel," this Court erroneously relied upon 
Idaho Code § 19-871 for its authority to order the SAPD to compensate "conflict counsel" from the 
SAPD budget. Specifically, because there is not a conflict in Mr. Hall's case and because Mr. 
Roark is an expert attorney appointed by the Court to conduct its inquiry and report to the Court 
regarding whether a conflict exists, Idaho Code § 19-871 does not require the SAPD to pay for Mr. 
Roark. 
When an indigent petitioner files a post-conviction petition, Idaho Code §§19-4904 and 19­
860 require the county to bear the cost of expenses in that post-conviction case. Moreover, 
pursuant to Idaho Code §19-871 (d), the SAPD has statutory responsibility to represent capital 
clients in post-conviction, and concomitantly to pay for the costs incurred as part of that 
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representation. However, the cost ofMr. Roark's services will not be a cost incurred by the SAPD, 
and instead is a cost incurred by this Court by procuring Mr. Roark's services. When the SAPD 
incurs a cost, it does so pursuant to contractual agreement between the SAPD and the expert. No 
such arrangement or contract exists between the SAPD and Mr. Roark. 
Idaho Code §19-871 provides as follows: 
Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required 
in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate 
public defender shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated 
out of the budget of the state appellate public defender. 
Comparatively, Idaho Code §19-860(b) states: 
If a court before whom a person appears upon a formal charge assigns an attorney 
other than a public defender to represent a needy person, the appropriate district 
court, upon application, shall prescribe a reasonable rate of compensation for his 
services and shall determine the direct expenses necessary to representation for 
which he should be reimbursed. The county shall pay the attorney the amounts so 
prescribed. The attorney shall be compensated for his services with regard to the 
complexity of the issues, the time involved, and other relevant considerations. 
In this case, this Court has selected an attorney other than the public defender and in 
defining the scope of representation, "determined the direct expenses necessary to representation." 
Thus, pursuant to I.C. 19-860(b) Ada County, not the SAPD, is responsible for the remuneration for 
Mr. Roark's services. Additionally, pursuant to I.C. §19-871, no determination was made by the 
SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the Act. The SAPD's statutory 
obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of 
the state appellate public defender[,]" is triggered by the SAPD's inability to carry out its duties. 
Absent an inability to carry out its duties, the SAPD has no obligation to pay for alternate counsel. 
Here, the order requiring the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel of this Court's choosing is premised 
on the Court's erroneous conclusion that an additional attorney is necessary to determine if a 
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conflict exists. Therefore, the Court's conclusion is misplaced and the SAPD is not obligated to 
pay for Mr. Roark's appointment and services. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution 
of this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and post-
conviction proceedings required in capital cases and will provide guidance in this and future cases. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this Court's 
post-conviction Memorandum Decision and Order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict 
counsel at the SAPD expense and then stay these post-conviction proceedings pending resolution of 
the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of January, 2011. 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
~A:~~~C . 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
BOISE ID 83707 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
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Statehouse Mail 
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__ Hand Delivery 
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FacsimileZ Hand Delivery 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
IAN THOMSON 
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit 
I.S.B. # 5888 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
CASE NO. SPOT 0500308
 
AFFIDAVIT OF
 
JOSHTEWALT
 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
County of Ada. ) 
Josh Tewalt, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1.	 I am employed by the State of Idaho, Division ofFinancial Management 
(hereinafter, DFM); 
2. That I have been employed with DFM since June, 2008; 
3.	 I have been the financial analyst for the Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender (hereinafter, SAPD) since 2009; 
4. I am currently the financial analyst for the SAPD; 
5.	 That I am familiar with the codes, regulations and other rules that govern 
the financial dealings of state agencies; 
6.	 That I am familiar with the SAPD's FY2011 actual budget and the 
SAPD's FY2012 budget; 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 1 
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7.	 That the budget year for FY20ll began on July 1, 2010 and will end on 
June 30, 2011; 
8.	 That the SAPD's FY20ll budget was $1,954,800, which was a 10.25% 
reduction as compared with the FY2010 budget; That from the Operating 
expenses, the SAPD hires contract attorneys to handle conflict cases and overflow 
cases when the SAPD caseload is too high for the Appellate Unit attorneys; 
9.	 That in FY20ll, the SAPD had only $85,000 for non-capital conflict 
contracts; 
10.	 That this amount was insufficient and so for FY20 11, the SAPD is 
seeking, and the Governor has approved, a supplemental appropriation in the 
amount of $86,500 to cover shortfalls in those existing contracts; 
11. That the Legislature has not yet approved the Supplemental Request; 
12.	 That the $86,500 supplemental was requested for, and is specifically 
designated, for existing contract shortfalls in the Appellate Unit, as outlined 
above; 
13.	 That because of the budget shortfalls, and because of fixed costs in the 
operating expenses, for example, rent, telephone and data lines, the SAPD has 
scheduled three (3) furlough days to date during Fiscal Year 2011; 
14. Any additional furlough dates have not yet been ruled out; 
15.	 That the SAPD requested an $180,500.00 FY20ll Supplemental 
Appropriation to be used in capital cases, and requested this amount as an on­
going request for the SAPD budget, but that request was not approved by the 
Governor and therefore it is unlikely that it would be funded by the Joint Finance 
and Appropriations Committee of the Legislature; 
16.	 That all state contracts must contain a clause that indicates that any 
contract is subject to sufficient appropriation from the Legislature; 
17.	 That any remaining money in personnel cannot be "moved" to cover 
operating expenses without the permission ofDFM and David Fulkerson, (State 
Financial Officer); 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 2
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18.	 That currently, the SAPD would not be pennitted to move any remaining 
personnel money into operating because any unspent money would have to be 
reverted to the State to help offset any budget shortfalls for FY2011; 
19.	 That the SAPD does not have the legal authority to "carryover" personnel 
money from one fiscal year to another; any unspent personnel money, absent 
consent from DFM to move to cover operating expenses, must be reverted to the 
General Fund at the end of the FY20 11 Budget Year; 
20.	 That any contract currently initiated by the SAPD would not have the 
guarantee of sufficient Legislative General Fund Appropriations; 
21.	 Thus, the SAPD has no money in the FY2011 budget to cover an 
additional contract for conflict services in Erick Hall v. State ofIdaho; 
22. That the SAPD's FY2012 budget recommendation is $2,040,200; 
23.	 That the FY2012 budget recommendation is broken down as follows: 
$1,613,700 in personnel costs, $426,500 for operating costs, and $0.00 for capital 
outlay; 
24.	 That the FY2012 operating expense must cover fixed costs like rent 
(approximately $78,000 for FY2012), data and telephone lines (approximately 
$20,000), and legal research ($34,000); 
25.	 That given those fixed expenses, the SAPD has only $123,000 to cover all 
other operating expenses not listed above; 
26.	 That until the final FY2012 is approved by the Joint Finance and 
Appropriation Committee, the SAPD does not know the amount of the FY2012 
Appropriation except that it will not exceed the above numbers and could, in fact, 
be less than the above numbers; 
27.	 That in light of the above, DFM would recommend against entering any 
additional contracts for legal services in FY2012, as such contracts may not be 
sufficiently funded and there is no mechanism to assure the contract is sufficiently 
funded; 
28. Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSH TEWALT	 3 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to e me this Ie) ~day of <;~-O2010. 
~otaI)'PUbliC for aho 
Residing at ~/f~dk~ c# ~ 
My commission expires ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
T-/'_~_ 
EVAN SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /C?ft, day of January, 2010, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: ".{/./ fhdJ(':,,:J f ~~Jt<:£...e.JI'J.,r-l 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
JAN 10 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
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QEPUTY 
OR,SINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
 )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
Case No. CV PC 080 3085
 
MOTION FOR COURT TO
 
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
 
(CAPITAL CASE)
 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court to take judicial notice of items identified in Mr. 
Hall's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (herein "Motion to Reconsider"). 
In this motion, Mr. Hall specifically sets forth the items for which he asks this Court to take 
judicial notice. 
Applicable Law 
Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice in the context of 
adjudicative facts. Such facts are defined as follows: 
MOTION FOR COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
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I A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known with the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
I court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
I 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
LR.E. 201 (a}-(b). This definition is broad but not exhaustive of all matters which a court may 
judicially notice. See, e.g., Pern v. Stocks, 93 Idaho 866, 870, 477 P.2d 108, 112 (1970) 
I (Population of a town "is an appropriate subject for judicial notice, being a matter of common 
I knowledge generally known in the area where the court was sitting."); City ofLewiston v. Frary, 
91 Idaho 322, 420 P.2d 805 (1966) ("Facts within common knowledge are not mentioned in the I Dudicial notice] statute, yet universally such facts are judicially noticed by the courts."); cf 
I Kurtis A. Kemper, J.D., What Constitutes "Adjudicative Facts" Within Meaning ofRule 201 of 
Federal Rules of Evidence Concerning Judicial Notice ofAdjudicative Facts, 150 A.L.R. FED.I 543 (1998) (observing that judicial notice rule applies only to adjudicative facts, which are 
I generally identified as the facts of a particular case, in contrast to legislative facts, which are 
generally described as established truths, facts, or pronouncements that do not change from case I 
to case and are applied universally).
 
I Idaho Code § 9-101 also provides a non-exhaustive list of facts which courts judicially
 
I
 notice:
 
I 
1. The true signification of all English words and phrases, and of legal 
expressions. 
2. Whatever is established by law. 
I 3. Public and private official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments of this state and of the United States. 
I 4. The seals of all the courts of this state and of the United States. 
I 
MOTION FOR COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
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I 
I 5. The accession to office and the official signatures and seals of office of the 
principal officers of government in the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments of this state and of the United States. 
6. The existence, title, national flag, and seal of every state or sovereign 
I recognized by the executive power of the United States. 
7. The seals of courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of notaries 
I public. 
8. The laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions I and political history of the world. In all these cases the court may resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference. 
I Id. When a request for judicial notice involves "records, exhibits or transcripts from the court 
file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for I 
which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all partaies [sic] 
I copies of such documents or items," a court must judicially notice these items so long as a 
I request is made and the court is supplied with the necessary information. See I.R.E. 201(d). 
Accordingly, Mr. Hall requests that this Court take judicial notice of the following record 
I items: 
I 1. Shannon Romero has served as co-counsel on Abdullah v. State, post-conviction 
case number SPOT 0500308 since the summer of2007; 
I 2. Nicole Owens has served as co-counsel on Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case 
I
 number SPOT 0500308, since the last week in July, 2007;
 
3. Nicole Owens has served as co-counsel on the instant case since January 8, 2008' 
I 4. Shannon Romero briefly served as co-counsel on the instant case from April 2010 
I until July 2010. 
I
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I 
I 5. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Re: SAPD 
Involvement With Trial And Pretrial, filed on August 17, 2009 (attached as 
exhibit A); 
I 6. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Memorandwn 
I Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial, filed on August 31, 2009 
(attached as exhibit B); I 7. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Response To 
I Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The SAPD 
With Trial Counsel, filed on September 1,2009 (attached as exhibit C); I 
8. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re: Conflict 
I Counsel, filed on September 15,2009 (attached as exhibit D); 
I 9. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Motion For 
Permission To Appeal filed on September 24,2009 (attached hereto as exhibit E); 
I 10. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Appointing 
I
 Keith Roark, filed October 15,2009 (attached as exhibit F);
 
11. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Amended Motion 
I 
I for Permission to Appeal and Memorandwn in Support Thereof, filed on October 
23,2009 (attached as exhibit G); 
12. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re: Waiver 
I Hearing, filed on March 1, 2010 (attached as exhibit H); 
I 13. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order re: 
Appointment of Conflict Counsel, filed on April 30, 2010 (attached as exhibit I); 
I 
MOTION FOR COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
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I 14. Abdullah v. State, post-conviction case nwnber SPOT 0500308, Order Finding 
I Abdullah Knowingly and Voluntarily Waived the Conflict, filed on May 7, 2010 
(attached as exhibit J); and 
I 15. Payne v. State, post-conviction case nwnber CV PC 201011137, State's Motion 
I for Inquiry Into Possible Conflict with the State Appellate Public Defender, filed 
on August 17,2010 (attached as exhibit K). I CONCLUSION 
I For the reasons set forth above, we ask this Court to take judicial notice of the items 
identified herein as A-K, which are submitted in support ofMr. Hall's Motion to Reconsider. I 
I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 10th day of January, 2011. 
I 
I Ian H. Thomson Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I 1 ~ \ I (' ,0U''''-j/~/~l\ ,\J( , 
I 
Nicole Owens 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I	 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 11 th day of January, 2011, served a true and
 correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, as 
indicated below: I ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835I IMSI - J BLOCK BOISE ID 83707 
I JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE I 200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
I 
~	 U.S. Mail
 
Statehouse Mail
 
Facsimile
 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimiler Hand Delivery 
~ ~~~'c~:-~~~_ 
EVAN SMITH -------- ~~ I ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 
I IHT/es 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIEflBF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
 
WlTH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial 
counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an 
abundance of caution, the Court orders both parties to address the following: 
1.	 the potential impact of this involvement, 
2.	 whether this creates a conflict of interest,1 
3.	 the extent of that involvement, and 
4.	 whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
potential witnesses. 
Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with 
citation to legal authority no later September 1,2009. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 17th day of August 2009.
 
~e.~'---_ 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
I
 The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,100 S.Ct. 1708,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this (l day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY 1. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MARK J. ACKLEY 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE, [DAHO 83703 F~ 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
.;~ 
ORDER RE: EFFECT OF SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308 2
 
001493
LL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I EXHIBIT B
 
I
 
I
 001494
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I  
 
 
I 
I 
I4J 001/02:31~~/31.i2008 16·24 FAX 
* I GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
I Shawna Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
I Idaho State BarNo. 2127 200 West Front Str~. Room 3191 _ 
Boise, Idaho 83702 I Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
I 
RECEiVED
 
AUG 3 \ 2009 
C'-f\-- AnocLL~"TE
;:,In\c:. \' R ~UBUC OEFENOE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner,I vs. 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I 
) 
) Case No. CV PC 2005 21802 
) 
) MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD 
) INVOLVEMENT WITH 
) TRIAL AND PRE·TRIAL 
) 
) 
) 
--------------) 
I COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the 
I SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial. 
The Court has instructed the parties to address: 
I (1) the potential impact of [the] involvement [of the SAPD during the trial], 
(2) whether this creates a conflict I 
I MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH), Page 
I 001495
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I
 
(3) the extent of that involvement, and I (4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
I 
I potential witnesses. Taking issue #3 first, the State is at a disadvantage in determining the extent of the 
SAPO's involvement during trial. The State must rely on other sources for this 
I 
infonnation. The extent of the contact between the SAPD's office and trial counsel was 
discussed at Mrs. Toryanski's deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226, In. 1 - pg.240, In. 10) The 
State also 'previously asked the SAPD for infonnation about their contact with trial 
I counsel. In response, the SAPO provided the State documents attached as Exhibit # 1. 
The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying assurance from Mr, Ackley that 
I no conflict existed, and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course 
based l in part, on an understanding of case law which indicates that the defense may be inI the best position to foresee a conflict. 
An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the I best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict 
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a triaJ. 
I Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U,S, 335,347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
I As for whether there is a conflict of interest, again, the State has relied on Mr. 
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen 
I as existing are if the SAPO attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to 
what they are now claiming is reversible error. The September 15,2004, email from Kim 
I Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email touches on Mrs. Toryanski's thoughts 
I 
I 
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of theI attorney-client relationship, ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should 
testify and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain, Each of those issues has 
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent 
on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the 
I MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH), Page 
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I 
email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a 
I 
I potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs. 
Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KTs depo, pg. 226, I Ins, 19-20) 
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3, 
I 
2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark 
Ackley present, where the SAPO suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's 
speedy trial rights are the basis for a claim for relief. It seems concerning that the same 
I counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's decision to 
request continuances. However, defense counsel requested a continuance September 
I 2004 and their request was denied. 
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potentia! impact of theI involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate Public Defender's 
I Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the communications 
I 
between the SAPD and trial counsel, the State does not intend to call any members of the 
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and 
I 
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting 
himself or other attorneys in his office in the witness chair. 
Accordingly, based on the best information available to the State, the State 
I Appellate Public Defender attorney staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing. The State does not know the presence OT extent of any waivers by Mr. Abdullah, 
I which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings, 
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently
I unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefing. 
I
 
I
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I 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 0/51'day of August, 2009. I 
I GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
I
 
I ~~~
 S .Dunn 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I
 
I
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
 
I
 was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
 
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~day of August 2009, 
I \J10-- .f~ _334 -;) q ~S-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
Shawna Dunn 
I From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.stale.id.usJ 
Sent: FrIday. May 09,200812:12 PM 
I To: Shawna Dunn; Roger Bourne Cc: Shannon N. Romero 
Subject: Abdullah v. Stale: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trIal counsel and I the SAPO Attachments: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
I 
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. AbUliaI'!, Sup. Ct. No. 
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
Shawna, 
I This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the 
Toryanskis at the time of their representation of Azad AbduJlah. I previously agreed to I look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such 
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your 
patience.I 
I have located and attacbed the following: 
I 1.	 Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim 
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me). 
I a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been 
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence I (although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below). 
2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.I 
a.	 Both faxes, dated 12/11103 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to 
correspond with the attached email with the string of commWlications on I	 12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding 
challenges to the death penalty statute. 
I I have located but h~y~ not attached the following: 
I 1. A summary ofa telephone call on 11124/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly Huskey, written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included: 
I	 a. The outcome of the trial; 
b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and 
I	 c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti 
I 812112009 
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I 
I evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism 
or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as 
Mitch' s description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the 
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings. 
I 2. A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1124/05, written by me. 
The topics of the conversation included: 
I	 a. Hearing on PSI; 
b. Fonnal sentencing scheduling; 
c. Amendments to ICR 32; I d. _Whether we would a_ttend the hearing; and _ 
e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure. 
I 3.	 An email summary Qf a _writt~n summM:Y ofa telephone call on 9/03/04 from 
Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17, I	 2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I 
may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not 
located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in I	 October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included: 
I a. The Court closing the courtroom; b. Kline/Littlefield; 
c. Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey; I d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
 
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
 
f. Kim's reference to commWlications sent by them to the prosecution
 I regarding the prosecution's case;
 
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would
 
plead guilty;
 I h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
 
I 4. An email summary 91ilwritten sununaty of an undated telephone conversation
 between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet
 
located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my
 
I 
I notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the 
files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics 
of the conversation apparently included; 
a. Sentencing scheduled for 1121/05; 
b. Residual doubt; I c. Scope of allocution; 
d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah I regarding the events; and 
I 8/21/2009 001500
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e, An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area 
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not 
sure what this references)" 
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom ofdisclosing these documents as they differ 
from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are surmnaries of correspondence, not the 
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. 1 need to further assess 
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could 
or should be redacted, I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with 
my team and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the 
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again. 
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why I took the time to 
describe for you the contents of these summaries. 
-Mark 
8/21/2009
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08/31/2008 18.28 FAX 141 008/023I FW: Defense motion to be tiled on Tuesday Page 1 of2 
I Shawna Dunn 
I From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@torysnski.com] 
I 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM 
io: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
SUbJect: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I M&M: 
I 
FYI _. we'r~ moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the 
"heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request 
that the motion be filed under seal. 
I K 
I 
-----Original Message----­
From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPHCd!agaweb.netJ
 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 10:04 AM
 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Co: kim@toryanski.com
I Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I Judge Copsey: 
I 
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings 
related to this motion be conducted in chamben. 
Pat Owen 
I 
I -----Original Message----­
From: Kim W. Toryanski [mailto:kim@to!n!l~i.com]
 
Sent: Monday, September 06. 2004 9:59 AM
 
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I 
I
 Judge Copsey:
 
I
 
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning.
 
we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the
 
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that
 
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of
 
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide
 I detective and case officer.
 
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in
 
I the written motion. In SUInItJ.ary. we assert that the defendant has a
 
I 8/21/2009 001502
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I 08/31/2008 1626 FAX I4J 008/023 FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday Page 20f2 
I Founeenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a 
I 
reasolUlble opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the 
relationship, whether an actual contlict of interest may have arisen by 
virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were 
affected and c~mpromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of 
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or I compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether . prejudice [0 the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the 
proceedings and the proper administration of justice is paramount to all 
I involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process. 
In evaluating the appropriateness of rhe motion to continue, we have 
I referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to 
I 
assert legal claims) of~e ABA Guidelines for.the Appointmen! and 
Perfonnance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003). 
Without lUl opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially ca]ls into 
I 
question all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be 
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are 
different and deserving ofhigher due process standards. 
I Kim Toryanski 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 8/21/2009 001503
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I 08/31/2008 1626 FAX Abdullah continuance motion was denied Page lofl 
I Shawna Dunn 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com) 
Sent: Tuesday, September 07.20043:53 PM 
To: Mark Ackley: Molly J. Huskey' 
Subject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address ifAzad 
gets convicted of fast degree, the jury fmds an aggravator, and that 
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the 
"glory" of being the fust to try a death. case under the new statute. 
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the 
deposition of detective littlefield, rhe one that Erika Klein had the affair 
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on 
deaf em. The prosecutor asked for the scope oftbe depo to be limited. 
but the judge said no !imitatOD! OD defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to 
taking the depo. 
The jUdge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that 
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups of the NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for IIlQre money to get some additiOnal experts 
to advise me. and to testify. Again, nooray. 
All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with 
me! 
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go 
until 1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of 
the week. 
Will keep you posted. 
Kim 
8/21/2009
 001504
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08/31/2008 1626 FAX ~011./023 I Page I of I 
I 
Shawna Dunn 
I From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state,id.us] 
Sent: Tllursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM 
I To: kim@toryanskLcom SubJeGt: Penry v. Johnson 
I Kim, 
I 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions co prospective jurors 
I 
regarding whet-her mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
defense) or 'whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case, H@re is 
a relevant portion Chat my have application for you during jury selection: 
I 
I ~.Pen.ry I did not hold that: the mere mention of "mitigating circumst:anC8s" to ~ 
capital sent::encing juxy satisfies the 2iqhth JUlIendmAnt::. Nor does it stand for 
the propositioD that it ia constitutiODally sufficieot to into~ the 
jury that it may "coDsidern mitigati:ng circumstances in dec:ic:ling the 
appropriata 8entance. Rather, the key under Penr,y ~ is that the jury 
I
 be able to ncon.ider and give ef~ecC CO Ca defendant's .itigatingJ
 evidenc. in imposing sentCUlce." 492 u.s., at 319. 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also John80~ v. T.xa~, 509 U.S. 350, 381. 113 S.Ct:. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1993) (O'CO~:R, J., dills8nt::ing) ("lA] sencencer [must] be allowed to give
I full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumBCanca/il" ($mphasis in original». For it is only when t::he jury is given a "vehic~& for expressing its 
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its Ben~encing decision," 
Penry ~, 492 U.S., at 329, 109 S.Ct.. 2934, that: we can be BUre that:: the jury "hasI t::reated the de£euQant as a 'unique~y individual human hein[g]' and has roade a reliable determination that. death is the apPX'OPriate sentence," ··1921 id., at. 319, 
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 
I 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»." (my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that sirnpy inquiring of a "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must 
effect:; if they cannot, ~hen chey should be 
I Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litiga~ion uni~ 
I mackley@sapd.state.id.us (208) 334-2712 
I
 
I
 
I 8/21/2009 
prospective juror ~hether they will 
be det@rmim;ld whether they can give ic 
exclUded for cause. 
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Page 1 oi2 
Shawna Dunn 
I From: Kim W. Toryanski [klm@toryanskLcom} 
Sent: Friday, September 10, 2004 6:45 AM 
I To: Mark Ackley Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words, "give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and 
Kim have observed. we are forming the questions with lhe word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on 
correcting that today. I Today w!" be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least t?day we get lunch. 
Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks. 
I I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today? 
I Kim 
-----Original Message----­
from: Mark Ackley (mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
 I sent: Thursday, september 09, 20014:17 PM
 To: kim@toryanskLcom 
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson 
I Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-cotlnsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation
I
 specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday'S jury selection.
 Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective
 
jurors regarding whether mitigating fact;s would "matter" to them (as worded by
 
the defense) or whethe!r they could simply • consider" mitigating facts if
I instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v.
 
I
 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) de!Blt with jury inst;ructions on mitigation
 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application
 
for you during jury selection:
 
I 
npen~ I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances· to a 
capital sentencing jU1Y sat.isfillis the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand 
for the proposition that it ia eon8~itutioDally sufficient to 
inform the jury that it may "cODs1deZ"" mitigating ai~cWlUlta:n.ces 
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry 
I
 
I I is that the jury be able to "consider and gi,VfJ effecr; co Ca
 
defendan't ' II JIliclgat1zagl 8v1deDce 1n im,poS1Dg seJ:l'te.lu:e. " 492 '0. s.,
 
at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 u.s.
 
350,381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, ~25 I.,Eld.2c1 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, if., Cli:uentiny)
 
I 
("[A] sentencer (must] be allowed eo give fu~l censideration and fu~l effect 
to mitigating circumst.ancBs" (umphaais in origina1»). Fer it is only when ~he 
jury is given a "vehicle for expressiD~ its 'reasoned mora1 r.~ponse' to that 
evidence in rendering its sentencing deciaiell," penry ~, 492 U.s., at 329, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, that ,we can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant a. a 
'unique1y individual human bein[g]' and has made a reliable determination thatI death is the appropriatB sen~ence,· --1921 i4., at 319, ~09 S.Ct. 2934 
I 8/21/2009 001506
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I,
 (quc~ins wooduon v. North Carolina, 428 u.S. 290, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 297S. 49
 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
 
I, (roy emphasis added) In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will ~consider' mitigation is no~ enough. It must be determined whe~her they 
CaD give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.I, Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
I,
 Capital Litigation uni~
 mackley@sapd,state.id.us
 (20S) 334-2712
 I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I, 8/21/2009 
I 
001507
I. 08/31/2009 
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1627 F,~X ~013/023 
Page 2 of2 
(quc~ins Wooduon v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 290, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 297S. 49 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976))." 
(my emphasis added) 
In short, it s ems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they 
wi l "consider* mitigation is not: enough. It must be determined whet.her they 
CaD give it e fect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation unit. 
mackley sapd.state.id.lls 
(208) 334-2712 
I. 
I 
8/21/2009 
taI 014./02308/31/2008 16 27 FAX 
I Page 10f2 
I
 ShawnaDunn 
I
 From: Kim W. Toryanski lkim@toryenskl.com]
 Sent: Wednesday, September 15,20047:09 AM 
To: Mark AckleyI SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutors office have progressed and we have been told that they wouldI accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, 
I 
child endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat 
wrestling with our dient to take the deal. UnbelievablY, he's resisting. Day by day. we're putting more pressure 
on him to take the deal. He contil"\ues to resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. 
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision I"\ot to 
taka a plea. That relationship is being affEicted too. 
I The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client. 
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attomeys will I not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I 
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the 
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they lA!In impose it Where children were involved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that 
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire. 
I We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. 
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not 
I close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire. 
Kim 
I 
I 
----Original Message---­
From: Mati< Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
 
To: klm@toryanski.com 
Subject: Penry v, Johnson 
I Kim. 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel. Kimberly Simmons. and our mitigationI specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a ~ortion of yesterday's jUry selection. 
I 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
I 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782. 797 (2001) dealt with jUry instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the cas@. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
"Penry I did not hold. that t.he mere mention of "mitigating circWIlsCanC4lIS" to !! 
I 
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capita.l sentencing jury slitisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand 
for the propoaition that it is constitutiona11y sufficient to 
infor.m the jury that it may nconsider n mitigating circumstancesI in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry 
:t is t:.ha~ the ju;ry be able to "consider aDd give effect co [a 
defendl!!U1t ' s m1 t;1gat:.i:a.g} evidence i12 impOSJ.Dg B8Dt:eDCe." 4.92 11.5.,I at 319, 109 S.Ce. 2934 (emphasis added). See a180 Johnson v. Texas, 509 0.5. 
I 
350, 381, 113 S.C~. 2658, 125 L.Ed.Jd 290 (1993) (0' CONNOR, J., dissenting) 
(n[AJ 8entencer [must] b. allowed eo give full consideration and fu11 effect 
to matigllting circumstances" (emphasis in original». For it is only when the 
jury is givQQ a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that 
I 
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision," Penry I. 492 ~.S., ~t 329, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, that we olin be Sure that: the jury "has treated the defendant as a 
'uniquely individua1 human bein[g], and has mad. a reliable dete~nation that 
death is the appropriate sentenoe,n ••1921 id., lit 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 
(qu~ing Woodson v. North carolina, 428 ~.S_ 280, 304, 30~, 96 S.Ce. 2978, 49 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».°I (my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems thac simpy inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they will ~consider· mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it .f£.~ti if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley
 Idaho State Appellace Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.scate.id.us

I (208) 334-27l2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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08!~1!~009 1627 FAX 141 0 16,/023 I - State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384 Page 1 of 1 
I Shawna Dunn 
I From: Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanskl.com] 
Sent: Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM 
I To: Mark Ackley SUbJect: State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384 
I
 Mark:
 
I
 
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.
 
On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
 
case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution.
 
I
 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a-copy of a letter from the clerk of the
 
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada COUDty Court that Repon on
 
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the
 
reporter's transcript and clerks record. 
I Mitch 
Mitchell E. Toryanski 
I This transmission (inclnding attachments if any) is intended only for the 
use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged, 
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication 
I Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client 
I
 
or other privileges. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, or me employee
 
Dr agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
 
I 
this communication is snicrly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product 
privileges are not waived by the transmission afthis message.lfyoll have 
received this conununication in elTor, please notify me immediately via 
e-mail at info@toryanskicom or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 8/21/2009 001510
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Shawna Dunn 
From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us) 
Sent: Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AM 
To: Shawna Dunn 
Subject: RE: Abdullah v. Slate: SPOT050030a - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
SAPO 
Shawna, 
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received 
from Mitch Tory~~i. This is th~ note that I summarized in an email to you last week. 
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not 
changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every 
communication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our 
appointment as Mr. Abdullah's counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery 
disclosure attaching each of the communications that I've already sent to you infonnally 
and in piece-meal fashion. lfyou have any questions, then please let me know. 
Mark 
MJH 11/24/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome oftrial. wanted to know ifwe filed post trial motions 
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that 
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed 
the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young man, his father 
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into 
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church. he was 
affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is 
no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of 
course with a first degree murder, people will find utter disregard. He said 
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC, 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn't tell him the truth· they still don't know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare 
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew 
the client was telling lies to them. 
Hopes we can get the client some relief. 
8/21/2009
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From: Mark Ackley [meckley@sapd.state.id.us] 
Sent: Friday, May 09,20083:41 PM 
To: Shawna Dunn 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
SAPO 
Shawna, 
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts, I guess I'm not sure what I expected, 
but upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my swnmary of conversations 
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully-the notes in their entiretY will lighten your 
concerns if not alleviate them completely. 
Below is the 1/24/05 note ofmy conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark 
MJA 1/24/05 MIA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KT called: 
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out 
3. Q whether any 3ll1endments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was 
not aware ofany at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through 5000 pages ofPSI. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that ifwe leave before the conclusion 
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is 
scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
S. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. I 
refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from. death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts 
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I mentioned the 
possibility ofcrafting a separation of powers argument, that the legislature 
cannot completely divest a district court judge of its sentencing 
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further 
considered prior to sentencing. 
8/21/2009
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I ShawnaDunn 
I From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
Sent: Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM 
I To: Shawna Dunn SUbJect: Abdullah v. Slate: SPOT0500308 4 disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
SAPD 
I Shawna,
 
I
 The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator.
 At the time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter 
and Kimberly Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things 
(which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any I conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I 
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I 
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my file as I had suggested in myI email. 
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety, 
I including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted 
I 
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but 
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to 
visits I had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented 
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Mony reassigned cases to adjust for 
national workload. standards. As a result, I think I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come 
I
 back until October 2006.
 
I
 
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that
 
those suggestions are not implicated by Azad's claims, but 1 suppose that could be a matter of
 
interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to
 
State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify 
Judge Copsey. I don't think the grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the followingI was written in the Appellant's Brief, "The district court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions
 
I
 
were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. AI-Kotrani's family's representations and "self­

serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a former
 
employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction
 
I
 
at a time as Mr. Al-Kotrani would get confused if more than one instruction was given. Further, Mr, Al­

Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off' if not under constant supervision. The district court dismissed
 
Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - pAD,
 
L.24; R, p.79.) . , . Accordingly, Mr, AI-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that 
Dr, Sanford's conclusion that Mr. AI-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible because it 
I
 took into consideration information obtained from Mr. AI-Kotrani's family. The district court further
 erred in failing to consider infOlmation obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe same
 
nationality of Mr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not 
I significant." Of course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their failure to do so. 
I
 I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my
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I decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
I - Mark 
From; Mark Ackley
I sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
 
I 
To: Michael Shaw 
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala 
Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up 
Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and 
then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am prettyI certain were not placed in Prelaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations wi~h, or in refe!ence to. trial counsf?1. 
I From legal pad 
I 
1. 12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about 
everything being adequately preserved 
2. 9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad) 
I • Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings. Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have 
objected. [It looks like I suggested - "move to unseal the motion. right to public trial" 
I	 • Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
I • Quotes attributed to Kim T. including. UNow more than ever...1could kick [Copsey] off. u I indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's 
I
 
[racist] remarks. rrhis is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI­

Kotrani) which we then faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not
 
indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DO]
 
I 
• My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" [NOTE: this is a reference 
to the Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an 
acquittal]; quote attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since 
the beginning of the case 
I	 • Kim thought the State would have troUble proving murder. referring to the State's 
I 
case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove 
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried 
about Kim's confidence] 
I 
• Reference to ''weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial 
counsel] sent to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks 
•	 Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to What he did, she [Angela] poured the 
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson I 
I 
• References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the 
lab. Many things they are stili trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a 
motion to continue] 
I 8/21/2009 
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I 
I 
3. Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict 
for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge) 
• Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05 
I • They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge said the law was well-settled (not mitigation) 
• Judge limited the scope of AA allocution 
• They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this I was in response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client ever confess to you."] 
I 
• One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not 
sure what this references] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 4843 
I MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 
I 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
I 
~h  • "'".~  
ro"' : ~ 
, . iJ i ~ _ .•:'¥)<"L.. 
IN THE DISTRI£T COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
I 
I AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, 
I Petitioner, 
I 
I 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080 
) (formerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) RESPONSE TO COURT 
) ORDER INQUIRING INTO 
) THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
) INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD 
) WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 
) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
I Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State 
I Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August 
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following I issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with 
I trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of 
interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial I 
and trial involvement with trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. 
I Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary of 
I the relevant law governing conflicts of interests. RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 1I 001519
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I.
 
I RELEVANT LAW
 
I A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. 
I 
See State v. Severson, _ P.3d _,2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May 
I 29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140 
Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see 
alsa State v. Cook, 144 Idaho-784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). Although Idaho-
I 
I appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect 
to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right 
to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
I 
I 789, 793, 102 P.2d 1108, 1112 (2004); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 
632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts nevertheless 
I recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation with respect to 
I post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230, 233­
234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to 
I the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction 
I counsel as a result of a conflict of interest." (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335, 347 
(1980))).I The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel 
I conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty of loyalty. 
I Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring 
under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 2I 
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I
 is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,' for Sixth 
I Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's 
I performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002). 
In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the 
I interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." (Idaho Rules of 
I Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 (commentary).) Consistent with counsel's duty of 
I 
zealous- advoeacy, counsel has an ethical -duty not to represent a client if that 
I representation "will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client, 
a former client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...." LR.P.C. 
1.7(a)(2).! Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment 
I 
I to determine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or 
will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 347 ("[T]rial courts 
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense 
I 
I counsel."). 
Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if one attorney 
in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact 
I with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See 
I Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct 
governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law I firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office). 
I Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire 
I ! Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include those outlined in Rule 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally 
involve financial, property, or business interests. See I.R.P.C. 1.8. I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 3 
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public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the 
I circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of 
I prejudice to the client. Id. at *7. Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of 
I 
interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an 
I individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id. Even if such a 
conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed consent. Id. at 
*6. 
I 
I In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's 
active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act 
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness." 
I 
I See I.R.P.c. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as 
both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony 
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal
I services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
I the client. I.R.P.C.3.7(a). 
I 
II. 
THE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH 
THE TORYANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTERESTI There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and 
I post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict 
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of suchI 
contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited 
I responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing 
I counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 4I
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I
 
counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
I raised by Mr. Abdullah. 
I Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited 
nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing 
I Mr. Abdullah. 
I [MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I 
I 
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm 
sorry. But did you ever pay me at aU to, like, help represent you in 
this case? 
[MS. TORYANSKI]. No, no, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? 
I A. No. Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery? 
A. No. 
I 
I Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all 
I 
about this case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis 
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and 
myself. 
I Q. ... I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual 
conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone 
I versus like, "Let's sit down and really strategize and give me some advice how to proceed." So with those two things in mind, where would you put 
Dennis Benjamin? I A. Oh, he's at the top. Q. Okay. And that was primarily limited to the death penalty motions? 
A. That's correct. I Q. And Chuck Peterson? A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum? 
Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you In yourI representation ofAzad. 
A. I didn't rely on Chuck at all. 
Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton? I A. She helped in the way that I have already described. Q. SO in the limited fashion ofjury selection? 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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 A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had 
been offered. I Q. David Leroy? 
A. Same as Teresa Hampton. 
Q. David Nevin? I A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but 
David didn't help. 
I Q. Okay. Joan Fisher? A. Where is she on the scale? Q. Uh-huh. 
I A. Way at the bottom. Q. Myself? 
A. - At the bottom. 
I Q. I'm not taking it personally. I'm just trying to -- okay. A. I don't even know if you are really on - I mean, we'd talked, but I 
never really felt that you even were in on the chart. 
I Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your conversation? 
A. No. 
I (Addendum A, p.232, Ls.1-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.13 - p.240, L.IO (emphasis 
I added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at 
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily 
I limited given the SAPD's lack of knowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A, 
I p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did 
you ever give me any discovery? A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware, 
I did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your 
I conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on any 
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally
I Addendum A. Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective 
I
 
I
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assistance of counsel that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the 
I SAPD or its counsel.2 
I A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is 
I 
Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict Of Interest 
No pretrial, trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis gives 
rise to a potential or actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. 
I 
I Such contacts were minimal, and do not form the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah 
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted 
the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post-trial 
I 
I representation of Mr. Abdullah. The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was 
initiated by the Toryanskis. (See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn, with 
attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the 
I 
I SAPD, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, 
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails 
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski, and are generally representative of the 
I limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.) 
I I. September 9, 2004 Email - Deposition Exhibit 9 
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to I her, dated September 9, 2004, was "probably responding to me even though the e-mail 
I starts with a communication from you, apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 & 
I
 
2 Even if this were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a 
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short, I advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from 
their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment. 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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 Exhibit 9.) In that email, Mr. Ackley informed Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his 
I attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors 
I questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect 
question. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed 
I Ms. Toryanski to relevant case law for the governing legal standard in questioning 
I prospective jurors about mitigating evidence, which Ms. Toryanski acknowledged she 
and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly duringjury selection. (Addendum 3, p.227, 
I 
I L.14 - p.228, L.18 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute 
the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.2 -p.228,L.18.) 
2. September 15, 2004 Email - Deposition Exhibit 10 
I 
I On September 15, 2004, Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she 
discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief 
that a plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being 
I 
I informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel 
and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel 
putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and 
I Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5) 
I Ms. Toryanski's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose 
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3, Exhibit 10.) During her I deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and 
I did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it 
was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.ID - p.231, L.25.) I
 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 8 
I 001526
 
 
 
il.
 
I
 
I
 3. Other Communications 
I Ms. Toryanski also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she 
and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPD through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey. I (Addendum 3, p.232, L.13- p.237, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues 
I as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the 
I prosecutor and the lead detective; (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey; 
(3) Ms. Toryanski's inclination to request a continuance; and (4) issues arising post-
I 
I verdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3, 
p.232, L.B - p.237, L.19.) 
I 
Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also 
I faxed orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals 
from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and 
memoranda challenging the constitutionality of the then new death penalty statute, which 
I 
I trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum B.) There were a handful of 
additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD, involving 
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict. 
I The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of 
I written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, in addition to summaries 
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD. (See Addendum 
I B.) This information was provided by the SAPD to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email 
I over a month before depositions of Kim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn 
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis I 
regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9 
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 (Deposition of Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has failed to raise any 
I concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these 
I contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State 
evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and 
I Mr. Abdullah existed. 3 This understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has not 
I filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done 
so if the commmrications between the SAPD and trial counsel had raised the specter of a ­
I conflict, potential or actual. 
I Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the 
fact that the Toryanskis have not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the 
I SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and 
I Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD 
provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their 
I representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The 
I SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels' 
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial counsels' statements to the 
I SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained 
I 
I 3 The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the 
State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of 
a conflict in its briefing to this Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme 
I 
cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,163 (1988) ("[T]he Government 
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a 
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts... must take it into 
I 
consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an 
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp. 
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution 
for they can be misused as a technique [] of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted). 
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing if the State 
I alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest. RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 10 
-

I 001528
 
 
 tm -
 
 
 
 
I
 
I
 
cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD 
I were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their 
I representation of Mr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in 
Mr. Abdullah's case. 
I 
I There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD, 
particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that 
the SAPD's interests, or those- of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict with 
I 
I Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or 
Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts, 
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards 
I 
I and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a 
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley 
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment and dedication to 
I 
I 
the interests of Mr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the 
SAPD's representation of Mr. Abdullah.4 
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarilyI 
unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a 
I potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from 
such contact. This is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and I
 
I 4 Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a 
potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given 
I the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD's internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional 
conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists. I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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content of their contacts with the SAPD, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey,5 and the State 
I has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and post-
I trial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create 
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature 
I 
I and content of contact between trial counsel and the SAPD supports Mr. Abdullah's 
claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between 
Mr. Abdullah and the -SAPD based on contacts the SAPD had with trial counsel pretrial, 
I 
I during trial, and post-verdict. Perhaps the more important question is whether the 
SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley and/or 
Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential 
I conflict of interest. 
I B. The SAPD's Pretrial, Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not 
I 
Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah, Even If 
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An 
Evidentiary Hearing 
The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial 
I counsel does not render Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary 
I hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of 
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey I 
and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's 
I behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between 
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah.I 
I 
5Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial counsel were able to create a conflict of 
interest with appellate and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact 
with counsel and/or by disclosing information to such counsel which was otherWise 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
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I 
In relevant part, Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an 
I attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
necessary witness." l.R.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7 
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony 
I 
I involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal 
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
the client. l.R.P.C. 3.i(a). The purpose-of the advocate-witness rule is to prevent the trier 
I 
I of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and 
witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from 
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. l.R.P.C. 3.7, commentary,-r,-r 2,3.
I 1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before A 
Judge
I Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would occur at a 
I hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of 
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly I prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from 
I pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 
840 So.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to I 
prevent prejudice to opposing counsel and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not 
I implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a 
I post-conviction evidentiary hearing before ajudge); see also State v. Van Dyck, 827 A.2d 
I 
192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike a jury, a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles of advocate 
I and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he is an attorney."); cf 
Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the 
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who 
I may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, I.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where 
I testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but 
would take place before ajudge acting as a fact-finder. 
I 
I 2. Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses 
Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the 
trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 1.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely- to be -a 
I 
I necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making 
statements to Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's post-
I 
I conviction claims for relief. 
As previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and co­
counsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course of 
I their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15, 2004 email sent 
I by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknowledged writing the email and 
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah 
I and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, L.19 - p.231, L.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her 
I deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary 
witness if the recantation involves testimony relevant to one of Mr. Abdullah's claims for I post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel, 
I however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a "necessary witness" 
I
 standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297,
 
1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing 
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, and 
I disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential 
I violation of the Rule"); Van Dyck, 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her 
I 
testimony is relevant, material and cannot be obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734 
I So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("The necessity standard requires more than 
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary 
witness "ifhis orhertestimonyis relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." World 
I 
I Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony 
will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can 
determine whether another witness can testify. Id. 
I 
I The necessity for Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence 
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their 
written and/or verbal communications with Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the 
I 
I verbal and/or written communications with the SAPD must be relevant.7 Third, 
Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information. 
Where, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition 
I testimony, confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or 
I Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant information. See 
Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration ofI 
I 
6 Of course, if trial counsel offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written 
communications with the SAPD, then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. Ackley 
I 
and/or Ms. Huskey to testify. 
7 Because the relevance of testimony from Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey cannot be 
determined until trial counsel testify and until this Court determines that the testimony 
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately
I addressed. RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and 
I the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the 
I relevant issues); State v. Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To 
I 
demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must 
I show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere."); Utley v. 
City ofDover, 101 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where 
moving party failed t<r demonstrate lawyer's testimony could not be gained from other 
I 
I sources); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) (lawyer not a 
necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended 
testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey 
I 
I would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could 
be obtained from other sources. 
3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship To 
I Mr. Abdullah 
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would otherwise be 
I necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from 
I representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocate I 
and witness in the same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel, 
I "in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to 
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client." I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt. ~4. Thus,I 
substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's 
I representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify, the amount 
I and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retaining RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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new counsel, and the client's right to choice of counsel.8 Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. I.E. 
I Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship 
I where law firm represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial, 
counsel had done significant amount of substantive work on case, client would be denied 
I choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J. Inv. Group, I. I. C. v. 
I DAE/Westbrook, I. I. c., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (substantial 
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated numerous 
I complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged 
I written discovery). 
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah SInce 2005. Specifically, 
I Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has 
I been the SAPD during the entirety of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is 
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital
I 
I 
I 8 The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a 
distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney­
client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988)(citing 
I 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and 
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's 
choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel 
has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that 
relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. 
I 
I Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) 
("considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose 
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in 
I 
continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a 
relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. 
Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent 
defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate 
than if counsel is retained."). 
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defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of 
I documents, Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in 
I the world of post-conviction, is the functional equivalent of a trial. The amount of time 
I 
that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also 
I to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to 
assess is obviously great. 
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley -specifically, would result 
I 
I in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even 
assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or 
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial 
I 
I hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict 
of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to 
labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict 
I 
I cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 
(pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public 
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender 
I cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public 
I defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis, in light of whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict I 
of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice. Id. at *7. Only if the facts 
I demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood of 
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public I 
defender's office. Id. 
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 Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of 
I interest arising from the SAPD's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential 
I conflict based on that contact, and presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice 
I which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPD office. Any testimony that 
I would be offered by Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or post-
I 
trial contact with trial counsel would serve only to support Mr. Abdullah's claims-. The 
I only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were 
predisposed to disregard the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because 
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah. This possibility aside, there is no significant 
I likelihood of prejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office. 
I III. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
I For the reasons set forth above, the SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact 
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley 
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming 
I arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the 
I SAPD would result in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court 
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification ofI Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice that would 
I justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office. 
I
 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 19 
I 001537
 
 
 
 
I
 
I
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15t day of September, 2009. 
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NICdiE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah 
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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this 1st day of September, 2009, served a I true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL 
COUNSEL as indicated below: I
 
SHAWNADUNNI ROGER BOURNE 
I
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
 
BOISE ill 83702
 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH INMATE #76321 
I
 
IMSI - J BLOCK
 
POBOX 51
 
BOISE ID 83707
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__ U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
X Hand Delivery 
x	 U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
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Page 226 
1 Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Beyond Joan Fisher and 
2 the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying 
3 degrees in this case, did you also contact me on 
4 occasion? 
5 A. Yeah, because you and I had met at a 
6 conference, I think. Litigating for Life, maybe? 
7 And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you. - I 
8 was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you 
had shown me as an exhibit here. I mean, Dennis, 
he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark. 
11 You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?" 
12 Q. Okay. And I am going to show you 
13 what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and 
10? Sorry about the coloring on that.14 
15 A. That's okay. These are e-mails. 
16 Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to 
17 you. Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004. This 
18 was after the jury selection had commenced. 
Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and 
it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later. 
Q. And the first one, what was the date on 
that, again? I'm sorry. 
A. September -- 9 is September. Exhibit 9 
24 is September 10. 
25 Q. That was after jury selection? 
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Page 227 
A. Had begun. 
Q. Okay. And were there questions? Was 
there a discussion, then, about jury selection 
there? 
A. Let's see. Maybe this is an e-mail 
from you to me in which I respond because of, "As 
I noted yesterday." YOu're probably responding to 
me even though the e-mail starts with a 
communication from you, apparently. 
Q. Yeah, there are multiple e-mails 
actually reflected in that document; is that 
right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. So just start with the earliest one. 
A. Okay. Which is September 9. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Then you're writing to me. You're 
telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the 
mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a 
portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted 
that there was some contention regarding questions 
to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
facts would matter to them, as worded by the 
defense, or whether they could just simply 
consider mitigating facts if instructed by the 
__"~v,_,,,,_,,""'-,"_L_~~ .• ',-- ""--"'~"""-- ,.._""'•.,-••"",~" .., <' ,M.. ,.,',- ""'''''-'~''''''''~ ..~ __"~""'~_'.~·'.' ~"""·".~4"'''..,.' •.~" ...,eo, 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
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1 1 court as worded by the judge. The case of Penry 
2 versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on 
3 
1 
1 mitigation at close of the case. There is a 
4 relevant portion that may have application for you 
5 during jury selection. And then you recited -­
1 6 Q. -- some of the language from the Penry 
7 cases? 
8 
1 
1 A. Yes. And then I say, Yes, Mark this 
9 helps us a lot. And we've been intending to ask 
10 the mitigation questions using the words weight -­
I 11 give weight and value to mitigation evidence and 
12 then give examples of our mitigation facts. ButI 13 as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming 
I 14 the questions with the word consider, and we need 
15 to fix that. We'll work on correcting that today. 
It will be a long day. 
17 Q. Okay. So those string of e-mails have1 18 to deal with jury selection type questions? 
I 19 A. Oh, yes. And then the September 15th 
20 one, just like you've indicated -- oh, it's again
I 21 responding to that same e-mail about the 
22 observations, plea negotiations with theI 23 prosecutor's office have progressed and we were 
I 24 told that they would accept them -- Oh, okay. 
25 Q. Could you continue reading that? 
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1 A. One count of first degree murder, 
2 dismiss all other five charges, arson, three 
3 counts of attempted murder, child endangerment 
4 with no aggravators. And there were aggravators 
S that were presented at sentencing. Of course, we 
6 are going to the mat 
7 Q. Could you slow down for the court 
8 reporter? 
A. Oh, okay. You're here. I forgot about 
that. 
11 MR. ACKLEY: Do we need to start over on 
12 that? 
13 THE REPORTER: Yeah, when you say could 
14 continue reading that. 
lS THE WITNESS: Dismiss all other five 
16 charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of 
17 attempted murder, child endangerment. And no 
18 aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of 
19 course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our 
20 client to take the deal. Unbelievably he's 
21 resisting. Day by day we're putting more pressure 
22 on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. 
23 Our attorney/client relationship is being affected 
24 because of this. He has become hostile and angry 
2S that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems 
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I 1 to support his decision not to take a plea. That 
2 relationship is being affected too. 
I 3 Want me to read the whole thing? 
I Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Yes, please.4 
5 A. The deal closes the day we begin to 
I 6 exercise our peremptory challenges ln Jury 
7 selection. We expect -that to be next Tuesday or 
I 8 Wednesday. After that the prosecution goes into 
9 overdrive to bury our client. 
10I Q. Does that seem to be an accurate 
I 11 reflection of how you were feeling at the time? 
12 What's the date on that one? September lOth? 
I 13 A. 15th.
 
14 Q. 15th. So jury selection began, I
 
15I think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the 
I 16 record says that the state's case-in-chief started 
17 on the 27th. So basically there is 20 days. Not 
181 all those dates, obviously, were jury selection, 
19 but there is a 20-day span there. You are about 
201 halfway through at that point? 
I 21 A. Yep. 
22 Q. SO at that point, at least at that 
I 23 time, you felt like your attorney/client 
24 relationship was suffering because of these 
25I discussions about the plea bargain?
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I 1 A. I am writing that that's how I feel. 
2 Q. Okay. So is it fair say -- I mean,
I 3 obviously the passage of time does affect people's 
I memory. Would you supplement your testimony4 
5 earlier today about the relationship in light of 
I 6 your e-mail? 
7 A. Well, I just -- Azad wasn't doing what 
I 8 I thought was In his own best interest. 
9 Q. And he was becoming hostile with you? 
10I A. I think he was angry that we kept
I 11 wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same 
12 thing. And -- but ...I 13 Q. And you were increasing pressure on him 
14 to take the deal?I 15 A. Well, by just continuing to ask him and 
I 16 have different approaches to it. But I just felt 
so strongly that this was in his best interest. 
And I fretted that that young man would get the 
19 death penalty. 
20I Q. But I am just trying to establish 
I 21 whether that seems to be consistent with how you 
felt at that time back then. 
A. Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. I mean, he didn't 
24 like the fact that, you know, I guess we kept 
25I coming back with it. 
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I 1 Q. Okay. I will go on with the similar 
2 questions that I asked with the other attorneys
I 3 even though they may seem silly. I'm sorry. But 
did you ever pay me at all to, like, helpI : represent you In this case? 
I	 6 A. No, no, no. 
7 Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to 
I 8 Azad? 
I	 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any 
I 11 discovery? 
12 A. No. 
I 13 Q. Beyond these two contacts, can you 
14 think of any other significant contacts that youI 15 had with me during the course of your entire 
I 16 representation? 
17 A. I think we had some e-mails. There was 
I 18 more e-mails. There is a little bit more e-mail 
19 because I -- you and Molly and I talked on theI 20 phone about the relationship with the prosecutor,
I 21 Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield. And I 
22 really appreciated the time you took to talk with 
I 23 me because you validated my concerns. And I 
24 really wasn't getting that from a lot of defenseI 25 counsel. Because I had asked Chuck what he 
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thought, Chuck Peterson. He bounced down to my
 
office and I mentioned it to him. And Teresa, you
 
know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of
 
it. I didn't get the perception from talking to
 
others that other defense counsel thought it was
 
as big a deal as I thought it was. But you and
 
Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a
 
definite impact on the integrity of the case. And
 
that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I
 
decided to move forward.
 
Q. Do you recall whether it was a matter, 
like, saying that there was definitely an impact 
or something that should be investigated? 
A. Something that should be investigated. 
Q. Do you recall whether you informed us 
that the judge had given you leave to depose 
them 
A. Yes. 
Q. -- and do the further investigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't this, also -- I don't know if 
this is reflected in the telephone conversation or 
not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, "I 
am going to look at personnel files now" -­
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. -- "of all the police officers"? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And ln your memory, do you recall 
whether it was reflected on the record or 
4 
5 otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was 
6 going to look at these personnel files of all 
7 o£ficers-because of this issue with Erika Klein 
8 and Todd Littlefield had come forward? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Did those go kind of hand in hand? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And you said other e-mails between us, 
but then you went directly to that telephone call. 
14 So that would have been a telephone conversation 
15 as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the 
16 discussion you just referenced about Todd 
17 Littlefield and Erika Klein affair? 
18 A. Right. 
19 Q. Do you recall, has the state or the 
20 prosecution shown any kind of summary of that 
21 conversation at all? 
22 A. I think I saw an exhibit on that, 
23 maybe. I think so. 
24 Q. But something that kind of outlined the 
25 topics of discussion? 
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I 1 A. Yeah.
 
2 Q. Okay. All right. And beyond those
 
3I three contacts, do you recall any other 
I 4 significant contacts during the scope of your 
5 representation? 
I 6 A. Well, just, it may be part of those 
7 contacts, or it might be, you know, somethingI 8 additional, additional e-mail. I can't remember, 
but recusing the judge was an issue that was 
discussed. 
I 11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. And I wasn't -- I was not inclined toI 13 move to recuse the judge. But there was a just 
I 14 a discussion of the pros and cons of that. And I 
15 think there was e-mail about that because I think 
I 16 that I had let you know I was leaning towards 
17 moving for a continuance. But I hadn't preparedI 18 anything yet. 
I 19 Q. Can you remember whether an e-mail 
20 exists or not impacted by the fact that you had 
I 21 apparently seen some sort of summary? 
22 A. Yes, it could. Which is one of theI 23 reasons why I have tried not to look at all these 
I 24 affidavits because I don't want to be colored by 
25 those kinds of things.
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1 Q. But the state provided you kind of 
2 these e-mails or documents? 
3 A. They are just exhibits that are part of 
4 the petition, or something, that I have seen. One 
5 or two. I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I 
6 think there may have been something, I think so, 
. - 7­ in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been 
8 prepared. I can't remember. 
9 Q. Do you have that, what was given to 
10 you? 
11 A. No, huh-uh. But I do have what was 
12 these exhibits (indicating). And there are 
13 attachments in here. But mostly it's the 
affidavits.I :: Q. SO you saw these exhibits, as you've
I 16 described them, as attached to some sort of 
17 affidavit? 
I 18 A. I can't remember what they were 
attached to or -- it was just -­ they were 
numbered. I looked at it, and I recall that we 
had had a conversation. 
Q. Okay. And beyond that, do you recall 
I	 23 any other contact with me? 
24 A. Not during all this. We talked at the 
25I	 end, I think, during the spring before Azad was 
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I
 1 sentenced on the other charges. I think you and
 
2 Kimberly had come to the courtroom. I think we 
I 3 may have chatted then. You came to the courtroom 
4 a couple times, I remember that. I remember thereI 5 was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a 
I 6 lengthy order that we had been handed by the 
7 
-judge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk. It was 
I 8 lengthy, and was concerning something that had 
9 been argued quite a while ago. And we just hadI 10 recently gotten it, and I remember we had thought
I 11 that that was interesting, the timing of it. But 
12 that's all I can really remember.I 13 Q. SO most of the contact was either 
14 during this as reflected here, or later after he'sI 15 already been sentenced to death? 
A. Yes, I believe.
 
17 Q. But before sentenced on the other
 
I	 18 non-capital charges by the judge? 
19 A. Yeah, I think so.I 20 Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys
I 21 that you recall speaking to at all about this 
22 case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis 
I 23 Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David 
24 Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself. 
25I A. Consulting with, you mean? 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com] 
I Sent: FrJday, September 10, 2004 6:45 AM To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I Yes. Mark, this helps us a Jot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words, 
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and 
Kim have observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need:to fix that. We'll work on I correcting that today. 
I 
Today will be a fong day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish af 5:00. but at leasftoday we ,get lunch~ 
Copsey even needs to be .reminded that we need bathroom breaks. 
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -- will you be able to stop by today? 
I Kim 
I 
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-----Original Message---­
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanskLcom
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
"Penry I did n·;:,t hold that the mere mention of "mitigating .cii.rcumstances" to a 
capi t.a.l s-sn ten,c:ing j !,l.rY' satisfies the Eigh.th Amendlnen t. Nor does it stand 
for the proposition that it is oonstitutionally suffioient to 
inform the jury that it may "oonsider" mitigating oiroumstanoes 
in deoiding the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under Penry 
I is that the jury be able to "oonsider and give effect to [a 
defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence." 492 u.s., 
at. 3:t9, 109 S.C.t. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johnson 'v_ ',Texas, ·509 u.s. 
35::),3EH, J.l3 S.. Ct.. :2658, 125 L .. Ed.2d 290 {1993) (O'CONNOR, J_, dissenting) 
(" [h) sentencex' LlI',uat.] be a110,"eo to give :full consideration :and full effect 
t;(.\ mitigatin.;; ci.r~i.'"c':i!stances" (ampha.sis inorigi:nal)}. For 'it :ii...5 only when the 
j\:t.::y.i.s gi"·..,n a "vehicle £or expressin.g it$ 'reasoned IT.ora'l %lSsponse' to· that 
sV';i.de.nce in re~derin9 its sentencing deci.s.:Lon," Penry IF ·492 U. S. I :at 328, 109 
8. Ct. '293.~, t.."hat ·i<7e C<-:trL be sure that the jury "has treat.ed ·,the defendant as a 
'urtj.quel"1' indi-...:i.dual human bein [~TJ' and. has made a reliable oeterm:ination that 
o~at;h J,.::1 the appropriate :.sentence," **1921 i.d., at 319, 109 S .. ·.Ct. 2934 
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(.::.t'llOting Woocison v. North Carolina, 428 U.:S. 280, 304, 305, B6 S.Ct. 2978, 49
 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).u
 
(my emphasis added) 
In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they 
will "consider fl mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
oan give it effecti if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us 
(208) 334-2712
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom] 
I Sent: Wednesday, $eptember 15,20047:09 AM To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I Mark, plea negotIations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been 'told that.they would 
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (ar5On,3.ets ,of attempted murder, 
I child .endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, wsare going to the mat wrestling with our client to :take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure 
I
 
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney Client relationship is being affected because of this.
 
He has become hostile and angry thatwe are encouraging a .,Iea. HIs family seems to Si:ipport.hls decision not to
 
take a plea. That relationship Is being affected too.
 
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jUry selection. We expect that to 
be next Tuesday or Wed..After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client. 
I Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been ltold that his attorneys Will 
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the 
I 
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and :actually impose it jf 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that 
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire. 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. 
I He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you_ We're close. but not close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst atbial, based upon the 
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire. 
I Kim 
I -----Original Message----­
I 
From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, september 09, 20044:17 PM
 
To; kim@toryanskl.com
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
I 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
".Penry I did not cold that the mera mention of "mitigat:i..ng ciroumstanoes" t.o a 
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capital. sent.encji:ng jl.1.ry s'atisfies the Eight.h AInenrlment. Nor does it stand 
for the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to 
inform. the jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances 
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry 
I is that the jury be able to. "consider. and give effect to {a 
I
 
·1 defendant's mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S.,
 
at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johr.scn ·v. 'TGOxas, 509 U.S .
 
.350, .381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR.! ;;r., dissenting)
 
( .. [A] sentencoe.r [must] be allo'-"sd .to give full consideration'and full effect 
I 
t.o m:i.t.i<;rating c.irc.umstances" (emphasis in original)}. For .it ·,i·s or~ly when the 
j U~7Y is qi '.rem a "vehicle for e>:pressing its 'reasoned !.Uc·ral .r.esponse I to that 
r"vi.,:;'ence in ::::ender'ing its seni::encing decisi.on," Pel''I1:y I ,492 lU. S., at 328, 109 
S.Ct-. 2934, tha.t W~J can be sure that the jury "has treated. :the defendant as a 
I 
'un.i.q-~~ely· individ'.lal human bein[g] 1 and has madE! a .:·:aliable :detElrminat~on that 
de;;;~th is the aP1?ropl~iate sentence," **1921 id., at 319, 109 -lLCt:. 293'4 
(q-uot:ing ~"oodso.n 'IJ. North Carolina., 428 V.:S. 280, 304, 305, :96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 
LEd.2d 944 (1876».n 
(my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they 
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley
 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
I mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 (208) 334-2712 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
I Sent: Friday, May 09,200812:12 PM To: 'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Bourne Cc: Shannon N. Romero 
SUbject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPD I Attachments: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
I
 
Shawna, 
I This is my response to your r~qu~st for correspondence between our office and the Toryanskis 
I at the time of their representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained 
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience. 
I
 I have located and attached the following: 
I 1. Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski) 
and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me). 
I a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional 
I correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below). 
I
 2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
 
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond 
I 
I with the attached email with the string of communications on 12/17/03 and 
apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death 
penalty statute. 
I have located but have not attached the following:I
 
I
 
1. A summary of a telephone call on 11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly Huskey,
 
written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included:
 
a. The outcome of the trial; I b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and 
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the mitigation evidence, 
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof, I and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of 
I 1 001558
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I 
their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his 
I hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings. 
I 2. A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. The topics of the conversation included: 
I a. Hearing on PSI;
 b. Formal sentencing scheduling;
 
c. Amendments to ICR 32;
I d. Whether we would attend the hearing; and
 
e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.
 
I 3.	 An email summary ofa written summary of a telephone call on 9/03/04 from Kim to 
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. I have I not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my 
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files 
I that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the 
conversation apparently included: 
I a.	 The Court closing the courtroom; 
b. Kline/Littlefield; 
I
 c. Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey;
 d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence; 
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder; I	 f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the 
prosecution's case; 
I g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead guilty; 
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab I 
I 
4. An email summary of a written summary of an undated telephone conversation 
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located my 
contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron 
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files that they left I	 behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation 
apparently included: 
I a. Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05; 
b. Residual doubt; I c. Scope of allocution; 
I 
d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah regarding the 
events; and 
I	 2 
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I 
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area ofI	 investigation - still suspects something in their system D\JOTE: I am not sure what 
this references]" 
I I have multiple concerns about the wisdom of disclosing these documents as they differ from 
the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the I correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess 
I 
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could or 
should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team 
and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the Toryanskis; I perhaps they could check their offices again. 
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why I took the ti~ to describe for I you the contents of these summaries. 
.-Mark 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I	 Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.comJ 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM 
To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
Subject: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I	 M&M: 
FYI -- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of theI "heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request that the motion be filed under seal. 
-----Original Message----­
I From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.net] Sent: Monday, September 06,200410:04 AM 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey 
I	 Subject: RE: Defense motion Cc: kim@toryanski.com to be filed on Tuesday 
I	 Judge Copsey: 
I I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings related to this motion be conducted in chambers. 
I	 Pat Owen 
-----Original Message----­
From: Kim W. Toryanski [mailto:kim@toryanskLcom]
 I Sent: Monday, September 06,20049:59 AM
 To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I
 
I Judge Copsey:
 
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning, 
I we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of 
I the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide detective and case officer. 
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in 
I the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the 
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by I	 virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of 
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or 
I	 1 001561
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I 
compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether 
I prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
 proceedings and the proper administration ofjustice is paramount to all
 involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.
 
I In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue, we have
 
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to
 
assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
 
I Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003). Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into 
question all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be 
I	 vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
 counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
 different and deserving of higher due process standards.
 
I	 Kim Toryanski 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom] 
Sent: Tuesday, September 07,20043:53 PM 
To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
SUbject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
I 
I So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address if Azad
 gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and that
 mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the
 
"glory" of being the first to try a death case under the new statute.
 
I The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the
 
. deposition of detective Iittlefteld, the one that Erika Klein had the affair
 
I with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on
 deaf ears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited,
 but the judge said no limitatons on defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to
 
taking the depo.
 
I 
I The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that 
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups of the NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts 
to advise me, and to testify. Again, hooray. 
I All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with
 me!
 
I 
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
 
until 1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
 
the week.
 
I Will keep you posted. 
Kim 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Mark Ackley
 
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2004 4: 17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanskLcom
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
I Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, 
I Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply 
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The caseI of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application for you 
during jury selection: 
I 
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital 
sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the 
IproPosition that it is constitutionally sufficient to inform the jury that 
it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate 
sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury be able to 
I 
I 
I "consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in 
imposing sentence. " 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, 
J., dissenting) (" [AJ sentencer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full 
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in original». For it is only when the jury 
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in 
rendering its sentencing decision," Penry 1,492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we 
can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human 
bein[g]' and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," 
**1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 
1305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».ff 
(my emphasis added)
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will 
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it 
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation UnitI mackley@sapd.state.id.us (208) 334-2712 
I
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
 
Sent: Friday, September 10, 20046:45 AM
 
To: Mark Ackley
 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson
 
I Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words, "give 
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have 
observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on correcting that I today. 
Today will be a long day-- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. Copsey
I even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.
 
rm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -- will ¥ou be able to stop _by today? 
IKim 
I 
-----Original Message----­
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanskLcom
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
I Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by theI defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
I 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
I 
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a 
capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for 
the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to inform the 
jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the 
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury 
I 
I be able to "consider and give effect to fa defendant's mitigating] 
evidence in imposing sentence. II 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 
I 
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give 
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its 
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision," 
I 
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has 
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a 
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319, 
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»." 
I (my emphasis added) 
I 1 
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I 
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will 
"considerN mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give itI effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I 
Mark J. Ackley
 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us 
(208) 334-2712
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom] 
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM 
To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I 
I Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea
 
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment),
 
and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take
 
the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to
 
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are
 
encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too.
 
I The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next 
Tuesday or Wed. After that, th~ prosecution goes into. overdrive to bury our client. . 
l ather issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that 
I 
say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that 
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven in 
this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the 
aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire. 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a I grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and 
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire. 
IKim 
I -----Orig ina' Message----­
I 
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanski.com
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
I 
Kim, 
I 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
I 
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
I "Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a 
capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for 
the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to infor.m the 
I jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury 
I 1 001567
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be able to "consider and give effect to [a defendant 's mitigating] 
evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 
I 
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give 
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its 
I 
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision," 
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has 
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a 
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319, 
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».ff 
I (my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley
 Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanskLcom] 
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 12:23 PM 
To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384 
I Mark: 
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week. 
I On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the case and directed that your office file a written notice of substitution. 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy of a letter from the clerk of the 
I Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the 
reporter's_transcript and clerks rec?rd.. 
I Mitch Mitchell E. Toryanski 
I This transmission (including attachments if any) is intended only for the use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged, 
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication 
I 
I Privacy Act, 18 U.S.c. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of 
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product 
privileges are not waived by the transmission ofthis message. If you have 
received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via I e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
I Sent: To: Subject: 
Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM 
'Shawna Dunn' 
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPO 
I 
Shawna, 
I Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but 
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary of conversations not to raise I a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns ifnot alleviate 
them completely. 
I Below is the 1/24/05 note of my conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark 
1/24/05 MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KT called: 
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out 
3. Qwhether any amendments pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was 
not aware of any at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that if we leave before the 
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell 
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. 
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury 
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I 
mentioned the possibility of crafting a separation ofpowers argument, 
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court judge of its 
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might 
be further considered rior to sentencing. 
I 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject:1 
Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM 
'Shawna Dunn' 
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPO 
1 
Shawna, 
I The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the 
1
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly 
Simmons. In the course of his file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not 
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during 
I 
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenced my notes- contained on a legal pad. I have 
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not 
take my file as I had suggested in my email. 
I Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety, including a 
1
conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the 
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I 
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after 
I 
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was 
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think 
I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006. 
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those 
I suggestions are not implicated by Azad' s claims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "EI-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the 
I grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief, "The district court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on 
Mr. AI-Kotrani's family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford 
I did speak with one non-relative, a former employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. AI-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused ifmore than one 
instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack oft" if not under constant 
I 
1super;,ision. The district court dism~ssed Mr. Muhammad'.s testimony, noting t~at the "Iraqi com~~ity is very 
close. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - pAO, L.24, R., p.79.) ... Accordmgly, Mr. AI-Kotrani asserts that the dIstnct court 
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. AI-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible 
because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. AI-Kotrani's family. The district court further 
erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is of the same nationality of 
Mr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." OfI course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their 
failure to do so. 
I I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision to 
disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
1-Mark 
I 1 001573
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From: Mark Ackley 
I Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM To: Michael Shaw Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe AyalaI Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up 
Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then 
share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were 
I not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in reference to, trial counsel. 
I From legal pad 
I 
1. 12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about 
everything being adequately preserved 
2. 9103104 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad} 
Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings. I	 • 
I 
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I 
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"] 
• Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
Quotes attributed to Kim 1. including, "Now more than ever... 1 could kick [Copsey] off." I I	 • indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist] remarks. 
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then 
I faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested a motion to DQ] 
I	 • My thoughts reflected, ':confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" [NOTE: this is a reference to the 
I 
Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acquittal]; quote 
attributed to Kim 1. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since the beginning of the 
case 
I 
• Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as 
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder 
and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence] 
• Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial counsel] sent I to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks 
• Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the gasoline, I would plead to conspiracy to arson 
References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab. I • Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to continue] 
I
 3. Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict for
 death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by jUdge) 
• Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05 I	 • They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the judge said the law was well­
settled (not mitigation) 
I	 2 001574
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• Judge limited the scope of AA allocution 
I • They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to 
you."] 
I • One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what this references] 
I 
I 
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From: Mark Ackley
 
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 20089:26 AM
I To: 'Shawna Dunn'
 Subject:	 RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel 
and the SAPD 
I 
Shawna, 
I Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from 
I 
Mitch Toryanksi. This is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appearsI the note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not changed the note in 
. any way, thus-the typos~ I believe we have now disclosed every communicatio~ or note 
referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's 
counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery disclosure attaching each of the 
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. If you have I any questions, then please let me know. 
I Mark 
MJH 11/24/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know if we filed post trial 
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me 
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far 
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young 
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the 
mountains into Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church, 
he was affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there 
is no way ajury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He 
said of course with a first degree murder, people will find utter 
disregard. He said some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC. 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare 
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they 
knew the client was telling lies to them. 
Hopes we can get the client some relief. 
I 
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SEP 15 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J WEATHERBY 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFf\DA -~-
".. ' .'" ," - ";,1" 
\",-. ,J 'I .- 20i09 
... ~" 'i' d .AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ORDER RE: C01\TfLICT COUNSEL THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate 
Public Defender, Mark Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons, 
provided advice to Mr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury 
voir dire, during trial and post trial. l The record establishes that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek 
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of 
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear. 
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address 
the implications and extent of this involvement. 
Both the State and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided 
the Court with additional evidence. 
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that 
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah 
I The Court notes that Ms. Sinunons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that 
they had no involvement in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to 
allow the State Appellate Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This 
is why the Court was unaware of the conflict. 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL 
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in post-conviction proceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office's representation of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore, 
the Court shall hold a hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to 
this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings. 
ANALYSIS 
In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where 
the defendant is facing the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote: 
In the 12 years since Furman . .. every Member of this Court has written or joined 
at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and 
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other 
punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it 
is a justified response to a given offense. 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different" 
is the application of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from 
its application in most other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is 
literally fighting for his life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As 
Justice O'Connor noted in a concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to execute a 
defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner ... is afforded 
process that will guarantee, as much as .is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed 
out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982). 
Therefore, this Court's responsibility is heightened. 
Every defendant has the right be represented by conflict-free counsel.2 Wood v. Georgia, 
450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial 
court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or "reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980); 
see also State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to 
indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a 
2 This was recently reaffinned in Slale v. Severson, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing 
was denied, Severson has not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited. 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL 
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conflict that arises when retained counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is 
true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should 
know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162, 184 (2002) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). When, as was
 
true in Mickens, the judge is not merely reviewing the pennissibility of the defendant's choice of 
counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know 
that a conflict does exist, the duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified. Id 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the 
"possibility of a conflict" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party 
paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge 
even when no objection was made. Id at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 272). The Court,
 
therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it 
knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the 
criminal defendant is facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is. 
In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
 
conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
 
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,
 
1320 (8th Cir.1991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
 
may inquire further into the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do
 
so." Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
 
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions of the
 
record that reflect the evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate
 
Public Defender's Office's factual representations. However, the determination of whether a
 
conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.
 
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must detennine whether a conflict actually exists.
 
Lopez. 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a
 
conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the 
defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. Id. If, on the other hand, the court concludes 
that a conflict of interest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id. 
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While the State Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their 
role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant 
conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counsel.3 
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there is a "mere theoretical 
division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he evil [of 
conflict-ridden counsel] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ... 
[making it] difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation 
of a client." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added). 
In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr. 
Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual 
conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists 
because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's 
retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even if they are not called in the 
post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may have foregone viable 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys 
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. 
The Court finds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict 
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an 
evidentiary proceeding to detennine the effect the conflict may have had on their representation.4 
J By analogy, when a petitioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may be raised in a successive petition absent a clear and voluntary waiver. See Commonwealth 
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of 
being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an 
arrangement, a successive post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, is not barred. 
See Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). In fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, courts are 
instructed to advise a petitioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the 
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." fd at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the 
record whether he wishes to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. fd 
4 The Court is not making any determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. Abdullah in a 
subsequent proceeding. However, clearly Mr. Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he 
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL 
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Furthennore, the Court finds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three 
members of the officer, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and 
advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial. 
Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley 
heads the Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable 
claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also 
have a conflict because he could claim they did not pursue claims that may implicate Ms. 
Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction 
proceeding. 
While Mr. Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and that 
waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an 
opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is 
indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense. 
When an indigent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer, the trial judge's 
appointment of counsel is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding, 
by definition, the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the 
judge. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a ... judge before 
whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps 
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the 
proceedings." /d. (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies. 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948)). If the Court had 
been aware of the conflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified 
private counsel at public expense at the outset of these proceedings. 
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of 
waiving these conflicts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims 
in this post-conviction proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further 
adversely affected his post-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 874 (9 th Cir. 
2006); Karis v. Calderon. 283 F.3d 1117, 1126-27 (9 th Cir. 2002). 
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proceedings, including any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It 
may even affect his ability to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts. 
The Court hereby schedules a hearing for September 25, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine 
whether Mr. Abdullah can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether 
the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the 
Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death 
qualified private counsel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense.5 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 15th day of September 2009.
 
~'e~ 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
S A trial court may appoint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good cause. State v. Nath.
 
137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857, 859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. [d. at 715,
 
52 PJd at 860. The trial court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
 
right to counsel. [d. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I~ day of September 2009, I served a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
 
MARK 1. ACKLEY
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
AZAD ABDULLAH 
#76321 
IMSI-J BLOCK 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Distr'ct Court 
I ~?
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I 
i\.;,_________ 
I MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I State of Idaho I.S.B. # 4843 
I MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 I Capital Litigation Unit 
I 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
A.ilii~~ 
". ~.:O; 'J' ~\ ",,"."1(" 
- , >', ,JJUJ 
*. 
J. [)/\V'J~) : .i/,,'v';'\"' ;; :(), Cierk 
Lv E. H(> .r\~ES 
.. C'EPUTY 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
I 
Petitioner, 
I v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
I Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802 
) (fonnerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
) TO APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) (Capital Case) 
I The Petitioner, AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley, 
I Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD), 
hereby moves this Honorable Court for pennission to appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c), from the 
I Order Re: Conflict Counsel, filed September 15,2009. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-
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I 
I ARGUMENT 
Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Order Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of 
I
 
Mr. Abdullah Presents A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial
 
Grounds For Differences Of Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May Materially
 
Advance The Orderly Resolution Of These Post-Conviction Proceedings
 
I A. Introduction 
I 
On August 17,2009, the Court issued an order directing the parties to address the following 
I issues: (l) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with trial 
counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of interest; (3) the 
extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial and trial involvement with 
I 
I trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. (Appendix 1.) 
The State filed its Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial on 
August 31, 2009, and the SAPD filed its Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And 
I 
I Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial Counsel on September 1, 2009, attached hereto as 
Appendices 2 and 3. In these pleadings, both parties explained why they did not believe the SAPD 
had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, on September 15,2009, this Court entered an order finding 
I that the SAPD has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah. (Order Re: Conflict Counsel, 
I attached hereto as Appendix 4.) Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 12, Mr. Abdullah moves 
this Court for pennission to appeal the Court's order finding a conflict of interest which is 
I 
necessary to preclude an unwarranted inquiry of Mr. Abdullah and to prevent any additional 
I interference with the attorney-client relationship. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 12, a request for pennission to appeal must be made to the district court I prior to filing a motion for pennissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Pennission for an 
I interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of 
I law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate 
I MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 2 
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I
 
I appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." 
I I.A.R. 12(a). 
B. Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Order Finding A Conflict In The SAPD'sI Representation Of Mr. Abdullah Presents A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences OfOpinion 
I 1. Pennissive Appeal From This Court's Finding The SAPD Has A Conflict In Its 
Representation Of Mr. Abdullah Involves A Controlling Question Of Law 
I This Court found the SAPD has a conflict of interest based on its pretrial and trial contact 
I with trial counsel. (See Appendix 4.) The controlling question of law then is whether a district 
court in capital post-conviction proceedings can find an actual conflict of interest based solely on 
I post-conviction counsels' limited contact with trial counsel during the underlying proceedings, 
I where the court cannot identify the specific scope and nature of the conflict, and where both parties 
agree no conflict of interest exists. (See Appendix 4.) This is a legal question of first impression 
I 
I and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 665 P.2d 
701 (1983). 
I 
2. There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This 
Court's Order Re: Conflict Counsel 
Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem 
I 
I from case law cited in the SAPD's response to the Court's inquiry. Mr. Abdullah incorporates by 
reference his Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The 
SAPD With Trial Counsel (herein Response). (See Appendix 3.) 
I 
I In concluding no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, the SAPD 
relied on a Sixth Amendment analysis adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Severson, --­
P.3d ---, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho 2009) and set for in numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
I 
"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a correlative right to representation free from 
I 
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-
I
 
I
 conflicts of interest." Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). In several cases in which 
I the Supreme Court has defined the right to conflict-free counsel, the defense attorney actively and 
concurrently represented conflicting interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-167, (2002); I 
see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (attorney representing co-defendants); Cuyler 
I v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1990) (same). In such cases, the Court created a distinction 
between an actual conflict of interest, which adversely affects counsels' performance, and a mere I 
theoretical one. See Mickens, 535 U.s. at171-172. ("{Alnactual G-Qnf1ict. of in~(est Ime~sl _ 
I precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of 
I
 loyalties.") Id. at 171. Specifically, it must be established the defendant's counsel actively
 
represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See Dunlap v. State, 141
 
I Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376, 388 (2004) (Dunlap Ill) (citing State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967
 
I
 P.2d 702, 712 (1998)). As the Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals has stated:
 
I 
I 
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the 
duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these 
basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of 
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only 
when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of 
I
 
interest.
 
United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.1991); see also People ex rei. Woodardv. Dist.
 
Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985)("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of 
I 
I speculation or conjecture...."). 
Courts generally give great weight to opinions of counsel in determining whether a conflict 
exists. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, trial courts "necessarily rely in large 
I measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 
I (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482); see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 784. Some courts, including the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held trial counsel's judgment that no conflict of interest exists I 
I
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I
 
I is a sufficient basis for a court to conclude there is no conflict. United States v. Crespo de Llano, 
I 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1987). Consistent with its ethical I 
obligations, Mr. Abdullah's counsel have assessed the conflict of interest issue and are of the 
I opinion no conflict exists. This opinion was reached in consideration of counsels' obligations 
under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho Code, I 
and the American. Bar Association Guidelines fQt: th~ Appointm~nt and PerformaJIce of Defense 
I Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. Notably, the State has also researched this issue and is of the 
I opinion a conflict of interest does not exist. 
The Court's order asserts the conflict of interest is based on the fact the SAPD advised trial 
I counsel on a limited number of issues and "Mr. Abdullah has a 'colorable claim' that the [SAPD] 
I has an actual conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action." (Appendix 4, 
I 
pA, Ls. 10-12.) The Court specifically notes the SAPD "advis[ed] trial counsel to seek and 
I continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggest[ed] specific voir dire approaches." (Appendix 
4, p.1, Ls.l 7-19.) The conflict, according to the Court, is created by a theoretical situation in which 
the SAPD "may have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims 
I 
I may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel." (Appendix 4, p.4, Ls.16­
19.) (Emphasis added.) Despite this conclusion, the Court acknowledges that "[b]oth of these areas 
are the subject ofMr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.18-19.) Indeed, the 
I 
I Court has previously stated that Mr. Abdullah, in his Final Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
"essentially [] alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision made by trial 
counsel in petitioner's defense." (Appendix 5, Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery 
I and Granting Petitioner's Motion for a Protective Order, filed 2/14/08.) There is simply no 
I 
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I
 evidence to support the Court's finding the SAPD has refrained from raising theoretical 
I unidentified claims related to advice they may have given trial counsel. 
The Court's order fails to identify the specific scope and nature of the SAPD's conflict ofI interest, while asserting it arises from the limited contact with, and apparent advice given to, trial 
I counsel. A careful examination of the SAPD's advice and contacts with trial counsel reveals there 
is no actual conflict. (See, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Targeted Inquiry, filed 9/24/09, I 
incorporated hereinby reference.)
 
I Assuming arguendo there is a conflict which Mr. Abdullah is unwilling to waive, this
 
I Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to controlling case law. 
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cook, the Court of Appeals 
I 
I refused to impute one public defender's conflict to the entire office. [d. at 794, 171 P3d. at 1292.1 
The court noted that the detennination of whether one public defender's conflict should be imputed 
I 
to the entire office should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis with the relevant inquiry being 
I "whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood 
of prejudice." [d. at 793 (quoting State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982». If so, there is a 
presumption that "both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise." [d. In reaching 
I 
I its decision, the court reasoned that: 
Automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the office 
I 
has a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal 
representation of indigent clients. This, together with the fact that such concurrent 
representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or 
otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule 
imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where 
I 
I 1 The Court of Appeals decision in Cook, declining to automatically impute one public defenders conflict of interest to the entire public defender's office, was recently adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Severson, --- P.3d ---, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho 2009). Rehearing has I been denied but Severson has not yet been released for publication. 
I MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 6 
-

001591
 
 
 
 
 
 
.1 
ice." 
 e." 
I 
I
 
I there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively 
represent a client. 
I /d. at 794. 
I There is no indication that Mr. Abdullah would be prejudiced if he continued to be 
represented by Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens. Both Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens are currentlyI 
serving as co-counsel on Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case and are familiar with the issues and 
I claims raised in his Final Petition. Ms. Romero has been recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court 
I as qualified to handle capital cases at trial and in post-conviction. Neither Ms. Romero nor Ms. 
Owens actually advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel, sat in on the trial, are witnesses in the post­
I conviction case, or in any other way participated in the underlying proceedings. If the entire SAPD 
I office is disqualified from representing Mr. Abdullah it will result in substantial delay and 
prejudice to Mr. Abdullah. There is no indication Ms. Romero or Ms. Owens would be hampered 
I 
I in their ability to effectively represent Mr. Abdullah especially given the deference Idaho Courts 
generally give to public defenders offices in setting aside conflicts of interest. 
In addition, finding a conflict of interest and then imputing that conflict to the entire SAPD 
I 
I office will significantly hamper the SAPD's statutory directive to provide legal representation to 
indigent clients given the extreme financial strain that would be placed on the SAPD if it had to 
provide conflict counsel outside the office. Similarly, finding a conflict of interest under the 
I 
I circumstances of this case would place an unworkable burden on the SAPD and its staff to avoid 
any contact whatsoever with attorneys handling capital cases even where such attorneys initiate the 
contact and do not solicit or otherwise rely on the advice of the SAPD. 
I In conclusion, the Court's order finding an actual conflict between the SAPD and 
I ) Mr. Abdullah is based on theoretical, unidentified facts. The Court's order both deviates from 
controlling case law and creates substantial grounds for differences of opinion regarding aI 
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I controlling question of law. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the Court's finding of an actual 
I conflict of interest is correct, the Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPO office 
deviates from controlling case law. I 3.	 An Immediate Aooeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of 
These Post-Conviction Proceedings I Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) mandates that "[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and 
I post-conviction challenge ... be considered in the same appellate proceeding." I.C. § 19-2719(6). 
I Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation 
because Mr. Abdullah asserts the Court's ruling and anticipated inquiry will significantly damage 
I the existing attorney-client relationship and will substantially delay these post-conviction 
proceedings.2 I 
The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. 
I It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of 
I constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes 
I 
effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988)(citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 
I 176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the 
accused has the right to rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to 
respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. 
I 
I Once appointed counsel has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, 
that relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 
U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude 
I 
I 
2 Moreover, addressing this issue now will preserve the unitary system in death penalty cases. As 
of now, the Court's order explicitly excludes finding a conflict in the SAPD's representation of Mr. 
Abdullah in direct appeal. (Appendix 4, p.2.) ("This order does not affect the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office's representation of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal ofhis underlying conviction.") In 
I so doing, the Court's order bifurcates and defeats the unitary system of appeals in a capital case. 
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I
 recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude 
I recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney 
with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 I S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an 
I indigent defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate 
than if counsel is retained.'')3 If a conflict, actual or potential, threatens to compromise either the I 
adequate representation of a defendant or the institutional inter~st Ln rendering a just verdict, a gial_ 
I judge has discretion to disqualify an attorney. United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 612 (2d 
I Cir.1993). However, absent a conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, disqualification of 
counsel violates a defendant's right to continued counsel ofchoice. 
I 
I The SAPD has had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah since 2005, 
representing his interests in capital post-conviction proceedings before this Court. See People v. 
I 
Harlan, 54 P.3d 871,881 (Colo. 2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over 
I a period of seven years in a complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification"). 
Developing a trusting relationship with a capital client is perhaps counsels' number one priority. 
See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
I 
I Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline 10.5. ("Relationship 
With The Client"). To disrupt this relationship and thrust new counsel on Mr. Abdullah would 
violate Mr. Abdullah's constitutional rights and unnecessarily delay these proceedings in light of 
I the complexity of facts and circumstances in this case and the dearth of individuals both qualified 
I 3 See also McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22-23 (Alaska 1974); State v. Madrid, 468 P.2d 561 (Ariz. 1970); Clements v. State, 817 S.W.2d 194 (Ark. 1991); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 
1101, 1105-1106 (D.C. 1978); Finkelstein v. State, 574 So.2d 1164, 1167-1168 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. I 1991); English v. State, 259 A.2d 822 (Md. App. 1969); People v. Johnson, 547 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. App. 1996); Matter of Welfare ofMR.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn. Ct.App.1987); In re Civil 
Contempt Proceedings Concerning Richard, 373 N.W.2d 429, 432 (S.D.l985). I 
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I and able to take this case. Beyond the preexisting relationship, present counsel have already filed a 
I Final Amended Petition, and are fully engaged in the process of effectively representing 
Mr. Abdullah in his post-conviction proceedings. I The Court's order finding a conflict of interest unnecessarily interferes with and undermines 
I the relationship of trust between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah. The Court's order would disqualify 
the SAPD based on the mere possibility the SAPD "may have foregone" raising potentially I 
unmeritoriQUS claims. Mr. AbdulWl currently has a relationship of trust with post-conviction 
I counsel. (Appendix 6, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Azad Haji Abdullah.) Mr. Abdullah has 
I "developed a strong relationship of trust with [] attorneys and the staff at the SAPD" and describes 
that "SAPD staff feels to me like family, because I speak with them and see them more often than 
I my own family." (Appendix 6, p.2.) In fact, the Abdullah family also has a strong relationship of 
I trust with the SAPD. (Appendix 6, p.2.) These relationships have taken considerable time and 
I 
effort to develop because both Mr. Abdullah's and his family's ability to trust was damaged by the 
I negative experience he and his family had with trial counsel. (Appendix 6, p.l.) Thus, the 
determination by the Court there is a conflict of interest, in direct contradiction of the SAPD's 
assessment, interferes with and undermines the current relationship the SAPD has with 
I 
I Mr. Abdullah and his family. Further more, it risks violating Mr. Abdullah's right to his continued 
choice of counsel. 
I 
This post-conviction case is now in its fourth year due primarily to the complexity of the 
I issues and the volumes ofmaterial created in the underlying case.4 If conflict counsel is appointed, 
there will be substantial delay; substitute counsel will need to review volumes of material and 
I 4 There are approximately seven thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's Transcript, approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record and approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages 
of documentation in trial counsels' files. See also the district Court's Status Memorandum filed on 
I 8/18/2009 attached hereto as Appendix 7. 
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I conduct a thorough investigation in order to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case. The amount of 
I time conflict counsel would need to review the materials in the case and establish a meaningful and 
trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah is clearly substantial and would result in prejudicial delay. I Mr. Abdullah believes it is likely another court will rule there is no actual conflict of 
I interest and remand this case for further post-conviction proceedings following appeal. This will 
cause undue and prejudicial delay in contradiction to the mandate of I.C. § 19-2719(6). Moreover, I 
this Court's order subverts the unitary system of l!Ppel!l~ in Qapital cases. 
I C. Conclusion 
This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for 
I difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution 
I of this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and post­
conviction proceedings required in capital cases. 
I REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
I Mr. Abdullah respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this 
Court's order finding a conflict of interest and stay these post-conviction proceedings pending I 
resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court.
 
I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of September, 2009.
 
I 
I 
I 
I N OLEOWENS 
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah 
I 
I
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I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 24th day of September, 2009, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as indicated below: 
I SHAWNADUNN 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE I 200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 BOISE ID 83702 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH 
INMATE #16321 
I IMSI - J BLOCK PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
I 
I L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
700 W STATE ST, 4TH FL 
BOISE ID 83720 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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AUG 17 2009 
STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DFr:E,'\jf'lER J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
-' o.J By J. WEATHERBY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJSTRIEfJBF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308 
ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
 
WITH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial 
counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an 
abundance of caution, the Court orders both parties to address the following: 
1. the potential impact ofthis involvement, 
2. whether this creates a conflict of interest, I 
3. the extent of that involvement, and 
4. whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
potential witnesses. 
Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with 
citation to legal authority no later September 1, 2009~ 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 17th day ofAugust 2009.
 
~~ 
Cheri C. Copsey ~~-
District Judge 
I The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 11day ofAugust 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MARK J. ACKLEY 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE _ J 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703 F~J 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney RECE\VED
 
ShawnaDunD AUG 3 , 2.009 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
rdaho State BarNo. 2127 STATE APPELLA1"E 
200 West Front Street, Room. 3191 puauc OEFEND~R 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN mE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAll ABDULLAH. ) 
) Case No. CV PC 2005 21802 
Petitioner, ) 
VS. ) MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD 
} INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) TRIAL AND PRE~TRlAL 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
------------) 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the 
SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial. 
The Court has instructed the parties to address: 
(1) the potential impact of [the] involvement [of the SAPD during the trial], 
(2) whether this creates a conflict 
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH). Page 
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(3) the extent of that involvement, and 
(4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
potential witnesses. 
Taking issue #3 first, the State is at a disadvantage in detennining the extent of the 
SAPD's involvement during trial. The State must rely on other sources for this 
information. The extent of the contact between the SAPO's office and trial counsel was 
discussed at Mrs. Toryanski's deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226, In.l - pg.240, In.lO) The 
State also previously asked the SAPD· for information about their contact with trial 
counsel. In response, the SAPO provided the State documents attached as Exhibit #1. 
The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying ass~ce from Mr. Ackley that 
no conflict existed. and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course 
based, in part, on an understanding ofcase law which indicates that the defense may be in 
the best position to foresee a conflict. 
An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the 
best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict 
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
As for whether there is a conflict of interest, again, the State has relied on Mr. 
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen 
as existing are if the SAPD attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to 
what they are now claiming is reversible error. The September 15, 2004, email from Kim 
Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email toucl1es on Mrs. Toryanski's thoughts 
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of the 
attorney-client relationship, ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should 
testifY and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain. Each of those issues has 
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent 
on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the 
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH), Page 
001603
 
 
.} t 
.  
  
 
.
 
ENf
@003/023108/31/2009 16: 25 FAX 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a 
potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs. 
Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KT'sdepo,pg. 226, 
Ins.19-20} 
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3, 
2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark 
Ackley present, where the SAPD suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's 
speedy trial rights are the basis for a claim for relief. It seems concerning that the same 
counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's decision to 
request continuances. However, defense counsel requested a continuance September 
2004 and their request was denied. 
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potentiaJ impact of the 
involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the conununications 
between the SAPD and trial cOWlBel, the State does not intend to call any members of the 
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and 
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting 
himselfor other attorneys in his office in the witness chair. 
Accordingly, based on the best information avaiJable to the State, the State 
Appellate Public Defender attomey staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing. The State does not know the presence or extent ofany waivers by Mr. Abdullah, 
which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings, 
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently 
unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefmg. 
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH>, Page 
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II
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this OIV day of August, 2009.
 
II
 GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor II
 
II
 ~~ 
II Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
II
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
II I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and COITect copy of the foregoing document 
II
 was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
 
Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~day of August 2009. 
II \J1iA. i4- -33'-1-;;L q ~5'" 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
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I 
I ShawnaDunn 
'from: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.ld.us) 
I Sent: Friday. May 09, 200812:12 PM To: Shawna Dunn; Roger Boume 
Cc: Shannon N. Romero 
I SubJect: Abdullah V. State: SPOT0S0030a· disclosure of correspondence between "trial counsel and the SAPO 
Attachments: F'N: Defense motion to be flied on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
I v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 31659 I former1y H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
I
 Shawna,
 
This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the 
Toryanskis at the time oftheir representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to 
I 
I look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such 
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your 
patience. 
I have located and attached the following: 
I 1.	 Six emails (some ofwhich overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim
 
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey andlor me).

I a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been
 
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence
 I (although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below).
 
2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly. I 
a.	 Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to 
correspond with the attached email with the string ofcommunications onI	 12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding 
challenges to the death penalty statute. 
I I have located but h~e not attached the follOWing: 
1. A sununary ofa telephone calIon 11124/04 from Mitch Toryanski to MollyI Huskey. written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included: 
a The outcome of the trial; I b. Wh~ther our office files post-trial motions; and 
I	 
~c.	 Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti . . . 
8/21/2009	 " 
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1 
evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism
 
or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as
1 Mitch's description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the
 
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings. 
1 2.	 A surrnnary ofa telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. 
The topics of the conversation included: 1 
a. Hearing on PSI; 
b. Fonnal sentencing scheduling; 1	 c. Amendments to IeR 32;
 
cL Whether we would attend the hearing; and
 
I
 e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure.
 
3.	 An email summary Qf a written summary ofa telephone calIon 9/03/04 from 
Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,1	 2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I
 
may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not
 
located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in
1	 October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included~ 
1 a. The Court closing the courtroom;
 b. Kline/Littlefield;
 
c. Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey;
 1 d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree ofconfidence;
 
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
 
f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution
 1 regarding the prosecution's case;
 
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed be did and for what he would
 
plead guilty;
 1 h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab
 
4. An email summary gfa written summary of an undated telephone conversation 1	 between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet 
located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my 
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the1	 files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics 
of the conversation apparently included: 
1 
a. Sentencing scheduled for 1121105; 
b. Residual doubt; I c. Scope ofallocution; 
I 
d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah 
regarding the events; and 
8/21/2009I 
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Page 3 of3 
e.	 An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area 
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not 
sure what this references]" 
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom ofdisclosing these documents as they differ 
from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the 
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess 
whether we have an obligation to disclose these swnmaries, and if so, whether they could 
or should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with 
my team and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the 
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again. 
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indeed, that is why I took the time to 
describe for you the contents of these summaries. 
-Mark 
8/21/2009
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FW; Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I 
Shawna DunnI From: Kim W. Toryenski [kim@toryensld.com] 
Sent: Monday, september 06, 2004 1:59 PM 
I To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
SUbJect: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I M&M: 
FY1 .- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of theI ''heads up" for the judge. The judge bas not responded to Pat Owen's request that the motion be filed under seal. 
I K 
I 
---QrigiDal Message-­
From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWBNPH@adaweb.net} 
I 
Sent: Monday, S~mber 06,2004 10:04 AM
 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Cc: kim@toryanski.com
 
Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I Judge Copsey: 
I 
I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings 
related to this motion be conducted in chambers. 
Pat Owen 
I ~-•.Qriginal Message-­
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski (mailto:1cim@torxUlski.coml
 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM
 
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tucsday 
I 
Judge Copsey: 
I 
I The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning. 
we will be filing a motion to continue the 1riaJ. The groUJ1l.is for the 
motion are directly related to the Sta~'s revelation on Friday morning that 
I 
during the course of this ease. a soxual Ielationship existed between one of 
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide 
detective and case officei.'. 
Fun details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in 
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has aI 
8/21/2009 
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Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the tempoml duration ofthe 
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by 
virtue ofthe relationsbip, whether the prosecutors ethical duties were 
affected and cDmpromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of 
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or 
compromised in connectioJ1 with the nature of the relationship, and whether 
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While !he integrity ofthe 
proceedinss lllld the proper adm.inisttation ofjustice is paramount to 8U 
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process. 
In evaluating the appropriateDe$S ofdJe motion to coIttinue, we have 
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to 
assert leSa! claims) oltho ABA OQidcliocs tot the AppointmC'Dt and 
Perfonnance ofDefense CoUll&el in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. Febnwy, 2003). 
Without lUl opportunity to investigate a Jn4ttel" which potentially cal15 into 
question all infonnation about the case, 8lI,y conviction obtained may be 
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assisTance of 
counsel The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated lbat death cues are 
different and deserving ofhigher due process standards. 
Kim Toryansld 
812112009
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Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
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From: Kim W. Toryenskl [kim@toryanski.com) 
Sent: Tuesday, September 07.20043:53 PM 
To: Mark Ackley: Molly J. Huskey· 
Subject; Abdullah continuance molion was denied 
So maybe there is one more appeUate /ssnc for you two to address ifAzad 
gets convicted of fust degree, the jury finds an l1ggra'Vator, and that 
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey 'Wants the 
"glory" ofbeing the first fA) try a death case under the new statute. 
The good news is that. in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the 
deposition ofdetective Jittlefield. the: one that Erika Klein had the affair 
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objeoted. but it fell on 
deafem. The prosecutor asked for rhe scope ofthe depo to be limited. 
but the judge said no limicatons on defense inquiry. rm loolcing forward to 
taking the depo. 
The jUdge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that 
need to be: looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups ofthe NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for IIIQrc money to get some additional expertS 
to advise me, and to testifY. Again, hooray. 
All in aU, I think rm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with 
me! 
JUly selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go 
until I :00 and then adjourn tor the day. Same routine through the end of 
the week. 
Will keep you posted. 
Kim 
812112009
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II 
II ShawnaDunn 
From: Mark Ackley (mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
II Sent: T11ursday, September 09. 20044:11 PM To: kim@toryanski.com 
SubJect: Penry v. Johnson 
I Kim, 
II AS I noted yesterday, my eo-counsel. Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, ob$erved a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
II 
noted that there was some contention regarding ques~ions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigaeingfacts wouLd umatter" tQ ~~am (as worded by the 
defense) or whel:her they could simply "consider- mitigating facts if instructed by 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson. 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on m1t1gation at the close of the case. H@re is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
II 
II 
".PeJUY I clia Dot hold thac c.he mere mention of ·mit,1.gat:1ng c12:C\UIIIJCanc8s lt to a. 
capieal. sentencing ju;r;y sat1s:f1.es t:he Eighth AlMDdmI!m~. lIor does it stand for 
the proposition ~bat it is oonstitutionally suffici~t to inform the 
II 
jury that it may ·consider- Ddtigating cireums~ana.s in deeiaing the 
appropriate aeneeDae. Rather, the key under Penzy :r is that the jury 
be ab1e to n~onllider and "ive effece to Ca defeadant rs "u.t:.igat;:!l2gJ 
evidence in impoa:ing sent;eIlce." 492 u.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (eD;)hD.sis 
added). See &180 Johnson v. Tex~s, 509 U.S. 350, 381. 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1993) (OlC~OR, J., dissenting) (II [A] a8n1:oncer [must] be allowed to giveII full consi~eraeion and full effece to mieigaeing ciraumat:anaasu (~s1s in 
II 
origina1». For ~t is on1y when the ~ury is given a ·vehia1e for expressing its 
'reasoned moral xespOD.se' to thac evidence in r~deriDg its s8ntenciaq deoislon.­
penry %, 492 U.S., ac 329. 109 s.Ct. 2934, that ~e c~ be £Ure that the ~uzy Dhas 
treated the de£eudaDt ae a ·UDi.que1y individual hWIIIUI beiA[g]' and has IlIAd. a 
r$liable 4eeer.mi~~!on ~bae death is the a~~XQPri&t••entBDOe,U ·.1921 ~d., at 319, 
109 s.cc. 293' (~oting wooason v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. ~80~ 3D4 r 305, 96 S_Ct. 
I
 2979, 49 L.Zd.24 944 (1976»."
 (my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will ·considerM mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they ean g~v. ic effece: if ~hey cannot, then they shOUld be exclUded for caU$e. 
I Mark J. Ackley
 Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 
I (208) 334-2712 
I
 
I
 
I 8/21/2009 
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II 
II Shawna Dunn 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [klm@toryanskLcom} 
II Sent: Friday. September 10, 2004 6:45 AM To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
II 
II Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be askIng the mitigation questions using the words. 
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence. and then give examples of our mitigation facts. but. as Shelley and 
Kim have observed. we are forming the Questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on 
correcting that today. 
Today will be a long day- we start questionin9 at 9;00 ~n(l will finish at 5;00, but at least today we get lunch. 
Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks. II I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today? 
II Kim 
II 
---Original Message-

From: Mark AckleV [mallto:macldey@sapd.state.ld.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, september 09,2004 4:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanski.com 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson 
II	 Kim. 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel. K1mberly Simmons. and our mitigation 
II
 specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.
 
II 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating fac~s would .·matter- eo ~em (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply ·consider· mitigating facts if 
inSl;ructsd by the Court; (as worded by the jUdge). The case af Penry v. 
Johnson, 532	 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury ins~ructions on mdtigation 
at the close	 of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection:
II 
n~eAr,Y I did not hold that the mere meneion o£ ~tigating circumstances" to a 
capital sentencing jU2:Y Ba~i.£:i.8s the E:i.Uhth Am.endmeDt. 1I10r doeB it standII	 for the proposition that it iQ eODst~tutional1y 8~ffieient to inform. the jury that it may acons1Clar" mitigat1.ng a:lz:'C'UJlUSbBnCeS 
in deciding the appropriate seneence. aather, t:he key undeZ' Penry
II J: is that the jury be ab1e to "consider alJd g~ve ef:Eece to III defendlJJJ:t'lI ~c.tgatjDl11 ende.ace :LZ2 :J..11tf'oS1Dg seD~ezlC'e .. " 492 'O'.s., 
II
 
ac 319 t 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphaGia added). Se. also Johnson v. Texas, S09 u.S.
 
350, ~81, 113 S.Ct. ~658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONROR. J., 418.enting)
 
("[Al sencancer (must] be allowed to give £u11 consideration and fu~l effect
 
II 
to mitigat1Dg circumstancBs· (.mph.sis ~ original»). For 1t 18 Qn1y when the 
ju~ is given ill nvehicle for exp3:88siug its 'realloned moral. zo••ponse' to that 
e.".idence in rendering 1tG s~tencing dlllciaiou,· Peary J:, 492 11.S., at 329, 109 
S. Ct, 2934., that .we CaD be sul:'e t.hat the :Jury Aba. treated ~ defsndlmt. liS D 
'un1que1y indivilSual human. bein[g]' and. hall mad. a reliable CSetezm1naticn that 
death is the appropriate sentence,· ••1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 
II 
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(qao~ing Woodson v. No~th Carolina, 428 U.S. 290, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978. 49
 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
 
(my emphasis added) 
In short, it seems that simpy in~iring of a prospective juror whether they 
will ~considerw mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
oan give i~ effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
mackleyisapd.state.id.us 
(208) 334-27l2 
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II 
Shawna Dunn 
I From: Kim W. Toryanski (kim@torysnskl.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, September 15.2004 7:09 AM 
I To: Mark Ackley SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would 
I 
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 ets of attempted murder. 
Child endangennent), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat 
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day. we're putting more pressure 
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney client relationship Is being affected because of this. 
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to 
take a plea. That relationship Is beIng affected too.. 
I The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client-
I Other issues are erupting. One haS to do wtth his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he Is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I 
The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated dally. Even the 
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can Impose it where children were involved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that 
none of it stacks up agaInst the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire. 
I We are consultIng with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. 
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not 
dose enough. If plea negotiations fail. we have told our client to antioipate the worst at trial, based upon theI verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these Jurors during voir dire. 
Kim 
I 
I 
--Original Message--­
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:maddey@sapd.st.ate.id.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2004 4:17 PM
 
To: k1m@toryanski.com
 
Subject: PEnry v. Johnson
 
I Kim. 
AS I noeed yesterday, ~ co-counsel. Kimber1y Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection.II Kim noted ehat there was some contention regardin9 questions to prospective 
I 
jurors regarding whecher mitigating faoes would Gmatter p to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider b mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782. 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at" the close of tne case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
I ~P~ r did DOe hold that ~he mere maneioQ of n~tigat~~ ~i:~umstancesa to a 
I 8/21/2009 
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I 
I 
capital sen.tenc;i.ng jury satisfies the :eighth Ame~&llent. Nor does 1t s~and 
for the pro»oaition that it is constitueiona11y sufficient to 
inform the jury that it May Dconsider lt mitigating CirCWlUlioaDc8s 
in deciding the app~opriate sentence. Rather, ~he key under Penry 
:t is t:hat. the j~ be able to "consider 4I2d give effect eo Ill. 
de£sJ2c!lluJt'. m:l.t:l.gatmg] ev:tdezJce .:1.11 impoS:J.Dg BEIZlt:e.Dc:e." 49Z u.s., 
a~ 319, 109 S.Ce. 2934 (emphasis adde4). See a18Q Johnson v. Texas, 509 u.s. 
350. 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 ~.Bd.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissen~in~) 
("CAl sentence%' [must} be al10vad to give full Clons1.deration aDd £\111 effect 
to mit.:LgatinQ' circumstances" (eaphaSli. in. o:riginal». For it: is on.ly wben tbe 
ju:ry is givea a ·vehicle ~or expressing ies "reaBone4 mor~ response' to that 
evidence in rendering its ssntencing decision," Peury %, &92 U.S •• at 328, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, t.hat we can be Sure tha't ehe jury alias treated the de£endaDt as a 
'uniquely inciividua~ human bein[g]' and he.. made a re1ia.ble 4ete:cminat:ion thaT. 
deaeh 1s the ap'pro~iate sentence," -.1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 
(quoting Woodson V. North Carolina, 428 U.S.- 280, 304, 305, 96 s.ce. 2978, 49 ­
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».­
(my emphasis added) 
In short. it seems thac simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they 
will ~consider~ mitiga~1on is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can g~VG ~t .~~.ct; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us 
(2081 334-2712 
8121/2009
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State v. Abullaht Sup. Ct. No. 316591 fonnerly H0201384 
I 
Shawna Dunn 
I From: Mitch Toryanskl {mitCh@toryansld.com] 
sent: Thursday, March 10,2005 12:23 PM 
I To: Mark Ackley SubJect: State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ fonnerly H0201384 
I Mark: 
This is to follow up on Kim's phone call mCSBage to you earlier this week.I On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as eounsel from the 
I 
case and directed that youroffice file a written notice of substitution. 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy ofa letter from the clerk oftlie 
Supreme Court advising the clerk ofthe Ada County Court that Report on 
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed aDd ordering preparation oflhe 
reporter's transcript and clerks record. 
I Mitch 
Mitchell E. TOI}'lUl$ki 
I This transmlBsion (including anachments ifany) is intended only for the 
use of the addressee and may contain woxmation that is privileged, 
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Ele<;tronic COnumlnication 
I Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. SectioWl251O-2521 and protected by attomey/client 
I 
or other privilegcs. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, or the employee 
or agent responsible for delivering the message TO the intended recipiCDl, 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of 
I 
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or wolk product 
privileges are not waived by the transmission of this message. Ifyou have 
receive.d this conununication in error, please notify me immediatcly via 
e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
8121/2009
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II 
ShawnaDunnII From:	 Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us) 
Sent:	 Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AMII To: Shawna Dunn 
Subject: RE: Abdullah v. Slate: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
II	 SAPO 
I	 Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received 
from Mitch Toryankgi This ia the note that I liummarized in an email to you last week. 
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have notI	 changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every 
communication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our 
appointment as Mr. Abdullah's counsel. I may very well send you a fonnal discovery II	 disclosure attaching each of the commWlications that rye already sent to you infonnally 
and in piece-meal fashion. If you have any questions, then please let me know. 
I Mark 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
MJH 11124104 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome oftrial. wanted to know ifwe filed post trial motions 
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that 
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed 
the aggravators. for example, when Amad was a young man, his father 
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into 
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church~ he was 
affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is 
no way a jwy is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of 
CQUl'Se with a first degree murder, people will find utter disregard. He said 
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC. 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn~ tell him the truth - they still don"t know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare 
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew 
the client was telling lies to them. 
Hopes we can get the client some relief. 
I 
812112009II 
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I 
Shawna Dunn I From~ Marl< Ackley (maekley@sepc!.8tate.id.us]
 
Sent: Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM
 I To: Shawna Dunn
 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between hial counsel and the 
I SAPO Shawna, 
I Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts, I guess I'm not sure what I expected, 
I 
but upon further refleetiQn~ it was unreasonable to expect_my s~ ofconversations 
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your 
concerns ifnot alleviate them completely. 
I Below is the 1124/05 note ofmy conversation with Kim Toryanski, - Mark 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
8/2112009
I 
-
MIA 1/24/05 MIA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KT called: 
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source ofdisagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out 
3. Qwhether any amendments pending re ICR 32 ­ I told KT that I was 
not aware ofany at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through 5000 pages ofPSI. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that ifwe leave before the conclusion 
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is 
scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. I 
refered her to the Stover case for the non-eapital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts 
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past I mentioned the 
possibility of crafting a separation ofpowers argument, that the legislature 
cannot completeJy divest a district court judge ofits sentencing 
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further 
considered mior to sentencin~. 
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I 
ShawnaDunnI From: Mark Ackley [mackJey@sapd.state.id.us] 
I Sont: Friday. May 09, 20084:36 PM To: Shawna Dunn 
SLlbJect: Abdullah v. Slate: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
I SAPO
 
Shawna,
 
II The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator.
 
I 
At the tim~ I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter 
and Kimberly Sirmnons. In the course ofhis file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things­
[which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any 
I 
conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I 
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I 
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my fIle as I had suggested in my 
email. 
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety,II including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted 
I 
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that referencet and just summarizing i4 but 
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to 
visits r had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented 
I 
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for 
national workload standards. As a result, I think I was offAzad's case pretty quickly and did not come 
back until October 2006. 
I 
Although it looks lilce I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I tbink you'U agree that 
those suggestions are not implicated by .A2ad's claims, but I suppose that could be a matter of 
interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "E1-ConfI'ani (sic)" case; that reference is to 
State v. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify 
Judge Copsey. rdon't think the grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the followingI was written in the Appellant's Brief" "The distriot court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. AI-Kotrani's family's representations and "self­
serving reports:' The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a fonner 
employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al·Kotrani one instmction 
I 
I at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused ifmore than one instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI­
Kotrani had the tendency to "slack ofF' ifnot wtder constant supervision. The district court dismissed 
Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40_ 
L.24; R., p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that 
Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial w~ not credible because it 
took into consideration infonnation obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The distriot court further I erred in failing to cOl15ider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe same 
I 
nationality ofMr. AI-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not 
significant." Ofcourse, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judget and we have not raised any 
claims based on their failure to do so. 
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my 
II 
8/2112009I 
-
001622
  
 
t
 
 
 
ru  .  -
l
 
,  t,
.  
b 1i1c
      2           
l
 
  
-
 ad. b
n-   · 
 
· ss-"  •• 0,
t  
             
 
 ,
 
I 08/31/2009 16:29 FAX 141 022/023 
Page 2 of3 
I 
decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
I -Mark 
I from: Mark Ackley sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 10:47 AM 
To= Michael Shaw 
I Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Renaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala SUbject: RE: Abdullah file dean up 
Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and I then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It Includes some notes from IMBI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were not placed in Prelaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from 
conversations with, or in.refe!ence to. trial COunselL 
I From legal pad 
I 
1. 12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about 
everything being adequately preserved 
2. 9103104 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad) 
I • Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings. JUdge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have 
objected. [It loeks like I suggested - "move to unseal the motion, right to public bial1 
I	 " Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
I
 " Quotes attributed to Kim T. including. "Now more than ever.. .! could kick [Copsey]
 off." I indicated that we would send the EI-Contranf (sio) opinion with Copsey's
 
I
 
[racist] remarks. rrhis is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AJ­

Kotranl) which we then faxed to them [this has been confirmed by sara] (It is not
 
Indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DO]
 
I 
• My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L, Dunlap· [NOTE: this is a reference 
to the Jimmie Thomas case where lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they WOUld obtain an 
acquittal]; quote attrtbuted to Kim T. nwe've been seeing things· (bizarre things) since 
the beginning of the case 
I	 • Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's 
I 
case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove 
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried 
about Kim's confidence] 
•	 Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial 
counsell sent to the prosecution to show them how their case suoks 
I • Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the 
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson 
I	 • References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the 
lab. Many things they are stili trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a 
motion to continue] I 
I 8/21/2009 
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I 3. Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge) 
• Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05I • They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge said the law was well-settled (not mitigation) 
• Judge limited the scope of AA allocution 
I • They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in response to a Question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client 
ever confess to you., 
I • One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure What this references] 
I
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I 
IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlcr 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
I Petitioner, 
I 
I 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent.. 
I
 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080 
) (formerly SPOTOS00308) 
) 
) RESPONSE TO COURT 
) ORDER INQUIRING INTO 
) TIlE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
) INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD 
) WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 
) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
I 
Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State 
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August 
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following 
I issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with 
I trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of 
interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial 
I and trial involvc::ment with trial counsel makes members ofthe SAPD potential witnesses. 
Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary ofI 
I 
the relevant law governing conflicts of interests. 
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1. 
I 
I RELEVANT LAW 
A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. 
See State v. Severson, _. P.3d -----J 2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May 
I 29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140 
I Idaho 53,60,90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see 
also State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 184, 171 P.3d 128-2 (Ct. App. 2007). Although- Idaho 
I appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect 
I to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right 
I
 
to appointed counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
 
I 789, 793,102P.2d 1108, 1112(2004);Plantv.State, 143 Idaho 758, 761,152P.3d 629,
 
632 (ClApp. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a
 
I
 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts nevertheless
 
I recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation With respect to
 
post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230, 233- .
 
234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to
 
I the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction
 
I
 counsel as a result of a conflict of interest," (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335, 347
 (1980))).
 
I The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel
 
conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty ofloyalty.
 I 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring 
I under an actual conflict of interest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which 
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is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,' for Sixth 
I 
I Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's 
performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002). 
In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the 
I 
I interests ofthe client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behal£" (Idaho Ru1es of 
Professional Conduct, Ru1e 1.3 (commentary).) Consistent with counsel's duty of 
zealous advocacy, counsel has an ethical duty not to represent a client if that 
I 
I representation ''will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client, 
a former client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...." I.R.P.C. 
I 
1.7(a)(2).1 Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment 
I to detennine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or 
will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at· 347 ("[TJrial courts 
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense 
I .counseL"). 
I Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if orie attorney 
in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact 
I with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See 
I Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct 
governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law 
I firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office). 
Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire I 
I Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include I those outlined in Ruie 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally 
I 
involve financial, property, or business interests. See I.R.P.C. 1.8. 
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public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the 
I 
I circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of 
prejudice to the client. Id at *7~ Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of 
interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an 
I 
I individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id Even if such a 
conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed consent.Idat 
*6. 
I 
I In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's 
active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act 
I 
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness." 
I See LR.P.C. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as 
both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony 
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal 
I 
I services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
the client. LR.P.C.3.7(a). 
II. 
I TIlE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL. TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH 
TIIE TORYANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
I There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and 
post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict I 
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of such 
I contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited 
responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing I 
I 
counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial 
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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I
 
counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
I raised by Mr. Abdullah. 
I Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited 
nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing 
I Mr. Abdullah. 
I [MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I 
I 
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm 
sorry. But did you ever pay me at aU to, like, help represent you in 
this case? 
[MS. TORYANSKl]. No, no, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? 
I A. No. Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery? 
A. No. 
I 
I Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all 
I 
about this case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis 
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and 
tnysel£ . 
I 
I Q. .. I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual 
. conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone 
versus like, "Let's sit down and really 8t;rategize and give me some advice 
how to proceed." So with those two things in niind, where would you put 
Oennis Benjamin? 
A. Oh, he's at the top. I Q. Okay. And that was primarily limited to the death penalty motions?
 A. That's correct. .
 
Q. And Chuck Peterson?
 I A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum?
 Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you in your
 
representation of Azad.
I A. I didn't rely on Chuck at all.
 Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton?
 
A. She helped in the way that I have already described.
 I Q. SO in the limited fashion ofjury selection?
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A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had 
been offered. 
Q. David Leroy? 
A. Same as Teresa Hampton. 
I Q. David Nevin? A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but 
David didn't help. 
I Q. Okay. Joan Fisher? A. Where is she on the scale? 
Q. Uh-huh. 
I A. Way at the bottom. Q. Myself? 
A. At the bottom. 
I Q. I'm not taking it personally. rmjust trying to -- okay. A. I don't even know ifyou are really on - I mean, we'd talked, but I 
never really felt that you even were in on the chart. 
I Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your conversation? 
A. No. 
I (Addendum A, p.232, Ls.1-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.B - p.240, L.lO (emphasis 
I added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at 
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily 
I limited given the SAPD's lack ofknowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A, 
I p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did 
you ever give me any discovery? A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware, 
I did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your 
conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on anyI 
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally 
I Addendum A. Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective 
I
 
I
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assistance of cOl.UlSel that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the 
I SAPD or its counsel.2 
I A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is 
I 
Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict OfInterest 
No pretria4 trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis gives 
rise to a potential or actual conflict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. 
I 
I Such contacts were minimal, and do not form the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah 
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted 
the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post-trial 
I 
I representation of Mr. AbdulIah~ The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was 
initiated by the Toryanskis. (See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn, with 
I 
attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the 
I SAPD, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, 
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails 
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski, and are generally representative of the 
I limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.) 
I
 1. September 9, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 9
 
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to 
I her, dated September 9, 2004, was '~robably responding to me even though the e-mail 
I starts with a communication from you, apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 & 
I 2 Even ifthis were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a 
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short, 
advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from I their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment. 
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Exhibit 9.) In that email, Mr. Ackley infonned Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his 
I attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors 
I questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect 
question. (Addendum 3, p.227. L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed 
I 
I 
Ms. Toryanski to relevant case .law for the governing legal standard in questioning 
prospective jurors about mitigating evidence, which Ms. Toryanski acknowledged she 
and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly dmingjwy selection. (Addendum 3, p.227, 
I 
I L.14 - p.228, L.I8 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute 
the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.2 - p.228.L.I8.) 
2. September 15, 2004 Email- De,position Exhibit 10 
I 
I On September 15, 2004, Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she 
discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief 
I 
that a plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being 
I informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel 
and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel 
I 
putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and 
I Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5) 
Ms. Toryans]ci's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose 
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3, Exhibit 10.) During her 
I deposition. Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and 
I did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it 
was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.IO -p.23t, L.25.) 
I 
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3. Other Commwrications 
I Ms. Toryanski also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she 
I and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPO through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey. 
(Addendum 3, p.232, L.13- p.237, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues I as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the 
I prosecutor and the lead detective;. (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey; 
(3) Ms. Toryanski's inclination to request a continuance; and (4) issues arising post- . 
I verdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3, 
I p.232, L.t3 -p.237, L.l9.) 
Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also 
I faxed. orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals 
I from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and 
memoranda challenging the constitutionality ofthe then new death penalty statute, which 
I trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum ~.) There were a handful of 
I additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPO, involving 
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict. 
I 
I The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of 
written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPO, in addition to summaries 
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPO. (See Addendum 
I B.) This infonnation was provided by the SAPO to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email 
I over a month before depositions ofKim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn . 
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis 
I regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9 
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(Deposition of Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has failed to raise any I 
concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these 
I contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State 
evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and I Mr. Abdullah existed 3 1ms understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has not 
I filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done 
so if the communications between the SAPD and trial counsel·had raised the specter of aI conflict, potential or actual. 
I Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the 
fact that the Toryanskis have not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the 
I 
I SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and 
Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD 
provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their 
I 
I representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The 
SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels' 
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial cOWlSels' statements to the 
I SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained 
I 3 The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the
 State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of
 
a conflict in its briefing to this Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme
 I cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) ("[T]he Government
 
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a
 
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts... must take it into
 I consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an
 
I
 
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp.
 
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution
 
for they can be misused as a technique 0 of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted).
 
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing ifthe State
 
alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest.
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cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD I 
were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their 
I representation ofMr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in 
Mr. Abdullah's case. I There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD, 
I particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that 
the SAPD'sinterests, or those of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict withI Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or 
I Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts, 
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards 
I 
I and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a 
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley 
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment 8I;ld dedication to 
I 
I the interests of Mr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the 
SAPD's representation ofMr. Abdullah.4 
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarily 
I 
I unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a 
potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from 
such contact. This is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and 
I 
I 4 Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given 
the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD's I internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional 
conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists. 
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content of their contacts with the SAPD, Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey,S and the State I has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and post-
I trial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create 
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature I 
and content of contact between trial co\ll1Sel and the SAPO supports Mr. Abdullah's 
I claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between 
Mr. Abdullah and the SAPO based on contacts the SAPO hactwith trial counsel pretrial,I during trial, and post-verdict. Perhaps the more important question is whether the 
I SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley andlor 
Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential 
I conflict of interest. 
I B. The SAPD's Pretrial, Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not 
I 
Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPO And Mr. Abdullah, Even If 
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An 
Evidentiary Hearing . 
The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial 
I 
I counsel does not render Mr. Ackley andlor Ms, Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary 
hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of 
I 
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey 
I and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's 
behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between 
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah. 
I S Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial coWlsel were able to create a conflict of 
interest with appellate and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact I with counsel and/or by disclosing information to such counsel which was otherWise protected by the attorney-client privilege.
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In relevant part, Rule 3.7 ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an I 
attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
I necessary witness." LR.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7 
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony I involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal 
I services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
the client. LR.P.C. 3.7(a). The purpose ofthe advocate-witness rule is to prevent the trier I of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and 
I witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from 
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. I.R.P.C. 3.7, commentary m2,3.
I 1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before A 
Judge 
I 
I Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would occur at a 
hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of 
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly 
I 
I prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from 
pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 
I 
840 SO.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to 
I prevent prejudice to opposing counsel and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not 
implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a 
I 
post-convietion evidentiary hearing before a judge); see also State v. Van Dyek, 827 A.2d 
I 192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike ajury, a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles ofadvocate 
and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he is an attorney.''); cf. 
Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the 
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majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who 
I may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, 1.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where 
I testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but 
would take place before a judge acting as a fact-finder. 
I 2. Mr. Ackley AndiOr Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses 
I Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the 
trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely to be II 
I 
I necessary witness." I.RP.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making 
statements to Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's post-
I 
I conviction claims for relief. 
As previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and co-
I 
counsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course of 
I their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15,2004 email sent 
by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknowledged writing the email and 
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah 
I 
I and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, L.19 - p.231, L.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her 
. deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary 
witness ifthe recantation involves testimony relevant to one ofMr. Abdullah's claims fOf 
I post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel, 
I
 however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a ''necessary witness"
 
standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297, 
I 1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognan(v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing 
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, andI disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential 
I violation of the Rule''); Van Dyck. 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her 
testimony is relevant, material and cannot be obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734 
I 
I 
So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (''The necessity standard requires more than 
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary 
witness "ifhis or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere." .World 
I 
I Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony 
will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can 
determine whether another witness can testify. Id 
I 
I The necessity for Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence 
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their 
written and/or verbal communications with Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the 
I 
I verbal and/or written communications with the SAPD must be relevant.7 Third, 
Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information. 
I
 
Wh.ere, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition
 
I -testimony, confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or
 
Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant information. See
 
Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration of 
I 
6 Of course, if trial cOWlSel ·offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written 
communications with the SAPD, then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. AckleyI and/or Ms. Huskey to testify. 
I 
7 Because the relevance of testimony from Mr.- Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey cannot be 
-determined until trial -counsel testify and until this Court detennines that the testimony 
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately 
addressed. 
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the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and 
I the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the 
I relevant issues); State v. Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To 
demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must 
I show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere.''); Utley v. 
I City of Dover, 101 S.W.3d 191,202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where 
moving party faired to demonstrate lawyer's teStimony could not be gained from other 
I 
I sources); Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) Oawyer not a 
necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended 
testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey 
I 
I would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could 
be obtained from other sources. 
I 
3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship To 
Mr. Abdullah 
I 
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms.. Huskey would otherwise be 
I necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from 
representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocate 
I and witness in the. same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel, 
I "in detennining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must 1:?e given to 
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client." I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt. '4. Thus, 
I substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's 
I representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify, the amount 
and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retaining 
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new counsel, and the client's right to choice of counsel.8 Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E.I Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship 
I where law finn represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial, 
counsel bad done significant amount of substantive work on case, client would be denied I 
choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J. Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. 
I DAE/Westbrook, L.L.C., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 200S) (substantial 
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated nmnerous I complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged 
I written discovery). 
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah since 2005. Specifically,
I Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has 
I been the SAPD during the entirety ofMr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is 
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital 
I 
8 The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in AmericanI jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attomey­
client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 {l988)(citing I Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and 
"imposes on the State an affinnative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's I choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that 
.relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel bad been retained. See Morris v.I Slappy, . 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's right to choose 
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in I continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a re1ationslJip of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 222 (rex. 
Cr.App. 1989X"Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent
I defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is ·no less inviolate than ifcounsel is retained."). 
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defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of 
I documents..Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in 
I the world of post-eonviction, is the functional"equivalent of a trial. The amount of time 
that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also 
I 
I to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to 
assess is obviously great. 
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley specifically, would result 
I 
I in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even 
assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or 
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial 
I 
I hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict 
of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to 
I 
labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict 
I cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 
(pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public 
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender 
I cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public 
I .defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis, in light ofwhether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict 
I of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice. [d. at *7. Only if the facts 
demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood ofI 
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public 
I defender's office. Id. 
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Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of 
I 
I interest arising from the SAPO's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential 
conflict based on that contact, and presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice 
I 
I which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPO office. Any testimony that 
would be offered by Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or post­
trial contact with trial counsel wotild selVe only to support Mr. Abdullah's claims. The 
I 
I only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were 
predisposed to disregard the testimony ofMr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because 
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah. This possibility aside, there is no significant 
I likelihood ofprejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPO office. 
I III. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
I For the reasons set forth above, the SAPO's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact 
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley 
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary Witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming 
I arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the 
I SAPO would result in a substantial- hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court 
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification of 
I Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood ofprejudice that would 
I justify disql,la1ifying the entire SAPD office. 
I
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September. 2009. 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 U XilLLO·I
 NICdiE OWENS 
Co-eounsel for Mr. Abdullah 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE SMn WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 20
 
I
 001645
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
,
 
c
APD  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have, on this 1st day of SePtember, 2009, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING 
INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF TIlE SAPD WITH 1RIAL 
COUNSEL as indicated below: 
SHAWNADUNN 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUIlE 3191 
BOISE ill 83702 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH 
INMATE #76321 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX51 
BOISE ill 83707 
u.s. Mail 
__ Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
~Hand Delivery 
-.L..-U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
__Facsimile 
__Hand Delivery 
~
 
Administrative Assistant
 
Capital Litigation Unit
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Page 226 
1 Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Beyond Joan Fisher and 
2 the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying 
3 degrees in this case, did you also contact me on 
4 occasion? 
5 A. Yeah, because you and I had met at a 
6 conference, I think. Litigating for Life, maybe? 
7 And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you. I 
8 was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you 
9 had shown me as an exhibit here. I mean, Dennis, 
10 he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark. 
11 You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?" 
12 Q• Okay. And I am going to show you 
13 what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and 
14 10? Sorry about the coloring on that. 
15 A. That's okay. These are e-mails. 
16 Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to 
17 you. Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004. This 
~8 was after the jury selection had commenced. 
19 Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and· 
20 it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later. 
21 Q. And the first one, what was the date on 
22 that, again? I'm sorry. 
23 A. September -- 9 J.s. September. Exhibit 9 
24 J.s. September 10 . 
25 Q. That was after jury selection? 
~
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1 A. 
2 Q. 
3 there a 
4 there? 
5 A. 
6 from you 
Page 227 
Had begun. 
Okay. And were there questions? Was 
discussion, then, about jury selection 
Let's see. Maybe this is an e-mail 
to me in which I respond because of, "As 
! 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
:I 
S 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
7" I noted yesterday." You're probably responding to i 
8 me even though the e-mail starts with a I 
! 
9 communication from you, apparently. 
10 Q. Yeah, there are multiple e-mails 
11 actually reflected in that document; is that 
12 right? 
"., 
13 A. Uh-huh. P.i 
F 
14 Q. So just start with the earliest one. 
15 A. Okay. Which is September 9. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. Then you're writing to me. You're 
18 telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the 
19 mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a 
20 portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted 
21 that there was some contention regarding questions 
22 to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
23 facts would matter to them, as worded by the 
24 defense, or whether they could just simply 
25 consider mitigating facts if instructed by the 
I Tucker and Associates., Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
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~ court as worded by the judge. The case of Penry 
2 versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on 
3 mitigation at close of the case. There is a 
4 relevant portion that may have application for you 
5 during jury selection. And then you recited -­
6 Q. -- some of the language from the Penry 
7 cases? 
8 A. Yes. And then I say, Yes, Mark this 
9 helps us a lot. And welve been intending to ask 
~o the mitigation questions using the words weight -­
1~ give weight and value to mitigation evidence and 
j 
. 
.. 
iI
Ii
 
i
 
12 
13 
then give examples of our mitigation facts. But 
as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming 
~I 
14 the questions with the word consider, and we need I 
15 to fix that. WeIll work on correcting that today. 
16 It will be a long day. 
17 Q. Okay. So those string of e-mails have 
18 to deal with jury selection type questions? 
19 A. Oh, yes. And then the September 15th 
20 one, just like youlve indicated -­ oh, it's again 
21 responding to that same e-mail about the 
22 observations, plea negotiations with the 
23 prosecutor's office have progressed anq we were 
24 told that they would accept them -­ Oh, okay. 
25 Q. Could you continue reading that? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
~6 
~7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. One count of first degree murder, 
dismiss all other five charges, arson, three 
counts of attempted murder, child endangerment 
with no aggravators. And there were aggravators 
that were presented at sentencing. Of course, we 
are going to the mat 
Q. Could you slow down for the court 
reporter? i 
~ 
A. Oh, okay. You're here. I forgot about : 
that. 
MR. ACKLEY: Do we need to start over on 
that? 
THE REPORTER: Yeah, when you say could 
continue reading that. 
THE WITNESS: Dismiss all other five 
charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of 
attempted murder, child endangerment. And no 
aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of 
course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our 
client to take the deal. Unbelievably he's 
resisting. Day by day we're putting more pressure 
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. 
Our attorney/client relationship is being affected 
because of this. He has become hostile and angry 
that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems 
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~Page 230 ~ ,1 to support his decision not to take a plea. That [ 
~ 2 relationship is being affected too. ~ ~ 
3 Want me to read the whole thing? ~ ~ 
~ 
4 Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Yes, please. ~ . 
. 
5 A. The deal closes the day we begin to ~ 
6 exercise our peremptory challenges in jury
 
7 selection. We expect that to be next Tuesday or
 
8 Wednesday. After that the prosecution goes into
 
9 overdrive to bury our client.
 
10 Q. Does that seem to be an accurate 
11 reflection of how you were feeling at the time? 
12 What's the date on that one? September 10th? 
13 A. 15th. 
14 Q. 15th. So jury selection began, I 
15 think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the 
16 record says that the state's case-in-chief started 
17 on the 27th. So basically there is 20 days. Not 
18 all those dates, obviously, were jury selection, 
19 but there is a 20-day span there. You are about 
20 halfway through at that point? 
21 A. Yep. 
22 Q. SO at that point, at least at that 
23 time, you felt like your attorney/client 
24 relationship was suffering because of these 
25 discussions about the plea bargain? 
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1 A. I am writing that that's how I feel.
 
2 Q. Okay. So is it fair say -- I mean,
 
i3 obviously the passage of time does affect people's ~
 
4 memory. Would you supplement your testimony , 
~
 
5 earlier today about the relationship in light of
 
6 your e-mail?
 
7 A. Well, I just --Azad wasn~t doing what
 
8 I thought was in his own best interest.
 
9 Q. And he was becoming hostile with you?
 
10 A. I think he was angry that we kept 
11 wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same 
12 
-­thing. And but ... 
13 Q. And you were increasing pressure on him I 
14 to take the deal? = 
lS A. Well, by just continuing to ask him and 
16 have different approaches to it. But I just felt 
17 so strongly that this was in his best interest. 
18 And I fretted that that young man would get the 
19 death penalty. 
20 Q. But I am just trying to establish 
21 whether that seems to be consistent with how you 
22 felt at that time back then. 
23 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. I mean, he didn l t 
24 like the fact that, you know, I guess we kept 
25 coming back with it. 
I 
I 
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1 Q. Okay. I will go on with the similar 
2 questions that I asked with the other attorneys 
3 even though they may seem silly. I'm sorry. But 
4 did you ever pay me at all to, like, help 
5 represent you in this case? 
6 A. No, no, no. 
7 Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to 
8 Azad? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any
 
11 discovery?
 
12 A. No.
 
., 
13 iQ. Beyond these two contacts, can you 
14 think of any other significant contacts that you 
15 had with me during the course of your entire 
16 representation? 
17 A. I think we had some e-mails. There was 
18 more e-mails. There is a little bit more e-mail 
19 because I -- you and Molly and I talked on the 
20 phone about the relationship with the prosecutor, 
21 Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield. And I 
22 really appreciated the time you took to talk with 
23 me because you validated my concerns. And I 
24 really wasn't getting that from a lot of defense 
25 counsel. Because I had asked Chuck what he 
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1 thought, Chuck Peterson. He bounced down to my 
2 office and I mentioned it to him. And Teresa, you 
3 know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of 
4 it. I didn't get the perception from talking to 
5 others that other defense counsel thought it was 
6 as big a deal as I thought it was. But you and 
7 Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a 
8 definite impact on the integrity of the case. And 
9 that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I 
10 decided to move forward.
 
11 Q. Do you recall whether it was a matter,
 
12 like, saying that there was definitely an impact
 
13 or something that should be investigated?
 
14 A. Something that should be investigated.
 
15 . Q. Do you recall whether you informed us 
16 that the judge had given you leave to depose 
17 them 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. -- and do the further investigation? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Didn't this, also -- I don't know if 
22 this is reflected in the telephone conversation or 
23 not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, If I 
24 am going to look at personnel files now" -­
25 A. Yes. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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Q. -- "of all the police officers"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in your memory, do you recall 
whether it was reflected on the record or 
otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was 
going to look at these personnel files of all 
officers because of this issue with Erika Klein 
and Todd Littlefield had come forward? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did those go kind of hand in hand? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said other e-mails between us, 
but then you went directly to that telephone call. 
So that would have been a telephone conversation 
as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the 
discussion you just referenced about Todd 
Littlefield and Erika Klein affair? 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you recall, has the state or the 
prosecution shown any kind of summary of that 
conversation at all? 
A. I think I saw an exhibit on that, 
maybe. I think so. 
Q. But something that kind of outlined the 
topics of discussion? 
§I 
­
~ ~ 
­
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Okay. All right. And beyond those 
3 three contacts, do you recall any other 
4 significant contacts during the scope of your 
5 representation? 
6 A. Well, just, it may be part of those 
7 contacts, or it might be, you know, something 
8 additional, additional e-mail. I can't remember, 
9 but recusing the judge was an issue that was 
10 discussed. 
11 Q. 
12 A. 
13 move to 
Okay.
 
And I wasn't -- I was not inclined to
 
14 a discussion of the pros and cons of that. And I 
15 think there was e-mail about that because I think 
16 that I had let you know I was leaning towards 
17 moving for a continuance. But I hadn't prepared 
18 anything yet. 
19 Q. Can you remember whether an e-mail 
20 exists or not impacted by the fact that you had 
21 apparently seen some sort of summary? 
22 A. Yes, it could. Which is one of the 
23 reasons why I have tried not to look at all these 
24 affidavits because I don't want to be colored by 
2S those kinds of things. 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
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~ Q. But the state provided you kind of 
2 these e-mails or documents? 
3 A. They are just exhibits that are part of . 
4 the petition, or something, that I have seen. One 
5 or two. I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I i 
6 think there may have been something, I think so, 
7 in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been ! 
8 prepared. I can't remember. 
9 Q. Do you have that, what was given to 
10 you? 
11 A. No, huh-uh. But I do have what was 
12 these exhibits (indicating). And there are 
13 attachments in here. But mostly it's the 
14 affidavits. 
15 Q. SO you saw these exhibits, as you've 
16 described them, as attached to some sort of 
17 affidavit? 
18 A. I can't remember what they were 
19 attached to or -- it was just -­ they were 
20 numbered. I looked at it, and I recall that we 
21 had had a conversation. 
22 Q • Okay. And beyond that, do you recall 
23 any other contact with me? 
24 A. Not during all this. We talked at the 
25 end, I think, during the spring before Azad was 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704
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1 sentenced on the other charges. I think you and 
2 Kimberly had come to the courtroom. I think we 
3 may have chatted then. You came to the courtroom 
,.<
! 
; 
~ 
~ 
n 
,
 
~ 4 a couple times, I remember that. I remember there I 
5 was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a 
6 lengthy order that we had been handed by the 
7 jUdge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk. It was 
8 lengthy, and was concerning something that had 
9 been argued quite a while ago. And we just had 
10 recently gotten it, and I remember we had thought 
11 that that was interesting, the timing of it. But 
12 that's all I can really remember. 
13 Q. So most of the contact was either 
14 during this as reflected here, or later after he's 
15 already been sentenced to death? 
16 A. Yes, I believe. 
17 Q. But before sentenced on the other 
18 non-capital charges by the judge? 
19 A. Yeah, I think so. 
20 Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys 
21 that you recall speaking to at all about this 
22 case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis 
23 Benjamin,.Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David 
24 Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself. 
25 A. Consulting with, you mean? 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
www.etucker.net 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryans1<i [kim@toryanski.com]I .. Sent: Frjday.•.September 10, 2004 6:45 AM 
To: Mark Ackley 
I SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I
 
Yes, Mark, this helps us a Jot We have been intending to be asking the mitigation que9lWns using the words,
 
"give weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and
 
Kim bave observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to 1ix that We'll work on
 
correcting that today.
 
I
 Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and wiIlfiraish at 5:00, but at leasUoday we get lunch.
 Copsey even needs to be rsminded thatwe need bathroom breaks.
 
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are In the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today? 
I Kim 
---Original Message-­
I
 From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
I 
Sent: Thursday, september 09,20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanskl.com
 
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was some content~on regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regard~ng whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the jUdge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
I 
l\E'en.r;y I d.1.d not ho.1.d that the IIlQre mention of "mi.tigating .eiirCU2lJ.Stanoes" to a 
oapita.J. senten.eing j\.1%1" satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does i1: stand 
for the proposition tha1: j,1: is consti1:utionaJ.l.y suffioient 1:0 
inform the jury tha1: i1: may "consider" mi.1:igating oiroums1:ances 
:in deciding 'the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under PenryI I is that the jury be aP1e 1:0 "consider and give effect; 1;0 [a 
I
 
defendant; ,s m:Lt:!gat:.1.ng] ev:!denoe :Ln imposing sentence. " 4192 u. s. ,
 
at 319, IDS s.c~. 2934 (emphasis added). See a~so Johnsonv~ ~8, 509 U.S.
 
350, .:361, ::1.13 s_Ct. 2658, 125 L.lild.2d 290 .(1993) (O'CONNOR., >3_, d:i.ssenting)
 
(" CAl sentencer [sust] be sJ.lowed to give £ull conl'ideration and fuJ.l effect 
to mi. tigating oi.ro-..uastancas ll (laIIIphasis in .original}). For 'it :is onJ.y when the 
ju:y is given a "voehioJ..e for expressing itG 'reasol).Qd mora~ :z:esponse' to· that 
8videBce :in renderiug :Lts sentencing decision," PenJ:Y I, -492 U.S., at 328, 109 
5.Ct. '2934, thai; we can ba sure that the jury "has treated i:ha defendant as a 
'uniquel.l' :i.~vido.1a~ hU1l!ar. beinrq]' and has macle a rel;iabl.e Osteraci.nati.on that 
death 13 the appropriate :sentenoe," **1921 id., at 319, 109 S.,Ct. 2934 
912008 
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I
 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 3QSJ 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49
 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1916)." 
(my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r1ng of a prospective juror whether they . 
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
I
 mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 (208) 334-2712 
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Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com] I Sent: Wednesday, $eptember 15, 20047:09 AM
 
To: Mark Ackley
 
I
 SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson
 
I
 
Mark. plea negotiations wtth the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been laid that ihey would
 
accept'S plea to one count 01 first degree murder. dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, :3 moOf attempted murder,
 
child .endangerment), and no aggravators wlll be presented at sentencing. Ofcourse, weare go10g to the mat
 
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
 
I
 
on111m to tak.e the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney clIent relationship is bein.9 affected because of this.
 
He l1as become hostile and angl)' that we are encouraging a plea.. HIs fartiny seems.to Sld.Pport his decision not to
 
take a plea. That relatlonsWp Is being a!Jecled too.
 
I.
 
The deal closes the day we begIn to exercise our peremptory challenges in jul)' selection. We expect that to
 
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that. the prosecution goes Into overdrive to bury our client.
 
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his Insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys Will 
notput him on the stand. for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demcmstrated daily. Even the 
I 
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose It where children were 1nvolved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs Into action and actually impose it if 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each yoir dire examination. but the reality is that 
none of it stacks up -against the aggravator 01 leaving 4 kids In a house on fire. 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to watk through this impasse. 
I He's a grey haired guy with .familiarity with the Muslim culture. W'l1I continue to advise yoo.. We're close. but not oIose enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to antioipate the worst attrJal. based upon the 
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these jurors dUr1Dg voir dire. 
I Kim 
I -Orfglnal Message-­From: Mark AcIdey [mallto:mackley@sapd.state,Id,us] Sent: ThUrsday, September 09, 2004 4:17 PM 
To: k1m@toIyanskl,oom 
I Subject: Penry v. Johnson Kim, 
I As 1 noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation ~ecialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's·jury selection. 
I 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding Whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or Whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
. instructed by the Court (as worded, by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782~ 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
"PeJU:Y I did not hcld that the ltLere mention of "nlit:iiJiSt,:i.ng .ciz:oumstanoes" to a 
-
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1 capital sentencing jury satisfiQs the Eigh.th Amendment. Nor does it stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to info:J:m. the jury that it may "oonsider" mitigating circumstances 
in deciding the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key under Penry1 :r is that the j.ury be able to. "consider. and give e££ect to fa 
I
 
derendant's m:i.tigat::i.ng] evidence in impos:i.ng sentence." 492 O.S.,
 
at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). Sae also Johnson 'V. 'Texas., 509 U.S.
 
350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2656, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993) (O'CONNOR1~' I dissenting)
 
: ,. fA) sentSQcer [must] be allo"'ed .to give. _full consideratio.D and full effect 
1 
to m.i-t.;igati.!"lg circumstances" (emphasis in origir,sl)}. For .i't ~·s only when the 
jt1:::y is given a "vehicle -for Elx:pressing j.ts 'reasoned ;:noral .w:;esponse' to that 
evidence in resdering its sentencing decis:i.on," Penry I, 492 O.S., at 328, 109 
S.Ct. 2934, that WQ can be sure that the jury' "has treated i:9!le defendant as a 
I 
'uniquely individual human beinIg), and has made a reliable ~ter.mination that 
death is the awropriate sentence," --1921 id., at 319, 109- !l.Ct. '2934­
{quoting Woodso.n v. North Carolina, 428 u.s. 290, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 
L.£d.2d 944 (1976»." 
(my emphasis added> 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they 
will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
1 Mark J. Ackley 
1 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 
(208) 334-2712 
1 
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I Mark Ackley 
I
 From:
 Sent:
 To: 
Cc: 
I SUbject: Attachments: 
I 
Shawna,I 
Mark Ackley 
Friday. May 09,200812:12 PM 
'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Bourne 
Shannon N. Romero 
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPO 
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
This is my response to your request for correspondence betwee1.1 our office and the Toryanskis 
at the time oftheir representation ofAzad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this I correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained 
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience. 
I I have located and attached the following: 
I 1.	 Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski) 
and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me). 
I a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional
 
correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have
 
I located summaries ofa few conversations, see below).
 
I
 2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly.
 
a.	 Both faxes, dated 12/11103 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond 
with the attached email with the string ofcommunications on 12117/03 andI	 apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death 
penalty statute. I 
I have located but have not attached the following: 
I 1.	 A summary ofa telephone calIon 11124/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly· Huskey, 
written by Molly. The topics ofthe conversation included: 
I 
a. The outcome ofthe trial;
 
. b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
 
I
 
I c. Mitch's retrospective assessment ofthe aggravation and the mitigation evidence,
 
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof,
 
and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of
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I 
their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his
 I hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
 
I 2. A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. The topics of the conversation included: 
I	 a. Hearing on PSI; 
b. Forma! sentencing scheduling; 
c. Amendments to ICR 32;
I d. Whether we would attend the hearing; and
 
e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure. I 
3.	 An email summary ofa written Summary of a, telephone call on 9/03/04 from Kim to 
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. I have 
I 
I not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my 
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files 
that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics ofthe 
conversation apparently included: 
I	 a. The Court closing the courtroom; 
b. Kline/Littlefield; 
c. Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey; I	 d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence; 
e..Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder; 
I f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the prosecution's case; 
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead
 I guilty;
 
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab 
I 4. An email summary ofa written summary of an undated telephone conversation 
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located myI contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron 
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the fues that they left 
behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation I apparently included: 
I
 a. Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05;
 
. b. Residual doubt; 
c. Scope ofallocution;I	 d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah regarding the 
events; and . . . 
I 
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I 
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area ofI	 investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what 
this references]" I 
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom ofdisclosing these documents as they differ from 
I the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries ofcorrespondence, not the correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess 
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could orI should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team 
and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry ofthe Toryanskis; I perhaps they could check their offices again. 
I sincerely invite your thoughts on this matter; indee~ that is why I tQokthe time to describe for I you the contents ofthese summaries. 
I -Mark 
I
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com] 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM 
To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
Subject: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I M&M: 
I FYI - we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the "heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request 
that the motion be filed under seal. 
I K 
I 
--Original Message--­
From: Patrick Owen [rnailto:PRQWENPH@adaweb.netl
 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 10:04 AM
 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Cc: kim@toryanski.com
 I Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I Judge Copsey: 
I I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings related to this motion be conducted in chambers. 
Pat Owen 
I 
I 
---Original Message----­
From: Kim W. Toryanski fmailto:kim@t01yanski.comJ
 
Sent: Monday, September 06,2004 9:59 AM
 
To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be fiJed on Tuesday 
I 
Judge Copsey: 
I 
I The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday moming, 
we will be tiling a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the 
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday moming that 
during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of 
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide 
detective and case officer. 
I 
I Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in 
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant bas a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration oftbe 
I 
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by 
virtue of the relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were 
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police roles of 
conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or 
1 
I 
-
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I compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether
 prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the
 proceedings and the proper administration ofjustice is paramount to all
 
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process.

I In evaluating the appropriateness ofthe motion to continue, we have 
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to 
I assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003). Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into 
question all information about the case, any conviction obtained may be 
I wlnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are 
different and deserving ofhigher due process standards. 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom} 
I Sent: Tuesday, September 07, 20043:53 PM To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey SUbject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
I 
I So maybe there is one more appellate issue for you two to address ifAzad gets convicted of ftrSt degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and tltat 
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the I "glory" ofbeing the first to try a death case under the new statute. 
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the 
deposition ofdetective littlefield, the one that Erika Klein had tho affair 
I with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it fell on deafears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of tbe depo to be limited, 
but the judge said no !imitatons on defense inquiry. I'm looking forward toI taking the depo. 
I 
The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that 
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups oftbe NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts 
to advise me, and to testify. Again, hooray. 
An in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming withI me! 
I 
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go 
until I :00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of 
the week. 
Will keep you posted.I Kim 
I
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I Shannon N. Romero 
From: Mark Ackley 
I Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2004 4: 17 PM
 To: kim@toryanski.com
 Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
I Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, 
I 
I Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply 
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case 
of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application for you 
during jury selection: 
I 
"Penry I di.d not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital 
sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the 
I
 
I proposition t.hat. it is constitutionall.y sufficient to inform the jury that
 
it may "consider" miti.gating circumstances i.n deciding the appropriate
 
sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I i.s that the jury be able to
 
I
 
"consider and give effect to fa defendant's mitigating] evidence in
 
imposing sentence." 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also
 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR,
 
J., dissenting) (" [A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full
 
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in or1ginal». For it is only when the jury
 
I
 
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned m.oral response' to that eV1dence in
 
rendering its sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 U. S., at 328, 109 S.ct. 2934, that we
 
can be sure "that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human
 
I
 
bein[g]' and has made a rel.iab~e determination that death is the appropriate sentence,"
 
**1921 id., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Caro~ina, 428 u.s. 280, 304,
 
305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
 
(my emphasis added) 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it 
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation unit 
mackley@sapd.state.id.usI (208) 334-2712 
I 
I 
I 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.comj
 
Sent: Friday, September 10,20046:45 AM
 
To: Mark Ackley
 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words. "give 
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have 
I observed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on correcting that today. 
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. CopseyI even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks. 
rm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom -will you be able to-stop.by taday1 
I Kim 
---Original Message---­
I
 From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd,state,id.us]
 
I 
sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanski.com
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
I 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection:I 
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a 
I capital sentencing jury satisfi.es the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to info~ the jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the 
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is tha~ the juryI be able to "consider and give ef£ect to fa defendant rs mitigating] 
evidence in .iDposing sentence." 492 U. s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2dI 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) {"CAl sentencer [must] be allowed to give full oonsideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in 
I 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its 
'reasoned moral. response' to that evidenoe .in rendering its sentencing deoision," 
Penry 1,492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has 
treated the defendant as a 'uniqueJ.y individual human bein[g] , and has made a 
reJ.iable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319, 
I
 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v.North CaJ:0J..ina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»." 
(my emphasis added)I 
1 
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In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they willI "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can givQ it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley
 Idaho state Appellate Public Defender
 Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us

I
 (208) 334-2712
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,I Shannon N. Romero 
II
 From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com]
 Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM To: Mark Ackley 
SUbject: RE: Penry v. Johnson!I 
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea 
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment),II and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to 
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are 
I encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too. 
I The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be nextII Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into.Qverdrive to bury our client 
Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put 
I him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that 
say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that 
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven inI 
I this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the . aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire. II We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a 
grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough. 
If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and 
nonverbal demeanor of these jUrors during voir dire. 
II Kim 
II -----Orlginal Message---­
II 
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.ld.us]
 
Sent: Thursday, september 09,2004 4:17 PM
 
I To: kIm@toryanski,com
 
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
II As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
II defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the jUdge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here isl a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
II 
r 
"l'enzy I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a 
capital sentenoing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does i1: stand for 
t:he propositiOD 1:ha1: i 1: is constitu1:i.ona~:Ly sufficient 1:0 inform 1:he 
jury 1:ha1: i1: may "consider" mitigat:.ing circumstances in deciding 'theI appropria1:e sent:ence. Ra1:her, 1:he key under Penry I is tha1: the jury 
1 
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il be able to "consider and give e:ffect to {a de:fendant' s mi tigatingJ evidence in imposing sentence." 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
I.
 added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
 full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
 
I.
 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
 
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision,"
 
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
 
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein(g]' and has made a
 
I.
 reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
 109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
 I. (my emphasis added)
 
I.
 
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will
 
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it
 
effec.t; if they cannot.. tJ1en __they should be excluded for cause. .
 
Mark J. Ackley
I.
 Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 Capital Litigation Unit rnackley@sapd.state.id.us 
I.
 (208) 334-2712
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanskLcom]
 
Sent: Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM
 
To: Mark Ackley
 
SUbject: State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384 
I Mark: 
I This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week.
 On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the
 
I 
case and directed that your office file a written notice ofsubstitution.
 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy of a letter from the clerk of the
 
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on
 
Imposition ofDeath Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation ofthe
 
reporter's tranSGript and clerks record.
 
I Mitch
 
Mitchell E. Toryanski
 
I This transmission (including attachments ifany) is intended only for the 
I 
use of the addressee and may contain infonnation that is privileged,
 
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication
 
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client
 
or other privileges. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, or the employee
 
I 
or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient,
 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
 
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attorney/client or work product
 
privileges are not waived by the transmission of this message. Ifyou have
 
I received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via e-mail at info@torvanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
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 FACSIMlLE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
TO: FROM:I MollyJ. Huskey Mitch Toryanski 
COMPANY: DATE.: 
'. ID Appellate PD's 12/11/2003I FAX NUMBER: 334-2985 
PHONE NUMBER: 
I 334-2712 R.E: YOUR REFEIlENCB NUMBER: 
State v. Abdullah (H0201384) 
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Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Friday, May 09, 2008 3:41 PM 
To: 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
theSAPD 
Shawna, 
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but 
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary ofconversations not to raise 
a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns ifnot alleviate 
them completely. 
Below is the 1/24/05 note ofmy conversation with Kim Toryanski. -Mark 
MJA 1/24/05 MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KTcalled: 
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source of disagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled. likely 2 weeks out 
3. Qwhether any amendments pending re ICR 32 ­ I told KT that I was 
not aware ofany at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through 5000 pages ofPSI. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that ifwe leave before the 
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell 
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. 
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury 
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I 
mentioned the possibility ofcrafting a separation ofpowers argumen4 
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court jUdge ofits 
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might 
be further considered prior to sentencin~. 
1 
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From:	 Mark Ackley 
Sent:	 Friday, May 09, 20084:36 PM 
To:	 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject:	 Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
theSAPD 
The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the 
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly 
Simmons. In the course ofhis file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not 
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during 
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenced my notes contained on a legal- pad. I have 
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not 
take my file as I had suggested in my email. 
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, r am giving you the email in its entirety, including a 
conversation that r had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the 
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I 
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after 
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, r represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was 
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think 
I was off Azad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006. 
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision to 
disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
1 
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I  
I  
I  
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those 
I suggestions are not implicated by Azad'sc1aims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "EI-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the 
I grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief, ''The district court further found that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford. 
I did speak with one non-relative, a fonner employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused if more than one 
instruction was given. Further, Mr. Al-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off' ifnot under constant . 
I supervision. The district court dismissed Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.24; R., p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court 
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible 
I because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The district court further erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is of the same nationality of 
Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." Of 
I course, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on their . failure to do so. 
I 
I 
I 
-Mark 
I 
I From: Marl< Ackley Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM To: Michael Shaw 
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronalda A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara O. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
I Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up 
I 
Michael, I will go through myemails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then 
share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were 
not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in 
reference to, trial counsel. 
I From legal pad 
1. 12117/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about I everything being adequately preserved 
2. 9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Mony (extensive notes on legal pad) 
I
 
I • Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings.
 
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I
 
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"]
 
• Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
I • Quotes attributed to Kim T. including, "Now more than ever...1could kick [Copsey] off." I indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist] remarks. 
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then I faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested a motion to DO} 
I • My thoughts reflected, ~confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" {NOTE: this is a reference to the Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acqUittal}; quote 
attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since the beginning ofthe 
I case 
• Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as
 
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder
 I and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence]
 
I
 
• Reference to "weekly love letters· they [I believe -they" is a reference to trial counsel] sent
 
to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks
 
I
 
• Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the gasoline,
 
would plead to conspiracy to arson
 
I
 
• References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab.
 
Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to
 
continue]
 
3. Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approXimated post jury verdict for
 I death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge)
 
• Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05
"I • They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the judge said the law was well­settled (not mitigation) 
I 2 001681
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I • JUdge limited the scope of AA allocution • They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in 
response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to 
you.U]I • One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure 
what this references] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2008 9:26 AM 
To: 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject: RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel 
and theSAPD 
Shawna, 
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from 
Mitch Toryanksi. lIDs is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appears 
the note was written on the day of the call, November 24, 2004. I have not changed the note in 
any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every ~unication, or note 
referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's 
counsel. I may very well send you a fonnal discovery disclosure attaching each of the 
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. Ifyou have 
any questions, then please let me know. 
Mark 
. MJH 11124/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know ifwe fJled post trial 
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me 
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far 
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a yOWlg 
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the 
mountains into Turkey to :freedom. He was on the board ofhis church, 
he was affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there 
is no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He 
said of course with. a first degree murder, people will find utter 
disregard. He said some ofthe jurors even wanted to find HAC. 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don~ know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare 
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they 
knew the client was telling lies to them.. 
Hopes we can get the client some relief. 
1 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBV 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJJ ABDlIllAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
 
ORDER RE: CONFliCT COUNSEL
 
In reviewing '~he material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the 
State Appellate Pubhc Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate 
Public Defender, M;:1I'k Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons, 
provided advice to IVIr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury 
voir dire, during trial and post trial I The record establishes that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office advised. trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek 
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of 
these areas are the subject ofMr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State 
Appellate Public DI!!fender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear. 
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address 
the implications and l;lXtent ofthis involvement. 
Both the Stat~ and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided 
the Court with additional evidence. 
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that 
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation ofMr. Abdullah 
J The Court notes that M~. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifica1lyrepresented to the Court in the original Petition that 
they had no involvemenl: in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Cowt found good cause to 
allow the State Appellatl: Public Defender's Office more than three yeatS to finalize the post-conviction petition. This 
is why the Court was UD2ware of the conflict. 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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I
 1 in post-conviction pr()ceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's 
I
 2 Office's representatien of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore,
 3 the Court shall hold :I. hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to 
I 4 this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings. 
I 
5 ANALYSIS 
6 In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where 
I 
7 the defendant is facin~ the death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
8 that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote: 
I 
9 In the 12 yean since Funnan ... every Member of this Court has written or joined 
10 at least one IJpinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and 
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other 
11 punishment, find hence must be accompanied by Wlique safeguards to ensure that it
 
12 is a justified response to a given offense.
 
I 13 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different" 
14 . is the application of tile Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from 
I 15 its application in most other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is 
16 literally fighting for his life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As 
I 17 Justice O'Connor nOl:ed in a concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punislunent to execute a 
18 defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner . . . is afforded 
I 19 process that will gwlrantee, as much as.is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed 
I 
20 out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982). 
21 Therefore, this Court:'s responsibility is heightened. 
I
 
22 Every defendant has the right be represented by conflict-free counsel? Wood v. Georgia.
 
23 450 U.S. 261, 271 (l981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial
 
I
 
24 court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or ''reasonably
 
25 should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980);
 
I 
26 see also State v. Lolo'o'dace. 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to 
27 
I 
indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a 
28 
29 
2 This was recently reafIinned in State v. SeI1erson, - P.3d -,2009 WL 1492659 adaho.2oo9). While rehearing 30 
was denied, Severson hit! not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited. 
I 31 ORDER RE: CONFUf.:.T COUNSEL
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conflict that arises wl~.en retained counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is 
true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]n1ess the trial court knows or reasonably should 
know that a particulflr conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Mickens v. Tay/or, 
535 U.S. 162, 184 (2')02) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (19S0». When, as was
 
true in Mickens, the ~ udge is not merely reviewing the permissibility of the defendant's choice of 
counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know 
that a conflict does (~"ist, the duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified Id. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the 
'"possibility of a cor.flict" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party 
paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge 
even when no objection was made. Id at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267,272). The Court, 
therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it 
knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the 
criminal defendant i!: facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is. 
In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
 
conflict mUJ)'1 be the·rough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
 
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256?259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Q.App. 2003); smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,
 
1320 (Sib Cir.l991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
 
may inquire further io.to the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do
 
so." Kaplan v. Unired States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
 
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions ofthe
 
record that reflect tlle evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate
 
Public Defender's Office's factual representations. However, the determination of whether a
 
conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.
 
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists.
 
Lopez, 139 Idaho at. 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a
 
conflict, it must obulLn a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the
 
defendant an opportlmity to acquire new counsel. Id If, on the other hand, the court concludes
 
that a conflict of intE:rest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id.
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While the Sta.te Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their 
role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant 
conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counsel.3 
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel, not by whether there is a ''mere theoretical 
division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he evil [of
 
conflict-l'idden collruiel] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ... 
[making it] difficult 10 judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attomey's representation 
of a client." Hollowcly v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added).
 
In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr. 
Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual 
conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists 
because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's 
retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even if they are not called in the 
post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may have foregone viable 
ineffective assistanc':: of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys 
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. 
The Court tb.ds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict 
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an 
evidentiary proceeding to determine the effect the conflict may have bad on their representation.4 
) By analogy, when a pl:titioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel rna)' be raised in a successive petition absent a clear and vohmtary waiver. See Commonwealth 
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (l)a. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of
 
being represented by trial counsel at the post~conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an
 
arrangement, a successj', e post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial colmSel, is not barred.
 
See CtUler v. State, 36~! S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). 10 fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, courts are
 
instrUcted to advise a ~etitioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the
 
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Jd at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the
 
record whether be wishe!. to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. [d.
 
• The Cc,wt is not roak.ng any detennination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. Abdullah in a 
subsequent proceeding. However, clearly Mr. Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he 
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to bold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the coofJict 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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Furthermore, the Court fmds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three 
members of the officer, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and 
advised Mr. Abdulla:l's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial. 
Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley 
heads the Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable 
claim that any attornl~Y working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also 
have a conflict bec:lUse he could claim they did not pursue claims that may implicate Ms. 
Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State 
Appellate Public DI::fender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction 
proceeding. 
While Mr. Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and that 
waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an 
opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is
 
indigent and is entitkd to conflict free counsel at pUblic expense. 
When an in:ligent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer, the trial judge's
 
appointment of counsel is itselfa critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding,
 
by definition, the defendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the
 
judge. .\1ickens, 53:: U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a '.' judge befOIe
 
whom a defendant ilppears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
 
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the
 
proceedings." [d. (ql:.oting Von Moltlce v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948». If the Court had
 
been aware of the c:::mflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified
 
private counsel at pul)}ic expense at the outset of these proceedings.
 
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of 
waiving these conflk:ts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims 
in this post-conviction proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the 
State Appellate Pub1 ic Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further 
adversely affected his pco:rt-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860. 874 (911t Cir. 
2006); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117. 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002). 
ORDER RE: CONFUt::T COUNSEL 
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proceedings, includiJlg any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It 
may even affect his ability to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts. 
The Court hereby schedules a hearing for September 25,2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine 
whether Mr. Abdulla.n can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether 
the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the 
Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death 
qualified private coullSel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense.S 
IT IS SO OF/DERED. 
Dated this 15lh day of September 2009. 
~"e 
Cheri C. Copsey ~ 
District Judge 
S A trial .;:ourt may appc,int substitute counsel for an indigent defimdant upon a showing of good cause. Stale v. Nath,
 
137 ldabo 112, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857,859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
 
lies within the sound di::~etion ofthe trial court and will be reViewed on appeal for an abuse ofdiscretion.ld at 715,
 
52 P.3d at 860. The triE.I court's decision win only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
 
right to counset./d
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OR Eo cE\ \} EO 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 1008I 
I
 AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH,
 
Petitioner, 
I
 
I vs,
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
fEB \ 5EU.1-'TE s"A.u.~~f\puaL\v"~) 
) Case No. SP-OT 05-00308 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
) MOTION TO COMPEL 
) DISCOVERY AND 
) GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
) MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
) ORDERI -------------) 
I The petitioner has filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief that 
includes a wide variety of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially,I 
I 
the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision 
I made by trial counsel in the petitioner's defense. The Court is infonned that trial 
counsel, Kim and Mitch Toryanski, and the Ada County Public Defenders Office, 
I 
who defended the petitioner before the Toryanski's, have both turned their files 
over to the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD). The SAPO has been granted 
I permission to conduct depositions of the Toryanski's and August Cahill and Ami! 
Myshin of the public defenders office who represented the petitioner. The State I 
has moved to compel discovery requiring the SAPD to provide copies of all of . 
I 
I trial counsel's files in preparation for the depositions and so the State can properly 
ORDF.R GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEl. DISCOVRRY 
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 1 
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respond to the petition for post conviction relief. The petitioner has moved for a 
I protective order for those files to include attorney client privilege materials and 
I work product. 
The State's motion to compel and the petitioner's motion for protectiveI 
order came on regularly for hearing on December 18, 2007. After argument, and 
I the Court being fully informed, the Court orders as follows. 
I 1. The State's Motion to compel is granted. In light of the number and 
variety of the petitioner's claims, trial counsels' files in their entirety are 
I fairly subject to discovery by the State. Such an order is consistent with 
I the doctrine of fairness and completeness and with the persuasive 
authority of Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003). TheI 
I 
Court has been advised that the State and the petitioner have agreed that 
I any documents provided to trial counsel by the State need not be 
duplicated by the SAPD as part of the discovery process. Other than 
I 
those duplicate items, all items in trial counsel's files are subject to 
I discovery to the State unless the pertinent claim in the petition is 
abandoned. 
2. Such discovery however is limited pursuant to the petitioner's motion I 
I 
for protective order which is also granted in part as follows. The 
I documents in trial counsel's files as well as any direct attorney client 
communications will not be admissible as evidence in the State's case in 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 2 
I 001693
 
 
 
 
 
I . A 
. ( 
I 
I 
chief in the event of a retrial or resentencing. However, in the event that 
the petitioner testifies, at a retrial or resentencing or other proceeding, 
I statements the petitioner made to trial counselor their agents may be 
used as cross examination or impeachment. Additionally, other material I 
I 
which was previously the subject of the attorney client privilege or work 
I product privilege may be used in cross examination of the petitioner if 
he testifies at retrial, resentencing or other future proceeding, , if made 
I 
relevant by the petitioner's testimony. 
If the petitioner testifies in such a way that he opens the door to 
I impeachment with materials or conversation previously the subject of 
one of the privileges and when challenged with the contents of thatI 
I 
impeaching document or statement disclaims it, then and only then will 
I extrinsic evidence of the previously privilege material be admissible for 
impeachment purposes. 
3. The petitioner's waiver of both his attorney client privilege and the 
I work product privilege was made impliedly by his filing of the petition 
I for post conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The petitioner was specifically advised on the record on December 18,I 
I 
2007 that asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims would waive 
I any attorney client privilege or work product privilege. His signature on 
this order constitutes his express waiver of those privileges. 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 3 
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I ". 
. , 
I 
4. The Courts reasoning and analysis was set out in detail on the record 
I during the hearing on December 18, 2007 and is hereby incorporated 
I into this order and adopted by reference. 
For the reasons set out above, the State's motion for discovery as modified I 
by the parties and petitioner's motion for protective order is granted in part as 
I 
I described above.
 
It is so ordered.
 
Ii, 
I
 DATED this J!i"day of ~2008.
 
I _~e.~,---_ Cheri C. Copsey --r---a 
District Judge I
 
I
 
I
 Mark Ackley/Shannon Romero
 State Appellate Public Defender for petitioner 
I
 
I
 Azad Abdullah 
PetitionerI
 
I
 
I
 
I
 ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
 AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 4 
I 001695
-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/!i" _----'-__ __+_ 2008. 
 
 
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
APPENDIX 6
 I
 
I
 
I
 001696
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 
MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
CASE NO. SPOT0500308
 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
 
AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJJ
 
ABDULLAH
 
(CAPITAL CASE)
 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
County ofAda ) 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, being fIrst duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1.	 All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge, feelings and beliefs. 
2.	 I am the Petitioner in the above-titled matter. 
3.	 I have been represented by the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) 
since this Court ordered the appointment of the SAPD on April 7, 2005. 
4.	 SpecifIcally, I was represented by Kimberly Simmons and Mark Ackley from the start of 
my post-conviction case in March or April of 2005 to around January of 2006, when 
Ronaldo Coulter replaced Mr. Ackley as my lead counsel. I was represented by Mr. 
CoUlter and Ms. Simmons until October of 2006, when both Ms. Simmons and Mr. 
Coulter left the SAPD office. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH 1
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I 
I 5. Since October of 2006, I have been continuously represented by Mark Ackley, an 
attorney with the SAPD, who has served as lead counsel on my case. 
I 6. Since April of 2007, I have been continuously represented by Shannon Romero, an 
attorney with the SAPD, who has served as co-counsel on my case. 
I 7. Since September of 2007, Nicole Owens, an attorney with the SAPD, has served as 
additional counsel on my case. 
I 
I 8. During the nearly 4 ~ years that I have been represented by the SAPD, I have developed 
a strong relationship of trust with my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD, including but 
not limited to Michael Shaw, the SAPD investigator, and Guadalupe Ayala, the SAPD 
I 
mitigation specialist. The SAPD staff feels to me like family, because I speak with them 
and see them more often than illy own family. My parents and siblings also have strong 
feelings of trust and confidence in the SAPD staff. Attachment 1, incorporated herein by 
reference, is a photograph ofmy mother with members of the SAPD staff. 
I 9. I am aware of and have received and read a copy of this Court's order directing my 
I 
attorneys, and the State, to provide information to this Court about the potential for a 
conflict of interest arising from the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact"with my 
trial attorneys, Mitch and Kim Toryanski. (See Order RE: SAPD Involvement with Trial 
and Pre-Trial, filed 8/17/09.) 
I 10. I am aware of and have received and read both a copy of the State's Memorandum Re: SAPD involvement with trial and pretrial, filed August 31, 2009, and the SAPD's 
Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD 
I with Trial Counsel, filed September 1, 2009. I am aware that both the State and my counsel at the SAPD have represented to the Court that they do not believe a conflict of 
interest exists based on the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with my trial 
I counsel. 
11. I am aware of and have received and read the Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel, filed I September 15,2009. My attorneys at the SAPD have reviewed and explained this Order tome. 
I 12. I am very concerned about the Court's order, which as I understand it, concludes that my 
attorneys at the SAPD have a conflict of interest with me, based on the pretrial, trial and 
post-trial contact the SAPD had with my trial counsel.I 13. Because of my prior negative experience with the Toryanskis, which I outlined in detail 
in my affidavit and supplemental affidavit, which are attached hereto and incorporated by I reference, I am extremely concemed about the Court's order. In light of my prior 
I 
experience with the Toryanskis, it has taken a long time for me to establish a good and 
trusting relationship with my current counsel, Mr. Ackley, Ms. Romero, and Ms. Owens, 
and the staff at the SAPD. Up to this point, I have had tremendous faith and confidence 
in the SAPD's representation of me during these post-conviction proceedings and have 
I 
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I felt that my attorneys and the SAPD staff have been concerned with looking out for my 
best interests and well-being throughout their representation ofme. 
I 
I 14. This Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel causes me great concern, stress, and terrifies me 
at the prospect of losing my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD. Ifmy attorneys at the 
SAPD are no longer allowed to represent me, I am also concerned about how much 
I 
longer this will delay my case, how long it will take me to establish a trusting relationship 
with new lawyers if the SAPD can no longer represent me, and how allowing new 
attorneys to represent me at this point will impact my post-conviction claims. 
I
 
DATEDthis 18 dayof~~009.I
 
I
 
I
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,,/;&'- day of~ ,2009.
..........,~
 ~., L '1, ~~~. ~\)A UPI;' "'4!I 
....... I"~ .4 ###

.. v.. .. ~ ~~ # ~". •• or ~
=*: N07'-1h \~\ 
... ·r~.• ' ..: • ..• .,.. .>:I : ..... .. . .. 
.. til. v!/ ... 
\;..\\ LItle /*1~7~... ... $ ~?? ..······o ...I "'"
.,
Op ID~~
. 
.. 
I 
~.Residing at~_~...,....--.:......:..;:'-=:-_----r+-r",....-....,..., 
My commission expires \ d" 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of , 2009, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: I
 
I
 
I 
MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS 
Administrative Assistant 
I
 
I
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEFlUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
STATUS MEMORANDUM
 
In confonnity with the intent ofLC. § 19-2719 (8),1 the Court hereby provides the Idaho 
Supreme Court with a memorandum describing the status of post-conviction in this case. 
(Attached is a copy of the current Register ofActions.) The Court has given this case first priority 
but has found repeatedly that the time limitations set forth in I.e. § 19-2719 could not be met and 
still accommodate Abdullah's constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court has extended the time 
limits set forth in the statute as follows. These extensions have been at Abdullah's requests, 
based on sworn testimony, and upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances which would 
make it impossible to fairly consider Abdullah's claims in the time provided. 
The jury trial against the defendant, Azad Haji Abdullah, commenced on September 10, 
2004, with the selection of a jUlY and ended on November 18, 2004, on an Indictment, filed 
November 15,2002. The underlying case took more than two (2) months to try and several years 
of complex litigation. The Court entered judgment on March 4, 2005. Abdul1~'s case involves 
complex legal and factual matters. 
Abdullah timely filed his original Post-Conviction Petition on April 15, 2005, and under 
oath the Petitioner, Azad Abdullah, testified that he needed substantially more time to investigate 
his claims and to prepare an Amended Petition. The State answered on May 12,2005, and the 
Court held a status conference on June 29,2005. 
I The Court notes that there is no procedure for compliance with this statute. 
STATUS MEMORANDUM
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At that status conference, the parties all agreed that both parties needed substantially more 
time to properly investigate potential post-conviction claims and both requested the Court to issue 
a scheduling order allowing Abdullah to file an Amended Petition on July 14,2006 with the State 
responding in September 29, 2006. The Court found good cause to grant their requests and issued 
a scheduling order on June 30, 2005, incorporating those requests. 
On January 13, 2006, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension oftime supporting 
that request with an Affidavit from Kimberly Simmons, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
stating good cause for another extension. The Court held a hearing on january 20, 2006, found
 
good cause to grant the extension and issued a scheduling order ordering any Amended Petition to 
be filed by January 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety (90) days. 
On December 20, 2007, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time 
supporting that request with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office, stating good cause for a six (6) month extension. The Court held a hearing on December 
21, 2006, found good cause for the extension and granted the request. The Court ordered any
 
Amended Petition to be filed no later than July 19,2007, with the State answering within ninety 
(90) days. 
Abdullah filed his Amended Petition on July 19, 2007. Due to concerns. about juror 
privacy the Court allowed Abdullah to withdraw that Amended Petition and to file an Amended 
Petition that protected juror privacy. The Court held a number of status conferences subsequent 
to this filing. 
The State answered the Amended Petition and moved for summary disposition on April 
10,2008. 
On August 29, 2008, Abdullah filed his Final Amended Petition and on September 26, 
2008, moved to supplement his Final Amended Petition. The State moved to strike portions of 
the Final Amended Petition. The State answered the Final Amended Petition and moved for 
summary disposition on March 31, 2009. Abdullah moved for an extension of time to allow his 
response and supported his motion with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office, stating good cause. The Court granted his Motion. On June 15, 2009, 
Abdullah responded to the State's Motions and requested an evidentiary hearing. The Court held 
STATUS MEMORANDUM
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a hearing on June 19, 2009, and ruled that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as to a number of 
the claims. The Court requested the parties to get together and try to narrow the subject matter for 
the evidentiary hearing because the parties indicated that they might need six (6) weeks. The 
Court tentatively scheduled that hearing to begin in October. 
The Court held a hearing on August 7. 2009. and based on that hearing moved the 
evidentiary hearing to begin February 2010. The Court scheduled an omnibus hearing to address 
any final issues on December 4.2009. The Court anticipates the parties may want to brief issues 
subsequent to the evidentiary hearing. 
Based on the above and the schedule evidentiary hearing. it is anticipated that the Court 
will be able to rule on the pending Final Amended Petition no later than June 1.2010. 
Dated this IS Ih day of August 2009. 
c~o~~--
District Judge 
STATUS MEMORANDUM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this li day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
 
within instroment to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING AITORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNA DUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
 
MARK J. ACKLEY
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District 
STATUS MEMORANDUM 
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ge 1 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
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4/1512005 
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122/2005 
12/2005 
6/1712005 
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6/2912005 
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1211/2005 
l14/2005[112005
 
/2212005 
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14 2006 / 
4/20/2006 
11/2006 
4/28/2006 
I 
Code 
NEWC 
CERT 
NOTC 
RSPS 
HRSC 
ORTR 
HRHD 
ORDR 
STIP 
ORDR 
MOTN 
OPPO 
CONT 
MOTN 
HRSC 
ORDR 
MOTN 
NOTC 
MOrN 
ORDR 
HRHD 
HRSC 
MOTN 
OPPO 
RSPN 
NOTH 
HRSC 
ORTR 
User 
CCCARUHA 
CCCARUHA 
CCCARUHA 
CCMONGKJ 
CCMONGKJ 
CCGftOSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCTHIEBJ 
DCANDEML 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCMARTLG 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCGROSPS 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCHARRAK 
CCHARRAK 
CCGROSPS 
New Case Filed 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Notice Of Filing 
Answ To Pelo For Post Convctn Relf{bower/st) 
Hearing Schedulect- (06129/2005) Cheri C. 
Copsey 
Order To Transport (6129/05 @ 11 :00) 
Hearing Held 
Scheduling Order 
Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questlonnair 
Order Granting Slip For Release Of Question 
Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing 
Qualified Non Opposition Molo Permit Access 
Audio/visual Equip Review Evidence 
Motion For Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled - Molo Sched Ordr 
(01120/2006) Cheri C. Copsey 
Order Granting In Part Mtn To Permit Access to 
AudioNldio Equipment 
Mtn for Extension of Time to File Amended 
Petition for PC Relief 
Notice of Hearing (1/20/06 @ 1:00) 
Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts 
Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
0112012006 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn 
Schad Ordr 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/02/200701:30 
PM) 
Motion for Preparation of Transcripts 
Opposition to Motion to Release Grand Jury 
Transcripts 
Response To State's Opposition To Motion To 
Release Of Grand Jury Transcripts 
Notice Of Hearing (5/15/06 @ 3:00pm) 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
05/15/2006 03:00 PM) 
Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.) 
JUdge 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
CheriC. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
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lime: 10:04 AM ROAReport 
age 2 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current JUdge: Cheri C. Cppsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant I 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
late Code User Judge
 
5/15/2006 HRHD CCGROSPS Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey
 
05/15/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held
 
19/2006 ORDR CCGROSPS Order Granting Petitioner Access to and Cheri C. Copsey
 
Possession of Grand Jury Transcripts with
 
limitations
 
110/2006 MOTN CCGROSPS Motion for Status Conference Cheri C. Copsey
 
1012312006 ORTR CCGROSPS Order To Transport (10125106 @ 4:3O--P.-M.} Cheri C. Copsey
 
t2212006 ORDR CCGROSPS Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Cheri C. Copsey
 
r 
File An Amended Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief 
2OO7 HRVC DCANDEML Hearing result for Status held on 05/0212007 Cheri C. Copsey 
01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
7/19/2007	 PETN DCELLlSJ Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey
 
ORDR TCWEAT.JB Order Permitting Withdraw! of Petitioner's Cheri C. Copsey
rO/2007 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
 
816/2007 HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30 Cheri C. Copsey
 
I	 PM) 
I 
ORDR DCANDEML Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey
 
8/9/2007 PETN TCWEAT.IB Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey
 
HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Status held on 08/09/2007 Cheri C. Copsey
 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
8/1712007 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Waiver Of Atty/Client PriVilege Cheri C. Copsey 
127/2007 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Conditional Non-Cbjection to State's Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
8/28/2007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 
15/2007 MOTN DCANDEML Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
MEMO DCANDEML Memorandum of law In Support of Motion for Cheri C. Copsey 
I 
Discovery 
112/2007 MOTN CCEARWD Motion for Order Requiring Preservation of All Cheri C. Copsey 
Physical and Documentary EVidence 
9/19/2007 MEMO DCANDEML Memorandum in Support of Motion to Preserve Cheri C. Copsey 
Evidence 
NOTH DCANDEML Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Cheri C. Copsey 
10/11/200702:30 PM) 
126/2007 OBJT CCMARTLG State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
MEMO CCMARTLG State's Memorandum In Support of the State's Cheri C. Copsey 
Objection to The Malo For Discovery 
1/10/2007 ORTR DCANDEML Order To Transport (10/11/07 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on Cheri C. Copsey(11/2007 10/111200702:30 PM: Hearing Held 
/26/2007 MOTN DCANDEML	 (3) Motion Directing Shipment of Evidence to Cheri C. Copsey
 
Petitioner's Expert
 
-

I 001708
 u
 
 
1 /  
 
 
Li it ti  
 
/ / /  
 
  
.I  
l  
 
  
 
 
vi
O
vi
otn
 
  
 
I 
Date: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial DIstrict Court - Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
me: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
[ ge 30f6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
 I 
Azad Hajj Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Code User	 JudgeLte 
10/26/2007	 MOTN 
1/9/2007	 NOTC 
OBJT 
1/14/2007	 ORDR 
MOTNt4/2007 
15/2007 ORDR 
MOTNf1712007 
NOTC 
HRSC 
1u11/2007	 MOTN 
MOTN 
I BREF NOTH 
RSPN~1312007 
1812007 CONT 
I HRSC 
HRHD 
I 
ORDR 
1/21/2007	 ORDR 
NOFG 
ORDR1/31/2007 
2/2008 ORDR 
HRSC 
l3/2008	 RSPS 
MEMO(812008 
722/2008	 MOTN 
MOTN124/2008 
1/25/2008	 RSPS 
I
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DCANDEML
 
DCANDEML
 
CCWRIGRM
 
DCANDEML
 
TCWEATJB
 
TCWEATJB
 
DCANDEML
 
DCANDEML
 
DCANDEML
 
CCAMESLC 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCTOONAL 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEAT.IB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEAT.IB 
TCWEATJB 
CCMARTlG 
CCDWONCP 
DCTYLENI 
TCWEATJB 
CCCHILER 
Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to Cheri C. Copsey 
Petitioner's Expert 
Notice of Discovery Status Cheri C. Copsey 
States Objection to Motions Directing Shipment of Cheri C. Copsey 
Evidence to Petitioner's Expert 
Order Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose 
ErikaKJein 
Motion for Waiver of Altomey-Cllent Privilege 
Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Motion for Preparation of Transcripts 
Notice of Hearing (12113) 
HearIng Scheduled (Motion 12113/200702:00 
PM) 
Mollon for Discovery 
MotIon To Compel 
Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel 
Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm) 
Response to Discovery 
Hearing result for Motion held on 1211312007 
02:00 PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For 
Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 121181200709:00 
AM) Motion to Compel/Discovery Issues 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12118/2007 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held MotIon to 
Compel/Discovery Issues 
Order Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose 
Tod Littlefield 
Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts 
Notice Of Filing 
Order re: Juror Contact 
Order to Transport (2/14/08 at 11 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
0211412008 11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact 
Response To Order Re Juror Contact 
Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury 
Contact 
Motion to PrOVide Trial Documents 
Motion for Partial Summary Disposition & 
Memorandum in Support Thereof 
Response to Motion for Partial Summary 
Disposition and Memorandum in Support Thereof 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
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Date: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
ime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
age 4 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs Stale Of Idaho, Defendant I 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
late Code User Judge 
1/31/2008 
I 
2/1312008 
11412008 
1 
1/25/2008 12712008 
1128/2008 
1/8/2008 110/2008 
1/11/2008 
117/2008 
'11212008 
il29/2008 
111/26/2008 
1
 
I
 
.1/1212008 
1111/17/2008 
11125/2008 
12115/2008
1 
RSPN 
MEMO 
REPL 
ORDR 
HRHD 
MOTN
 
HRSC
 
NOHG
 
ORDR
 
ANSW
 
HRHD
 
PROS 
PROS 
MISC 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MOTN 
OBJT 
OBJT 
OBJE 
NOTC 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWI;ATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
CCPRICDL
 
TCWEATJB
 
CCBOYIDR
 
DCDANSEL
 
CCAMESLC
 
TCWEATJB 
PRPERRRA 
PRPERRRA 
DCDANSEL 
DCDANSEL 
DCDANSEL 
DCDANSEL 
DCDANSEL 
CCWATSCL 
CCWATSCL 
MCBIEHKJ 
TCWEATJB 
Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re: 
Juror Contact 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Document sealed 
Memorandum in Response to State's 
Memorandum In Support of Order Limiting Juror 
Contact 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Reply to Response to Motion for Partial Summary Cheri C. Copsey 
Disposition & Memorandum in Support 
Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for 
Protective Order 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey 
0211412008 11:00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re 
juror contact 
Motion to Vacate Depositions Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
04111/2008 02:00 PM) Motion to Vacate 
Depositions 
Notice Of Hearing (4-11-08 @ 2:00pm) Motion to Cheri C. Copsey 
Vacate Depositions and Motion to Compel 
Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.) Cheri C. Copsey 
Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn 
for State of 10) 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Cheri C. Copsey 
04/1.112008 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to 
Vacate Depositions 
Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn Cheri C. Copsey 
Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE Cheri C. Copsey 
Final Amended Peititon for Post-Convlction Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief 
Motion for Court to Take JUdicial NOtice Cheri C. Copsey 
Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Cheri C. Copsey 
Post Conviction Relief Addenda With Original 
Affidavits 
MOtion to Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel Cheri C. Copsey 
(Kim Toryanski) 
State's Objection to the Renewed and Cheri C. Copsey 
Supplemental Motion for Discovery 
Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from Cheri C. Copsey 
Trial Counsel 
Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice 
Notice of Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
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Date: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicia' District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
lme: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
ge 50f6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Azad Haji Abduliah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
late Code User Judge 
(1512008 HRSC TCWEATJB Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/16/200902:00 PM) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
18/2008 CONT TCWEATJB Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/200902:00 PM) Cheri C. Copsey 
TCWEATJB Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
16/2009 REPL TCWEATJB Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel 
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanskl) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
REPL TCWEAT.lB Reply to State's Objection to Motion for Court to - Cheri C. Copsey 
Take Judicial Notice 
'n12009 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Strike Cheri C. Copsey 
19/2009 DCHH TCWEATJB Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
1 HRSC TCWEATJB estimated: Under 100 Pages Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/191200902:00 Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
1:/2009 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings Cheri C. Copsey 
7/2009 RESP CCTOWNRD Response To Court Cheri C. Copsey 
3/612009 NOTC DCDANSEL Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited Cheri C. Copsey 
1 Request for Discovery, and Motion for the Court and the Parties to Rely on the Record 
3/17/2009 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
1 ORDR TCWEATJB Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski) Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice 
1 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Regarding Petitioner's Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
3/31/2009
1 
MOTN 
ANSW 
CCLYKEAL 
CCLYKEAL 
Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State 
of Idaho) 
Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief and Brief in support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
1114/2009 MOTN CCRANDJD Motion for 14 day Exentsion Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD CCRANDJO Affidavit of Mark JAckley Cheri C. Copsey 
tO/2009 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To 
File Response To The State's Motion For 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Summary Disposition 
1/1212009 TCWEATJB Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
11512009 MISC DCDANSEL Response to the State's Motion for Summary Cheri C. Copsey 
Disposition 
1/1612009 MISC DCDANSEL Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit 
from the Record) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
6/18/2009 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of Cheri C. Copsey 
1 Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for Summary Disposition 
-
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Date: 8/1812009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
~e: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
"ge 6 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current JUdge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant I 
Azad Haji Abdullah. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho. Defendant 
Code User Judge 
6/18/2009 
I 
6/19/2009 
I 
126/2009 
16/2009 
7/8/2009 
19/2009 
7121/2009 
128/2009 2912009 
'/30/2009 
~4/2009 
1'6/2009 
81712009 
I
 
I
 
I
 
1,11/2009 
1/17/2009 
NOTC 
NOTC 
DCHH 
MOTN 
MEMO 
OROR 
STIP 
HRSC 
TRLD 
MOTN 
REQU 
STIP 
ORDR 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
DCHH 
HRSC 
MISC 
ORDR 
ORDR 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
DCDANSEl 
DCDANSEl 
DCDANSEl 
MCBIEHKJ 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
CCHOlMEE 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
DCDANSEL 
TCWEATJB 
Notice of Supplemental Authority Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice of FIling Original Verfication Page Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing result for Status held on 06/1912009 Cheri C. Copsey 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
Motion for More Time to Contact Witnesses for Cheri C. Copsey 
Evidentiary Hearing 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for More Time Cheri C. Copsey 
to Contact Witneses for Evidentiary Hearing 
Order Re: EVidentiary Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
Stipulation for Extension of Time Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/0712009 01 :30 Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
Transcript Lodged: 06-19-09 Cheri C. Copsey 
Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey 
Request For Status Of Pending Motion For Partial Cheri C. Copsey 
Summary Disposition And Discovery Motions 
Stipulation Re: Claims 
Order Directing The Preparation Of Transcripts 
Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts 
Miscellaneous: 54 Documents Unsealed 
Miscellaneous: 65 Documents Unsealed 
Miscellaneous: 4 Documents Unsealed 
Hearing result for Status held on 08/0712009 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/04/200901 :30 PM) Omnibus Hearing 
Proposed Agenda Items For Status Conference 
Standing Order Directing the Preparation of 
Transcripts of All Post Conviction Hearings 
Order Re: SAPO Involvement With Trial And 
Pre-Trial 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
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FILED 3t~\f\A.M -'P.M--=:::..-.;~~_ 
OCT 15 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
OEPUTY 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDlJLLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the 
State Appellate Pub:lic Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate 
Public Defender, Mark Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons, 
provided advice to :Mr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury 
voir dire, during trial and post trial.) The record establishes that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising them to seek a 
continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of 
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear. 
Therefore, concernecj about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address 
the implications and extent ofthis involvement. 
Both the State and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided 
the Court with additional evidence. Based on those responses, the Court found that the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office had a conflict of interest in its representation ofMr. Abdullah 
1 The Court notes that Ms. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that 
they had no involvement in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK 
CASE NO. CV-PC-l005-00308 1 
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in post-conviction proceedings as outlined in its September 15,2009, order. The law is clear that 
once a court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent
 
and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new
 
counsel. See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003).2 Mr.
 
Abdullah is indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.
 
In order to ensure that Mr. Abdullah knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives this 
conflict, the Court hereby appoints R. Keith Roark to independently advise Mr. Abdullah about 
the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case, as well as any future proceedings, 
including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions. Mr. Roark is private counsel 
qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial, in post-conviction and in appellate death penalty 
cases, having been c·ertified by the Idaho Supreme Court. It does not appear that Mr. Roark has 
had any prior involvement in Mr. Abdullah's representation. 
As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and 
searching review of the State Appellate Public Defender's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence 
involvement up to it3 appointment to represent Mr. Abdullah on appeal and on post-conviction. If 
he needs to take depositions, he may do so. Furthermore, the Court hereby forwards copies of the 
relevant materials provided to the Court including the following: 
1) State Appellate Public Defender's Office Motion and Memorandum for 
Targeted Inquiry filed 9-25-09; 
2) Order re: Conflict Counsel filed 9-15-09; 
3) Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement 
of the SAPD with Trial Counsel filed 9-1-09; 
4) Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement with Trial and Pre Trial filed 8-31­
09; and 
5) Order Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial filed 8-17-09. 
Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, he 
shall meet with and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any decision to waive the 
allow the State AppeUab;: Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This 
is why the Court was unaware ofthe conflict. 
2 This was recently reafftrrned in State v. Severson, - P.3d ----, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing 
I was denied. Sevenon ha,.o, yet been released for publication and cannol be cited. 
ORDER APPOINTINC:; KEITH ROARK
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as denied, Severson has not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited. 
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conflict. Once he is satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understands his rights and is capable of making a 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing before this 
Court. 
IT IS SO OltDERED. 
Dated this 15th day of October 2009. 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
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CERTW~ATEOFMAaWG 
I hereby certi fy that on this ti day of October 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
 
DEPUTY PROSEClJTING ATTORNEY
 
ROGER BOURNE
 
SHAWNADUNN
 
INTERDEPT. MAIL
 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
 
MARK J. ACKLEY
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
AZAD ABDULLAH
 
#76321
 
IMSI-J BLOCK
 
P.O. BOX 51
 
. BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Dis .ct 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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I 
I MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
I
 MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
 
I 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
I (208) 334-2712 
..,t"'l. ~;;;-----
1'OV FILED 
A,M_---P,.M---.~................­
OCT 232009 
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
• By eARL.Y ~TIMORE 
DEPUTY 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
I Petitioner, 
I v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
I Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802 
) (fonnerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) 
) AMENDED MOTION FOR 
) PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) (Capital Case) 
I The Petitioner, AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley, 
Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (hereinafter I 
"SAPD"), hereby moves this Honorable Court for pennission to appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 12(c), 
I from the Order Re: Conflict Counsel, filed September 15, 2009, and the Order Appointing Keith 
I Roark, filed October 15, 2009. (Order re: Conflict Counsel, attached hereto as Appendix 4; Order 
I 
Appointing Keith Roark, attached hereto as Appendix 8.) Mr. Abdullah moved for pennission to 
I appeal this Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel on September 24, 2009, but this Court has not yet 
addressed that motion. This Amended Motion for Pennission to Appeal incorporates that prior 
I
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I
 
I
 
motion for permission to appeal, and includes the additional request for permission to appeal the 
I Court's Order Appointing Keith Roark. 
ARGUMENTI 
1.
 
I This Court's Orders Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of Mr. Abdullah And
 
I
 
Appointing Keith Roark Present A Controlling Question Of Law As To Which There Are
 
Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion And In Which An Immediate Appeal May
 
Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of These Post-Conviction Proceedings
 
I A. Introduction 
On August 17,2009, the Court issued an order directing the parties to address the following I issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with trial 
I counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict of interest; (3) the 
extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial and trial involvement with I 
trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. (Appendix 1.) 
I The State filed its Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial on 
I August 31, 2009, and the SAPD filed its Response To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And 
Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial Counsel on September 1,2009. (State's Memorandum 
I Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pretrial, attached hereto as Appendix 2; SAPD's Response 
I To Court Order Inquiring Into The Pretrial And Trial Involvement Of The SAPD With Trial 
I 
Counsel, attached hereto as Appendix 3.) In these pleadings, both parties explained why they did 
I not believe the SAPD had a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, on September 15, 2009, the Court 
disagreed with the opinions of both parties and entered its order finding that the SAPD has a 
conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah. (See Appendix 4.) The Court found that a conflict 
I 
I exists because the SAPD "may have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel." 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 2 001720
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
 
I (Appendix 4, p.4, Ls.16-l9 (emphasis added).) The Court further scheduled a hearing for 
I September 25, 2009, for the stated purpose of determining "whether Mr. Abdullah can knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether the Court should appoint conflict 
I counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the Court should order the State Appellate 
I Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death qualified private counsel to represent him 
in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense." (Appendix 4, p.6 (emphasis in original).) I 
On.September 24~ 2009. Mr. Abdullah moved this Court for J2ermissiQn to appeal the On;ler 
I Re: Conflict Counsel pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 12. That same day, Mr. Abdullah 
I filed an unrelated motion to disqualify this Court from presiding over Mr. Abdullah's post-
conviction case. Presumably due to the filing of the motion to disqualify, the Court entered an 
I order vacating the hearing scheduled for September 25, 2009. (Order to Rescind Transport Order, 
I attached hereto as Appendix l3.i On September 25, 2009, Mr. Abdullah filed a motion for a 
I 
targeted inquiry, supported by a memorandum, further demonstrating the lack of a conflict of 
I interest and specifically requesting this Court to inter alia identify the purported conflict of interest. 
(Motion for a Targeted Inquiry and Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Targeted Inquiry, 
attached hereto as Appendix 9.) 
I 
I Counsel for Mr. Abdullah sought to schedule a hearing for his motion to disqualify, as well 
the motion for permission to appeal inter alia, but was allowed only to notice a hearing on the 
motion to disqualify. (See Email exchange between Judge Copsey's Court Clerk, John Weatherby, 
I 
I the prosecutor, and members of the SAPD office, attached hereto as Appendix 10); see also Local 
Rules of the District Court and Magistrate Division for the Fourth Judicial District, Rule 2.1 ("To 
schedule or re-schedule any court hearing or proceeding, counsel must contact the clerk of the 
I I See LR.C.P. 40(d)(5) ("Upon the filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall 
be without authority to act further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for 
I disqualification."). 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 3 001721
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presiding judge for a date and time certain."). Accordingly, a hearing was scheduled for October 
I 15, 2009, for the sole purpose of addressing Mr. Abdullah's motion to disqualify. (See Azad Haji 
I Abdullah ROA Case Number CV-PC-2005-21802 (formerly SPOT0500308), attached hereto as 
I 
Appendix 11.) On October 15, 2009, this Court heard argument solely on the motion to disqualify. 
I However, at the conclusion of argument, the Court not only denied the motion to disqualify but also 
summarily ordered the appointment of Keith Roark to "independently advise Mr. Abdullah about 
the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case; as weHas- any future proceedings, 
I 
I including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions." (Appendix 8, p.2.) The Court 
noted that it had not found that the SAPD had rendered any deficient or incompetent advice to Mr. 
I 
Abdullah's trial counsel, but believed appointment of conflict counsel was necessary to protect Mr. 
I Abdullah's Sixth Amendment rights.2 The Court indicated that the post-conviction proceedings 
would be suspended until resolution of the conflict issue, placing no time limitation on such 
resolution. The Court did not invite any input or response from either party regarding its 
I determination to appoint Mr. Roark and indefinitely suspend the post-conviction proceedings.3 The 
I Court did not rule upon the request for a targeted inquiry, but nevertheless forwarded the motion 
and memorandum to Keith Roark for his review. (See Appendix 8, p.2.)I Therefore, pursuant to I.A.R. 12, Mr. Abdullah moves this Court for permission to appeal 
I the order finding a conflict of interest and the order appointing Keith Roark (Appendices 4 & 8), 
2 A copy of the transcript from the October 15, 2009 hearing is not yet transcribed; accordingly, I undersigned counsel is relying on their best recollection of the hearing, and will defer to the official 
transcript of the hearing should it be inconsistent with anything stated herein. A standing order 
requiring the preparation of transcripts from all hearings in Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case is I in effect and the transcript should be available soon. 
I 3 The Court made its ruling from the bench and then immediately departed the courtroom without providing the parties any opportunity, or at most a meaningful opportunity, to respond. Since the 
Court departed without comment, this will not be reflected in the official transcript. Counsel for 
I Mr. Abdullah invites the Court and the State to comment on this if either the Court or the State believes this is not a fair and accurate reflection of what transpired at the conclusion of the hearing. 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 4 001722
 
 
 
 
I
 
I which is necessary to preclude an unwarranted inquiry of Mr. Abdullah, to prevent any additional 
I interference with the attorney-client relationship, to prevent unnecessary delay, to prevent the 
abrogation of the legislature's intent in creating the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender, I 
and to prevent the unnecessary expenditure of scarce financial resources. 
I B. This Court's Orders Finding A Conflict In The SAPD's Representation Of Mr. 
Abdullah And Appointing Keith Roark Present A Controlling Question Of Law As To 
Which There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of OpinionI 
pursuant 10 LA..R.-12,. a request for permissiOll-tQappeal must beJuade to the district court 
I prior to filing a motion for permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Permission for an 
I interlocutory appeal may be granted by the district court where there is "a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate 
I appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." 
I I.A.R. 12(a). 
I 
1. This Court's Finding The SAPD Has A Conflict In Its Representation Of Mr. 
Abdullah And Its Order Appointing Keith Roark Involve A Controlling Question 
I 
Of Law 
This Court found the SAPD has a conflict of interest based on the SAPD's limited contact 
with trial counsel during the course of trial counsels' representation of Mr. Abdullah, and as a 
I 
I result, has appointed Keith Roark to independently review and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the 
purported conflict of interest. (See Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) The controlling question of law is 
whether a district court in a capital post-conviction proceeding can validly find a conflict of 
I interest, suspend post-conviction proceedings, and appoint separate counsel based solely on post-
I conviction counsels' limited contact with, and "advice" to, trial counsel during the underlying 
criminal proceedings, where the district court cannot identify the specific scope and nature of the 
I 
conflict, cannot identify any prejudice to the petitioner arising from the alleged conflict, and where 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 5 
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both parties agree that no conflict exists. (See Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) This is a legal question of 
I 
I first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public interest. See Budell v. Todd, 105 
Idaho 2,3-4,665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983). 
I 
2. There Are Substantial· Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This 
Court's Orders Finding A Conflict OfInterest And Appointing Keith Roark 
I 
1. There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This 
Court's Order Finding A Conflict OfInterest 
. SUbstantial grounds for difference ·ofupinionregarding this-controlling question of law stem 
I 
I from case law cited in the SAPD's response to the Court's inquiry, which is incorporated here by 
reference. (See Appendix 3.) In concluding no conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and 
Mr. Abdullah, the SAPD relied on a Sixth Amendment analysis adopted by the Idaho Supreme 
I Court in State v. Severson, _ Idaho _, 215 P.3d 414 (2009), and set forth in numerous U.S. 
I Supreme Court decisions. "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a correlative right to 
representation free from conflicts of interest." Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). I In several cases in which the Supreme Court has defined the right to conflict-free counsel, the 
I defense attorney actively and concurrently represented conflicting interests. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 166-167 (2002); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (attorney I 
representing co-defendants); Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 337-38 (1990) (same). In such cases, 
I the Court created a distinction between an actual conflict of interest, which adversely affects 
I counsels' performance, and a mere theoretical one. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171-172 ("[A]n actual 
conflict of interest [means] precisely a conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a 
I mere theoretical division of loyalties."). Specifically, it must be established the defendant's 
I counsel actively represents conflicting interests to establish an actual conflict of interest. See 
I
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 Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 62 106 P.3d 376,388 (2004) (Dunlap III) (citing State v. Wood, 132 
I Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998)). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
The effective performance of counsel requires meaningful compliance with the I duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a breach of these basic duties can lead to ineffective representation. More than a mere possibility of 
a conflict, however, must be shown. The Sixth Amendment is implicated only I when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict of 
interest.
 
I United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.1991); see also People ex reI. Woodardv. Dist.
 
I Ct., 704 P.2d 851, 853 (Col. 1985) ("[A] trial court may not disqualify counsel on the basis of 
speculation or conjecture....").
 
I Courts generally give great weight to opinions of counsel in determining whether a conflict
 
I
 exists. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, trial courts "necessarily rely in large
 
I
 
measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347
 
I (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482); see also Burger, 483 U.S. at 784. Some courts, including the
 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held trial counsel's judgment that no conflict of interest exists
 
is a sufficient basis for a court to conclude there is no conflict. United States v. Crespo de Llano, 
I 
I 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir. 1987). Consistent with its ethical 
obligations, Mr. Abdullah's counsel assessed the alleged conflict of interest issue and concluded 
I 
I that no conflict exists. This opinion was reached in consideration of counsels' obligations under 
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho Code, and 
the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
I Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (hereinafter ABA Guidelines). Notably, the State also researched 
I this issue and was of the opinion a conflict of interest does not exist. (See Appendix 2.) 
I
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This Court's Order finds the conflict of interest is based on the fact the SAPD purportedly 
I advised trial counsel on a limited number of issues. Because of this "advice," the Court concludes 
I that "Mr. Abdullah has a 'colorable claim' that the [SAPD] has an actual conflict of interest and, 
therefore, cannot represent him in this action." (Appendix 4, p.4, Ls. 10-12.) The Court specifically 
I 
I noted that the SAPD "advis[ed] trial counsel to seek a continuance of the trial (which they did) and 
suggest[ed] specific voir dire approaches." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.17-19.) The conflict, according to 
this Court, is created by a theoretical situation in which the 8APD "may have foregone viable 
I 
I ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys 
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel." (Appendix 4, pA, Ls.16-19 (emphasis added).) Despite this 
conclusion, the Court acknowledges that "[b]oth of these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdullah's 
I post-conviction claims." (Appendix 4, p.l, Ls.18-19.) Indeed, the Court has previously stated that 
I Mr. Abdullah, in his Final Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, "essentially [] alleges ineffective 
assistance of counsel for nearly every decision made by trial counsel in petitioner's defense." 
I (Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for a 
I Protective Order, filed 2/14/08, attached hereto as Appendix 5.) Moreover, the Court fails to 
identify a single claim that was not raised by the SAPD on Mr. Abdullah's behalf, and even I 
acknowledges that it will not address the merits of any allegedly foregone claim. (Appendix 4, p.4 
I n.4 ("The Court is not making a determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. 
Abdullah in a subsequent proceeding.").) In other words, the Court's conflict analysis apparently I 
extends to situations in which the SAPD has foregone raising entirely frivolous post-conviction 
I claims on Mr. Abdullah's behalf. There is simply no evidence to support the Court's finding the 
I SAPD has refrained from raising any legitimate claims due to advice they may have given trial 
counsel. In short, the Court's order .fails to identify the specific scope and nature of the SAPD's 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 8 001726
 
 
.4
1
I
 
I
 
conflict of interest, and at most identifies a vague and theoretical conflict supported by nothing in 
I the record other than pure conjecture. A careful examination of the SAPD's advice and its contacts 
with trial counsel reveals there is no conflict. (See Appendix 9, incorporated here by reference.) I 
11.	 There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This 
Court's Order Imputing The Conflict OfInterest To The Entire SAPD Office I 
Assuming arguendo there is a conflict which Mr. Abdullah is unwilling to waive, this 
I Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to controlling case law. 
I State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). In Cook, the Court of Appeals 
refused to impute one public defender's conflict to the entire office. Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292.4 
I The court noted that the determination of whether one public defender's conflict should be imputed 
I to the entire office should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, with the relevant inquiry being 
"whether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood 
I of prejudice." Id. at 793 (quoting State v. Bell, 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982)). If so, there is a 
I presumption that "both an actual conflict of interest and actual prejudice will arise." Id. In reaching 
its decision, the court reasoned that: 
I	 Automatically disqualifying a public defender where another attorney in the office 
has	 a conflict of interest would significantly hamper the ability to provide legal 
I	 representation of indigent clients. This, together with the fact that such concurrent 
I 
representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or 
otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule 
imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where 
there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney's ability to effectively 
represent a client. 
I Id. at 794, 171 P.3d at 1292. 
I	 There is no indication that Mr. Abdullah would be prejudiced if he continued to be 
represented by Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens. Both Ms. Romero and Ms. Owens are currently I 
4 The Court of Appeals decision in Cook, declining to automatically impute one public defender's 
conflict of interest to the entire public defender's office, was recently adopted by the Idaho I Supreme Court in State v. Severson, _ Idaho _,215 P.3d 414, 426-27 (2009). 
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serving as co-counsel on Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction case and are familiar with the issues and 
I 
I claims raised in his Final Petition. Ms. Romero has been recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court 
as qualified to handle capital cases at trial and in post-conviction. Neither Ms. Romero nor Ms. 
Owens actually advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel, sat in on the trial, are witnesses in the post-
I conviction case, or in any other way participated in the underlying proceedings. Thus, this Court's 
I order imputing the alleged conflict to the entire SAPD office is contrary to the Idaho Supreme 
Court's opinion in Severson, addressing this very point.s Severson, _ Idaho at _,215 P.3d-atI 426-427. 
I This Court's apparent disqualification of the entire SAPD office and appointment of Keith 
Roark to evaluate the alleged conflict of interest ignores Severson and presumes Ms. Romero and I Ms. Owens will not act in accordance with ethical rules which require them to exercise independent 
I judgment and act in the best interests of Mr. Abdullah, irrespective of any advice Ms. Huskey or 
I Mr. Ackley may have provided to trial counsel. See Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 5.2(a) ("A 
lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the 
I direction of another person."). This Court has no basis for finding that either Ms. Romero or Ms. 
I Owens would be hampered in their ability to effectively represent Mr. Abdullah, especially given 
I 
the deference Idaho Courts generally give to public defender offices in setting aside conflicts of 
I interest and the deference generally given lawyers in the performance of their constitutional and 
ethical obligations. See, e.g., U.S v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 658 & n.23 (1984) ("Whenever we are 
I 
5 This Court's apparent reluctance to cite to Severson or rely on it as controlling authority 
apparently stems from its erroneous belief that a case is not final until released for official 
I 
publication. See Appendix 4, p.2 n.2; Appendix 8, p.2, n.2. In fact, an opinion becomes final 
twenty one (21) days after the last of the following events: the announcement of the opinion 
through the filing of the opinion; the announcement of the opinion on rehearing; or, the 
announcement of a modified opinion without a rehearing. See Idaho Appellate Rule 38(a)-(b). 
Severson was announced on May 29, 2009, and the rehearing was denied on August 24, 2009. 
I Thus, Severson became final on September 14,2009. 
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I asked to consider a charge that counsel has failed to discharge his professional responsibilities, we 
I start with a presumption that he was conscIous of his duties to his clients and that he sought 
conscientiously to discharge those duties."); Ex parte Stevens, 676 So.2d 1307, 1315 (Ala. 1996), I 
overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Henry, 770 So.2d 76 (Ala. 2000) ("This Court will 
I presume, until it is proven otherwise in the appropriate forum, that an attorney at all times acts in an 
ethical manner and upholds the oath of the profession."); DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite, 95 I 
CaLApp.4th 829~ 834 (Cal. CLApp. 2002) ("[T]he court should start with the presumption that, 
I unless proven otherwise, lawyers will behave in an ethical manner."). 
I In appointing Keith Roark, this Court detennined that, contrary to the SAPD's and the 
State's analysis, the SAPD has an actual conflict of interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah, 
I and that Mr. Abdullah must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive the conflict in order for 
I any attorney at the SAPD to continue representing him. (Appendix 4; Appendix 8.) The Court's 
finding of a conflict requiring the appointment of Keith Roark as independent counsel subverts the 
I 
I legislative intent of having a State Appellate Public Defender office, causes unnecessary delay, and 
interferes with the attorney-client relationship between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah. 
The SAPD necessarily has some degree of contact with trial counsel in nearly every capital 
I 
I case in Idaho. Such contact would not necessarily involve the same type of contacts that occurred 
in Mr. Abdullah's case. However, in cases where an SAPD's fonner client has been granted a 
resentencing or retrial after years of representation by the SAPD, the contact would presumably 
I 
I involve at least the transfer of some infonnation to trial counsel. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004); State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003); State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 52 P.3d 874 (2002). Under 
I
 
I
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such circumstances, the SAPD has a professional obligation to facilitate successor counsels' 
I representation of their fonner client; such obligation includes: 
I A. maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will infonn successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation; 
I B. providing the client's files, as well as infonnation regarding all aspects of the representation, to successor counsel; 
I C. sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel; and 
I D. cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may be chosen by successor counsel. 
I ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13. The criminal justice system, in its entirety, and especially the 
I 
capital defense bar, benefits when the SAPD follows its professional obligations to cooperate with 
I successor counsel. However, the Court's analysis creates an incentive for the SAPD to stonewall, 
or otherwise ignore, successor counsel even if making reasonable requests for assistance. Indeed, if 
I 
limited contact is all that is required to create a conflict of interest, then SAPD attorneys cannot 
I teach or participate in continuing legal education (C.L.E.) seminars because anything said by an 
attorney with the SAPO could arguably fonn the basis for a conflict of interest in any case where 
the C.L.E. topic(s) become relevant. Application of such an analysis conflicts with the SAPD's 
I 
I ethical obligation to contribute to the quality ofjustice in Idaho. See I.R.P.C. Preamble: A Lawyer's 
Responsibilities, ~ 1 ("A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, 
an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
I justice."). As stated in the professional rules:
 
I As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal
 system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate I knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in 
reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer 
should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and I the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on 
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I popular participation and support to maintain their authority. A lawyer should be 
mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, 
and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. 
Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic 
influence to ensure equal access to our system ofjustice for all those who because ofI economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should 
help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. I LR.P.C. Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, ~ 6 (emphasis added). 
I As the Court likely recognizes, the SAPD, and its attorneys, provide continuing legal 
education to lawyers throughout the state. Indeed, it is a matter of record in this case that SAPD I 
attorneys have been called upon to instruct Idaho attorneys regarding various aspects of capital 
I litigation in Idaho. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Mark 1. Ackley in Support of Motion for Extension of 
I Time for Filing an Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed December 20, 2006, attached 
hereto as Appendix 12 (noting participation as instructor in Idaho capital jury sentencing CLE).) 
I This Court's analysis for assessing and finding conflicts of interest, if adopted by other courts, 
I would effectively prohibit the SAPD from contributing to the integrity of Idaho's criminal justice 
system by providing continued legal education to Idaho lawyers. 
I 
I Mr. Abdullah requests this Court to consider the following hypothetical involving the very 
real issues in the Payne case. As this Court is presumably aware, in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
199 P.3d 123 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court considered inadmissible 
I 
I victim impact evidence when sentencing Mr. Payne to death. The Idaho Supreme Court found that 
the error was attributable to the district court's ignorance ofthe relevant law as set forth in Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The district court's error has caused a delay of approximately 
I 
I seven to eight years, has caused additional suffering by Mr. Payne's victims, and has accounted for 
an untold cost to Idaho taxpayers. That error, however, was attributable not only to the district 
court, but also to trial counsel who failed to object to the evidence prior to its admission. In fact,
I 
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the SAPD raised a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which the Idaho Supreme 
I Court recognized as mooted by its finding of reversible judicial error. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 
I
 199 P.3d at 150.
 
Hypothetically, if Mr. Payne's trial counsel had placed a simple phone call to the SAPD 
I 
I seven or eight years ago and inquired about the law governing victim impact statements, then the 
SAPD would have informed trial counsel of the holding in Payne v. Tennessee. Mr. Payne's trial 
counsel would -then presumably have informed the district court- of the controlling law, and the 
I 
I district court, in tum, would not have admitted or considered the inadmissible evidence. Ifthis had 
occurred, then Mr. Payne's case would presumably be in federal habeas corpus proceedings, as 
opposed to state resentencing proceedings, with the prospect of additional state capital post­
I
 
I conviction and appellate proceedings if Mr. Payne is resentenced to death.
 
Mr. Abdullah requests consideration of the ramifications of the district court's ruling in Mr.
 
Abdullah's case as applied to the Payne hypothetical. If the SAPD had indeed received that phone I 
call from Mr. Payne's trial lawyers seven or eight years ago, then the SAPD would have faced the 
I untenable situation of creating a conflict of interest, i.e., by informing trial counsel of controlling 
precedent and thus preventing constitutional error, or avoiding a conflict of interest, i.e., by I ignoring trial counsels' request and thus virtually assuring constitutional error. In short, the Court's 
I analysis and conclusion creates an incentive for the SAPD to disregard a known violation of a 
criminal defendant's constitutional rights and thus contribute to monumental waste of judicial and I 
taxpayer resources.
 
I If the Court's order finding a conflict is correct, that having limited pretrial, trial or post­

I
 trial contact with trial counsel in a capital case is sufficient to constitute a conflict of interest, then,
 
as noted above, the SAPD could have a conflict in nearly every single capital case for which it is 
I 
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I appointed. This places an unworkable burden on the SAPD and its staff to avoid any contact 
I whatsoever with attorneys handling capital cases, even where such attorneys initiate the contact and 
do not solicit or otherwise rely on the advice of the SAPD, as was the situation in Mr. Abdullah'sI 
case. Moreover, the finding of a conflict which is imputed to the entire SAPD office significantly 
I hampers the SAPD's statutory directive to provide legal representation to indigent clients. 
The Court's order fails to consider the critical role that public defender offices, like the I 
SAPD,. play in the criminal justice system. As stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota: 
I The judge, district attorney, and public defender are parts of a courtroom 
triumvirate. Each has a function which is essential to the working of the triumvirate. 
I Each has a function which is essential to the working of the system. The public defender's role is that of an adversary to the prosecutor-not an adversary of the 
I 
system but an integral part of it. ... [S]ociety reaps the benefit from a smoother 
functioning criminal justice system. 
Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771,777 (Minn. 1993) (quoting Stephen L. Millich, Public Defender 
I Malpractice Liability in California, 11 Whittier L.Rev. 535, 537-38 (1989)). The State ofIdaho has 
I determined that the best way to provide qualified counsel to capital defendants in post-conviction 
and appellate proceedings is through the creation of the SAPD. 
I 
I In conclusion, the Court's order finding an actual conflict between the SAPD and 
Mr. Abdullah and appointing Mr. Roark to evaluate the conflict and to advise Mr. Abdullah 
accordingly is based on theoretical, unidentified facts. The Court's order both deviates from 
I 
I controlling case law and creates substantial grounds for differences of opinion regarding a 
controlling question of law. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the Court's finding of an actual 
conflict of interest is correct, the Court's order imputing the conflict to the entire SAPD office 
I deviates from controlling case law. 
I
 
I
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3. An Immediate Appeal May Materially Advance The Orderly Resolution Of 
These Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) mandates that "[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and 
I post-conviction challenge ... be considered in the same appellate proceeding." Id. Allowing an 
I immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation because this 
Court's finding of a conflict and the appointment of Mr. Roark to conduct an inquiry into that 
I conflict, will substantially delay these post-conviction proceedings, will substantially undermine 
I the unitary system of appeal in death penalty cases, and will significantly damage the existing 
attorney-client relationship. 
I 1. Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Materially Advice The Orderly 
Resolution Of This Litigation By Preventing Substantial Delay In The 
I Underlying Post-Conviction Proceedings 
This post-conviction case is now in its fourth year due primarily to the complexity of theI issues and the volumes of material created in the underlying case.6 The appointment ofMr. Roark 
I creates substantial delay in these proceedings. Mr. Roark will need to review volumes of material 
and conduct a thorough investigation just to become acquainted with the facts of Mr. Abdullah's I 
underlying case and the proceedings thus far. The amount of time Mr. Roark will need to review 
I the materials in the case and establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah is 
I clearly substantial and will result in prejudicial delay. Presumably recognizing this, the Court 
placed no time limitation on Mr. Roark's investigation. Thus, the post-conviction proceedings have 
I been indefinitely suspended by the Court's order. Mr. Abdullah believes it is likely, based in part 
I on the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Severson, the Idaho Supreme Court will rule there is no 
actual conflict of interest and remand this case for further post-conviction proceedings following 
I 
I 6 There are approximately seven thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's Transcript, 
approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record and approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages 
of documentation in trial counsels' files. (See Status Memorandum, filed 8/18/2009, attached hereto 
as Appendix 7.) 
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 appeal. Cf Us. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 348 U.S. 140, 151-52 (2006) (holding that a district court's 
I erroneous deprivation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not subject to 
harmless error analysis). This will cause undue and prejudicial delay in contradiction to theI legislative intent and mandates of I.C. § 19-2719, including but not limited to, the requirement that 
I "[a]ll issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be considered in 
I the same appellate proceeding." See I.e. § 19-2719(6). 
I 
11. Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Preserve The Unitary System Of 
Appeals In Capital Cases 
This Court's order potentially subverts the unitary system of appeals in capital cases. See 
I 
I I.e. § 19-2719(6). Specifically, the Court's order explicitly excludes a finding of a conflict of 
interest in the SAPD's representation of Mr. Abdullah on direct appeal. (Appendix 4, p.2 ("This 
I 
order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's Office's representation ofMr. Abdullah 
I in the appeal of his underlying conviction.").) As a result, assuming arguendo that Mr. Abdullah 
declines to waive the purported conflict of interest, conflict counsel will be appointed to represent 
Mr. Abdullah in post-conviction proceedings, while the SAPD will continue to represent Mr. 
I 
I Abdullah on direct appeal. Once the post-conviction proceedings are resolved, the SAPD will then 
file a direct appeal from Mr. Abdullah's underlying conviction and sentence, while conflict counsel 
will presumably file an appeal related to the post-conviction case. Thus, this Court's order has the 
I potential to bifurcate the appellate and post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Abdullah's capital case, 
I in direct contravention of the Idaho Legislature's intent to have a unitary system of appeals in 
capital cases. See I.C. §19-2719 (6) ("In the event the defendant desires to appeal from any post-
I 
conviction order entered pursuant to this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken from 
I the conviction or sentence. All issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction 
I
 
I 
-
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challenge shall be considered in the same appellate proceeding."). Accordingly, addressing this 
I 
I issue now will preserve the unitary system in death penalty cases. 
lll. Allowing An Immediate Appeal Will Preserve The Existing Attorney-Client 
I 
Relationship Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah 
The SAPD has had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah since 2005, zealously 
representing his interests in capital post-conviction proceedings before this Court. The 
I 
I development and maintenance of a meaningful attorney-client relationship with Mr. Abdullah is 
one of the SAPD's highest priorities. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.5(A) ("Counsel at all 
stages of the case should make every appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust with the 
I 
I client, and should maintain close contact with the client."); see also ABA Guidelines, Commentary 
to Guideline I0.5 (noting that cultural and language barriers in conjunction with the depression 
associated with the isolation of death row present obvious hurdles when attempting to establish a 
I relationship of trust with a condemned individual). At the present time, the SAPD's relationship 
I with Mr. Abdullah is strong. (Appendix 6, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Azad Haji Abdullah, 
p.2 (describing "a strong relationship of trust" with the SAPD and characterizing the SAPD and its I 
staff "like family, because I speak with them and see them more often than my own family.").) In 
I fact, the SAPD also has a strong relationship of trust with Mr. Abdullah's family. (Appendix 6, 
p.2.) These relationships have taken considerable time and effort to develop, not only because Mr. I 
Abdullah faces the stress of living on death row, and not only because of the obvious cultural and 
I 
I language barriers that exist, but also because both Mr. Abdullah's and his family's ability to trust 
was so damaged by the negative experience he and his family had with trial counsel. (Appendix 6, 
p.l.) Indeed, the Court need not look beyond the record in the underlying criminal case itselfto see 
I the negative consequences of a breakdown in trust between a capital client and his counsel. (See,
 
I
 e.g., Tr. Vol. VIII, p.438, L. 19 - p.439, L.lO ("THE DEFENDANT: Can I make a statement?
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I THE COURT: ... This is not the time for statements. '" Are you going to testify? THE 
I DEFENDANT: I just don't feel I have been treated fairly somehow, not anything as far as 
legal advice or anything, but I have been advised, I think, wrongly -- THE COURT: I don't I 
want you to -- just wait. I don't want you to tell me here in court any advice because when you do 
I that, it is a waiver of the attorney/client privilege. You can -- I don't want you to tell me what 
advice you have been given.") (emphasis added); see also, Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance ofI 
CQuflJelif) Capital Cases: The Evolvirzg S/andardof Cgre, 1993 U. ILL. L ~v. 3.23, 33~ (1993) 
I ("Often, capital defendants have had bad prior experiences with appointed attorneys, leading them 
to view such attorneys as 'part of the system' rather than advocates who will represent their I 
interests.... A capital defendant who experiences, or previously has experienced, these kinds of 
I judgments understandably will be reluctant to trust his attorney.") (footnotes omitted).) 
I The attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in American jurisprudence. It is fundamental, 
I 
that once the attorney-client relationship is formed, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards 
I aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. 
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The 
I 
constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to 
I rely on counsel and "imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the 
accused's choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has 
established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that relationship is no less 
I 
I inviolate than if counsel had been retained. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22-23 & n.5 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("[C]onsiderations that may preclude recognition of an indigent 
defendant's right to choose his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent 
I defendant's interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has 
I 
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developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 881 (Colo. 
I 2002) (noting the fact that counsel had represented defendant over a period of seven years in a 
I complex capital case "weighs heavily against disqualification"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 
216, 222 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989) ("Once counsel has been validly appointed to represent an indigent 
I 
I defendant and the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship it is no less inviolate than if 
counsel is retained."). 
The Court's orders finding a conflict of interest and appointing Mr. Roark tmdermine the -­
I 
I attorney-client relationship between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. Where the SAPD, and the State 
for that matter, has asserted that there is no conflict of interest, the Court's order finding a conflict 
without regard for the SAPD's assessment sends a message to Mr. Abdullah that the SAPD's 
I advice and guidance cannot be trusted. For the Court to force substitute counsel upon Mr. 
I Abdullah for the purpose of investigating Mr. Abdullah's lawyers, further undermines that 
relationship. Mr. Abdullah recognizes that if a conflict truly threatens to compromise either the I 
adequate representation of a defendant or the institutional interest in rendering a just verdict, a trial 
I judge has a duty to conduct an inquiry and discretion to appoint separate counsel if necessary. See 
State V. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the district court I 
"appointed separate counsel, a public defender, to inquire into the conflict, determine if it was 
I subject to waiver, and to advise Lopez thereon.") However, because appointment of separate 
counsel constitutes an interference with an established and on-going attorney-client relationship, I 
"[m]easures of this kind could be justified, if at all, only upon a substantial showing of necessity. 
I Nothing in the record indicates the existence at trial of a potential conflict between [Mr. Abdullah] 
I and [his] attorneys warranting interference with the [] established attorney-client relationships." 
Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913,919 n.7 (Alaska App. 1996). 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 20 
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I Without making any additional findings or inquiry from Mr. Abdullah or his counsel, the 
I Court appointed Mr. Roark. Moreover, the Court has preemptively authorized Mr. Roark to 
conduct depositions of Mr. Abdullah's lawyers. The Court's order appears to be based on the I 
unwarranted assumption that the SAPD has acted neither with candor nor in good faith in response 
I to the Court's initial inquiry regarding the purported conflict of interest, in violation of the SAPD's 
ethical obligations. Deposing Mr. Abdullah's lawyers will inevitably and unnecessarily reveal I 
confidential infonnation covered by the attorney-client privilege and the work prodllct doctrin.e. 
I Such an extreme intrusion into the current, on-going attorney-client relationship, without 
I justification, cannot be countenanced. 
Undersigned counsel can conceive of no inquiry at depositions that would not infringe upon 
I the work product privilege, as well as the attorney-client privilege. An inquiry into why 
I undersigned counsel did or did not raise particular claims involves questions which inevitably 
I 
reveal work product as well as confidential attorney-client communications. Less extreme and 
I intrusive methods of investigating the purported conflict of interest can be had through a review of 
the pleadings that have been filed in this case and are already part of the public record. 
Undersigned counsel objects to this Court's order prospectively granting depositions and reserves 
I 
I the right to object to such depositions if requested. Even in cases where trial courts have deemed it 
appropriate to appoint independent counsel to advise a party regarding his or her right to conflict­
free counsel, undersigned counsel can find no cases authorizing or ordering depositions of counsel 
I 
I for the purpose of evaluating a conflict. See Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127 (noting that the 
district court appointed separate counsel to discuss the conflict issue and its implications with the 
defendant, without reference to any court-authorized depositions of trial counsel); see also, e.g.,
I Yepes v. Yates, 2009 WL 837649, *24 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2009) (noting that the trial court 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 21 001739
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I
 
I
 
I 
appointed independent counsel to detennine whether a conflict of interest existed between the 
I Petitioner and one of his attorneys; independent counsel infonned the court that a potential conflict 
existed between Petitioner and his lawyer, but Petitioner waived the conflict); People v. Jones, 91 
P.3d 939, 941-42 (Cal. 2004) (noting that the court appointed independent counsel to advise 
I 
I defendant of right to conflict-free counsel after being advised by trial counsel of a potential conflict 
of interest and handling alleged conflict through a series of in camera hearings); People v. 
McDermott, 51 P.3d 874, 902.;03 (Cal.20()-2) (noting that ihe trial court appointed independent 
I 
I counsel to consult with defendant and "in defendant's presence, Attorney Hill told the trial court he 
had met with defendant for an hour and half, 50 minutes of which were spent discussing the subject 
of the potential conflict of interest presented by Defense Counsel['s] prior representation of Randy
I Howard in a different case.").
 
I Absent a conflict, or serious potential for a conflict, the Court's interference with the
 
attorney-client relationship violates Mr. Abdullah's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
 I his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and unnecessarily delays these 
I proceedings based on the mere possibility the SAPD "may have foregone" raising potentially 
meritorious claims. I 
C. Conclusion 
I This case presents a controlling question of law as to which there are substantial grounds for 
I difference of opinion. Allowing an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution 
of this litigation under the special procedures for unitary appellate review of criminal and post­
I conviction proceedings required in capital cases. 
I
 
I
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I REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
I Mr. Abdullah respectfully requests that this Court grant permission to appeal from this 
Court's orders finding a conflict of interest and appointing Keith Roark, and that these post-I 
conviction proceedings be stayed pending resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 cd day of October, 2009. 
I ;Zf£~~ 
I Lead Counsel for Mr. dullah 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 23 
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 I I
,. Co-rrounseL for M . Abdullah 
\~O 
NICOLE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah 
--
--
I
 
I
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 
I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 23rd day of October, 2009, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as 
indicated below: 
SHAWNADUNN U.S. Mail I -­ROGER BOUlU\TE Statehouse Mail 
I 
-­ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE Facsimile ----,~200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 ~ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83702 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH -.X- U.S. Mail INMATE #76321 Statehouse Mail 
I 
-­
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile
 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery
 
BOISE ID 83707
 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON x U.S. Mail I -­
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE Statehouse Mail 
I 
-­
700 W STATE ST, 4TH FL Facsimile
 
BOISE ID 83720 __ Hand Delivery
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I AMENDED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 24 
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Administrative Assistant 
Capital Litigation Unit 
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AUG 17 2009
 
STATE APPELLATE
 
PI 1;::11 ri""' nr-r:E' l"E J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
 
, "--"_: '-':..It.:. ~ i\!U" R BV J. WEATHERBY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIef'5F 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
ORDER RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT
 
WITH TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it has come to the Court's attention that the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office may have been providing advice and support to the trial 
counsel both before the trial began and during trial. It is unclear the extent of that advice. In an 
abundance ofcaution, the Court orders both parties to address the following: 
1.	 the potential impact of this involvement, 
2.	 whether this creates a conflict of interest, I
 
3.	 the extent of that involvement, and 
4.	 whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
potential witnesses. 
Both parties shall simultaneously address the above issues and support their positions with 
citation to legal authority no later September 1, 2009. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 17th day of August 2009.
 
~~--
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
I The Supreme Court has presumed prejudice when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v.
 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708,64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this IIday of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MARK J. ACKLEY 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE. J 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703 F~J 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
ORDER RE: EFFECT OF SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney RECE1VED
 
Shawna Dunn AUG 31 2009 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney "'-f\-~ /\.'poELLAl'E[daho State Bar No. 2127 ~:::)lI"\' t: /"'\ ' 
200 West Front Str~ Room 3191 PUBUC DEFENDER 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH. ) 
) Case No. CV PC 2005 21802 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD 
) INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) TRIAL AND PRE·TRIAL 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and provides the following memorandum regarding the 
SAPD's involvement with trial and pretrial. 
The Court has instructed the parties to address: 
(1) the potential impact of [the] involvement [of the SAPD during the trial], 
(2) whether this creates a conflict 
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH), Page 
001747
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I
 
I (3) the extent of that involvement, and 
I (4) whether it makes the members of the State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
II 
potential witnesses. 
Taking issue #3 flI'St, the State is at a disadvantage in detennining the extent of the 
SAPD's involvement during trial. The State must rely on other sources for this 
I infonnation. The extent of the contact between the SAPD's office and trial counsel was 
II 
discussed at Mrs. Toryl!DSki's deposition. (KT's depo.'_~g. _22_~,__ln.1 - pg.240, 1n.IO) The 
State also previously asked the SAPD for information about their contact with trial 
counsel. In response, the SAPD provided the State documents attached as Exhibit #l. 
I The State relied on this accounting and an accompanying a5s~ce from Mr. Ackley that 
no conflict existed, and chose to take no further action. The State chose this course 
I based, in part, on an understanding ofcase law which indicates that the defense may be in 
the best position to foresee a conflict. 
I 
I An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the
 
best position professionally and ethically to detennine when a conflict
 
of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial,
 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,347 (1980) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
I As for whether there is a conflict of interest, again, the State has relied on Mr. 
Ackley's assurance that there was no actual conflict. Areas where conflict could be seen 
I 
I as existing are if the SAPD attorney staff are potential witnesses or if their advice led to 
what they are now claiming is reversible error. The September 15, 2004, email from Kim I Toryanski may give the reader pause. This email touches on Mrs. Toryanski's thoughts 
on a number of issues included as claims in the final petition, including the health of the 
I 
attorney-client relationship, ongoing discussions about whether Mr. Abdullah should 
testify and whether the petitioner would take a plea bargain. Each of those issues has 
I 
been discussed by Mrs. Toryanski in the deposition and she will be available to conunent 
on them further. If Mrs. Toryanski's comments are seen to deviate from the mood in the 
II l\fEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH), Page 
-
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email, the email may be used as impeachment and Mr. Ackley would have been a 
potential witness to admit the email. However, that would not be necessary because Mrs. 
Toryanski acknowledged foundation for the email in her deposition. (KT's depo, pg. 226, 
Ins. 19-20) 
There is an appearance of conflict which also evolves out of the September 3, 
2004, telephone conversation between Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey, with Mark 
Ackley present, where the SAPD suggested requesting a continuance. The defendant's 
speedy trial rights are the basis for a cbllm for relief. It seems concerniilg that the same 
counsel who would advise a continuance would then attack trial counsel's decision to 
request continuances. However, defense counsel requested a continuance September 
2004 and their request was denied. 
Next, the State will address the closely related issues of the potential impact of the 
involvement and whether it makes the members of State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office potential witnesses. Based on our current understanding of the conununications 
between the SAPD and trial cOW18el, the State does not intend to call any members of the 
SAPD attorney staff. The State spoke to Mr. Ackley about this issue some time ago, and 
Mr. Ackley stated he believed he could present Mr. Abdullah's case without putting 
himself or other attorneys in his office in the witness chair. 
Accordingly, based on the best infonnation available to the State, the State 
Appellate Public Defender attorney staff will not be called to testify at the evidentiary 
hearing. The State does not know the presence or extent of any waivers by Mr. Abdullah, 
which may further diminish or eliminate the impact on the UPCPA proceedings. 
To the extent that there may be additional communications the State is currently 
unaware of, the State seeks to retain an additional opportunity for briefing. 
MEMORANDUM RE: SAPD INVOLVEMENT IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 
(ABDULLAH). Page 
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I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this e;tirday of August, 2009. 
I 
I 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
I
 ~~ S aDmmI Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I
 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGI 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
I was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, 
I
 Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States Mail, this ~ay ofAugust 2009.
 \J1tA. -f4- -33~ -;;2. q ~~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
1 ShawnaDunn 
1 
'from: 
Sent: 
To: 
1 
Cc: 
SUbJect: 
Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
Friday. May 09.200812;12 PM 
Shawna Dunn; Roger Boume 
Shannon N. Romero 
Abdullah v. Stals: SPOT050030a • disclosure of correspondence between trIal counsel and 
the SAPO 
Attachments: F'N: Defense motion to be flied on TUesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
1 v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson: RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 31659 I formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
Shawna,I· This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the 
Toryanskis at the time of their representation of Azad Abdullah. I previously agreed to 
1 
I look for this correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such 
correspondence as contained in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your 
patience. 
I have located and attached the following: 
1	 1. Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim
 
Toryanski) and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).

1 a.. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been
 
additional correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence
 
I (although I have located summaries of a few conversations, see below).
 
2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly. 1 
a.	 Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to 
correspond with the attached email with the string of communications on1	 12/17/03 and apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding 
challenges to the death penalty statute. 
1 I have located but have not attached the following: 
I. A summary ofa telephone calIon 11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly I Huskey, written by Molly. The topics of the conversation included: 
a. The outcome of the trial; 1 b. Wh~theT our office files post-trial motions; and 
.. •	 4 •c. Mitch's retrospective assessment of the aggravation and the miti 
I 
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I evidence, the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof, and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as 
, 
Mitch's description of their varying degrees of their confidence during the 
course of the case and his hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings. 
, 2. A surrunary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. The topics of the conversation included: 
, a. Hearing on PSI; b. Fonnal sentencing scheduling; 
c. Amendments to ICR 32; 
II d. Whether we would attend the hearing; and e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure. 
II 3. An email summary Qf a written summary ofa telephone calIon 9/03/04 from Kim to Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I 
II may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files that they left behind after they left our office in 
October 2006. The topics of the conversation apparently included: 
II a. The Court closing the courtroom; 
b. Kline/Littlefield;
II c. Grounds to disqualifY Judge Copsey; d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence; 
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder;
II f. Kim's reference to commWlications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the prosecution's case; 
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed be did and for what he wouldII plead guilty; h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab 
II 4. An email summary {)fD- written SU1l11l1alY of an undated telephone conversation 
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17,2006. I have not yet 
'1 located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the 
I 
files that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics 
ofthe conversation apparently included: 
a. Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05; 
b. Residual doubt;
I c. Scope ofallocution;
 
I 
d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah 
regarding the events; and 
I 8121/2009 001752
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I 
I 
e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area 
of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not 
sure what this references]" 
I I have multiple concerns about the wisdom ofdisclosing these documents as they differ from the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries of correspondence, not the 
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess IJ whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could 
II 
or should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with 
my team and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the 
Toryanskis; perhaps they could check their offices again. 
II I sincerely invite your thoughts on tms matter; indeed, that is why I took the time to describe for you the contents of these summaries. 
II -Mark 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I
 
I
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I FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I Shawna Dunn 
I 
F.-om: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryenski.com] 
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM 
, 
To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
SUbJect: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
, 
M&M: 
FYI -- we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy ofthe 
''beads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request 
that tIle motion be filed under seal 
II K 
II ----Original Message-­From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.netJ Sent: Monday, September 06,2004 10:04 AM
 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
II Cc: kim@toryanski.com
 Subject: RE: Dofense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
II Judge Copsey: 
II I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings related to this motion be conducted in chambers. 
II Pat Owen 
~--OriginalMessage-­
From: Kim W. Toryansld [znailto:kim@torx'!lski.comJII Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday

II 
I I
 Judge Copsey:
 
'I 
The defense would like to advise you and the State that on 1'ucsday morning. 
we will be filing a motion [0 continue the trial. The grounds for the 
motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that 
during the course ofthis case, a sexual relatiombip existed between one of 
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead homicide 
I detective and case officer. 
I 
Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in 
the written motion. In Sl1IJDlJ.ary, we assert that the defendant has a 
I 8/21/2009 
141 008/023 
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08/31/2009 16:26 FAX 
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration ofthe 
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by 
virtue of tile relationsbip, wbecher the proseculox's ethical duties were 
affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police roles of 
conduct, whether evidence or wibless testimony may have been tainted or 
compromised in <;onneetion with the nature of the n:lationship. and whether 
prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the 
proceedings lIJld the proper adminislIation ofjustice is paramOWlt to all 
involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process. 
In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue. we have 
referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to inveStigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to 
88sert legal claims) ofthe ABA O\Iidelinc3 for the-Appointmcnt and 
Perfonnance ofDefense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003). 
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter whicb potentially Call5 into 
qu~stion all infonnation about the case, any conviction obtained may be 
vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are 
different and deserving of higher due process standards. 
Kim Toryansld. 
~ 009/023 
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I Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
I ShawnaDunn 
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From: Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com] 
Sent: Tuesday. September 07,20043:53 PM 
To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey· 
Subject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
So maybe there is one more appellate Issue for you two to address ifAzad 
gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds llD aggravator, and that 
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the 
"glory" ofbeinS tbe first fA> by a death case under- the new STAtute. 
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the 
deposition ofdetective littlefield, the one that Erika Klein had the affair 
with. The judge granted that!!! The prosecutor objeoted. but it fell 011 
deafem. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited, 
but the judge said no limitatODS on defense inqui1'y. I'm looking forward to 
taking the depo. 
The judge also said she would grant mare money to investigate things that 
need to be looked into regarding my concems about the screwups of the NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get SOme additional experts 
to advise me, and to testify. Agam, hooray. 
AU in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with 
me! 
JUI)' selection begins tomorrow tnoming at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go 
until 1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of 
the week. 
Will keep you posted. 
Kim 
8/21/2009
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I Shawna Dunn 
,
 
From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us]
 
Sent: Thursday. September 09, 2004 4:17 PM 
To: kim@toryanski.com 
, Subject: Penry v. Johnson 
Kim, 
II As I noted yesterday, my eo-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jUry selection. Kim 
II 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
rega.~ng whethez: mi.ti.gat.i.ng.. facts WQuJ.q "It\l;ll;t;er" to them (as worded by the 
defense> or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
II 
II 
"'l'e.ruy I did 'Dot hold tbae ehe mere meneion of -mitigat1ng o1rc:umseances· to a 
capital sentencing juxy satis£ies the Eighth Amendme:af=.. Nor does it stand for 
the proposition tbat it i6 Qonstitutionally suff~~1~t to intor.m the 
II 
jury that it may ·considern mitigating circumstances in de~iaing the 
appropriate aeneenee. Rat:her, the key under Pexu:y r is that e.he jury 
be able to "con.ider and aive e£fecc to fa defendant's .1tigatingJ 
evidence in izrz,posing seJ:lteDce." 492 u.s., at 319, 1.09 s.ce. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson v. TeXAz, 509 U.S. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658,125 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1993) (0 1CONNOR, J., dissenting) (IIrAl Ben~enc:er [lmiat] be allowed to giveII full oonsideraeion and fu11 effect to mielgating circumstanceSQ (emphasis in original». For ~t is on1y when the jury is given & ·v.hia~e Eor expressing its 
'reasoned mora1 response' to thae evidence in render~ ies se:a!=.encing decision." 
II Penry %. 492 U.S., at 329, 1.09 s.et. 2934, th.t we CaU be sure that the ~u:y Rhas t%'8A1:ed the Qe£enaant: All a 'uniQ;UtllJ.y i:a.cliviclual h1UlllU1 bCl;U1 [0]' and has JIlAde a r$liable dete~nation that death is the appropriate s8Dtence,u **1921 id •• at 319, 
II
 
1.09 S.Ct. 293~ (~oting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 r 304 r 305, 96 S.Ct.
 
2978,49 L.EQ.2d 944 (1976»."
 
(my emphasis added> 
In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror Whether they will 
~considerN mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give itf I 
effece; if ehey cannot, then they shOUld be exclUded for cause. 
fl Mark J. Ackley
 Idaho State ApPellate Public Defender
 Capital Litigation unit
 
mackley@sapd.seate.1d.us
 
I (206) 334-2712 
I
 
I
 
I 8/21/2009 001757
!
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
u
g Z t.i. .i. \.\ .o. 1t 1;t
se)
.Pe.r no cas lt 
e:al:
~t 
g 
t nr, th
a f e Ca 
ntence. U.S.
a s et
O-C "r ] :er mIl  
i sn
e  Dt:.e S
, S Ct
'8At ae£e : I q l
tion ante a .,
s.   ~ S  
.  
erN  
oul
 
p  
 
. e  
II 08/31/2003 16:27 FAX	 ~ 0 12/023 
I	 Page 10f2 
I ShawnaDunn 
, From: Kim W. Toryanski [klm@torysnski.comJ Sent: FrIday. September 10, 2004 6:45 AM 
, 
To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
II
 
Yes. Mark. this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words.
 
"give weight and valueH to mitigation evidence. and then give examples of our mitigation facts. but. as Shelley and
 
Kim have observed. we are forming the Questions with !he word ~consider" and we need to fix that. We'll work on
 
correcting that today.
 
II
 Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and wJttiinish at 5:00, but at Ieest today we-get.tunch..
 Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks.
 
II
 I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are in the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today?
 Kim 
II ·----original Message-­From: Mark Ackley [mallto;mackley@sapd.stal:e.ld.us] 
II 
sent: Thursday, september 09,20044:17 PM
 
To: kim@toryanski.com
 
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim. 
II As 1 noted yesterday, my co-counsel. K1mberly Simmons. and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to chern (as worded byII the defense) or whether they could 9imply ·consider" mitigating facts if 
II 
instructed by the Court (as wo~ded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 7~7 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on nUtigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury select1on: 
'1 "E~ r did not ho1d thae ehe mere meneio~ o~ ~tigating circumstances" to • ca.pit~1 sentencing jury sat:isfialll the Jl:iqhth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the proposition that it io const~tutionally sufficient to 
inform the jury that ie may ·consider- ~t1gat1ng ai:cumatances 
in decid.~ng tbe a.pp:r:op:r:iat::e seD~ence. Rather, the key undez: PenryI	 :I is that the jury be able to ·consider «J1d give effece to £11
 
defendant: 'II JJ1:ic.i.gat1.ngl ev:LdeAf;e in ~os1Dg selat:eZlce." 492 U.S.,
 
I
 ac 319 t 109 s.et. 2934 (emchAe!s added). Se. also Johnson v. Texa.~ 509 U.S.
 350, ~81, 113 S.Ct. ~658. 125 L.~d.2d 290 (1993) (O'OO~R. ~., dissenting)
 
I 
("[A] seneencer (must] be .11~e4 to give ~ull con8ideratiou and full effec~ 
to mitigae1ng circumst:.ncBS· (&mph••is ~ origina1». For i~ ~s on1y when ~a 
jury is given a "vehicle for exp~essiag its 'reasoned mo~al r ••ponse' to that 
evidence in rendertng iee se~tencing decision,- ~enry X, 492 U.S., at 329, 109 
I 
S.Ct. 2934, that .we cen bet sure that the ;uxy -haS treated the defendant: a. II 
, unique1y i:ndiviclual hwa.an bein [9J' and has made ~ reliable detezmiullticn that 
death is the appropria~8 sent:ence,· --1921 id., at: 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 
I 8121/2009 001758
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I 
I 
(QUoein~ woodBon v. Nor~h Carolin&, 428 U.S. 290, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 
L.Ed.2d 9~4 (1976))." 
(my emphasis added) 
, In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for causs. 
, Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
, mackley~sapd.state.id.us (206) 334-2712 
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I Shawna Dunn 
,
 
From: Kim W. TOlYanski {kim@toryenskl.com]
 
Sent: Wednesday, September 15,20047:09 AM 
To: Mark Ackley 
, 
SUbJect: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
, 
Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would 
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 ds of attempted murder, 
child endangerment), and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat 
II 
wrestling with our client to take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure 
on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney client relationship Is being affected because of this. 
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to 
take a plea. That relationship is being affected too. . 
The deal closes the dey we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jUry selection. We expect that to 
be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes into overdrive to bury our client 
II Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attomeys will not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
II The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated dally. Even the ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that 
II
 none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
 
II
 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse.
 
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not
 
close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the
 
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of these Jurors during voir dire.
 
II Kim
 
--Original Message--­
II
 From: Mark Acldey [mallto:mackJey@sapd,state.id.us]
 
tl 
Sent: Thursday, September 09,20044:17 PM
 
To: kJm@toryanskl,com
 
SubjeG1:: Penry v, Johnson
 
Kim, 
'I AS I no~ed yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jUry selection. Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whecner mitigating fac~s would Gmatter p to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply uconaider ft mitigating facts ifI instnlcted by the Court (as worcled by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jUry instructions on mitigation 
at· the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection:I 
~Penzy I did not hold that the mere mention of ft~t~gat~g eircumstaneesn to a 
I 
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capital Sen.tencing jury satisfies the Eighth AmeXl&aent. Nor does it stand 
I for the propoaition that it is const~tutiona11y 8ufficieDt to info%1ft the jury that: it may nconstdern mit!gatin" circumstaDces in deciding ehe app:c'opriate sentence. Rather, ~he key under Penry
, J: is eat. the jury be able to "consider aJ1d give effect eo [a defenda.ut's m:Ltigat;,ing] ftvidsl2ce in imposJ.ng se.nCaDcoe." 49~ u.s., 
at 319, 109 s.ce. 2934 (emphasis addva,. See a180 Johnson v. ~exaG, 509 u.s. 
, 350. 381. 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.~d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR. J., dissenting) (nrAJ sentenc~ [must] be a~10W8d eo give fu11 consideration and fu11 effect 
, 
to mitigating circumstances" (empha~i. in original». For it is only wben the 
jury is given a ·vehicle fo~ expressing its 'reaBoned mor~ response' to that 
evidence in rendering its seneencing decision." Penry ~. &92 U.S., a~ 32B, 109 
S. Ct. 2934, that: we can be Sure that the jury ·has treated the defendan~ as a 
II 
'uniquely individua~ 4uman bein[g], and ba. madv a re~iable determination that 
death 1s the appropriate sentence," **1921 id.• at 319, 109 S.ct. 2934 
(quotin~ Woo4Ron v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 a.Ce. 2978, 49 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1976».­
{my emphasis added) 
II In short. it seems that aimp¥ inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will ~consider~ mitigat~on is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can g~VG it: .f~.ct; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
II Mark J. Ackley Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
II mackley@sapd.etate.id.us (208) 334-2712 
II 
II 
II 
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I 
I 
I 
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State v. Abullah. Sup. Ct. No. 316591 fOmIerly H0201384I 
I Shawna Dunn 
,
 
From: Mitch Toryanskl (mitch@toryanskl.com]
 
Sent: Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM 
To: Mark Ackley 
SubJect: State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659 I formerly H0201384 
II Mark: 
II This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier rhis week. On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as eOUDScl from the 
II 
I!~e and ~ted tilat Y0lg Qffice tU~ a written notice ofsubstitution. 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy ofa letter from the clerk of the 
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on 
II 
Imposition ofDeath Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of1he 
reporter's transcript and clerks record. 
Mitch
 
Mitchell E. Toryanski
 
II 
II This transmission (including anacbments if any) is intended only for the 
use of the addrossee and may contain infonnation that is privileged, 
confidentia~ and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Conununication 
II 
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client 
or other privileges. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, or the employee 
or agent responsible for deliVering the message to the intended recipient, 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of 
tbis comnumicarion is strictly prohibited. Attomey/client or work product 
privileges are not waived by the tran&mission of this message. Ifyou haveII received this commlDlication in ertOJ:, please notify me immediately via e-mail at info@toryanski.com or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank: you. 
II 
'I 
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ShawnaDunn 
From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us} 
Sent: Wednesday, May 14,20089:26 AM 
To: Shawna Dunn 
Subject: RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT050030a - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
SAPO 
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received 
from Mitch Toryanksi This is thenote that I mJIDlParized in an email to you last week. 
It appears the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have not 
changed the note in any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every 
corinnunication, or note referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our 
appointment as Mr. Abdullah)s counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery 
disclosure attaching each of the conununications that I've already sent to you infonnally 
and in piece-meal fashion. If you have any questions, then please let me lmow. 
Mark 
MJH 11/24/04 Mill: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome oftrial. wanted to know ifwe filed post trial motions 
like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me that 
Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far outweighed 
the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young man, his father 
had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the mountains into 
Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church, he was 
affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there is 
no way a jury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He said of 
course with a first degree murder) people will find utter disregard. He said 
some of the jurors even wanted to find HAC, 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when txying to prepare 
the casc. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they knew 
the client was telling lies to them. 
HODes we can get the client some reliet 
812112009
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Shawna DunnII 
II 
From~ Mark AcI<ley [mackIEly@sepd.state.id.usJ
 
Sent: Friday, May 09, 20083:41 PM
 
To: Shawna Dunn 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 • disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and the 
I	 SAPO 
Shawna, 
I	 Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts, I guess I'm not sure what I expected, 
but upon further reflection, it was unreasonable-toexpectmy summary ofconversations 
not to raise a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your I concerns if not alleviate tliem completely. 
I	 Below is the 1/24/05 note ofmy conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 8/2112009 
MJA 1124/05 MIA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KT called: 
I. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m.• purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source ofdisagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out 
3. Q whether any amendnlents pending re ICR 32 - I told KT that I was 
not aware ofany at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing. but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through. 5000 pages of PSI. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that ifwe leave before the conc1wion 
of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell him that he is 
scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedme. I 
mered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury verdicts 
as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past. I mentioned the 
possibility ofcrafting a separation ofpowers argument, that the legislature 
cannot completely divest a district court jUdge ofits sentencing 
discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might be further 
considered 'Prior to sentencing. 
i 
001766
 
 
 
 
 
 
kl ley sepd. t t i  
 
 .
      
 h
1  
J
 -
 
 
 
 
 
  
    u  
pri
~ 021/023I 08/31/200916:29 FAX 
Page 1 of3 
I 
ShawnaDunn 
I From: Mark Ackley [mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
Sent: Friday, May 09. 2008 4~36 PM 
I To: Shawna Dunn 
SUbJect: Abdullah 'V. State: SPOT050030a • disclosure of correspondence belween trial counsel and the 
I SAPD Shawna, 
I
 The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator.
 
I 
At the time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter 
and Kimberly Simmons. In the course ofhis file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things 
[which is why I did not include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any 
conversations with the Toryanskis during their representation. When I prepared the below email, I 
referenced my notes contained on a legal pad. I have searched for those notes and my legal pad but I 
have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not take my flIe as I had suggested in myI email. 
Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am. giving you the email in its entirety, I including a conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted 
I 
somewhere in the same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference~ and just summarizing it, but 
on second thought I figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to 
visits I had with Azad after our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented 
I 
Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for 
national workload standards. As a result, I think I was offAzad's case pretty quickly and did not come 
back until October 2006. 
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to cOWlsel. I think you'll agree that 
those suggestions are not implicated by Azad's claims, but! suppose that could be a matter ofI interpretation. You will notice a reference below to the "El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to 
I 
State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify 
Judge Copsey. I don't think the grounds for disqualification are noted in the opinion, but the following 
was written in the Appellant's Brief, "The district court further found that Dr, Sanford's conclusions 
I 
were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on Mr. Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self­
serving reports:' The district court noted that Dr. Sanford did speak with one non-relative, a fonner 
employer. Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could only given Mr. Al-Kotrani one instruction 
at a time as Mr. Al-Kotrani would get confused. ifmore than one instruction was given. Further) Mr, Ai­
Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off" ifnot under constant supervision. The district court dismissed. 
Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very close." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40,I L.24; R, p.79.) . , . Accordingly, Mr, Al-Kotrani asserts that the district court erred in ruling that Dr, Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial w~ not credible because it 
took into consideration information obtained from Mr. Al-Kotrani's family. The district court further 
I erred in failing to cOI15ider information obtained from Mr. Muhanunad because he is ofthe same nationality of Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not 
significant." Ofcourse, trial counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any 
I
 claims based on their failure to do so.
 
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my 
I 
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I 08/31/2009 18:29 FAX	 141 022/023 
Page 2 of3 
I 
decision to disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
I -Mark 
I From; Mark Ackley 
I 
sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 10:47 AM 
To= Michael Shaw 
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. ThOmas; GUadalupe Ayala 
Subject: RE: Abdullah file dean up 
I Michael, I will go through my emails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It Includes some notes from IMSI Visits with AA that I am pretty 
certain were not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from 
conversafions -With, or In reference to; trial counsel. 
I From legal pad 
I 1. 12117/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concerned about everything being adequately preserved 
2. 9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad) 
I • Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed 
proceedings. Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have 
objected. [It looks like I suggested - "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial1 I 
• Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
I
 • Quotes attributed to Kim T. including. "Now more than ever.• .! could kick [Copsey]
 
I 
off: I indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's 
[racist] remarks. [This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (A1­
Kotrani) which we then faxed to them [this has been confirmed by sara] [It is not 
indicated. but I believe I suggested a motion to DQ] 
I 
• My thoughts reflected, "confidence sounds like L, Dunlap· (NOTE: this is a reference 
to the Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an 
acquittal]; quote attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since 
the beginning of the case 
I • Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove 
felony murder and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried 
I
 about Kim's confidence]
 
I 
• Reference to "weekly love letters· they [I believe "they' is a reference to trial 
counsel] sent to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks 
•	 Referencing AA. noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela) poured the 
gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson 
I­
I • References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the 
lab. Many things they are stll/ trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a 
motion to continue] 
I 8121/2009 
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II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
3, Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict 
for death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge) 
• Sentencing scheduled for 1121105 
•	 They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge said the law was 
well-seWed (not mitigation) 
•	 Judge limited the scope of AA allocution 
•	 They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this 
was in response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, -did the client 
ever confess to you.' 
•	 One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not 
sure what this references] 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 4843 
I MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
I 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. # 5888 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
I 
NO. ----~FFii":lF;=:ED;-----A.M -.:~·M.___:.._ 
'-­
SEP 0 12009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByE. HOLMES 
O!:PUW 
I 
IN THEDISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I
 AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH,
 
I
 Petitioner,
 
v. 
I
 
I STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent..
 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-003080 
) (fonnerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) RESPONSE TO COURT 
) ORDER INQUIRING INTO 
) THE PRETRIAL AND TRlAL 
) INVOLVEMENTOFTHESAPD 
) WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 
) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
I Petitioner Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel at the Office of the State 
I Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), hereby provides this response to the Court's August 
17, 2009 Order. In the order, this Court directed the parties to address the following 
I issues: (1) the potential impact of any pretrial and trial involvement the SAPD had with 
trial counsel; (2) whether the SAPD's past involvement creates a current a conflict ofI interest; (3) the extent of the SAPD's involvement; and (4) whether the SAPD's pretrial 
I and trial involvement with trial counsel makes members of the SAPD potential witnesses. 
Each issue identified by the Court will be evaluated in light of the following summary ofI 
I 
the relevant law governing conflicts of interests. 
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I I. 
RELEVANT LAW
 
I A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation.
 
I See State v. Severson, _ P.3d ------y 2009 WL 1492659 *4 (Idaho Supreme Court May 
29, 2009), citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Lovelace, 140 
I Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 285 (2003), citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); see 
I also State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2007). Although Idaho 
appellate courts have recognized a statutory right to post-conviction counsel with respect 
I to non-frivolous claims, our courts have yet to recognize a constitutionally grounded right 
I to appointed cOWlSel in post-conviction proceedings. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 793, 102 P.2d 1108, 1112 (2004); Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 
I 632 (Ct.App. 2006); see also I.C. §19-852(b); I.C. §19-4904. In the absence of a 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel, Idaho appellate courts neverthelessI 
recognize a petitioner's constitutional right to conflict-free representation with respect to 
I post-conviction counsel. See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-290, 17 P.3d 230,233­
234 (2000) ("Because these facts do not identify a conflict other than the one related to I the trial, they also fail to support the claim of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction 
I counsel as a result of a conflict of interest." (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S 335,347 
(1980»).
I The salient issue in conflict of interest cases is whether the interests of counsel 
I conflict with his or her client's interests, thereby compromising counsel's duty ofloyalty. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 688, 692 (1984) (recognizing that counsel laboring 
I under an actual conflict ofinterest breaches the duty of loyalty to his or her client, which 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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is "perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties."). "An 'actual conflict,' for Sixth 
I 
I Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's 
performance." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002). 
In Idaho, counsel has a duty to "act with commitment and dedication to the 
I 
I interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." (Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 (commentary).) Consistent with counsel's duty of 
zealous advocacy,counsel has an ethical duty not to represent a elient if that 
I 
I representation ''will be materially limited by a lawyer's responsibilities to another client, 
a fonner client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer...." LR.P.C. 
I 
1.7(a)(2): Trial courts generally rely on defense counsel's good faith and good judgment 
I to detennine, both professionally and ethically, whether a conflict of interest exists or 
will likely develop in the course of trial. Cuyler, 466 U.S. at 347 ("[11rial courts 
necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense 
I· counsel."). 
I . Based on established conflict of interest rules and precedent, even if one attorney 
in the SAPD office were found to labor under a conflict of interest based on prior contact 
I with trial counsel, that conflict cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See 
Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct I 
governing conflicts of interest, public defender offices are different from private law 
I firms, and conflict of one public defender cannot be imputed to public defender office). 
Rather, whether an individual public defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire I 
I 
1 Other potential conflicts of interest not implicated here or by the Court's order include 
those outlined in Rule 1.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and generally 
I 
involve financial, property, or business interests. See I.R.P.C. 1.8. 
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I public defender office is analyzed on a case-by-case basis, in light of whether the 
circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict of interest and a significant likelihood of 
I prejudice to the client. Id at *7; Only if the facts demonstrate both a potential conflict of 
I interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice will a conflict be imputed from an 
individual public defender to an entire public defender's office. Id. Even if such a 
I conflict exists, however, a client can waive the conflict through informed consent. Idat 
I *6. 
In addition to potential and actual conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer's 
I active representation of competing interests, a conflict may arise where a lawyer must act 
as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer "is [also] likely to be a necessary witness."I See LR.P.C. 3.7 (emphasis added). This Rule generally prohibits a lawyer from acting as 
I both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding unless: (1) the lawyer's testimony 
involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legalI 
services provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
I the client. LR.P.C.3.7(a). 
I II. THE SAPD'S MINIMAL PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND POST-TRIAL CONTACT WITH 
THE TORYANSKIS DOES NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
I 
I There is nothing about the SAPD's unsolicited and minimal pretrial, trial and 
post-trial contact with the Toryanskis that would give rise to a potential or actual conflict 
of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. In addition to the infrequency of such 
I contact, most (if not all) contact was initiated by the Toryanskis. The SAPD's limited 
I responses included referring trial counsel to well-established case law and directing 
counsel to follow existing legal standards. Significantly, the limited advice given to trial 
I RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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counsel by the SAPD is not the basis of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
I raised by Mr. Abdullah. 
I Most notably, during her deposition, Ms. Toryanski testified about the limited 
nature and scope of her discussions with Mr. Ackley during the course of representing 
I Mr. Abdullah. 
I [MR. ACKLEY]. Okay. I will go on with the similar questions that I 
I 
asked with the other attorneys even though they may seem silly. I'm 
sorry. But did you ever pay me at all to, like, help represent yon in 
this case? 
[MS. TORYANSKI]. No, no, no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? 
I A. No. Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any discovery? 
A. No. 
I 
I Q. Okay. Are there any other attorneys that you recall speaking to at all 
I 
about this case? We have gone through Chuck· Peterson, Dennis 
Benjamin, Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David Nevin, Joan Fisher, and 
myself. 
I Q. .., I'm trying to draw a distinction between, like, casual 
I 
conversations, running into the hall, popping an idea off of someone 
versus like, "Let's sit down and really st:rategize and give me some advice 
how to proceed. II So with those two things in niind, where would you put 
Dennis Benjamin? 
A. Oh, he's at the top. I Q. Okay. And that was primarily li~ited to the death penalty motions? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And Chuck Peterson? I A. Chuck. Where on the spectrum? Q. In terms of someone that you relied upon to assist you in your 
representation of Azad.I A. I didn~ rely on Chuck at all. Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm just trying to go through. Teresa Hampton? 
A. She helped in the way that I have already described. I Q. SO in the limited fashion ofjury selection? 
RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL I INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 5 . 
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I A. And talking to a client about a possible plea, about the plea that had been offered. 
Q. David Leroy? 
I A. Same as Teresa Hampton. Q. David Nevin? 
I 
A. Slightly more. He's slightly before Chuck Peterson on the scale, but 
David didn't help. 
Q. Okay. Joan Fisher? 
A. Where is she on the scale? 
I Q. Uh-huh. A. Way at the bottom. 
Q. Myself? 
I A. At the bottom. Q. I'm not taking it personally. I'm just trying to -- okay. 
A. I don't even know ifYOll are really on - I mean, we'd talked t but I 
never really felt that you even were in on the chart.I Q. As far as you're aware, did I know anything about the case other 
than what you were conveying to me in your conversation? 
A. No.I (Addendum A, p.232, Ls.l-12; p.237, Ls.20-24; p.238, L.13 - p.240, L.10 (emphasis 
I' added).) Thus, trial counsels' discussions with the SAPD and its counsel were minimal at 
best. To the extent any legal advice was even arguably conveyed, it was necessarily I limited given the SAPD's lack ofknowledge and involvement in the case. (Addendum A, 
I p.232, Ls.7-12 ("Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to Azad? A. No. Q. Okay. Did 
you ever give me any discovery? A. No."); p.240, Ls.7-10 ("Q. As far as you're aware, 
I did I know anything about the case other than what you were conveying to me in your 
I conversation? A. No.").) Further, Ms. Toryanski indicated that she did not rely on any 
advice from the SAPD in the course of representing Mr. Abdullah. See generally 
I Addendum A. Similarly, Mr. Abdullah has not alleged any claim of ineffective 
I
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assistance of counsel that would be inconsistent with any advice arguably given by the 
I SAPD or its counsel.2 
I A. The Minimal Unsolicited Contact Between The SAPD And The Toryanskis Is Insufficient To Give Rise To A Potential Or Actual Conflict OfInterest 
I No pretrial, trial or post-trial contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis gives 
rise to a potential or actual con:.t1ict of interest between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. 
I 
I Such contacts were minimal, and do not fonn the basis of any claims that Mr. Abdullah 
has raised regarding the ineffective assistance of his counsel. The Toryanskis contacted 
the SAPD office on a handful of occasions during their pretrial, trial, and post~trial 
I 
I representation of Mr. Abdullah~ The majority of this contact occurred via email, and was 
initiated by the Toryanskis. (See Emails from Mark Ackley to Shawna Dunn, with 
attached documents, containing actual emails exchanged between the Toryanskis and the 
I 
I SAPD, as well as summaries of other contacts between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, 
attached hereto as Addendum B.) Exhibits to Kim Toryanski's deposition include emails 
between the SAPD office and Kim Toryanski, and are generally representative of the 
I limited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel. (See Addendum A.) 
I
 1. September 9, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 9
 
During her deposition, Kim Toryanski acknowledged that Mr. Ackley's email to 
I her, dated September 9, 2004, was "probably responding to me even though the e-mail 
I starts with a communication from you, apparently." (Addendum 3, p.227, Ls.2-17 & 
I 2 Even if this were the case, which it is not, then it would still not, in and of itself, create a 
conflict of interest. Trial counsels' decisions and performance are at issue; in short, 
advice or comments from outside lawyers did not and could not relieve trial counsel from I their independent, personal and professional obligations under the Sixth Amendment. 
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I Exhibit 9.) In that email.Mr. Ackley infonned Ms. Toryanski that it had come to his 
attention that she and her co-counsel, Mitch Toryanski, were asking prospective jurors 
I questions about mitigating evidence and in doing so, were asking the legally incorrect 
I question. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.14 - p.228, L.16 & Exhibit 9.) Mr. Ackley directed 
Ms. Toryanski to relevant case .law for the governing legal standard in questioning 
I prospective jurors about mitigating evidence, which Ms. Toryanski acknowledged she 
I and Mr. Toryanski were applying incorrectly during jury selection. (Addendum 3, p.227. 
L.14 - p.228, L.18 & Exhibit 9.) During her deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute 
I the authenticity or authorship of this email. (Addendum 3, p.227, L.2 - p.228,L.18.) 
2. September 15, 2004 Email- Deposition Exhibit 10 I On September 15, 2004. Ms. Toryanski sent an email to Mr. Ackley in which she 
I discussed the following issues: (1) plea negotiations in Mr. Abdullah's case and her belief 
that a plea offer had been made; (2) Mr. Abdullah's insistence on testifying despite being I informed that counsel would not put him on the stand; (3) conflicts between trial counsel 
I and Mr. Abdullah due to Mr. Abdullah's refusal to plead guilty despite trial counsel 
putting tremendous pressure on him to do so; (4) conflicts between trial counsel and I Mr. Abdullah and his increasing unwillingness to follow trial counsels' advice; and (5) 
I Ms. Toryanski's feelings about the prospective jury panel and their inclination to impose 
the death penalty in Mr. Abdullah's case. (Addendum 3. Exhibit 10.) During her 
I 
I deposition, Ms. Toryanski did not dispute the authenticity or authorship of this email, and 
did not deny that it contained her feelings about Mr. Abdullah and his case at the time it 
was written. (Addendum 3, p.230, L.lO -p.231, L.25.)
I 
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3. Other Communications 
I 
I Ms. Toryanski also discussed other emails and telephone conversations that she 
and Mr. Toryanski had with the SAPD through Mr. Ackley and Molly Huskey. 
(Addendum 3, p.232, L.13- p.23?, L.19.) Ms. Toryanski identified the following issues 
I 
I as having been discussed in those emails and conversations: (1) the affair between the 
prosecutor and the lead detective;. (2) whether to move to recuse Judge Copsey; 
(3) Ms. Toryanski~s inclination to request a conti11t1at1Ce; and (4) issues arising post-
I 
I verdict, but prior to judicial sentencing on the non-death eligible offenses. (Addendum 3, 
p.232, L.13 - p.237, L.19.) 
Beyond these communications identified by Ms. Toryanski, the Toryanskis also 
I 
I faxed orders to Molly Huskey and requested advice as to whether permissive appeals 
from this Court's adverse rulings would be appropriate, and further faxed motions and 
memoranda challenging the constitutionality of the then new death penalty statute, which 
I 
I trial counsel had filed with this Court. (See Addendum !!.) There were a handful of 
additional communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD, involving 
primarily procedural matters post-jury verdict.
 
I The State, through Shawna Dunn and Roger Bourne, was provided with copies of
 
I written communications between the Toryanskis and the SAPD, in addition to summaries 
of verbal communications initiated by the Toryanskis with the SAPD. (See Addendum 
I B.) This information was provided by the SAPD to Ms. Dunn and Mr. Bourne via email 
I over a month before depositions ofKim and Mitch Toryanski were conducted. Ms. Dunn 
was present for both depositions but declined to question either of the Toryanskis 
I regarding their contact with the SAPD office. (See Addendum 3, passim; Addendum 9 
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I (Deposition of Mitch Toryanski), passim.) In addition, the State has failed to raise any 
concerns about a potential conflict between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah based on these 
I contacts. To the contrary, it is undersigned counsels' understanding that the State 
I evaluated this information and decided that no conflict between the SAPD and 
Mr. Abdullah existed. 3 This understanding is bolstered by the fact that the State has not 
I filed a motion regarding a potential conflict of interest, and presumably would have done 
I so if the communications between the SAPD and trial counsel had raised the specter of a 
conflict, potential or actual. 
I Given the nature of the contact between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, and the 
I fact that the Toryanskis have not contested the content and nature of the contacts with the 
SAPD, it is difficult to see how a conflict of interest between the SAPD and 
I Mr. Abdullah could arise as a result of these communications and contacts. The SAPD 
I provided a receptive ear for trial counsels' concerns and frustrations during their 
representation of Mr. Abdullah, which involved a minimal amount of interaction. The 
I SAPD gave limited advice to trial counsel, based both on observations of counsels' 
failure to follow established legal standards and on trial counsels' statements to the I SAPD regarding aspects of their representation of Mr. Abdullah. The SAPD remained 
I 
I 3 The Court ordered simultaneous briefing from the parties. Mr. Abdullah expects the 
State to concur with his analysis. However, in the event the State alleges the existence of 
a conflict in its briefing to this Court, such an allegation should be reviewed with extreme 
I 
cautions. See e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,163 (1988) ("[T]he Government 
may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent a defendant from having a 
particularly able defense counsel at his side; [accordingly] trial courts... must take it into 
I 
consideration along with all of the other factors which inform" a decision involving an 
alleged conflict of interest.); Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F.Supp. 
949,954 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Motions to disqualify should be reviewed with extreme caution 
I 
for they can be misused as a technique [] of harassment.") (internal quotations omitted). 
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah reserves the right to respond to the State's briefing if the State 
alleges a disqualifying conflict of interest. 
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cognizant of the potential for a conflict of interest that could possibly arise if the SAPD 
I were to provide in-depth, frequent and detailed advice to trial counsel throughout their 
I representation ofMr. Abdullah, and therefore, did not engage in any such involvement in 
Mr. Abdullah's case. 
I There is nothing about the contacts between trial counsel and the SAPD, 
I particularly when viewed in light of the Final Petition, that gives rise to the inference that 
the SAPD's interests, or those of Mr. Ackley or Ms. Huskey, conflict with 
I 
I Mr. Abdullah's interests, or in any way compromise the SAPD's, Mr. Ackley's and/or 
Ms. Huskey's duty of loyalty to Mr. Abdullah. To the contrary, the SAPD's efforts, 
through Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, to direct trial counsel to follow existing standards 
I 
I and to raise relevant legal issues is consistent with Mr. Abdullah's interest in receiving a 
fair trial. Moreover, nothing about the contact between the SAPD, through Mr. Ackley 
and Ms. Huskey, and trial counsel, implicates the SAPD's commitment and dedication to 
I 
I the interests ofMr. Abdullah and zealous advocacy on his behalf, or materially limits the 
SAPD's representation ofMr. Abdullah.4 
I 
Under these circumstances, given the nature of the limited and primarily 
I unsolicited contact between the SAPD and trial counsel, there is no inference of a 
potential or actual conflict of interest between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah arising from 
such contact. Ibis is particularly true where trial counsel has not disputed the nature and 
I 
I 4 Notably, the SAPD has previously conducted an internal evaluation of whether a 
. potential or actual conflict of interest exists between the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah, given 
the SAPD's limited pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with trial counsel. The SAPD'sI internal evaluation, conducted in light of prevailing standards of practice and professional conduct, resulted in the conclusion that no conflict of interest, potential or actual, exists. 
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I content of their contacts with tbe SAPD, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey,S and the State 
I 
has not alleged any concerns about such contacts. Simply put, the pretrial, trial and post-
I trial contact between trial counsel and the SAPD has not, does not, and cannot create 
conflicting interests between Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD. To the contrary, the nature 
I 
and content of contact between trial counsel and the SAPD supports Mr. Abdullah's 
I claims that trial counsel were ineffective. Thus, there is no conflict of interest between 
Mr. Abdullah and the SAPD based on contacts the SAPD had with trial counsel pretrial, 
during trial, and post-verdict. Perhaps the more important question is whether the 
I SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-trial contact with trial counsel renders Mr. Ackley and/or 
I Ms. Huskey necessary witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, thereby creating a potential 
conflict of interest. 
I B. The SAPD's PretriaL Trial And Post-Trial Contact With Trial Counsel Does Not 
I 
Constitute A Conflict Of Interest Between The SAPD And Mr. Abdullah, Even If 
That Contact Renders Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Potential Witnesses At An 
Evidentiary Hearing . 
The limited pretrial, trial and post-trial contact between the SAPD and trial I 
counsel does not render Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey likely witnesses at an evidentiary 
I hearing, and thus does not constitute a conflict of interest or require disqualification of 
the SAPD. Even assuming the limited contact between Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey I 
and trial counsel renders either or both likely necessary witnesses on Mr. Abdullah's 
I behalf at an evidentiary hearing, such status does not create a conflict of interest between 
the SAPD and Mr. Abdullah. 
I 
I 
S Indeed, it would be extremely troubling if trial counsel were able to create a conflict of 
interest with appellate and/or post-conviction counsel by initiating unsolicited contact 
with counsel and/or by disclosing infonnation to such counsel which was otherWise 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
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In relevant part, Rule 3.7 ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct precludes an 
I attorney from acting as an "advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a 
I necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a) (Emphasis added.) Despite this prohibition, Rule 3.7 
recognizes three exceptions to the advocate-witness rule: (1) the lawyer's testimony 
I involves an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony goes to the nature and value of legal 
I seIVices provided in the case; or (3) disqualification would work substantial hardship on 
the client. I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). The pU11'0se ofthe advocate-witness rule is to prevent-the trier 
I 
I of fact from being "confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and 
witness[,]" and to ensure that opposing counsel will not suffer prejudice resulting from 
the lawyer's dual role before the jury. LR.P.C. 3.7, commentary ~~ 2,3. 
I 1. The Advocate-Witness Rule Is Not Implicated In Proceedings Before A 
Judge 
I 
I Where, as here, the testimony of Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would occur at a 
hearing before a judge, rather than a trial before a jury, the possibility of confusion of 
I 
roles and prejudice to opposing counsel is non-existent. Moreover, Rule 3.7 explicitly 
I prohibits a lawyer from assuming a dual-role at trial, but does not prevent a lawyer from 
pretrial participation in a case as both an advocate and witness. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 
840 So.2d 962, 970 (Fla.2002) (holding that the purpose of advocate-witness rule, i.e., to 
I preyent prejudice to opposing counsel and/or avoid a conflict of interest, was not 
I implicated where the prosecutor was called as a rebuttal witness by the petitioner in a 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing before a judge); see also State v. Van Dyck, 827 A.2d 
I 192, 195 (N.H. 2003) ("Unlike a jury, a judge is unlikely to confuse the roles of advocate 
I and witness or to deem an attorney credible simply because he is an attorney."); cf. 
I 
Dimartino v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 66 P.3d 945,946 (Nev. 2003) (adopting the 
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I majority approach which does not require pretrial disqualification of an attorney who 
may be called as a witness at trial). As a result, 1.R.P.C. 3.7 is not implicated where 
I 
I testimony from attorneys at the SAPD, if offered, would not occur at a jury trial, but 
would take place before a judge acting as a fact-finder. 
2. Mr. Ackley And/Or Ms. Huskey Are Not Likely To Be Necessary Witnesses 
I Even assuming I.R.P.C. 3.7 is implicated at a proceeding where a judge is the 
trier of fact rather than a jury, Rule 3.7 only applies if the lawyer is "likely to be a I 
­
necessary witness." I.R.P.C. 3.7(a). At this point, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
I only implicated as potential witnesses in the event that trial counsel deny making 
I statements to Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey which are relevant to Mr. Abdullah's post-
conviction claims for relief. 
I As previously noted, Ms. Toryanski has already acknowledged that she and co­
counsel had a limited number of communications with the SAPD during the course ofI 
their representation of Mr. Abdullah. With respect to the September 15,2004 email sent 
I by Ms. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley, Ms. Toryanski acknoWledged writing the email and 
admitted that it contained her feelings and thoughts at that time, both about Mr. Abdullah I 
and his case. (Addendum 3, p.228, 1.19 - p.231, 1.25.) If Ms. Toryanski recants her 
I deposition testimony, such recantation would possibly render Mr. Ackley a necessary 
witness ifthe recantation involves testimony relevant to one ofMr. Abdullah's claims for 
I post-conviction relief. However, the possibility of a need for the testimony of counsel, 
I however, is insufficient to meet the necessity or likely to be a "necessary witness" 
standard of Rule 3.7. See World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists, 866 F.Supp. 1297, 
I 1302 (D.Colo. 1994); Fognani ·v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[O]pposing 
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counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture, and 
I 
I disqualification can occur only after facts have been alleged that demonstrate a potential 
violation ofthe Rule"); Van Dyck, 827 A.2d at 194 (witness is only necessary ifhis or her 
testimony is relevant, material and cannot he obtained elsewhere); Bradford v. State, 734 
I 
I So.2d 364, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) ("The necessity standard requires more than 
mere speculation that counsel will be required to testify."). A lawyer is a necessary 
witness "ifhis or her testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere:' Warld 
I 
I Youth Day, 866 F.Supp. at 1302. Where it is not clear whether an advocate's testimony 
will be necessary, a court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can 
determine whether another witness can testify. Id 
I 
I The necessity for Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey to testify hinges on a sequence 
of events unlikely to come to fruition. First, trial counsel must testify contrary to their 
written andlor verbal communications with Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey.6 Second, the 
I
 
I verbal andlor written communications with the SAPD must be relevant.7 Third,
 
Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey must be the only source for the relevant information.
 
Where, as here, there is a fair amount of evidence, including documents and deposition
 
I testimony, confirming trial counsels' statements, the testimony of Mr. Ackley andlor
 
Ms. Huskey would likely not be the only source for the relevant infonnation. See
I 
Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1274 (Colo. 2005) (necessity requires consideration of 
I 6 Of course, if trial counsel 'offer testimony consistent with their verbal and written 
communications with the SAPD, then there would be no need or occasion for Mr. Ackley
I andlor Ms. Huskey to testify. 
I 
7 Because the relevance of testimony from Mr. Ackley andlor Ms. Huskey cannot be 
.determined until trial counsel testify and until this Court detennines that the testimony 
I 
involves a genuine issue of material fact, the relevance inquiry cannot be adequately 
addressed. 
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I the nature of the testimony, weight of the testimony in resolving the disputed issues, and 
I 
the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence which might establish the 
I relevant issues); State 'Y. Schmitt, 102 P.3d 856, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To 
demonstrate compelling circumstances [that would justify disqualification], a party must 
show that the attorney will provide material evidence unobtainable elsewhere."); Utley v. 
I City ofDover, 101 S.W.3d 191,202 (Ark. 2003) (declining to disqualify lawyer where 
I 
- -- ­
moving party failed to demonstrate lawyer's testimony could not be gained from other 
sources); Harter 'Y. Plains Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 625, 632 (S.D. 1998) (lawyer not a 
I necessary witness where documentary evidence on subject of lawyer's intended 
I testimony admitted into evidence at trial). As a result, Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey 
would not be necessary witnesses because the evidence gained from their testimony could 
I be obtained from other sources. 
3. Disqualification Of The SAPD Would Cause Substantial Hardship ToI Mr. Abdullah 
Finally, assuming that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey would otherwise beI 
necessary witnesses, such status would not necessarily disqualify the SAPD from 
I representing Mr. Abdullah if such "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client." I.R.P.C 3.7(a)(3). Even if a lawyer will act as both an advocateI 
and witness in the same proceeding, and this dual role may prejudice opposing counsel, 
I "in detennining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must Oe given to 
the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client." I.R.P.C. 3.7, cmt. ~4. Thus,I substantial hardship involves consideration of inter alia the length of the attorney's 
I representation of the client, closeness of the trial to the request to disqualify. the amount 
and type of legal work already conducted by counsel, the financial burden of retainingI RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
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new counsel, and the client's right to choice ofcounsel.8 Nat'[ Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E. 
I Myers Co. Group, 937 F.Supp. 279, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (substantial hardship 
I where law firm represented client for twelve years, case was a month away from trial, 
counsel had done significant amount of substantive' work on case, client would be denied 
I choice of counsel and client would suffer financial burden); D.J Inv. Group, L.L. C. v. 
I DAElWestbrook, L.L.e., 113 P.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (substantial 
hardship existed where case had been pending for 3 years, parties litigated numeroos 
I complex legal issues, nearly all witnesses had been disposed, and parties had exchanged 
I written discovery). 
Here, the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah since 2005. Specifically, 
I Mr. Ackley has personally represented Mr. Abdullah since late 2006 and Ms. Huskey has 
I been the SAPD during the entirety ofMr. Abdullah's post-conviction case. Mr. Ackley is 
lead counsel for Mr. Abdullah and is on the Idaho Supreme Court's roster of capital 
I 
8 The importance of the attorney-client relationship is sacrosanct in AmericanI jurisprudence. It is fundamental, that once the attorney client relationship is fonned, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attomey­
client relationship takes effect." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,290 n.3 (l988)(citing I Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The constitutional safeguards include the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the accused has the right to rely on counsel and 
"imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's I choice to seek [that] assistance." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171. Once appointed counsel has established an attorney-client relationship with an indigent defendant, that 
relationship is no less inviolate than if counsel bad been retained. See Morris v.I S[appy, . 461 U.S. I, 22-23 & n. 5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in result) ("considerations that may preclude recognition ofan indigent defendant's right to choose 
his own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant's interest in 
I continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence"); Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex. 
Cr.App. 1989)("Once counsel has been validly -appointed to represent an indigent
I defendant and the parties enter into an attomey-client relationship it is no less inviolate than if counsel is retained."). 
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I defense counsel. After extensive litigation and review of an extraordinary number of 
documents, Mr. Abdullah's case is finally proceeding to an evidentiary hearing which, in 
I 
I the world of post-conviction, ~s the functional" equivalent of a trial. The amount of time 
that new counsel would need not only to get up to speed in Mr. Abdullah's case, but also 
to establish a meaningful and trusting relationship with Mr. Abdullah, while difficult to 
I 
I assess is obviously great 
Because disqualification of the SAPD and Mr. Ackley specifically, would result 
I 
in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah, Rule 3.7 does not require disqualification even 
I assuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses. If Mr. Ackley and/or 
Ms. Huskey are likely, necessary witnesses and the court concludes no substantial 
hardship would result from disqualifying the SAPD office, based on established conflict 
I of interest rules and precedent, even if some attorneys in the SAPD office are found to 
I labor under a conflict of interest because they are necessary witnesses, that conflict 
cannot be imputed to the entire SAPD office. See Severson, 2009 WL 1492659 at *7-8 
I (pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest, public 
defender offices are different from private law firms, and conflict of one public defender I 
cannot be imputed to public defender office). Rather, whether an individual public 
I defender's conflict should be imputed to an entire public defender office is analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis, in light ofwhether the circumstances demonstrate a potential conflict I 
of interest and a significant likelihood of prejudice. Id at *7. Only if the facts 
I demonstrate both a potential conflict of interest as well as a significant likelihood of 
prejudice will a conflict be imputed from one public defender to an entire public I defender's office. Id. 
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Here, as previously analyzed, there is neither an actual nor a potential conflict of 
I 
I interest arising from the SAPD's contact with trial counsel. Even assuming a potential 
conflict based on that contact, and presuming Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are 
necessary witnesses based on that contact, there is no significant likelihood of prejudice 
I 
I which would justify imputing the conflict to entire SAPD office. Any testimony that 
would be offered by Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey regarding their pretrial, trial or post­
trial contact with trial cOilIlsel would serve only to support Mr. Abdullah's elaims. The 
I 
I only possible "significant likelihood of prejudice" would be if this Court were 
predisposed to disregard the testimony ofMr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, simply because 
they are attorneys for Mr. Abdullah. This possibility aside, there is no significant 
I likelihood ofprejudice that would justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office. 
I III. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
I For the reasons set forth above, the SAPD's pretrial, trial and post-verdict contact 
with trial counsel does not create a conflict of interest and does not render Mr. Ackley 
and/or Ms. Huskey necessary Witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. Assuming 
I arguendo Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey are necessary witnesses, disqualification of the 
I SAPD would result in a substantial hardship to Mr. Abdullah. Finally, even if this Court 
were to conclude that no substantial hardship would result from the disqualification of 
I Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Huskey, there is no significant likelihood ofprejudice that would 
I justify disqualifying the entire SAPD office. 
I
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I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 15t day ofSeptember, 2009. 
I 
I 
I 
I U tlLLLU' 
I 
NICdiE OWENS 
Co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have. on this 1st day of September. 2009. served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER INQUIRING 
INTO THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE SAPD WITH TRIAL 
I COUNSEL as indicated below: 
I SHAWNADUNN 
I 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT. SUITE 3191 
BOISE ill 83702 
I AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH 
I 
INMATE #76321 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX51 
BOISE ID 83707 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
~ Hand Delivery 
..L...- U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
__Hand Delivery 
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Abdullah v. State of Idaho 6/19/2008	 Kim W. Toryanski 
Page 226 ~ n 
1	 Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Beyond Joan Fisher and ~,
2 the other attorneys that you spoke to in varying ~ 
3 degrees in this case, did you also contact me on I 
4 occasion?	 i 
~ 
i 
5 A. Yeah, because you and I had met at a
 
6 conference, I think. Litigating for Life, maybe?
 
7 And also Dennis Benjamin was referring to you. I
 
8 was just reminded of that in an e-mail that you
 
9 had shown me as an exhibit here. I mean, Dennis,
 
~o he would call you guys M and M, Molly and Mark. 
11 You know, "What do Molly and Mark say?" 
12 Q. Okay. And I am going to show you 
13 what's been marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 and 
14 10? Sorry about the coloring on that. 
15 A. That's okay. These are e-mails. 
16 Exhibit 9 is dated -- this is e-mails from me to 
17 you. Exhibit 9 is dated September 10, 2004. This 
18 was after the jury selection had commenced. 
19 Exhibit 10 is also an e-mail from me to you, and 
20 it's dated September 15th, 2004, five days later. 
21 Q. And the first one, what was the date on 
22 that, again? I'm sorry. 
23 A. September -- 9 is September. Exhibit 9 
24 is September 10. 
25 Q. That was after jury selection? 
I Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
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Page 227 " 
1 A. 
2 Q. 
3 there a 
4 there? 
5 A. 
6 from you 
Had begun. 
Okay. And were there questions? Was 
discussion, then, about jury selection 
Let's see. Maybe this is an e-mail 
to me in which I respond because of, "As
 
~ 
f 
~ 
~ 
~ 
7 I noted yesterday." You're probably responding to 
8 me even though the e-mail starts with a 
9 communication from you, apparently. 
10 Q. Yeah, there are multiple e-mails 
11 actually reflected in that document; is that 
12 right? 
13 A. Dh-huh. 
14 Q. So just start with the earliest one. 
15 A. Okay. Which is September 9. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. Then you're writing to me. You're 
U telling me that Kimberly Simmons and the 
19 mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill observed a 
20 portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted 
21 that there was some contention regarding questions 
22 to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
23 facts would matter to them, as worded by the 
24 defense, or whether they could just simply 
25 consider mitigating facts if instructed by the 
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Abdullah v. State of Idaho 6/19/2008 Kim W. Toryanski 
,
Page 228 !· 
I~ 
court as worded by the judge. The case of Penry ~ 
2
 versus Johnson dealt with jury instructions on 
3
 mitigation at close of the case. There is a 
·
 
4 relevant portion that may have application for you ~ 
· 
5 during jury selection. And then you recited -­
6 Q. -- some of the language from the Penry 
7
 cases?
­
8 A. Yes. And then I say, Yes, Mark this
 I
 
9
 helps us a lot. And we've been intending to ask I
 
10
 the mitigation questions using the words weight -- l 
~ 11
 give weight and value to mitigation evidence and I
 
~ 12 then give examples of our mitigation facts. But i
 
13 as Shelley and Kim have observed, we are forming I
 
14 the questions with the word consider, and we need
 
15 to fix that. We'll work on correcting that today.
 
16 It will be a long day.
 
17 Q. Okay. So those string of e-mails have
 
18 to deal with jury selection type questions?
 
19 A. Oh, yes. And then the September 15th
 
20 one, just like you've indicated -- oh, it's again
 
21 responding to that same e-mail about the
 
22 observations, plea negotiations with the
 
23 prosecutor's office have progressed and we were
 
24 told that they would accept them -- Oh, okay.
 
25 Q. Could you continue reading that?
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Page 229 
A. One count of first degree murder, 
2 dismiss all other five charges, arson, three 
3 counts of attempted murder, child endangerment 
4 with no aggravators. And there were aggravators 
S that were presented at sentencing. Of course, we 
6 are going to the mat 
7 Q. Could you slow down for the court 
8 reporter? 
9 A. Oh, okay. You're here. 
10 that. 
11 MR. ACKLEY: Do we need to start over on 
12 that? 
13 THE REPORTER: Yeah, when you say could 
14 continue reading that. 
1S THE WITNESS: Dismiss all other five 
16 charges, parentheses, arson, three counts of 
17 attempted murder, child endangerment. And no 
18 aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of 
l.9 course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our 
20 client to take the deal. Unbelievably he's 
2l. resisting. Day by day we're putting more pressure 
22 on him to take the deal. He continues to resist. 
23 Our attorney/client relationship is being affected 
24 because of this. He has become hostile and angry 
2S that we are encouraging a plea. His family seems 
Tucker and Associates, Boise, Idaho, (208) 345-3704 
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Page 230
 
~ 
to support his decision not to take a plea. That ~ I

relationship is being affected too. ~ 
Want me to read the whole thing? 
Q. BY MR. ACKLEY: Yes, please. 
A. The deal closes the day we begin to 
exercise our peremptory challenges in jury 
selection. We expect that to be next Tuesday or ~ ~ 
Wednesday. After that the prosecution goes into ~ i ~ 
overdrive to bury our client. ! 
;; 
I 
~ 
Q. Does that seem to be an accurate
 
reflection of how you were feeling at the time? I
 
~ 
What's the date on that one? September 10th? ~ 
EA. 15th. 
~ 
I
 Q. 15th. So jury selection began, I : 
! 
think, on the 7th, and my notes reflect that the ~ 
record says that the state's case-in-chief started" 
on the 27th. So basically there is 20 days. Not 
all those dates, obviously, were jury selection, 
but there is a 20-day span there. You are about 
halfway through at that point? 
A. Yep. 
Q. So at that point, at least at that 
time, you felt like your attorney/client 
relationship was suffering because of these 
discussions about the plea bargain? 
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Page 231 
~ A. I am writing that that's how I feel. 
2 Q. Okay. So is it fair say -- I mean, 
3 obviously the passage of time does affect people's ~ 
~ 4 memory. Would you supplement your testimony ~ 
5 earlier today about the relationship in light of 
6 your e-mail? 
7 A. Well, I just -- Azad wasn't doing what 
8 I thought was in his own best interest. 
9 Q. And he was becoming hostile with you? 
~o A. I think he was angry that we kept 
11 wanting to -- you know, keep revisiting the same 
~2 thing. And -- but ... 
~3 Q. And you were increasing pressure on him .~ 
14 to take the deal? ~ 
15 A. Well, by just continuing to ask him and 
16 have different approaches to it. But I just felt 
17 so strongly that this was in his best interest. 
18 And I fretted that that young man would get the 
19 death penalty. 
20 Q. But I am just trying to establish 
21 whether that seems to be consistent with how you 
22 felt at that time back then. 
23 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. I mean, he didn't 
24 like the fact that, you know, I guess we kept 
25 coming back with it. 
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Q. Okay. I will go on with the similar 
questions that I asked with the other attorneys 
even though they may seem silly. I'm sorry. But 
did you ever pay me at all to, like, help 
represent you in this case? 
A. No , no , no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask me to talk to 
Azad? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever give me any 
discovery? 
A. No. 
Q. Beyond these two contacts, can you 
think of any other 
had with me during 
representation? 
A. I think 
significant contacts that you 
the course of your entire 
we had some e-mails. There was 
more e-mails. There is a little bit more e-mail 
because I -- you and Molly and I talked on the 
phone about the relationship with "the prosecutor, 
Erika Klein, had had with Littlefield. And I 
really appreciated the time you took to talk with 
me because you validated my concerns. And I 
really wasn't getting that from a lot of defense 
counsel. Because I had asked Chuck what he 
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1 thought, Chuck Peterson. He bounced down to my ~~ 
2 office and I mentioned it to him. And Teresa, you i 
~ 3 know sort of -- Teresa Hampton, she was aware of ;: 
, 
4 it. I didn't get the perception from talking to 
5 others that other defense counsel thought it was 
6 as big a deal as I thought it was. But you and 
7 Molly saw -- seemed to see something that had a 
8 definite impact on the integrity of the case. And 
9 that was valuable to me in moving forward, how I 
10 decided to move forward. 
11 Q. Do you recall whether it was a matter, 
12 like, saying that there was definitely an impact 
13 or something that should be investigated? 
14 A. Something that should be investigated. 
15 . Q. Do you recall whether you informed us 
16 that the judge had given you leave to depose 
17 them 
18 A. Yes.
 
19 Q. -- and do the further investigation?
 
20 A. Yes.
 
21 Q. Didn't this, also -- I don't know if
 
22 this is reflected in the telephone conversation or
 
23 not, but do you recall the judge ever saying, "I
 
24 am going to look at personnel files now" -­
25 A. Yes.
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1 Q. -- "0£ all the police officers"? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And in your memory, do you recall 
4 whether it was reflected on the record or 
5 otherwise pretty much implicit that the judge was 
6 going to look at these personnel files of all 
7 officers because of this issue with Erika Klein 
8 and Todd Littlefield had come forward? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Did those go kind of hand in hand?
 
11 A. Yes.
 
12 Q. And you said other e-mails between us,
 
13 but then you went directly to that telephone call.
 
14 So that would have been a telephone conversation
 
15 as opposed to e-mail correspondence, the
 
16 discussion you just referenced about Todd
 
17 Littlefield and Erika Klein affair?
 
J.8 A. Right. 
J.9 Q. Do you recall, has the state or the
 
20 prosecution shown any kind of summary of that
 
21 conversation at all? ~
 
22 A. I think I saw an exhibit on that,
 
23 maybe. I think so.
 
24 Q. But something that kind of outlined the
 
25 topics of discussion?
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Okay. All right. And beyond those 
3 three contacts l do you recall any other 
4 significant contacts during the scope of your 
5 representation? 
6 A. Well, just l it may be part of those 
7 contacts, or it might bel you know, something 
8 additional, additional e-mail. I can't remember, 
9 but recusing the judge was an issue that was 
10 discussed. 
i 
11 Q. Okay. j
12 A. And I wasn't -- I was not inclined to ! 
13 move to recuse the judge. But there was a just; 
14 a discussion of the pros and cons of that. And I Iii g 
15 think there was e-mail about that because I think I 
1.6 that I had let you know I was leaning towards 
1.7 moving for a continuance. But I hadn't prepared 
18 anything yet. 
1.9 Q. Can you remember whether an e-mail 
20 exists or not impacted by the fact that you had 
21 apparently seen some sort of summary? 
22 A. Yes, it could. Which is one of the 
23 reasons why I have tried not to look at all these 
24 affidavits because I don't want to be colored by 
25 those kinds of things. 
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1 Q. But the state provided you kind of , 
2 these e-mails or documents? 
§
3 A. They are just exhibits that are part of 
4 the petition, or something, that I have seen. One 
5 or two. I mean, I have worked with Shawna, and I 
6 think there may have been something, I think so, 
'7 in just an exhibit to an affidavit that has been 
8 prepared. I can't remember. 
9 Q. Do you have that, what was given to 
10 you? 
11 A. No, huh-uh. But I do have what was 
12 these exhibits (indicating). And there are 
13 attachments in here. But mostly it's the 
14 affidavits. 
lS Q. So you saw these exhibits, as yourve 
16 described them, as attached to some sort of 
17 affidavit? 
18 A. I can't remember what they were 
19 att·ached to or -- it was just -­ they were 
20 numbered. I looked at it, and I recall that we 
21 had had a conversation. 
22 Q. Okay. And beyond that, do you recall 
23 any other contact with me? 
24 A. Not during all this. We talked at the 
25 end, I think, during the spring before Azad was 
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1 sentenced on the other charges. I think you and
 
2 Kimberly had come to the courtroom. I think we
 
3 may have chatted then. You came to the courtroom
 
4 a couple times, I remember that.
 
5 was a motion -- or excuse me -- an order, a
 
6 
__ lengthy order that we had been handed by the
 
7 judge's courtroom deputy, deputy clerk. It was
 
8 lengthy, and was concerning something that had
 
9 been argued quite a while ago. And we just had
 
10 recently gotten it, and I remember we had thought 
11 that that was interesting, the timing of it. But 
12 that's all I can really remember. 
13 Q. SO most of the contact 
14 during this as reflected here, or 
15 already been sentenced to death? 
16 A. Yes, I believe. 
17 Q. But before sentenced on 
18 non-capital charges by the judge? 
19 A. Yeah, I think so. 
2J. that you recall speaking to at all about this 
22 case? We have gone through Chuck Peterson, Dennis I 
23 Benjamin,.Teresa Hampton, David Leroy, David 
24 Nevin, Joan Fisher, and myself. 
25 A. Consulting with, you mean? . 
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Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanskLcom] 
. Sent: Friday., .September 10, 2004 6:45 AM 
To: Mark Ackley 
Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson 
Yes, Mark, this helps us a Jot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation que91IDns using the words, 
"give weIght and value" to mitigation evidence, and Ihen give examples of our mitigation facts, but., as Shelley and 
Kim have obserVed, we are fanning the questions with the word "consider" and we need to "fix that. We'll work on 
correctIng that today. 
Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5;00, but at leasUoday we get lunch. 
Copsey even needs to be r.eminded that we need bathroom breaks. 
I'm so glad Shelley and Kim are In the courtroom - will you be able to stop by today? 
Kim 
---Original Message-­
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd,state.id.us] 
Sent: Thursday, september 09,20044:17 PM 
To: kim@toryanskl.com 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson 
Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. 
Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by 
the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 
instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 O.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have application 
for you during jury selection: 
"Penry I did not hold that tb.e mere mention of "m.i.tigating .ei:rCWl\Stances" to a 
capital senteru:ti.ng jury satisfies the Eigh.th Juuendment. Nor does it stand 
for the proposition that; :it 1.s consUtuti.onal1y suffic1.ent to 
info%m t;he jury that it may "consider" mi.tiqa1;;ing circumstances 
in deciding 'the appropriate sentenoe. Rather, the key uncler Penry 
I i.s that the ju:y be $1e to "consider and give e££ec-c to [a 
de.fendan't's mi'tiga-tiDg] evidence in iJIlposing sentence. rr 492 U.S., 
at 319,109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johnson·v. ~8, 509 U.S. 
350, 361, 113 5_Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993) (O'CONNO~, J., dissenting) 
(n (A] sentenCt"'..r rlllUstJ be e.llowad to gi.ve £Ull con:sideratioo and fuJ.J. effect 
to m:l.tigatinq c1.roumstance.s" {emphasis ;in .ox:.iginal»). For "i.t :is only when the 
ju;y.is givan a "vehioJ..e for expressing its 'reasol;J.Qd r.ora~ ZJesponse' to· that 
evidence in. rendering its sentencing- dec.iEdon," Penry I, -492 U.S.,:at 328,109 
5.Ct. '2934, thai: we can be sure that the jury "has treated i:ha defendant as a 
·unj.queJ.~· irui:irid-.3a.l humarl beinrgJ I and has mad(~ a :cel.iabh atlterm:inati.on that 
daat;h :L3 the appropr:i.ate ,sentenoe,1< **1921 id., at 319, 109 S.·.Ct. 2934 
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I (quoting Woocson v. North Carolina, 428 U.£. 280, 304, 305 J ~6 8.Ct. 2978, 49
 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976}).u 
I
 (my emphasis added)
 In short, it seems that simpy inqu~r~ng of a prospective juror whether they . 
will "considerH mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I 
Mark J. Ackley
 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 
(208) 334-2712
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Mark Ackley 
From: Kim W. Toryanskl [kim@toryanski.com] I Sent: Wednesday, ~eptembe.r 15, 2004 7:09 AM 
To: Mark Ackley 
I
 Subject: RE: Penry v. Johnson
 
I
 
Mark, plea negotiations w1tb the prosecutors office have progressed and we have been 'tOld thatihey would
 
accept a plea to one count of first degree murder. dismIss all other 5 charges (arson, :3 .c'tso()f attempted murder,
 
child ,endangerment). and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat
 
wrestling with our clIent to:take the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure
 
I
 
on hIm to take the deal. He continues to resist. Our attorney clIent relationship is bein,g affected because of this.
 
He has become hostile and angry that we are encouragirtga ptea. HfS'famllyssems.tosmpporthisdecision notio
 
take a plea. That relationship Is being affected too.
 
The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to 
I,
 be next Tuesday or Wed. After that, the prosecution goes Into overdrive to bury our client.
 Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence ontestlfying. He has been toJd that his attorneys Will 
not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demo.mstrated daily. Even the 
I 
ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were Involved. Many 
of ones that generally favor the DP seem very willing to put theIr beliefs into action and actoally impose it if 
allegations are proven in this case. We shop our mitigation in each yoir dire examination., but the reality is that 
none of it stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids In a house on fire. 
I 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get 'ideas about how to w.aJk'through this impasse. 
He's a grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. we're close. but not 
close enough. If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst atmal, based upon the 
verbal statements and nonverbal demeanor of th°ese jurors during voir dire. 
I Kim 
I -Original Message-­From: Mark Ackley [mallto:mackley@sapd.state.ld,us] 
I 
Sent: Thursday, 5eptember 09, 2004 4:17 PM
 
To: klm@tDryanskl.com
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's'jury selection. Kim noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective 
jurors regarding Whether mitigating facts would "matt~r" to them (as worded by 
I the defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if 'instructed by the Court (as worde~ by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.s. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation
...- ... at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my have applicationI ALL-sTATE tJ:GALe for you during jury selection: 
'- ~~. 
o ;Eo '·Pe.nz:y I did not hold that the mera mention of Itmi:tigat:i.ng ,ci.iroumstanoes" to a 
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I capital sentencing jury satisfiQs the Eigh.th Amendment. Nor does it stand 
I 
for the proposition that it is consti.tutionally sufficient to 
i.nfoJ:tll the jury that it may "oonsider" mitigating circumstances 
in deciding the appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry 
1: is that the j.ury be able to . II consider . and give e:f:Eect. t.o fa 
de:fendant's mit:igat:ing] evidence in i..zrposing sentence." 492 O.S. 1 
I
 at. 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also Johr.son "V. 'Texas.1 509 U.S.
 350; 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 {1993) (O'CONNORJ ~_, dissenting)
 {" CA} senteocer f1l\.ustJ be allowed .to give..full considerati.oJa :and full eft'act 
I 
t.o mitigatil1.g cirOUlllstances" (emphasis in origimJ.l)}. For .i··t 5..'5 only when the 
ja~:-y is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral .t::eesponse I to that 
evidence in rs;oderinq its sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 lu.S. 1 at 328, 109 
I 
S.Ct. 2934, tha:!: WE) can be sure that the juxy "has treated ·:tks defendant as a 
. 'uni~ely ind.i;vidual hUIllan beintg}I and has maQQ. a :t:allab1e &ate",,'ination that 
death is the appropJ:iate /Sentence," **1921 i.d., at 319, 109 fl.et. '2934 
(~ucting Woodson v. North Carolina l 428 u.~. 280, 304, 305 1 95 S.Ct. 2978 1 49 
L.Ed.2d 944 (1'76)." 
I
 (my emphasis added)
 
I
 
In short, it seems that simpy inqu1r1nq of a prospective juror whether they
 
will. "consider II mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they
 
can give it effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.
 
I 
Mark J. Ackley
 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
Capital Litigation Unit
 
mackley@sapd.state.id.us
 
(208) 334-2712 
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I
 Mark Ackley 
I
 From:
 Sent: 
To: 
I Cc: SUbject: 
Attachments: 
I 
I
 Shawna,
 
Mark Ackley 
Friday, May 09,200812:12 PM 
'Shawna Dunn'; Roger Boume 
Shannon N. Romero 
Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPD 
FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday; Abdullah continuance motion was denied; Penry 
v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; RE: Penry v. Johnson; State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 
31659/ formerly H0201384; 66857.pdf; 66858.pdf 
This is my response to your request for correspondence between our office and the Toryanskis 
I 
I at the time oftheir representation ofAzad Abdullah. I previously agreed to look for this 
correspondence and disclose it since we both recognized that such correspondence as contained 
in the Toryanskis files was incomplete. Thank you for your patience. 
I have located and attached the following:
I 
I
 
1. Six emails (some of which overlap) between the Toryanskis (mostly Kim Toryanski)
 
and our office (Molly Huskey and/or me).
 
a. NOTE: it appears from some of the emails that there may have been additional 
correspondence. I cannot locate any additional correspondence (although I have
 I located summaries ofa few conversations, see below).
 
I 2. Two facsimile cover pages from Kim to Molly. 
a. Both faxes, dated 12/11/03 signed by Kim and sent to Molly seem to correspond 
I 
I with the attached email with the string of communications on 12/17/03 and 
apparently pertain to pleadings and rulings regarding challenges to the death 
penalty statute. 
I have located but have not attached the following:I 
I
 
1. A summary ofa telephone calIon 11/24/04 from Mitch Toryanski to Molly Huskey,
 
written by Molly. The topics ofthe conversation included:
 
a. The outcome ofthe trial;
I . b. Whether our office files post-trial motions; and
 
c. Mitch's retrospective assessment ofthe aggravation and the mitigation evidence, 
the new death penalty jury system, Judge Copsey's professionalism or lack thereof, I and Mr. Abdullah's truthfulness or lack thereof; as well as Mitch's description of 
I 1 001810
 
 
  
u j
rn
91
I , 
            
I 
I  
  I  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 1 1  
  
  
 
 
I 
their varying degrees of their confidence during the course of the case and his
 I hopes for Mr. Abdullah in future proceedings.
 
I 2. A summary of a telephone call from Kim to me on 1/24/05, written by me. The topics 
of the conversation included: 
I a.	 Hearing on PSI; 
b. Formal sentencing scheduling; 
I
 c. Amendments to ICR32;
 d. Whether we would attend the hearing; and 
e. Potential challenges to the sentencing procedure. I 
3.	 An email summary ofa written summary ofa telephone call on 9/03104 from Kim to 
Molly Huskey (for which I was present), written by me on March 17,2006. I haveI not yet located my contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my 
notes to Ron Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files I that they left behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics ofthe 
conversation apparently included: 
I a.	 The Court closing the courtroom; 
b. KlinelLittlefield; 
I c. Grounds to disqualify Judge Copsey;
 d. My thoughts regarding trial counsels' degree of confidence;
 
e. Kim's comments regarding the State's ability to prove murder; I	 f. Kim's reference to communications sent by them to the prosecution regarding the 
prosecution's case; 
g. Kim's reference to what Mr. Abdullah agreed he did and for what he would plead
 I guilty;
 
h. Referencing to problems with the State's lab 
I 4.	 An email summary ofa written summary of an undated telephone conversation 
between Mitch and me, written by me on March 17, 2006. I have not yet located myI	 contemporaneous written summary. I think I may have given my notes to Ron 
Coulter or Kimberly Simmons. I have not located my notes in the files that they left 
behind after they left our office in October 2006. The topics of the conversation I	 apparently included: 
I a. Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05;
 
. b. Residual doubt;
 
c. Scope ofallocution;
I	 d. Mitch's comments about statements made to them by Mr. Abdullah reg~ding the 
events; and . 
I 
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I 
I e. An unclear reference which my email summary noted as follows: "One area of 
investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what 
this references]" 
I have multiple concerns about the wisdom ofdisclosing these documents as they differ from I the emails and the faxes to the extent they are summaries ofcorrespondence, not the
 
correspondence themselves which tend to speak for themselves. I need to further assess
 
whether we have an obligation to disclose these summaries, and if so, whether they could or
 I should be redacted. I will make a decision on Tuesday after further discussion with my team
 
and Molly Huskey. I would also be interested in making further inquiry of the Toryanskis;
 
I perhaps they could check their offices again.
 
I sincerely invite your thoughts on trusmatter;- indeed, that is Why I took the timeto describefor ­I you the contents of these summaries. 
I -Mark 
I
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I	 Shannon N. Romero 
From:	 Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com] 
I Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 1:59 PM To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey 
Subject: FW: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday 
I	 M&M: 
I FYI - we're moving for a continuance. The following is a copy of the "heads up" for the judge. The judge has not responded to Pat Owen's request 
that the motion be filed under seal. 
----Original Message--­
I From: Patrick Owen [mailto:PROWENPH@adaweb.net]
 Sent: Monday, September 06, 200410:04 AM
 
To: Judge Cheri Copsey
 
I	 Cc: kim@toryanski.com
 Subject: RE: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I	 Judge Copsey: 
I I request that any such motion be filed under seal and that any proceedings
 related to this motion be conducted in chambers.
 
I	 PatOwen 
----Original Message--··
 
From: Kim W. Toryanski fmailto:kim@toryanskLcomJ
 
I Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 9:59 AM
 To: Patrick Owen; Judge Cheri Copsey
 
Subject: Defense motion to be filed on Tuesday
 
I 
Judge Copsey: 
I The defense would like to advise you and the State that on Tuesday morning, 
we will be filing a motion to continue the trial. The grounds for the 
I motion are directly related to the State's revelation on Friday morning that during the course of this case, a sexual relationship existed between one of 
the case prosecutors and a key witness in this case, the lead. homicide 
detective and case officer. 
I Full details of the defense necessity for a continuance will be recited in 
the written motion. In summary, we assert that the defendant has a 
I Fourteenth Amendment due process right and a Sixth Amendment right to have a reasonable opportunity to investigate the temporal duration of the 
relationship, whether an actual conflict of interest may have arisen by 
virtue ofthe relationship, whether the prosecutor's ethical duties were 
I affected and compromised, whether the detective has violated police rules of conduct, whether evidence or witness testimony may have been tainted or 
I	 
1 
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I 
I compromised in connection with the nature of the relationship, and whether prejudice to the defendant has resulted. While the integrity of the 
proceedings and the proper administration ofjustice is paramount to all I involved, only Mr. Abdullah stakes his life on the process. 
In evaluating the appropriateness of the motion to continue, we have 
I referenced Guideline 10.7 (duty to investigate) and Guideline 10.8 (duty to assert legal claims) of the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Rev. February, 2003). 
Without an opportunity to investigate a matter which potentially calls into 
I question all information about the case, any conviction obtained may be
 vulnerable to appellate attack on the basis of ineffective assistance of
 
counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that death cases are
 
different and deserving of higher due process standards.
 
I Kim Toryanski 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I Shannon N. Romero 
From: Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com] 
I Sent: Tuesday, September 07,20043:53 PM To: Mark Ackley; Molly J. Huskey Subject: Abdullah continuance motion was denied 
I 
I So maybe there is one more appelJate issue for you two to address if Azad gets convicted of first degree, the jury finds an aggravator, and that 
mitigation does not outweigh the aggravator(s). I think Copsey wants the I "glory" of being the first to try a death case under the new statute. 
I 
The good news is that, in the continuance, I detailed the need to take the 
aeposition ofdeteetive littlefield, the one-that-Erika Klein had the affair 
with. Thejudge granted that!!! The prosecutor objected, but it feU on 
deaf ears. The prosecutor asked for the scope of the depo to be limited, 
but the judge said no limitatons on defense inquiry. I'm looking forward to I taking the depo. 
I 
The judge also said she would grant more money to investigate things that 
need to be looked into regarding my concerns about the screwups ofthe NMS 
lab. So I'm going to put in for more money to get some additional experts 
to advise me, and to testifY. Again, hooray. 
All in all, I think I'm going to call it a win. Thanks for wargaming with I me! 
I
 
Jury selection begins tomorrow morning at 9:00. We're in 507. We'll go
 
until 1:00 and then adjourn for the day. Same routine through the end of
 
the week.
 
I
 Will keep you posted.
 Kim 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
1 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I From: Mark Ackley Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM To: kim@toryanskLcom 
SUbject: Penry v. Johnson 
I 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, 
I 
Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim noted that there was 
some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors regarding whether mitigating 
facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the defense) or whether they could simply 
"consider" mitigating facts if instructed by the Court (as worded by the judge). The case 
I 
of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation 
at the close of the case. Here is a relevant portion that my ~ve applicat; on far you 
during jury selection: 
"Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "mitigating circumstances" to a capital
I sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to inform the jury that 
it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the appropriate
I sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury be able to 
I 
"consider and give effect to [a defendant's mitigating] evidence in 
imposing sentence. " 492 u.s., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). See also 
Johnson v. Texas, 509 u.s. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, 
J., dissenting) {"fAJ santancer [must] be allowed to give full consideration and full 
effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in original». For it is only when the jury 
is given a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned m.oral response' to that evidence inI rendering it.s sentencing decision," Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328,109 S.Ct. 2934, that we 
I 
can be sure that the jury "has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human 
bein[g]' and has made a re~iable determination that death is the appropriate sentence, /I 
**1921 id., at 319,109 S.ct. 2934 {quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 426 U.S. 280, 304, 
305,96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»." 
(my emphasis added)I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will 
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it 
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause.I Mark J. Ackley 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation UnitI mackley@sapd.state.id.us (208) 334-2712 
I
 
I
 
I
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I Shannon N. Romero 
From: 
I Sent: To: SUbject: 
Kim W. Toryanski [kim@toryanski.com] 
Friday, September 10, 20046:45 AM 
Mark Ackley 
RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I 
I Yes, Mark, this helps us a lot. We have been intending to be asking the mitigation questions using the words. "give 
weight and value" to mitigation evidence, and then give examples of our mitigation facts, but, as Shelley and Kim have 
obseNed, we are forming the questions with the word "consider" and we need to fix that. We'll wor!< on correcting that 
today. 
I Today will be a long day- we start questioning at 9:00 and will finish at 5:00, but at least today we get lunch. Copsey even needs to be reminded that we need bathroom breaks. 
I'm so glad Shelley aFld Kim are in the courtroom = will you be able to stop by today? 
I Kim 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
----Original Message----­
From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 20044:17 PM 
To: kim@toryanski.com 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson 
Kim, 
As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation 
specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
defense> or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
the court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jUry instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
"Penry I did not hold that the mere menti.on of "mitigating circumstances" to a 
capital. sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Nor does it stand for 
the proposition that it is constitutionally sufficient to info~ the 
jury that it may "consider" mitigating circumstances in deciding the 
appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I .is that the jury 
be able to "consider and give effect to {a defendant's mitigating] 
evidence in imposing sentence. " 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis 
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 381,113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J' T dissenting) ("[A} sentencer [must] be a110wed to give 
fu11 consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vebic1e for expressing its 
t :reasoned moral response' to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision," 
Penry I, 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has 
treated the defendant as a 'uni.quely individua1 human ];)ein[g]' and has made a 
re1iable determination that death is the appropriate sentence, It **1921 id., at 319, 
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North caro1ina, 428 U.s. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct. 
2978,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»." . 
(my emphasis added) 
1 
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I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will "consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it 
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for cause. 
I Mark J. Ackley Idaho state Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
I mackley@sapd.state,id.us (208) 334-2712 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I	 Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: Kim W. Toryanski {kim@toryanskLcom]
 
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 7:09 AM
 
To: Mark Ackley
 
SUbject:	 RE: Penry v. Johnson 
I 
I Mark, plea negotiations with the prosecutor's office have progressed and we have been told that they would accept a plea 
to one count of first degree murder, dismiss all other 5 charges (arson, 3 cts of attempted murder, child endangerment), 
and no aggravators will be presented at sentencing. Of course, we are going to the mat wrestling with our client to take 
the deal. Unbelievably, he's resisting. Day by day, we're putting more pressure on him to take the deal. He continues to 
resist. Our attorney client relationship is being affected because of this. He has become hostile and angry that we are 
encouraging a plea. His family seems to support his decision not to take a plea. That relationship is being affected too. 
I The deal closes the day we begin to exercise our peremptory challenges in jury selection. We expect that to be next
 
Tuesday or Wed. After that. the prosec::uti()!1goes into overdrive to bury our client.
 
I Other issues are erupting. One has to do with his insistence on testifying. He has been told that his attorneys will not put him on the stand, for ethical reasons. More and more, he is reluctant to follow the advice of counsel. 
I	 The dreadful reality of the DP being imposed by this panel of prospective jurors is demonstrated daily. Even the ones that say they are generally opposed to the DP say they can impose it where children were involved. Many of ones that 
generally favor the DP seem very willing to put their beliefs into action and actually impose it if allegations are proven in 
I th is case. We shop our mitigation in each voir dire examination, but the reality is that none of it stacks up against the
 . aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a house on fire.
 
We are consulting with an experienced DP defense lawyer to get ideas about how to work through this impasse. He's a 
I
 grey haired guy with familiarity with the Muslim culture. Will continue to advise you. We're close, but not close enough.
 If plea negotiations fail, we have told our client to anticipate the worst at trial, based upon the verbal statements and 
nonverbal demeanor of these jurors during voir dire. 
I Kim 
I -----Original Message----­From: Mark Ackley [mailto:mackley@sapd.state.id.us] 
I 
Sent: Thursday, september 09, 2004 4: 17 PM
 
To: klm@toryanski.com
 
Subject: Penry v. Johnson
 
Kim, 
I As I noted yesterday, my co-counsel, Kimberly Simmons, and our mitigation specialist, Shelley Hill, observed a portion of yesterday's jury selection. Kim 
I 
noted that there was some contention regarding questions to prospective jurors 
regarding whether mitigating facts would "matter" to them (as worded by the 
defense) or whether they could simply "consider" mitigating facts if instructed by 
I 
the Court (as worded by the judge). The case of Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 
(2001) dealt with jury instructions on mitigation at the close of the case. Here is 
a relevant portion that my have application for you during jury selection: 
",Penry I did not hold that the mere mention of "m.itigating circumstances" to aI capital sentencing jury satisfies the Eighth Amend1l1ent. Nor does it stand for the proposition that it is constitutiona~~y sufficient to infor.m the 
jury that it may "consider" mi.tigating circumstances in deciding the 
I appropriate sentence. Rather, the key under Penry I is that the jury 
1 
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 be able to "consider and give effect to fa defendant's mitigating]
 
I
 
evidence in imposing sentence. " 492 U.S., at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis
 
added). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.s. 350, 381, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d
 
290 (1993) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ("[A] sentencer [must] be allowed to give
 
full consideration and full effect to mitigating circumstances" (emphasis in
 
I
 
original». For it is only when the jury is given a "vehicle for expressing its
 
'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in renderi.ng its sentencing decision,"
 
Penry If 492 U.S., at 328, 109 S.ct. 2934, that we can be sure that the jury "has
 
I
 
treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a
 
reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence," **1921 id., at 319,
 
109 S.Ct. 2934 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305, 96 S.Ct.
 
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976»."
 
{my emphasis added} 
I In short, it seems that simpy inquiring of a prospective juror whether they will 
"consider" mitigation is not enough. It must be determined whether they can give it 
effect; if they cannot, then they should be excluded for ~ause, 
I Mark J. Ackley
 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 
capital Litigation Unit
I rnackley@sapd.state.id.us
 (208) 334-2712 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
SUbject: 
Mitch Toryanski [mitch@toryanski.com] 
Thursday, March 10,200512:23 PM 
Mark Ackley 
State v. Abullah, Sup. Ct. No. 31659/ formerly H0201384 
I Mark: 
I This is to follow up on Kim's phone call message to you earlier this week. On March 4, the Judge approved our motion to withdraw as counsel from the 
I 
case and directed that your office file a written notice ofsubstitution. 
Yesterday, we received in the mail a copy ofa Jetter from the clerk of the 
Supreme Court advising the clerk of the Ada County Court that Report on 
Imposition of Death Penalty has been filed and ordering preparation of the 
reporter's transcript and. clerks record. 
I Mitch Mitchell E. Toryanski 
I This transmission (including attachments if any) is intended only for the 
I 
use of the addressee and may contain information that is privileged, 
confidential, and exempt from disclosure under the Electronic Communication 
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and protected by attorney/client 
or other privileges. If you are not the intended recipient, or the employee 
I 
or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, 
you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of 
this communication is strictly prohibited. Attomeylclient or work product 
privileges are not waived by the transmission of this message. Ifyou have 
received this communication in error, please notify me immediately via 
e-mail at info@toryanskLcom or by telephone at (208) 841-0655. Thank you. I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
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TORYAN ~ '. j:ROUP 
}lttorneys . Counseum at Law 
era 
~ LLP 
I 
I TO: MollyJ. Huskey FROM: Mitch Toryanski 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
COMPANY: DATE: 
I " illAppeIl.a.te PD's 12/11/2003 FAX NUMBER: eLUDING COVER: 
334-2985 
I PHONE NUMBER: 334-2712 
YOUR REFERENCE NUMBER: 
I' State v. Abdullah (H0201384) 
o FOR REVIEW o PLEASE COMMENT 0 PLEASE REPLY o PLEASE RECYCLE 
I NarBS/COMMENTS: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 913 W. RIVER STREET. SUITE 300, B0188, ID 83702 PHONE: (208) 947-8160 I FAX; (208) 947-8140 ~MAIL: INFO@TORYANSKJ.CO}.( 
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TORYANS: '\jr,ROUP LLP 
}lttomeys .. tou7isifors at Law 
I
 
FACSIMILE TRAN::~EET 
TO: 
Molly J. HuskeyI 
COMPANY' DATE: 
ID AppeJb.te PD's 12/11/2003I FAX NUMBER, 334-2985 
PHONE NUIdBE.R: 
I 334-2712 
INCLUDING COVER: 
RE: YOUR REFERENCE NUMBER: 
State v. Abdullah (H0201384) 
I o URGENT ~ORREvrEW 0 PT.EASE COMMENT 0 PLEASE REPLY o PLEASE RECYCLE 
NOTES/COMMENTS,I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
 
I
 
913 W. RIVER STREET, SUITE 300, BOISE, lD 83702 
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I 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Friday, May 09.20083:41 PM 
To: 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPO 
Shawna, 
Thank you for calling, and sharing your thoughts. I guess I'm not sure what I expected, but 
upon further reflection, it was unreasonable to expect my summary of conversations not to raise 
a few eyebrows. Hopefully the notes in their entirety will lighten your concerns ifnot alleviate 
themcompletely.- - --- ­
Below is the 1/24/05 note ofmy conversation with Kim Toryanski. - Mark 
MJA 1124/05 MJA: TIC with Kim Toryanski 
KT called: 
1. Hearing is still scheduled today for 3 p.m. - purpose solely to discuss 
PSI and where the source ofdisagreements may lie 
2. Sentencing hearing will be rescheduled, likely 2 weeks out 
3. Q whether any amendments pending re ICR 32 ­ I told KT that I was 
not aware ofany at this time 
4. I told KT that we would go to the hearing, but may only stay briefly if 
they are going through 5000 pages ofPSr. Our purpose is primarily to 
provide support for Azad. KT said that ifwe leave before the 
conclusion of the hearing then she will pass this on to Azad and also tell 
him that he is scheduled for a call with us tomorrow. 
5. KT and I talked briefly about challenges to the sentencing procedure. 
I refered her to the Stover case for the non-capital charges. I asked her 
whether she has considered any constitutional arguments that would 
mandate giving the judge sentencing discretion to downwardly depart 
from death. She said that she had not but has referred to the jury 
verdicts as recommendations which has upset the judge in the past I 
mentioned the possibility ofcrafting a separation ofpowers argument, 
that the legislature cannot completely divest a district court judge of its 
sentencing discretion. I told her that such a challenge and others might 
be further considered prior to sentencing. 
1 
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I Mark Ackley 
From: Mark Ackley 
I Sent:	 Friday, May 09, 2008 4:36 PM To: 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel and 
the SAPOI 
Shawna, 
I 
I The below email was written in response to an interoffice email from Michael Shaw, our investigator. At the 
time, I was not assigned to represent Azad. Instead, Azad was being represented by Ron Coulter and Kimberly 
Simmons. In the course ofhis file review, Michael wanted to know, among other things [which is why I did not 
I 
include his initial email inquiry below], whether I had notes from any conversations with the Toryanskis during 
their representation. When I prepared the below email, I referenc-ed my notes contained on a legal pad. I have. _ 
searched for those notes and my legal pad but I have not located them to date. Michael indicates that he did not 
take my file as I had suggested in my email. 
I Because I don't want to adjust the electronic content at all, I am giving you the email in its entirety, including a 
I 
conversation that I had with Joan Fisher from a different date which I had apparently noted somewhere in the 
same legal pad. I thought about redacting that reference, and just summarizing it, but on second thought I 
figured that would only raise more eyebrows. My note also includes references to visits I had with Azad after 
I 
our office began representing him. To refresh your memory, I represented Azad briefly before Ron Coulter was 
hired. Once he was hired, Molly reassigned cases to adjust for national workload standards. As a result, I think 
I was offAzad's case pretty quickly and did not come back until October 2006. 
I 
Although it looks like I might have arguably given some suggestions to counsel, I think you'll agree that those 
suggestions are not implicated by Azad'sc1aims, but I suppose that could be a matter of interpretation. You 
will notice a reference below to the "El-Contrani (sic)" case; that reference is to State v. AI-Kotrani, 141 Idaho 
I 
66, 106 P.3d 392 (2005), and pertains to a potential motion to disqualify Judge Copsey. I don't think the 
grounds for disqualification are noted in the opiriion, but the following was written in the Appellant's Brief, 
"The district court further fOWld that Dr. Sanford's conclusions were not credible because Dr. Sanford relied on 
Mr. Al-Kotrani's family's representations and "self-serving reports." The district court noted that Dr. Sanford 
did speak with one non-relative, a former employer, Mr. Abdul Muhammad, who testified that he could onlyI	 given Mr. AI-Kotrani one instruction at a time as Mr. AI-Kotrani would get confused ifmore than one 
instruction was given. Further, Mr. AI-Kotrani had the tendency to "slack off" ifnot under constant 
supervision. The district court dismissed Mr. Muhammad's testimony, noting that the "Iraqi community is very I close." (Tt., p.39, L.24 - pAO, L.24; R., p.79.) ... Accordingly, Mr. A1-Kotrani asserts that the district court 
erred in ruling that Dr. Sanford's conclusion that Mr. Al-Kotrani is incompetent to stand trial was not credible 
because it took into consideration information obtained from Mr. A1-Kotrani's family. The district court furtherI erred in failing to consider information obtained from Mr. Muhammad because he is ofthe same nationality of Mr. Al-Kotrani and its erroneous conclusion that Mr. Muhammad's statements were not significant." Of 
course, triaI counsel never moved to disqualify the judge, and we have not raised any claims based on theirI . failure to do so. 
I will discuss disclosing Molly's email notes on Tuesday. I anticipate disclosing them unless my decision toI disclose my own notes to you is questioned. 
-MarkI 
I	 1 
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I From: Mark Ackley 
I 
Sent: Friday, March 17,2006 10:47 AM
 
To: Michael Shaw
 
Cc: Kimberly Simmons; Ronaldo A. Coulter; Paula Swensen; Barbara D. Thomas; Guadalupe Ayala
 
Subject: RE: Abdullah file clean up 
I Michael, I will go through myemails. I will forward any that are relevant. Perhaps you take my file and then share or give to Ron or Kimberly. It includes some notes from IMSI visits with AA that I am pretty certain were 
not placed in Prolaw. Below I have summarized most of my handwritten notes from conversations with, or in 
reference to, trial counsel. I From legal pad 
I
 1. 12/17/03 TC with Joan Fisher about the Abdullah case noting that she is concemed about
 everything being adequately preserved 
I
 2. 9/03/04 TC conversation with Kim T. with Molly (extensive notes on legal pad)
 
I
 
• Discussion re the Court closing the courtroom; they did not object to closed proceedings.
 
Judge made them file a motion to continue under seal. Should have objected. [It looks like I
 
suggested -- "move to unseal the motion, right to public trial"]
 
•	 Discussion about Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield 
I 
I 
• Quotes attributed to Kim T. including, "Now more than ever... 1could kick [Copsey] off." I 
indicated that we would send the EI-Contrani (sic) opinion with Copsey's [racist] remarks. 
[This is in reference to the Iraqi client case that Eric F. handled (AI-Kotrani) which we then 
faxed to them [this has been confirmed by Sara] [It is not indicated, but I believe I suggested 
a motion to DO] 
I • My thoughts reflected, '~confidence sounds like L. Dunlap" {NOTE: this is a reference to the 
Jimmie Thomas case where Lynn Dunlap told Jimmie they would obtain an acquittal]; quote 
attributed to Kim T. "we've been seeing things" (bizarre things) since the beginning of theI case 
I 
• Kim thought the State would have trouble proving murder, referring to the State's case as 
an attempt to "bootstrap the murder" - I asked her why they could not prove felony murder 
and Kim T did not have a good answer [NOTE: I was quite worried about Kim's confidence} 
I • Reference to "weekly love letters" they [I believe "they" is a reference to trial counsel} sent to the prosecution to show them how their case sucks 
I • Referencing AA, noting that he will plead to what he did, she [Angela] poured the gasoline, would plead to conspiracy to arson 
• References to problems with the State's lab. They still need an expert to attack the lab. I Many things they are still trying to get. [It appears I may have suggested a motion to continue] 
I
 3. Undated TC conversation with Mitch Toryanski (date can be approximated post jury verdict for
 death sentence, but prior to formal sentencing by judge) 
I	 • Sentencing scheduled for 1/21/05 •	 They (trial counsel?) scratched residual doubt because the jUdge said the law was well­
settled (not mitigation) 
I	 2 
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I • JUdge limited the scope of AA allocution • They were never told what happened; AA was never straight [NOTE: I believe this was in 
response to a question I always ask trial counsel, specifically, "did the client ever confess to 
you."]I • One area of investigation - still suspects something in their system [NOTE: I am not sure what this references] 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3 
-
001827
u
 
I
 
I Mark Ackley 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
From: Mark Ackley 
Sent: Wednesday, May 14, 2008 9:26 AM 
To: 'Shawna Dunn' 
Subject: RE: Abdullah v. State: SPOT0500308 - disclosure of correspondence between trial counsel 
and the SAPO 
Shawna, 
Below is an electronic note written by Molly Huskey regarding a call that she received from 
Mitch Toryanksi. This is the note that I summarized in an email to you last week. It appears 
the note was written on the day of the call, November 24,2004. I have not changed the note in 
any way, thus the typos. I believe we have now disclosed every communication, or note 
referencing a communication, with the Toryanskis prior to our appointment as Mr. Abdullah's 
counsel. I may very well send you a formal discovery disclosure attaching each of the 
communications that I've already sent to you informally and in piece-meal fashion. Ifyou have 
any questions, then please let me know. 
Mark 
MJH 11/24/04 MJH: Telephone Call from Mitch Toryanski. 
Called re: outcome of trial. wanted to know ifwe flIed post trial 
motions like motion for new trial. TOld him we didn't do that. Told me 
that Azhad was a good person and the good things he had done far 
outweighed the aggravators. for example, when Azhad was a young 
man, his father had been imprisoned. Azhad led his family over the 
mountains into Turkey to freedom. He was on the board ofhis church, 
he was affectionate with his children. 
This new system gives too much power to the prosecutor because there 
is no way ajury is going to acquit after hearing all the evidence. He 
said ofcourse with a fIrst degree murder, people will find utter 
disregard. He said some ofthe jurors even wanted to find HAC. 
Said Copsey's demeanor made her impssible to work with. She was 
demeaning and belittled the attorneys. He really thinks she needs to be 
trained in professionalism. 
He said client didn't tell him the truth - they still don't know what really 
happened. This put them at a huge disadvantage when trying to prepare 
the case. HE says they were much more optimistic re: the possible 
outcome earlier in the trial and the longer it went on, the more they 
knew the client was telling lies to them. 
Hopes we can get the client some relief. 
1 
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NO·----FlL=!O~~U 
A.M P.M.--+:-1~_-
SEP 15 2009
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDARO~ IN" AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDl-'LLAH, 
Petitioner, 
VB. 
THE STATE OF ]]),t\HO 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308
 
ORDER RE: CONFliCT COUNSEL
 
In reviewing ,he material filed in support ofthe Final Amended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the 
State Appellate POOEc Defender's Office attorneys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate 
Public Defender, M;::rk Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons, 
provided advice to lV[r. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury 
voir dire, during trial and post trial. I The record establishes that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising trial counsel to seek 
a continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of 
these areas are the subject ofMr. Abdullah's post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear. 
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address 
the implications and l;lxtent oftms involvement. 
Both the Stat·~ and the State Appellate Public Defender's Office responded and provided 
the Court with additional evidence. 
Based on the following and having fully considered those responses, the Court finds that 
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation ofMr. Abdullah 
I The Court notes that M;. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that 
they had no involvement: in the trial of this matter. It was on this representation that the Court found good cause to 
allow the State Appellate: Public Defender's Office more than three years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This 
is why the Court was Wl2 'IlVlIre of the conflict. 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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in post-conviction proceedings. (This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office's representatien of Mr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.) Therefore, 
the Court shall hold ~1. hearing to determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives this conflict both as to 
this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings. 
ANALYSIS 
In examining whether the appropriate procedural safeguards are in place in a case where 
the d.efen~t_ is ~~ci_llg ~e death penalty, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that "death is different." In his concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote: 
In the 12 yean since Furman . .. every Member of this Court has written or joined 
at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and 
irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other 
punishment, Hnd hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it 
is a justified l'l~sponse to a given offense. 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,468 (1984). The constitutional reason that "death is different" 
is the application ohlle Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruelty" to a degree that varies from 
its application in mClst other criminal cases. Because this is a capital case and Mr. Abdullah is 
literally fighting for Iris life, this Court must ensure that Mr. Abdullah's rights are protected. As 
Justice O'Connor Dmed in a concurrence, it would be cruel and unusual punishment to execute a 
defendant without providing "extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner ... is afforded 
process that will gumantee, as much as .is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed 
out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982). 
Therefore, this Court's responsibility is heightened. 
Every defend.mt has the right be represented by conflict-free counseL2 Wood v. Georgia. 
450 U.S. 261, 271 (l981). In order to ensure a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial 
court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or "reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict may exist." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980); 
see also State v. LQ'wdace. 140 Idaho 53,60,90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). This duty with respect to 
indigent defendants is far more imperative than the judge's duty to investigate the possibility of a 
2 This was recently reaffi.rmed in State v. SeverSOll, - P.3d -,2009 WI.. 1492659 (Idaho. 2009). While rehearing 
was denied, Severson ha:~ not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited. 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL 
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conflict that arises wl~.en retained counsel represents either multiple or successive defendants. It is 
true that in a situation of retained counsel, "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should 
know that a particul~lr conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162, 184 (2')02) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)). When, as was
 
true in Mickens, the: udge is not merely reviewing the permissibility of the defendant's choice of 
counsel, but is responsible for making the choice herself, and when she knows or should know 
that a conflict does exist, the' duty to make a thorough inquiry is manifest and unqualified. lei 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court squarely held that when a record discloses the 
"possibility of a cor.mct" between the interests of the defendant and the interests of the party 
paying their counsel's fees, the Constitution imposes a duty of inquiry on the state-court judge 
even when no objection was made. ld at 185 (citing Wood, 450 U.S. at 267, 272). The Court,
 
therefore, has an ongoing obligation to inquire into potential conflicts of interest about which it 
knows or reasonably should have known. Id This obligation is even more important where the 
criminal defendant i~ facing the death penalty, and Mr. Abdullah is. 
In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential
 
conflict must be the-rough and searching and should be conducted on the record. See State v.
 
Lopez, 139 Idaho 256? 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003); Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,
 
1320 (8th Cir.1991). The Court is entitled to rely on factual representations made by counsel and
 
may inquire further into the facts, though it "is under no original or continuing obligation to do
 
so." Kaplan v. Unired States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967). The Court ordered counsel to
 
respond to the Court's questions in writing. Both responded and attached relevant portions of the
 
record that reflect the evidence. In reaching a decision, the Court relied on the State Appellate
 
Public Defender's Office's factual representations. However, the determination of whether a
 
conflict exists is for the Court to decide and not for counsel.
 
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict actually exists.
 
Lopez, 139 Idaho a1. 259, 77 P.3d at 127. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a
 
conflict, it must obulin a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the
 
defendant an opportlmity to acquire new counseL Id It: on the other hand, the court concludes
 
that a conflict of intc::rest does not exist, the representation may continue without a waiver. See id.
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While the Stl.te Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict created by their
 
role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the trial, the more significant
 
conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained from asserting viable ineffective assistance
 
of counsel claims that may implicate advice they gave to Mr. Abdullah's retained trial counse1.3
 
An actual conflict is defined by its effect on counsel. not by whether there is a "mere theoretical
 
division of loyalties," Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 172 n. 5 (emphasis added). "[T]he evil [of
 
conflict-riddc;:n couru:d] is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, ...
 
- - "-- - ~ -­
[making it] difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation 
ofa cIient." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 (1978) (emphasis added).
 
In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas action, Mr. 
Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has an actual 
conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists 
because attorneys in the State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's 
retained trial counsel, sat in on the trial and are witness even if they are not called in the 
post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could claim the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may have foregone viable 
ineffective assistanc,:: of counsel claims because such claims may implicate advice the attorneys 
gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. 
The Court fhds, therefore, the State Appellate Public Defender attorneys have a conflict 
of interest and that if the issue were asserted in later proceedings the court would have to have an 
evidentiary proceeding to determine the effect the conflict may have had on their representation.4 
J By analogy, when a pditioner is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial counsel, the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may be raised in a 5uooessive petition absent a clear and voluntary waiver. See Commonwealth 
v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974). Absent a showing that the petitioner was specifically advised of the hazards of
 
being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction hearing and that the petitioner consented to such an
 
arrangement, a successi'r e post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, is not barred.
 
See Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987). In fact, in South Carolina as a result of this case, coW1S are
 
instnlcted to advise a !='~titioner who wishes to waive this conflict that "the dual representation will result in the
 
waiver of any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" Id at 22. The petitioner is then required to state on the
 
record whether he wishe~. to proceed, thereby waiving the issue. ld.
 
4 The Cc'urt is not mal<...ng any determination regarding the validity of such claim if made by Mr. Abdullah in a 
subsequent proceeding. However, clearly Mr. Abdullah could make that claim in subsequent proceedings and if he 
were to assert that claim, the court would be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict 
ORDER RE: CONFLICT COUNSEL
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Furthennore, the CO!.lI1 fmds that this conflict affects the entire office because at least three 
members of the offil::er, Molly Husky, Mark Ackley and Kimberly Simmons, met with and 
advised Mr. Abdulla:l's trial counsel pre-trial, during jury selection, during trial and post-trial. 
Molly Husky is the State Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley 
heads tbe Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a colorable 
claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky or being supervised by Mark Ackley would also 
have a conflict because he could claim they did n..Qt pllfSue claims that _may implicate M_s--'-- _ 
Husky's, Mr. Ackley's or Ms. Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State 
Appellate Public Ddender's Office is conflicted for the purpose of this post-conviction 
proceeding. 
While Mr. Abdullah may waive this conflict, only he may waive the conflict and -that
 
waiver must be a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver or the Court must give him an
 
opportunity to acquire new counsel. Lopez, 139 Idaho at 259, 77 P.3d at 127. Mr. Abdullah is
 
indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense.
 
\Vhen an in:ligent defendant is unable to retain his own lawyer. the trial judge's
 
appointment of coun::el is itself a critical stage of a criminal trial. At that point in the proceeding,
 
by definition, the ddendant has no lawyer to protect his interests and must rely entirely on the
 
judge. Jvfickens, 53:: U.S. at 184. For that reason it is "the solemn duty of a ... judge before
 
whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps
 
necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the
 
proceedings." !d. (qt.oting Von Maltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948»). If the Court had
 
been aware of the c:;mflict, the Court would have ordered the appointment of death qualified
 
private c-cUDsel at pu[;lic expense at the outset of these proceedings.
 
Therefore, this Court has an obligation to hold a hearing to explain the implications of 
waiving these conflicts and how that would not only affect Mr. Abdullah's right to assert claims 
in this post-convictic'[l proceeding but would affect his ability to pursue claims associated with the 
State Appellate Publ ic Defender's Office's involvement with his private trial counsel in further 
adversely affected his pccrt-conviction counsel's performance. See Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 874 (9'1l Cir.
 
2006); Karis v. Caldero7l, 283 F.3d 1117. 1126-27 (9lh Cir. 2002).
 
ORDER HE: CONFLICT COUNSEL 
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I
 
proceedings, incLudhlg any federal habeas actions or successive post-conviction proceedings. It 
may even affect his ahility to challenge this Court's actions regarding these conflicts. 
The Court het'eby schedules a hearing for September 25, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. to detennine 
whether Mr. Abdulla.11 can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive these conflicts, whether 
the Court should appoint conflict counsel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the 
Court should order the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death 
squalified private COUllSel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public expense.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 151h day of September 2009.
 
~e 
Cheri C. Copsey ~ 
District Judge 
S A trial \:ourt may appClint substitute counsel for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good cause. State v. Nath,
 
137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857,859-60 (2002). Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that
 
lies within the sound di:;~tion ofthe trial comt and will be reViewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id at 7] 5.
 
52 P.3d at 860. The triEJ court's decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it violated the defendant's
 
right to counsel. Id
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I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OR e. c E \ \} E0 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA nn6 fEB \ 5 LUU 
I AZAD HAJ! ABDULLAH, ) ) Case No. SP-OT 05-00308 
ST~~"~~~pusL\C ee.\"r;)""'­
I vs. 
Petitioner,· - ) 
) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) ) 
DISCOVERY AND 
GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
I Respondent. ) -------------) ORDER 
I The petitioner has filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction relief that 
I includes a wide variety of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially, 
the petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for nearly every decision 
I made by trial counsel in the petitioner's defense. The Court is informed that trial 
I counsel, Kim and Mitch Toryanski, and the Ada County Public Defenders Office, 
I who defended the petitioner before the Toryanski's, have both turned their files 
over to the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPO). The SAPO has been granted 
I permission to conduct depositions of the Toryanski's and August Cahill and Amil 
I Myshin of the public defenders office who represented the petitioner. The State 
has moved to compel discovery requiring the SAPO to provide copies of all of 
I trial counsel's files in preparation for the depositions and so the State can properly 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVRRY AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
I 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 1 
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I respond to the petition for post conviction relief. The petitioner has moved for a 
protective order for those files to include attorney client privilege materials and 
I work product. 
I The State's motion to compel and the petitioner's motion for protective 
order came on regularly for hearing on December 18, 2007. After argument, and I 
I 
the Court being fully informed, the Court orders as follows. 
I 1. The State's Motion to compel is granted. In light of the number and 
variety of the petitioner's claims, trial counsels' files in their entirety are 
I 
fairly subject to discovery by the State. Such an order is consistent with 
I the doctrine of fairness and completeness and with the persuasive 
authority of Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
Court has been advised that the State and the petitioner have agreed that I 
I 
any documents provided to trial counsel by the State need not be 
I duplicated by the SAPD as part of the discovery process. Other than 
those duplicate items, all items in trial counsel's files are subject to 
discovery to the State unless the pertinent claim in the petition is 
I abandoned. 
I 2. Such discovery however is limited pursuant to the petitioner's motion 
for protective order which is also granted in part as follows. TheI documents in trial counsel's files as well as any direct attorney client 
I communications will not be admissible as evidence in the State's case in 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
I 
AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 2 001838
, 
J
 
I
 
I
 
chief in the event of a retrial or resentencing. However, in the event that 
I 
I 
the petitioner testifies, at a retrial or resentencing or other proceeding, 
I statements the petitioner made to trial counselor their agents may be 
used as cross examination or impeachment. Additionally, other material 
I 
which was previously the subject of the attorney client privilege or work 
I product privilege may be used in cross examination of the petiti_oner if 
he testifies at retrial, resentencing or other future proceeding, , if made 
relevant by the petitioner's testimony. 
I If the petitioner testifies in such a way that he opens the door to 
I impeachment with materials or conversation previously the subject of 
I one of the privileges and when challenged with the contents of that 
I 
impeaching document or statement disclaims it, then and only then will 
I extrinsic evidence of the previously privilege material be admissible for 
impeachment purposes. 
3. The petitioner's waiver of both his attorney client privilege and the 
I work product privilege was made impliedly by his filing of the petition 
I for post conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The petitioner was specifically advised on the record on December 18,I 
I 
2007 that asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims would waive 
I any attorney client privilege or work product privilege. His signature on 
this order constitutes his express waiver of those privileges. 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 3 
I 001839
 
 
r'S
 
I 
. 
I 
4. The Courts reasoning and analysis was set out in detail on the record I 
during the hearing on December 18, 2007 and is hereby incorporated 
I into this order and adopted by reference. 
I For the reasons set out above, the State's motion for discovery as modified 
by the parties and petitioner's motion for protective order is granted in part as 
I described above. 
I It is so ordered. 
Ii,I DATED this 1ft-day of 
I
 
I
 
I
 
~2008. 
_~e.~,---_ 
Cheri C. Copsey -r---a 
District Judge 
I Mark Ackley/Shannon Romero State Appellate Public Defender for petitioner 
I
 
I
 
Azad Abdullah 
I
 Petitioner
 
I
 
I
 
I ORDER GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
(ABDULLAH) PAGE 4I 001840
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofIdaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN TBEDISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTRJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
County ofAda ) 
) 
) CASE NO. SPOT0500308 
) 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ~ AFFIDAVIT OF AZAD HAJJ ) ABDULLAH 
) 
) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) 
) 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1.	 All matters set forth are based on my personal knowledge, feelings and beliefs. 
2.	 I am the Petitioner in the above-titled matter. 
3.	 I have been represented by the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) 
since this Court ordered the appointment ofthe SAPD on April 7, 2005. 
4.	 Specifically, I was represented by Kimberly Simmons and Mark Ackley from the start of 
my post-conviction case in March or April of 2005 to around January of 2006, when 
Ronaldo Coulter replaced Mr. Ackley as my lead counsel. I was represented by Mr. 
Coulter and Ms. Simmons until October of 2006, when both Ms. Simmons and Mr. 
Coulter left the SAPD office. 
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5. Since October of 2006. I have been continuously represented by Mark Ackley. an 
attorney with the SAPD. who has served as lead counsel on my case. 
I 
6. Since April of 2007, I have been continuously represented by Shannon Romero, an 
attorney with the SAPD. who has served as co-counsel on my case. 
I 
7. Since September of 2007, Nicole Owens, an attorney with the SAPD, has served as 
additional counsel on my case. 
I 
8. During the nearly 4 ~ years that I have been represented by the SAPD, I have developed 
a strong relationship of trust with my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD. including but 
I 
not limited to Michael Shaw. the SAPD investigator. and Guadalupe Ayala, the SAPD 
mitigation specialist. The SAPD"Staff feels to me like family. because I speak with them 
and see them more often than my own family. My parents and siblings also have strong 
feelings of trust and confidence in the SAPD staff. Attachment 1, incorporated herein by 
reference, is a photograph ofmy mother with members ofthe SAPD staff. 
I 
I 9. I am aware of and have received and read a copy of this Court's order directing my 
attorneys. and the State. to provide information to this Court about the potential for a 
conflict of interest arising from the SAPD's pretrial, trial. and post-trial contact with my 
trial attorneys, Mitch and Kim Toryanski. (See Order RE: SAPD Involvement with Trial 
and Pre-Trial, filed 8/17/09.) 
I 
I 10. I am. aware of and have received and read both a copy of the State's Memorandum Re: 
SAPD involvement with trial and pretrial, filed August 31, 2009. and the SAPD's 
Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD 
with Trial Counsel, filed September 1. 2009. I am aware that both the State and my 
I 
counsel at the SAPD have represented to the Court that they do not believe a conflict of 
interest exists based on the SAPD's pretrial, trial, and post-trial contact with my trial 
counsel. 
I 11. I am aware of and have received and read the Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel, filed September 15.2009. My attorneys at the SAPO have reviewed and explained this Order 
tome. 
I 12. I am very concerned about the Court's order, which as I understand it, concludes that my 
attorneys at the SAPO have a conflict of interest with me, based on the pretrial, trial and 
post-trial contact the SAPO had with my trial counsel.I 13. Because of my prior negative experience with the Toryanskis, which I outlined in detail 
in my affidavit and supplemental affidavit, which are attached hereto and incorporated byI reference. I am extremely concerned about the Court's order. In light of my prior 
experience with the Toryanskis, it has taken a long time for me to establish a good and 
trusting relationship with my current counsel, Mr. Ackley, Ms. Romero, and Ms. Owens,I and the staff at the SAPO. Up to this point, I have had tremendous faith and confidence in the SAPD's representation of me dwing these post-conviction proceedings and have 
I 
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I felt that my attomeys and the SAPD staff have been concemed with looking out for my best interests and well-being throughout their representation ofme. 
I 14. This Court's Order re: Conflict Counsel causes me great concern, stress, and terrifies me at the prospect of losing my attorneys and the staff at the SAPD. Ifmy attorneys at the 
SAPD are no longer allowed to represent me, I am. also concemed about how much 
longer this will delay my case, how long it will take me to establish a trusting relationshipI with new lawyers if the SAPD can no longer represent me, and how allowing new 
attomeys to represent me at this point will impact my post-conviction claims. 
I
 
I
 DATEDthis 18 daYOf~009. 
I
 
I
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \'6(Y'- day of~ ,2009.I ..........,.,#,
 
........~~ ~t>ALlJ~;"#,#.
 
.:0 ~v ........... -1 ~#.

':.1 I. ~ ..I ! * l N07'-iA \~"\ 
•• "f" •• >.
. . '. .,-. : 
• • 6 ... • •irIJ\ l/ ::I
 ~~. ~tlC ,t ..... $
.. -. . ..- ..~'~...... ... .. 
..~#. ~ 0-....•••:10 III.... : 
""" J: ID'"~ ..
.., . 
~ 
Residing at ~ .
 
My commission expires=5-;"I"""".......~..., \a
 
I CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __day of , 2009, a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
I
 
MELISSA RICHESON GALLEGOS I Administrative Assistant 
I
 
I
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NO'=m 7 .FILED.~A.M	  J P.M _ 
AUG	 18 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner,
 
CASE NO. CY-PC-2005-00308
 
vs.
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO STATUS MEMORANDUM 
Res ondent. 
In confonnity with the intent ofI.C. § 19-2719 (8); the Court hereby provides the Idaho 
Supreme Court with a memorandum describing the status of post-conviction in this case. 
(Attached is a copy of the current Register of Actions.) The Court has given this case first priority 
but has found repeatedly that the time limitations set forth in I.C. § 19-2719 could not be met and 
still accommodate Abdullah's constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court has extended the time 
limits set forth in the statute as follows. These extensions have been at Abdullah's requests, 
based on sworn testimony, and upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances which would 
make it impossible to fairly consider Abdullah's claims in the time provided. 
The jury trial against the defendant, Azad Haji Abdullah, commenced on September 10, 
2004, with the selection of a jury and ended on November 18, 2004, on an Indictment, filed 
November 15, 2002. The underlying case took more than two (2) months to try and several years 
of complex litigation. The Court entered judgment on March 4, 2005. AbdulllUl's case involves 
complex legal and factual matters. 
Abdullah timely filed his original Post-Conviction Petition on April 15, 2005, and under 
oath the Petitioner, Azad Abdullah, testified that he needed substantially more time to investigate 
his claims and to prepare an Amended Petition. The State answered on May 12, 2005, and the 
Court held a status conference on June 29, 2005. 
I The Court notes that there is no procedure for compliance with this statute. 
STATUS MEMORANDUM 
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At that status conference, the parties all agreed that both parties needed substantially more 
time to properly investigate potential post-conviction claims and both requested the Court to issue 
a scheduling order allowing Abdullah to file an Amended Petition on July 14, 2006 with the State 
responding in September 29,2006. The Court found good cause to grant their requests and issued 
a scheduling order on June 30, 2005, incorporating those requests. 
On January 13,2006, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time supporting 
that request with an Affidavit from Kimberly Simmons, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
stating good cause for another extension. The Court held a hearing on January 20, 2006, found 
good cause to grant the extension and issued a scheduling order ordering any Amended Petition to 
be filed by January 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety (90) days. 
On December 20, 2007, Abdullah again moved the Court for an extension of time 
supporting that request with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office, stating good cause for a six (6) month extension. The Court held a hearing on December 
21, 2006, found good cause for the extension and granted the request. The Court ordered any 
Amended Petition to be filed no later than July 19, 2007, with the State answering within ninety 
(90) days. 
Abdullah filed his Amended Petition on July 19, 2007. Due to concerns. about juror 
privacy the Court allowed Abdullah to withdraw that Amended Petition and to file an Amended 
Petition that protected juror privacy. The Court held a number of status conferences subsequent 
to this filing. 
The State answered the Amended Petition, and moved for summary disposition on April 
10,2008. 
On August 29, 2008, Abdullah filed his Final Amended Petition and on September 26, 
2008, moved to supplement his Final Amended Petition. The State moved to strike portions of 
the Final Amended Petition. The State answered the Final Amended Petition and moved for 
summary disposition on March 31, 2009. Abdullah moved for an extension of time to allow his 
response and supported his motion with an Affidavit from Mark Ackley, State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office, stating good cause. The Court granted his Motion. On June 15, 2009, 
Abdullah responded to the State's Motions and requested an evidentiary hearing. The Court held 
STATUS MEMORANDUM 
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a hearing on June 19, 2009, and ruled that an evidentiary hearing was necessary as to a number of 
the claims. The Court requested the parties to get together and try to narrow the subject matter for 
the evidentiary hearing because the parties indicated that they might need six (6) weeks. The 
Court tentatively scheduled that hearing to begin in October. 
The Court held a hearing on August 7, 2009, and based on that hearing moved the 
evidentiary hearing to begin February 2010. The Court scheduled an omnibus hearing to address 
any final issues on December 4,2009. The Court anticipates the parties may want to brief issues 
subsequent to the evidentiary hearing. 
Based on the above and the schedule evidentiary hearing, it is anticipated that the Court 
will be able to rule on the pending Final Amended Petition no later than June 1, 2010. 
Dated this 18th day of August 2009. 
ch~of:r~?r---
District Judge 
STATUS MEMORANDUM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this li day of August 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
 
MARK J. ACKLEY
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District 
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l)ate: 8/18/2009	 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
lime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
age 1 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant I 
Azad Haji Abdullah. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
late	 Code User Judge 
NEWC CCCARUHA New Case Filed Cheri C. Copseyi/15/2005 
CCCARUHA Petition For Post Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey 
CERT CCCARUHA Certificate Of Mailing Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC CCMONGKJ Notice Of Filing Cheri C. Copsey 122/2005 
/1212005 RSPS CCMONGKJ Answ To Petn For Post Convctn Relf(bower/st) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCGROSPS Hearing Scheduled - (06/29/2005) Cheri C. Cheri C. Copsey11712005 Copsey 
ORTR CCGROSPS Order To Transport (6/29/05 @ 11 :00) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRHD CCGROSPS Hearing Held Cheri C. Copsey j29/2005 
30/2005 ORDR CCGROSPS Scheduling Order Cheri C. Copsey 
11/17/2005 STIP CCTHIEBJ Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questionnair Cheri C. Copsey 
ORDR DCANDEML Order Granting Stip For Release Of Question Cheri C. Copsey 11/21/2005 
1/22/2005 MOTN CCTHIEBJ Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing Cheri C. Copsey 
1211/2005 OPPO CCMARTLG Qualified Non Opposition Mom Permit Access Cheri C. Copsey 
CONT CCMARTLG Audio/visual Equip Review Evidence Cheri C. Copsey 
'2114/2005 MOTN CCTHIEBJ Motion For Scheduling Order Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled - Motn Sched Ordr Cheri C. Copsey f21/2005 (01/20/2006) Cheri C. Copsey 
12/22/2005 ORDR CCGROSPS Order Granting In Part Mtn To Permit Access to Cheri C. Copsey 
AudioNidio Equipment 
113/2006 MOTN CCGROSPS Mtn for Extension of Time to File Amended Cheri C. Copsey 
Petition for PC Relief 
NOTC CCGROSPS Notice of Hearing (1/20/06 @ 1:00) Cheri C. Copsey 
120/2006 MOTN CCGROSPS Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey 
I ORDR CCGROSPS 
Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File Cheri C. Copsey 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
I 
HRHD CCGROSPS Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey 
01/20/200601 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn 
Sched Ordr 
HRSC CCGROSPS Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/02/2007 01 :30 Cheri C. Copsey 
1	 PM) MOTN CCMARTLG Motion for Preparation of Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey9/2006
 
5/2006 OPPO CCMARTlG Opposition to Motion to Release Grand Jury Cheri C. Copsey
 
Transcripts
 
114/2006 RSPN CCTHIEBJ Response To State's Opposition To Motion To Cheri C. Copsey 
Release Of Grand Jury Transcripts 
4/20/2006 NOTH CCHARRAK Notice Of Hearing (5/15/06 @ 3:00pm) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC CCHARRAK Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Cheri C. Copsey t1/2006 
05/15/200603:00 PM) 
4/28/2006 ORTR CCGROSPS Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.) Cheri C. Copsey 
I 001851
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,ate: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
ime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
rad Haji Abdullah, Plainliff vs State Of Idaho. Defendant 
Date	 Code User Judge
 
HRHD CCGROSPS Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey
1/15/2006 
05/15/2006 03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
I 
6/9/2006 ORDR CCGROSPS Order Granting Petitioner Access to and Cheri C. Copsey
 
Possession of Grand Jury Transcripts with
 
Limitations
 
8/10/2006	 MOTN CCGROSPS Motion for Status Conference Cheri C. Copsey
 
ORTR CCGROSPS Order To Transport (10/25/06 @ 4:30 P.M.) Cheri C. Copsey
10/23/2006
 
2/22/2006 ORDR CCGROSPS Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to Cheri C. Copsey
 
File An Amended Petition for Post Conviction
 
Relief
 
1/212007 HRVC DCANDEML Hearing result for Status held on 05/02/2007 Cheri C. Copsey 
01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
PETN DCELLlSJ Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey1/19/2007
 
130/2007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Permitting Withdrawl of Petitioner's Cheri C. Copsey
 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
 
HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30 Cheri C. Copsey
 
_/6/2007 
PM) 
ORDR DCANDEML Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey 
PETN TCWEATJB Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Cheri C. Copsey 1/9/2007
 
HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Status held on 08/09/2007 Cheri C. Copsey
 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Waiver Of Atty/Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 1/17/2007
 
/27/2007 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Conditional Non-Objection to State's Cheri C. Copsey
 
Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
 
ORDR TCWEATJB Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey
1/28/2007 
/5/2007 MOTN DCANDEML Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
MEMO DCANDEML Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Cheri C. Copsey 
Discovery 
1/12/2007 MOTN CCEARLJD Motion for Order Requiring Preservation of All Cheri C. Copsey 
Physical and Documentary Evidence 
MEMO DCANDEML Memorandum in Support of Motion to Preserve Cheri C. Copsey1/19/2007 
I 
Evidence 
NOTH DCANDEML Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Cheri C. Copsey 
10/11/200702:30 PM) 
I 
9/26/2007 08JT CCMARTLG State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery Cheri C. Copsey
 
MEMO CCMARTLG State's Memorandum In Support of the State's Cheri C. Copsey
 
Objection to The Mom For Discovery 
10/10/2007 ORTR DCANDEML Order To Transport (10/11/07 @ 2:30) Cheri C. Copsey 
10/1112007 HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on Cheri C. Copsey 
10/11/200702:30 PM: Hearing Held 
10/26/2007 MOTN DCANDEML (3) Motion Directing Shipment of Evidence to Cheri C. Copsey 
Petitioner's Expert 
1 001852
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Date: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
lime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
'age 30f6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
late Code User Judge 
_012612007 MOTN DCANDEML Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to Petitioner's Expert 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1/9/2007 NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Discovery Status Cheri C. Copsey 
OBJT CCWRIGRM States Objection to Motions Directing Shipment of Cheri C. Copsey ~1/1412007 ORDR DCANDEML 
-
-
Evidence to Petitioner's Expert 
Order Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose Cheri C. Copsey 
Erika Klein 
.4/2007 MOTN TCWEATJB Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 
12/5/2007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Cheri C. Copsey 
12/7/2007 MOTN DCANDEML Motion for Preparation of Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey 
NOTC DCANDEML Notice of Hearing (12/13) Cheri C. Copsey 
HRSC DCANDEML Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12113/2007 02:00 Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
L11/2007 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
I 
MOTN 
BREF 
NOTH 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
CCMARTLG 
Motion To Compel 
Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel 
Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
~13/2007 RSPN CCTOONAL Response to Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
/18/2007 CONT TCWEATJB Hearing result for Motion held on 12/13/2007 Cheri C. Copsey 
02:00 PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For 
I HRSC TCWEATJB Discovery Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12118/2007 09:00 AM) Motion to Compel/Discovery Issues Cheri C. Copsey 
HRHD TCWEATJB Hearing result for Motion held on 12/18/2007 Cheri C. Copsey 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion to 
1 Compel/Discovery Issues 
ORDR TCWEATJB Order Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose Cheri C. Copsey 
Tod Littlefield 
1/2112007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey 
NOFG TCWEATJB Notice Of Filing Cheri C. Copsey 
t/31/2007 ORDR TCWEATJB Order re: Juror Contact Cheri C. Copsey 
1/2/2008 ORDR TCWEATJB Order to Transport (2114/08 at 11 AM) Cheri C. Copsey 
I HRSC TCWEATJB Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02/1412008 11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact Cheri C. Copsey 
1/3/2008 RSPS CCMARTLG Response To Order Re Juror Contact Cheri C. Copsey 
18/2008 MEMO CCDWONCP Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury 
Contact 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1/22/2008 MOTN DCTYLENI Motion to Provide Trial Documents Cheri C. Copsey 
124/2008 MOTN TCWEATJB Motion for Partial Summary Disposition & 
Memorandum in Support Thereof 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1/25/2008 RSPS CCCHILER Response to Motion for Partial Summary Cheri C. Copsey 
Disposition and Memorandum in Support Thereof 
-
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.fate: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
"ime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
I Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
IAzad Hajj Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho. Defendant 
Date Code User	 Judge 
1/31/2008 RSPN TCWEATJB Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re: Cheri C. Copsey 
Juror Contact 
Document sealed 
MEMO TCWEATJB Memorandum in Response to State's Cheri C. Copsey 
Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Juror 
I Contact 
REPL TCWEATJB	 Reply to Response to Motion for Partial- Summary Cheri C. Copsey(1312008 Disposition &Memorandum in Support 
I 
/14/2008 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for 
Protective Order 
HRHD TCWEATJB	 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Cheri C. Copsey 
02/14/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re 
juror contact 1/25/2008 MOTN CCPRICDL	 Motion to Vacate Depositions Cheri C. Copsey 
3/27/2008 HRSC TCWEATJB	 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
04/11/200802:00 PM) Motion to Vacate 
Depositions 
_/28/2008 NOHG CCBOYIDR	 Notice Of Hearing (4-11-08 @ 2:00pm) Motion to Cheri C. Copsey 
Vacate Depositions and Motion to Compel 
1/8/2008 ORDR	 DCDANSEL Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.) Cheri C. Copsey 
4/10/2008 ANSW CCAMESLC	 Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn 
for State of 10) 
1/11/2008 HRHD TCWEATJB	 Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Cheri C. Copsey 
04/1.1/2008 02:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to 
Vacate Depositions 
1/7/2008 PROS	 PRPERRRA Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn Cheri C. Copsey 
5/12/2008 PROS PRPERRRA	 Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE Cheri C. Copsey 
1/29/2008 MISC DCDANSEL	 Final Amended Peititon for Post-Conviction Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief 
9/26/2008 MOTN DCDANSEL	 Motion for Court to Take Judicial NOtice Cheri C. Copsey 
MOTN DCDANSEL Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery Cheri C. Copsey 
I 
I 
MOTN DCDANSEL Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Cheri C. Copsey 
Post Conviction Relief Addenda With Original 
Affidavits 
MOTN DCDANSEL	 MOtion to Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel Cheri C. Copsey 
(Kim Toryanski) 
11/1212008 OBJT CCWATSCL	 State's Objection to the Renewed and Cheri C. Copsey 
Supplemental Motion for Discovery 
11/17/2008 OBJT CCWATSCL	 Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from Cheri C. Copsey 
Trial Counsel 
11/25/2008 OB.IE MCBIEHKJ Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice 
NOTC TCWEATJB	 Notice of Hearing Cheri C. Copsey12/15/2008 
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Date: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
lime: 10:04 AM ROAReport 
Page 50f6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Azad Haji Abduliah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
'ate Code User Judge 
12115/2008 HRSC TCWEATJB Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/16/200902:00 
PM) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1211812008 CONT TCWEATJB Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/200902:00 PM) Cheri C. Copsey 
TCWEATJB Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
1/6/2009 REPL TCWEATJB Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel Cheri C. Copsey 
Discovery from Trial Cou~sel (Kim Toryanski) 
-
1 REPL TCWEATJB Reply to State's Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice Cheri C. Copsey 
1nl2009 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Strike Cheri C. Copsey 
1/9/2009 DCHH TCWEATJB Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
I HRSC TCWEATJB estimated: Under 100 Pages Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/19/2009 02:00 Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
1/5/2009 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings Cheri C. Copsey 
127/2009 RESP CCTOWNRD Response To Court Cheri C. Copsey 
i/6/2009 NOTC DCDANSEL Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited 
Request for Discovery, and Motion for the Court 
Cheri C. Copsey 
and the Parties to Rely on the Record 
3/17/2009 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel 
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Cheri C. Copsey 
Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial 
Notice 
1 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Regarding Petitioner's Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery 
Cheri C. Copsey 
f31/2009 MOTN CCLYKEAL Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State 
of Idaho) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
ANSW CCLYKEAL Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Cheri C. Copsey 
Relief and Brief in support of Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
1/14/2009 MOTN CCRANDJD Motion for 14 day Exentsion Cheri C. Copsey 
AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit of Mark JAckley Cheri C. Copsey 
1/20/2009 ORDR TCWEATJB Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To 
File Response To The State's Motion For 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Summary Disposition 
~/1212009 TCWEATJB Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
/15/2009 MISC DCDANSEL Response to the State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
Cheri C. Copsey 
1/16/2009 MISC DCDANSEL Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit 
from the Record) 
Cheri C. Copsey 
~/18/2009 NOTC TCWEATJB Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Summary Disposition 001855
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~ate: 8/18/2009 Fourth Judicial District Court· Ada County User: DCCOPSCC 
lime: 10:04 AM ROA Report 
Page 60f6 Case: CV-PC-2005-21802 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey 
Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
fad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho. Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
1/18/2009 
6/19/2009
I 
1/26/2009 
_/612009 
./8/2009 
./9/2009 
./21/2009 
./28/2009 
7/29/2009 
I 
7/30/2009 
./412009 
~/6/2009 
f/7/2009 
I
 
I
 
_/11/2009 
1/17/2009 
NOTC 
NOTC 
DCHH 
MOTN 
MEMO 
ORDR 
srlP 
HRSC 
TRLD 
MOTN 
REQU 
STIP 
ORDR 
MOTN 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
DCHH 
HRSC 
MISC 
ORDR 
ORDR 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
DCDANSEL 
DCDANSEl 
DCDANSEl 
MCBIEHKJ 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEAT./B 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
CCHOLMEE 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
TCWEATJB 
DCDANSEL 
TCWEATJB 
Notice of Supplemental Authority Cheri C. Copsey 
Notice of Filing Original Verfrcation Page Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing result for Status held on 06/19/2009 Cheri C. Copsey 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated. Under 1-00 Pages ­
Motion for More Time to Contact Witnesses for Cheri C. Copsey 
Evidentiary Hearing 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for More Time Cheri C. Copsey 
to Contact Witneses for Evidentiary Hearing 
Order Re: EVidentiary Hearing Cheri C. Copsey 
Stipulation for Extension of Time Cheri C. Copsey 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/07/2009 01 :30 Cheri C. Copsey 
PM) 
Transcript Lodged: 06-19-09 Cheri C. Copsey 
Order to Transport Cheri C. Copsey 
Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts Cheri C. Copsey 
Request For Status Of Pending Motion For Partial Cheri C. Copsey 
Summary Disposition And Discovery Motions 
Stipulation Re: Claims 
Order Directing The Preparation Of Transcripts 
Motion For Preparation Of Transcripts 
Miscellaneous: 54 Documents Unsealed 
Miscellaneous: 65 Documents Unsealed 
Miscellaneous: 4 Documents Unsealed 
Hearing result for Status held on 08/07/2009 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
12/04/2009 01:30 PM) Omnibus Hearing 
Proposed Agenda Items For Status Conference 
Standing Order Directing the Preparation of 
Transcripts of All Post Conviction Hearings 
Order Re: SAPO Involvement With Trial And 
Pre-Trial 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
Cheri C. Copsey 
I
 
I
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NO.----=~'7'I~':'"'lr__-
FII.£D 3t~~AM -rP.M-""'--'='---_ 
OCT 15 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO~CV-PC-200S-00308
 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
 
In reviewing the material filed in support of the Final AI11ended Petition, including various 
e-mails attached to the Toryanskis' depositions, it came to the Court's attention that several of the 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office attomeys, including Molly Husky, the State Appellate 
Public Defender. M~iI"k Ackley, Chief of the Capital Litigation Unit, and Kimberly Simmons, 
provided advice to :Mr. Abdullah's privately retained trial counsel before trial began, during jury 
voir dire, during trial and post triaL] The record establishes that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office advised trial counsel on several matters, including advising them to seek a 
continuance of the trial (which they did) and suggesting specific voir dire approaches. Both of 
these areas are the subject of Mr. Abdu11ah~s post-conviction claims. The full extent of the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office's involvement and what advice was given was unclear. 
Therefore, concerned about the apparent conflict of interest, the Court ordered counsel to address 
the implications and extent of this involvement. 
Both the State and the State Appellate Public Defertder~s Office responded and provided 
the Court with additional evidence. Based on those responses, the Court found that the State 
Appellate Public Defender~s Office had a conflict ofinterest in its representation ofMr. Abdullah 
1 The Court notes that Ms. Simmons and Mr. Ackley specifically represented to the Court in the original Petition that 
they bad no involveti1ent in the trial of this matter. It was on this repIeSCilta:tion that the Court found good cause to 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308 1 
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in post-conviction proceedings as outlined in its September 15,2009, order. The law is clear that 
once a court concludes defense counsel does have a conflict, it must obtain a knowing, intelligent 
and voluntary waiver from the defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new 
counsel. See State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2003).1 Mr.
 
Abdullah is indigent and is entitled to conflict free counsel at public expense. 
In order to ensure that Mr. Abdullah knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives this 
conflict, the Court hereby appoints R Keith Roark to independently advise Mr. Abdullah about 
the conflict and its potential effect on this post-conviction case, as well as any future proceedings, 
including federal habeas or successive post-conviction actions. Mr. Roark is private counsel 
qualified to represent indigent defendants at trial, in post-conviction and in appellate death penalty 
cases, having been certified by the Idaho Supreme Court. It does not appear that Mr. Roark has 
had any prior involwment in Mr. Abdullah's representation. 
As part of this appointment, the Court authorizes Mr. Roark to conduct a thorough and 
searching review of the State Appellate Public Defender's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence 
involvement up to its appointment to represent Mr. Abdullah on appeal and on post-conviction. If 
he needs to take depositions, he may do so. Furthermore, the Court hereby forwards copies ofthe 
relevant materials provided to the Cotut including the following: 
1) State Appellate Public Defender's Office Motion and Memorandum for 
Targeted Inquiry filed 9-25-09; 
2) Order re: Conflict Counsel filed 9-15-09; 
3) Response to Court Order Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement 
ofthe SAPD with Trial Counsel filed 9-1-09; 
4) Memorandum Re: SAPD Involvement with Trial and Pte Trial filed 8-31­
09; and 
5) Order Re: SAPD Involvement With Trial And Pre-Trial filed 8-17-09. 
Following a thorough review of the record and any investigation he deems necessary, he 
shall meet with and advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any decision to waive the 
allow the State AppeUate Public Defender's Office more than tbrte years to finalize the post-conviction petition. This 
is why the Court was unaware ofthe conflict. 
Z This was recently reaffirmed in State v. Severson, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 1492659 (Idaho, 2009). While rehearing 
was denied, Severson has not yet been released for publication and cannot be cited. 
ORDER APPOINTING KEITH ROARK
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conflict. Once he is satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understands his rights and is capable of making a. 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing before this 
Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 15th day ofOctober 2009. 
Cheri C. Copsey CS 
District Judge 
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CERTlFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ti day of October 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
lNTERDEPT. MArr. 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBUC DEFENDER
 
MARK J. ACKLEY
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
AZAD ABDULLAH 
#76321 
IMSI-JBWCK 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Dis· .ct 
-.
.,:" 
" 
"'
".-'
.: 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEYI State Appellate Public Defender State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843I MARK. J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 I NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 Capital Litigation Unit 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane I Boise, Idaho 83703 (20~) ~34-2712 
I 
NO. ~'Fi/i:i';-- _ 
FIlEDA.M-__-JP.M
SEP 252009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
CONFORM 
t~~lf 
IN THE DISlRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII nmICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
I 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
I 
Petitioner, 
I v. 
STATE OF IDAHO,I Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802 
) (formerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR A TARGETED 
) INQUIRY 
) 
) 
) 
) (Capital Case) 
I 
The Petitioner, AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, by and through his attorneys, Mark Ackley, 
I 
I Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender 
(SAPD), hereby moves this Honorable Court to conduct a targeted inquiry regarding the SAPD's 
I 
alleged conflict of interest at the hearing scheduled for September 25,2009, at 10;00 a.m. This 
I motion is supported by the Memorandwn in Support of the Motion for a Targeted Inquiry, filed 
simultaneously with this Motion. 
I
 
I
 MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY 1 
I 001863
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I 
I 
I RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this 25th day ofSeptember. 2009. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of September, a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing document, MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY, was delivered to the following:I
 ROGER BOURNE
 
SHAWNADUNN
I ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
 200 WEST FRONT ST., RM. 3191
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
I
 AZAD HAn ABDULLAH 
INMATE #76321I IMSI, J BLOCK
 PO BOX 51
 
BOISE In 83707
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
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I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
MOTION FOR A TARGETED INQUIRY 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
FacsimileK Hand Delivery 
u.s. Mail 
~ Statehouse Mail 
__Facsimile 
__Hand Delivery 
I 
3 
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Administrative Assistant 
I
 
I
 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
I State Appellate Public Defender State ofIdaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
I MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330 
SHANNON N. ROMERO, I.S.B. #5888 
I NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. #7679 Capital Litigation Unit 
-----1647ntlcefHarOOfl~fie 
I Boise, Idaho 83703 (208) 334~2712 
I 
NO. ~'imi _ 
AM FILED 
. --- IP.M. _ 
SEP 252009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
 
By J. WEATHERBY
 
DEPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURlH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
I 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
I 
Petitioner, 
I v. 
STATE OF IDAHO,I Respondent 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802 
) (formerly SPOT0500308) 
) 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF MOTION FOR A TARGETED 
) INQUIRY 
) 
) 
) 
) (Capital Case) 
I 
I 
Comes now the Petitioner, Azad Haji Abdullah, through his counsel, Mark Ackley, 
I Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens of the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender 
(SAPD), hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion For a Targeted Inquiry 
I 
(hereinafter "Memorandum") regarding the alleged conflict of interest between the SAPD and 
I Mr. Abdullah. A hearing is currently scheduled for September 25,2009, at 10:00 a.m. 
In this Memorandum, counsel for Mr. Abdullah identify all theoretical conflicts of 
interest that may arise from the SAPO's contact with trial counsel in Mr. Abdullah's case, and 
I identify the reasons why the SAPO believes no conflict exists. 
I
 
I
1MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY 
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I
 
I 
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I This Court issued an Order directing Mr. Abdullah and the State to submit simultaneous 
briefing by September 1,2009, supported by legal authority, regarding the SAPD's pretrial and 
trial involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. (8117/09 Order re: SAPD Involvement with 
I 
I Trial and Pre-trial.) The Court's order was specifically directed toward resolving the question of 
whether the, SAPD's contact and pretrial and trial involvement with trial counsel constituted a 
I 
eonflict of interest. On- August -3-1, -2009 j the State- submitted its. "Memorandum re:- SAPD 
I Involvement with Trial and Pre-Trial" (hereinafter "State's Memorandum"), in which it asserted 
that it did not believe there was a conflict of interest and did not believe any attorneys with the 
SAPD office would be necessary witnesses at Mr. Abdullah's evidentiary hearing. (See State's 
I Memorandum, incorporated here by reference.) The SAPD filed its "Response to Cowt Order 
I Inquiring into the Pretrial and Trial Involvement of the SAPD Wit1:l Trial Counsel" (hereinafter 
"Response") the following day, and asserted that there was no conflict of interest based on the 
I SAPD'spretrial, trial and post-trial interactions with trial counsel. (See Response, filed 9/1109, 
I incorporated here by reference.) Both the State and the SAPD attached emails to their respective 
filings documenting the interactions between the SAPD and trial counsel, while the SAPD also 
I attached excerpts from Ms. Toryanski's deposition testimony relating to her communications 
- with the SAPD. (See Memorandum (attachments); Response, Addenda A& B.)I Despite the parties' shared belief that no conflict of interest exists, the Court issued an 
I "Order re: Conflict Counsel" (hereinafter Order) on September 15, 2009, concluding that "the 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah inI poSt-conviction proceedings." (Order, pp.1-2.) Although the Court failed to specifically identify' 
I
 
I
 
. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ~OTIONFOR TARGETED INQUIRY 2 
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I
 
any particular conflict, the Court made a number of statements in its Order relating to the 
I perceived conflict of interest: 
This order does not affect the State Appellate Public Defender's Office's
 I representation ofMr. Abdullah in the appeal of his underlying conviction.
 
I 
I While the State Appellate Public Defender's Office addresses the conflict 
created by their role as witnesses in both advising trial counsel and observing the 
trial, the more significant conflict includes a colorable claim that they refrained 
from asserting viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims that may implicate 
advice they gave to Mr.Abdullah1 sretained trial counsel. [Footnote omitted.}- ­
I 
I In this case, on a successive post-conviction petition or in a federal habeas 
action, Mr. Abdullah has a "colorable claim" that the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office has an actual conflict of interest and, therefore, cannot 
I 
represent him in this action. That colorable claim exists because attorneys in the 
State Appellate Public Defender's Office advised Mr. Abdullah's retained trial 
counsel, sat in on the trial and are witnesses [sic] even ifthey are not called in the 
I 
post-conviction case. More significantly, should Mr. Abdullah so chose, he could 
claim the State Appellate Public Defender's Office post-conviction attorneys may 
have foregone viable ineffective assistance of counsel claims because such claims 
may implicate advice the attorneys gave to Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel. 
I· 
I 
Furthermore, the Court finds that this conflict affects the entire office because at 
least three members of the officer [sic], Molly Husky [sic], Mark Ackley and 
Kimberly Simmons, met with and advised Mr. Abdullah's trial counsel pre-trial, 
during jury selection, during trial and post-trial. Molly Husky [sic] is the State 
Appellate Public Defender and the office supervisor. Mark Ackley heads the 
Capital Litigation Unit and supervises that unit. Mr. Abdullah would have a
·1· 
I 
colorable claim that any attorney working for Ms. Husky [sic] or being supervised 
by Mark Ackley would also have a conflict because he could claim they did not 
. pursue claims that may implicate .Ms. Husky's [sic], Mr. Ackley's or Ms. 
Simmons' advice. Therefore, the Court finds that the entire State Appellate Public 
I Defender's Office is conflicted for the purpose ofthis post-conviction proceeding. 
(Order, pp.2; 4-5 (emphasis in original).)1 
I 1 This memorandum doeS liot address that aspect of this Court's order regarding members ofthe 
I
 
.SAPD who "sat. in on the trial[,)" where two members of the SAPD office, according to the
 
emailswhicharenowpartoftherecord.werepresentforapartialdayofjuryvoirdire.1bis
 
.issue is not addressed because no member of the SAPD would or could· ever be called to testify
 
I 
in contradiction to what the Official Clerk's Record and Official Court Reporter's Transcript 
from voir dire reflect occUrred in court and on the record on the day SAPD office members were 
. 3MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FORTARGETED INQUIRY 
I 
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I As a result of having found the existence of a conflict, this Court ordered a hearing be 
held on September 25, 2009, at which this Court will "determine whether Mr. Abdullah waives 
I 
I this conflict both as to this post-conviction proceeding and in any subsequent proceedings." 
(Order, p.2.) But see Order, p.6 ("The Court hereby schedules a hearing ... to detennine whether 
Mr. Abdullah can knowingly intelligently and volWltarily waive these conflicts, whether the 
I 
I Court should appoint conflict cOWlSel to advise him regarding this waiver, or whether the Court 
should order the State Appellate Public Defender'S Office to provide Mr. Abdullah death 
qualified private counsel to represent him in these post-conviction proceedings at public 
I 
I expense." (footnote omitted».
 
RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITY
 
In light of this Court's conclusion that the SAPD is currently laboring under a conflict of 
I interest in its representation of Mr. Abdullah, based on pretrial, trial, and post-trial contacts the 
I SAPD had with trial counsel, .the SAPD urges this Court to conduct an inquiry at the September 
25, 2009 hearing that is both searching and targeted at the conflict issue. See State v. Lopez. 139 
I Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating that once a trial court is aware that a 
. conflict may exist, it must conduct an inquiry that is both searching and targeted at the conflict I issue). While such an inquiry is usually part of this Court's evaluation of whether a conflict of 
I interest exists, and this Court has presumably already found a conflict of interest, this Court has 
. neither identified the specific nature of the conflict nor the basis for its finding that a conflict ofI interest exists. 
I 
il present for part of the voir dire. Moreover, ifmere observation of events which are part of the 
I. public record is sufficient to render an individual a witness, then Ms. Simmons, Shawna Dunn, the Honorable Patrick Owen, and this Court would all be witnesses in this case. 
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Identification of the nature and basis for any conflict of interest is necessary before I Mr. Abdullah can even consider making an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of any 
I alleged conflict. Seeld 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct (IRPC) 1.7(a)(2), a concurrentI 
conflict of interest exists where "there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
I clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client 
or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and -domesticI 
relationships." Despite the existence of this type ofconflict, the rules nevertheless allow a lawyer 
I to represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes thatthe lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not 
I prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
I against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before 
a .tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. IRPC· 
I 
I 
·1.7(b); see also State v. Severson, _ P.3d --.oJ 2009· WL 1492659 *6 (Idaho 2009)2 ("To 
determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists, Idaho Courts look to the standards set 
forth in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct''). Because Mr. Abdullah cannot give informed. 
I 
I consent until the conflicts of interest are identified, the SAPD urges this Court to conduct a 
targeted inquiry, directed at identifying both the basis for and the nature ofany potential conflict. 
I 
I. IDENTIFICATION OF ALL BASES FOR THEORETICAL CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST BETWEEN TIlE SAPD AND MR. ABDULLAH BASED ON CONTACT 
·1 
THE SAPD HAD WITH TRIAL COUNSEL 
The SAPD identifies herein the theoretical conflicts that could exist based on the 
interactions between the SAPD and trial-counsel. Identification of these theoretical conflicts of 
I 
I interest is based on a thorough review of all contacts between the SAPD and the Toryanskis, 
2 A remittitur has been issued in this case and thus it is final. 
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previously identified and submitted to this Court as attachments to the SAPD's Response.3 In 
I 
I addition to identifying all theoretical conflicts, the SAPD sets forth why it believes no actual 
conflict of interest exists with respect to each theoretical conflict identified herein. 
A. SAPD "Advice" to Trial Counsel 
I 
I The first set oftheoretical conflicts is based on the "advice" given by the SAPD. In some 
instances identified below, it is not clear if the SAPD gave advice, and if so, what advice it 
provided to trial counsel. For the purpose of this Motion and in light of this Court's .Order re: 
I Conflict, it will be assumed that the SAPD did in fact provide advice to trial counsel. 
I 1. The SAPD's Possible Suggestion That Trial Counsel Move To Disgualify 
I 
This Court 
Mark Ackley and Ms. Huskey may have suggested to Kim Toryanski that trial counsel 
move to disqualify this Court from presiding over Mr. Abdullah's trial during a September 3, 
I 2004 telephone conversation. (See Response, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw 
I" re: Abdullah File Clean up, referencing 9/3104 telephone call with Kim Toryanski and Molly 
Huskey.) Assuming the SAPD recommended that trial counsel move to disqualify this Court, 
I trial counsel made no such motion. 
I Because the advice offered by the SAPD to trial counsel"was not followed, there is no 
basis for presuming the existence of a conflict of interest arising from the SAPD failing to raise a 
I claim regarding the disqualification motion. The SAPD's advice to counsel was not followed, 
and it cannot be said that the SAPD has refrained from claiming trial counsel were ineffective inI 
3 An additional contact, discovered only this week during the SAPD investigator's second review I "oftrial counsels' files in anticipation ofan evidentiary hearing, is addressed in this Memorandum. 
and attached for this Court's and the State's review. Because this Court ordered the State be 
given access to the entirety of trial counsels' files, the" State has been priVy to this coJt.tact. SeeI 2114/08 Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery and Granting Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order p.2 ("In light of the number and variety of the petitioner's claims, trial 
counsels' files in their entirety are fairly subject to discovery by the State."). " I 
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I 
failing to move to disqualify this Court where such failure was not premised on the SAPD's 
advice. 
2.	 The SAPD's Possible Advice To Trial Counsel To Object To This Court's 
Order Sealing The Proceedings Relating To The Klein/Littlefield Affair 
According to notes from a September 3, 2004 telephone conversation among Mrs. 
Toryanski, Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey, Mr. Ackley may have suggested to Mrs. Toryanski that 
she move to unseal trial counsels' motion to continue that this Court ordered be filed under seal, 
based on Mr. Abdullah's right to a public trial. (Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from 
Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw re: Abdullah file clean up, referencing 9/3104 telephone call with 
Kim Toryanski and Molly Huskey.) The motion to continue was based on trial counsels' need to 
. investigate the affair between the prosecutor, Erika Kle~ and the lead detective, Todd 
Littlefield, which had just been revealed to trial counse1.4 
The record demonstrates trial counsel made a motion to unseal the motion to continue 
and the transcripts from the in-chambers hearing on the motion to continue. (R., pp.l009-1012.) 
This Court held a hearing and denied that request. (Tr. Vol. IT, p.179, L.3 - p.I90, L.l5.) 
Because it appears trial counsel followed ~e SAPD's advice and moved to unseal the motion 
and the transcripts from the hearing relating to the motion to continue, there is no conflict of 
·interest that can arise from the SAPD's advice. lhat is, it cannot be said the SAPD did· not 
·pursue claims that may implicate the SAPD's advice where trial counsel arguably followed the 
SAPD's advice.. There is no argument that could be made that trial counsel were in~ffective in 
.. Errors in the spelling of the prosecutor's and detective's names demonstrate the SAPD's lack 
ofknowledge. (Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to Michael Shaw re: 
Abdullah File Clean Up, referencing 9/3/04 telephone call with Kim Toryanski and Molly 
Huskey, identifying "Erica Kline and Detective Whitfield.") 
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moving to unseal the motion to continue and the related hearing where this Court denied the 
I motion.S 
I 3. The SAPD's Possible Advice to Trial Counsel to Move to Continue the Trial 
I 
Based on Mrs. Toryanski's Representation that the Defense Had No Expert to 
Attack the State's Laboratory Results and the Revelation of the Affair 
between the Lead Detective and the Assistant Prosecutor (9/3/04 TC with KD 
Based on Mrs. Toryanski's assertion that the defense had no expert to attack the State's 
I Laboratory Results, in conjunction with the revelation that the .lead detective and assistant 
I prosecuting attorney were having an affair, Mr. Ackley may have advised Mrs. Toryanski to 
move to continue the trial. (Response, Addendum B, 3/17/06 Email from Mark Ackley to 
.1 Michael Shaw re: Abdullah file clean up, referencing 9/3/04 telephone call with Kim Toryanski 
I and Molly Huskey.) In fact, Ms. Toryanski did move to continue the trial, and did reference the 
I 
toxicology results, and the State's choice of testing labs, as decisions that may have been 
I impacted by the affair between the Detective Littlefield and prosecutor Erika Klein, and areas of 
inquiry that trial counsel would explore in a deposition of Detective Littlefield. (9/7/04 
Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Filed Under Seal,pp.4-10.)
 
I Given that trial counsel did move to continue the trial, consistent with possible advice
 
I given by Mr. Ackley, and the SAPD has raised a claim that trial counsel were ineffective in 
failing to assert and honor Mr. Abdullah's right to a speedy trial by requesting multiple 
I CQntinuances, it cannot be said that the SAPD has a conflict and is refraining from raising claims 
·1 on Mr. Abdullah's behalf that may implicate their advice to move to continue the trial. (See . 
Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Claim FF, Trial Counsel Rendered 
I 
I 6 Notably, it could be argued that there coUld be a a potential conflict had trial counsel failed to move to unseal the motion and hearing based on the advice ofthe SAPD, and the SAPD had not 
raised a ~laim ofineffective assistance resulting from trial counsels' failure. 
I 
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Ineffective Assistance By Failing to Assert And Honor Mr. Abdullah's Demands to Exercise HisI 
Right to a Speedy Trial.) 
I 
4. Mr. Ackley Advising Mrs. Torvanski That Trial Counsels' Voir Dire 
Questioning Of Prospective Jurors Was Erroneous And Directing TrialI Counsel To Review Relevant Portions Of Penry v. Johnson (919/04 Email 
From Mr. Ackley To Kim Toryanski)
 
I Kimberly Simmons, fonner co-counsel for Mr. Abdullah, and Shelley Hill, observed a
 
portion ofjury selection in Mr. Abdullah's case on one day, September 8, 2004. (See R~
I Addendum B, 919/04 Email from Mr. Ackley to Mrs. Toryanski.) Based on their observations, 
I they reported back to Mr. Ackley that both trial counsel and this Court were incorrectly inquiring 
of prospective jurors' ability to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence. Mr. AckleyI advised Mrs. Toryanski of Supreme Court precedent suggesting that asking jurors if they could 
I simply consider mitigating evidence is not enough. Mr. Ackley advised Mrs. Toryanski that 
.prospective jurors needed to be questioned to detennine whether they could give effect to 
I 
I mitigating evidence, and if they could not, trial counsel needed to move to exclude those jurors 
for cause. ld 
The SAPD has challenged all aspects oftrial counsels' perfonnance during jury selection, 
I 
I including but not limited to voir dire. (See Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Claim EE., Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Stipulating To Strike Pro-Life 
.1 
Jurors Based Solely On Their Jury Questionnaires, By Failing To Conduct AD. Adequate Voir 
I Dire, By Failing To Move To Strike Jurors For Cause, And By Failing To Utilize Preemptory 
Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors.") The SAPO's claim that trial counsel wereinetTective 
throughout all aspects ofjury selection is consistent with the advice Mr. Ackley provided to trial 
. .I counsel re~g the inadequacy oftheir voir dire ofprospective jurors. Thus, it cannot be said 
I 
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that the SAPD has a conflict of interest which is causing SAPD attorneys to refrain from raising 
I claims on Mr. Abdullah's behalf that may implicate their advice to trial counsel regarding voir 
I dire. 
5. Mr. Ackley's "Advice" To Mrs. Toryanski About Possibly Crafting A 
I Separation Of Powers Argument Challenging The Sentencing Procedures . Utilized In Mr. Abdullah's Case 
I In a post-verdict, pre-judicial sentencing phone conversation initiated .by Mrs. Toryanski 
I 
to Mr. Ackley on January 24, 2005, Mr. Ackley mentioned the possibility of challenging the 
I post-verdict sentencing procedure in Mr. Abdullah's case and indicated that such a challenge, as 
. well as others, might be considered prior to sentencing. (Response, Addendum B, 1/24/05 Mr. 
Ackley note of telephone conversation with Kim Toryanski.) Trial counsel did not me any 
I 
I motions challenging the sentencing procedure in Mr. Abdullah's case, and did not ask the Court 
to impose a sentence other than death, despite the jury's sentencing verdict. 
Because the suggestion made by Mr. Ackley to Mrs. Toryanski was not followed, there is il 
.. no· basis for presuming the existence of a conflict of interest arising from the SAPD failing to 
II raise a claim regarding trial counsels' failure to challenge the sentencing procedures. The 
SAPD's advice to counsel was not followed, and thus, it cannot be said that the SAPD has 
II refrained from claiming trial counsel were ineffective in failing to move to disqualify this Court 
II where such failure was not premised on the SAPD's advice. 
6. Trial Counsels' Request For Molly Huskey To Review This Court's AdverseII Rulings Arid Infonn Counsel Whether An Interlocutory Appeal Would Be 
il 
Advisable 
. On December 4, 2003, this Court issued its "~ision Regarding State Death Penalty 
)1 
I . Statute and Notice ofIntent to Seek the Death PenaIty[,]" denying trial counsels' objection to the 
State's notice to seek the death penalty, denying the motion to strike the notice seeking the death 
II
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I penalty, and denying the motion to declare the death penalty statute inapplicable to Mr. 
Abdullah's case. (R., pp.576-592.) On December 9, 2003, this Court issued its "Decision 
I Regarding Constitutionality of the Statutory Aggravating Factors[,]" denying Mr. Abdullah's 
I request to deem the statutory aggravating circumstances contained in Idaho Code §19-2515 
unconstitutional. (R., pp. 598-606.) 
I On December 11,2003, trial counsel preswnably faxed these orders to Molly Huskey,6 
asking Ms. Huskey to review the rofmgs and assist in "evaluatingwhether it is advisable to fileI 
an interlocutory appeal- on one or the other or both." (9/1109 Response, Attachment B, 12111103 
I fax cover sheet.) The nature of the advice provided by Molly Huskey, if any, is not evident 
from any subsequent email communications between the SAPD and trial counseL7 A review ofI the clerk's record demonstrates that trial counsel did not seek pennission to appeal these orders, 
I and no interlocutory appeal was ever initiated. 
Regardless of the nature of Ms. Huskey's advice to trial counsel, if any.. in order toI demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsels' failure to seek permission to 
I appeal these orders in 2003, current counsel must demo~te that the Idaho Supreme Court 
would have granted permission for the int~r1ocutory appeal, a completely discretionary decision, 
'I 
I 
and further, convince this Court that the Idaho Supreme'Court would have reversed this Court's 
rulings on both orders. See Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 177 P.3d 362,368 (2008) ("In 
I 6 In the fax cover sheet, Kim Toryanski states "[t]he orders were filed 12/4 & I know that Under the Idaho Appellate Rules we have 14 days to file notice of appeal withe trial ct. The clock is 
ticking. Thank you so muchl" (911109 R~sponse, Attachment B,I2111103 fax cover sheet.) 
While one order was filed December 4th, the other order was not filed until December 9th• As aI	 result, it is not clear that the December 9th Order, as opposed to some other ruling by this Court, 
was faxed by trial counsel to Molly Huskey for review. 
I 
I 7 See Response, passim & Addenda (identifying and citing to emails, telephone summaries, and 
deposition testimony of Mrs. Toryanski. for the limited, involvement of the SAPD in Mr. 
Abdullah's case and the limited nature ofthe SAPD's advice). 
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a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the 
I underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability of success of the motion in 
question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent 
perfonnance."); LA.R.l2(a) ("Pennission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from 
I 
I an interlocutory order or degree ofa district court in a civil or criminal action ...."). 
To prevail on this claim, current counsel would have to convince this Court that the Idaho 
I 
Supreme Court WGUld have granted relief; in.short, current counsel would have to convince this 
I Court that its ruling on these motions were wrong. Even if current counsel could demonstrate 
that trial counsels' interlocutory appeal would have been granted and this Court's orders 
reversed, current counsel would still need to demonstrate that Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced as a 
I result ofcounsels' deficient omission. Prejudice would be demonstrated based on the passage of 
I time between the theoretical date that interlocutory relief would have been granted and a future 
unknown date when Mr. Abdullah obtains relief from the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal 
I through reversal of this Court's orders. Significantly, prejudice would not be based on the denial 
of the right to appeal since this Court's rulings have been preserved for challenge on directI 
appeal..· If this Court's rulings were in fact erroneous, Mr. Abdullah will receive relief from the 
I Idaho· Supreme Court on direct appeal and there will be no opportunity for a successive petition 
or federal habeas review on this possible claim, and the type of "colorable claim" i.dentified byI the Court would never arise. 
I Because the SAPD cannot demonstrate deficient performance of trial counsel, where it 
cannot prove that the Idaho Supreme Court would have granted an appeal from this Court's 
I interlocutory orders, and it cannot prove that the Idaho Supreme Court would reverse this 
I Court's rulings, a challenge to trial counsels' failure to seek permission to appeal the 
I
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interlocutory orders from December of 2003 would be futile. This is particularly true where the I 
error, if any, will be remedied on direct appeal. See Gilpfn-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 
I P.3d 787, 792 (2002) ("A post-conviction action is not a substitute for and does not supplant a 
direct appeal from the conviction or sentence."). Further, finding a conflict of interest on this I 
ground would suggest that post-conviction counsel should raise a claim of ineffective assistance 
I ofcounsel for every preserved error for which permission to appeal has not been sought. Thus, 
the absence of a c1aiin-tliaCtrfaf counsels"- failure to seek permission to appeal this Court~s-I interlocutory order was ineffective, irrespective of whether or how the SAPD advised trial 
I counsel to proceed with the interlocutory appeal, does not result from the SAPD refraining from 
raising ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims where no prejudice can ever be shown. I In conclusion, in each area where the SAPD allegedly provided advice to trial counsel, it 
I cannot be shown that such advice led to a conflict of interest. Moreover, it is worth nothing that 
neither the State nor the Court has ever suggested that the "advice" rendered was deficient in 
I 
I light of the circumstances ofthe case as relayed by trail counseL 
B.. SAPD AS POSSIBLE WITNESSES TO STATEMENTS MADE BY TRIAL 
COUNSEL 
I t. Kim Toryanski's Statements To Mr. Ackley And Ms. Huskey Which Left Mr. Ackley With The Impression That Mrs. Toryanski Was Over-Confident In 
Tiia} Counsels' Ability To Obtain An Acquittal 
I 
I Mrs; Toryanski is the primary witness to both the content and tone ofher conversations with 
Mr. Ackley and Ms. Huskey. (Response, Addendum B, summary of 9/3/04 telephone 
conversation among Ms. Huskey, Mr. Ackley and Mrs. Toryanski.) In addition, Sherry Rogers, 
I 
I Mr. Abdullah, Dr. Craig Beaver, and Ms. Rosanne Dapsauski can each testify regarding MIs. 
Toryanski's over confidence in obtaining an acquittal. (See Final Amended Petition (or Post-
Conviction Relief, Claim C(4) & Attachments; Claim T(l) & Attachments; Claim II & 
I 
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Attachments.) Notably, this conversation arose in the context of Mrs. Toryanski's beliefs 
I regarding the flawed State Laboratory testing through NMS, and the impact of the 
I KleinJLittlefield affair. In addition, Mrs. Toryanski herself admitted that her confidence in Mr. 
Abdullah's case decreased substantially based on this Court's rulings excluding particular 
I 
I evidence immediately before the State presented its case-in-chief. (See Final Amended Petition, 
Addendwn 3, p.226, L.12 -p.231, L.25; Addendum 6, pp.6-7 & Addendum 17.) Indeed, trial 
counsel ultimately did-not object to the State's motion in-limine Ie: National Me.dical Services,­
I 
I filed September 14, 2004. (Trial Tr. Vol. ill, p.829, L.25 - p.830, L.6; R., Vol. VI, pp.l036-39.) 
Similarly, after this conversation, the Court denied trial counsels' motion to continue. 
I 
2. Mrs. Torvanski's Statement To Mr. Ackley And Ms. Huskey That Mr. 
Abdullah Would Plead To What He Did, Le., Conspiracy To Commit Arson. 
I 
And Indicating Mrs. Abdullah Poured Gasoline At The Crime Scene 
Mrs. Toryanski would be a witness to these statements and the content of the statements. 
I 
(Response, Addendum B, 9/3/04 Telephone conversation between Mr. Ackley and Mrs. 
Toryanski.) Similarly, the content of this email is established by Mrs. Toryanski's proffers to the 
State and by statements attributed to Mr. within those proffers. Mr. Abdullah would also·provide 
.1. 
I 
testimony he gave the Toryanski's various factual accOunts, including one like this, based on trial 
'1 counsels' representations that if he pled guilty to something, he would be released from jail. 
(Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p~212, L.8-I5; 211, L.l6-25 & Exhibits 49,50,51,52, 
and 53; Final Amended Petition, Addendum 6, p,18.) 
I 3.	 Mr. Toryanski's Statements To Mr. Ackley That Trial Counsel Did Not 
Pursue Residual Doubt Because This Court Indicated The Law Was Well­
Settled And Residual Doubt Was Not MitigationI 
After' the jury reached its penalty phase verdict but prior to judicial. sentencing, Mr. 
I Toryanski contacted Mr. Ackley and mentioned the fact that trial counsel did not pursue residual 
I
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doubt based on this Court's indication that the law was well-settled and residual doubt was not I 
mitigating evidence. (Response, Addendum B, Mr. Ackley's Summary of post-verdict, pre-
I judicial sentencing conversation between Mr. Toryanski and Mr. Ackley). The residual doubt 
issue has been raised in Mr. Abdullah's Final Amended Petition and there is no indication that I the SAPD offered any advice on the residual doubt issue to trial counsel. See Final Amended 
I Petition, Claims E-F & Addenda. Mr. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content, 
while the most that"c~atlbe'said ofMr. Acldey is that-heisa-witness to the statement having beenI made, not to its content. 
I 4. Mr. Toryanski's Statement To Mr. Ackley That Trial Counsel Were Never Told What Happened And Mr. Abdullah Was ''never straight" 
I These statements by Mr. Toryanski to Mr. Ackley were made after the jury reached its 
penalty phase verdict but prior to judicial sentencing. (Response, Addendum B, Mr. Ackley's 
I 
I Sununary of post-verdict, pre-judge sentencing conversation between Mr. Toryanski and Mr. 
Ackley.) Mr. Toryanski is a witness both to these statements and to their content, and Mr. 
Toryanski acknowledged making such statements and harboring such beliefs during his sworn 
I· 
I deposition testimony. (See Final Amended Petition, Addendum 9, p.614, L.22 - p.616 L.ll.) 
These statements are similar to those addressed below at 6, and that analysis is incorporated here 
by reference. 
I 
I 5. Mr. Toiyanski's Statements That Judge Copsey's Demeanor Made Her 
Impossible To Work With. That She Was Demeaning And Belittled The 
Attorneys And Was Unprofessional 
I 
These statements made by Mr. Toryanski are not tied to and do not implicate any claim 
I raised in Mr. Abdullah's 'Final Amended Petition. Moreover, Mr. Toryanski's statements were 
made after the jury reached its guilt phase and penalty phase verdicts in Mr. Abdullah's case. 
The SAPD did not witness Judge Copsey's demeanor during the underlying proceeding to any 
I 
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appreciable degree. (See Response, Addendum B, 9/9/04 Email from Mr. Ackley to Mrs. 
I 
I Toryanski acknowledging that Ms. Simmons and the SAPD mitigation specialist observed a 
portion of jury selection the day before.) The SAPD has since reviewed the underlying record 
and does not believe any of this Court's comments could provide the basis for a motion to 
I 
I disqualify for cause. Irrespective, there is no conflict that would have precluded the SAPD from 
raising this claim. Both Mr. and Mrs. Toryanski are witnesses to these statements and their 
content. Ms. Huskey-could only testify-that such a statement was made, but could not attest to the 
I truth of its content. 
I 6. Mr. Toryanski's Statement To Ms. Huskey That Mr. Abdullah Did Not Tell Trial Counsel The Truth And They Still Did Not Know What Really 
Happened. Which Put Them At A Huge Disadvantage 
I 
I Mr. Toryanski has consistently maintained that neither he nor Mrs. Toryanski ever knew 
what the truth was regarding the events of October 4-5, 2002, and the fact that trial counsel did 
I 
not know what really happened put them at a huge disadvantage. (Response, Addendum B, 
I 11124/04 telephone call from Mr. Toryanski to Ms. Huskey.) Mr. Toryanski is a witness to these 
statements, and has never denied .making these statements or expressing these feelings about Mr. 
Abdullah and the "truth." (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 9, p. 577, L.12 - p.580, L.23; 
I p.600, L.25 .;.. p.602, L.11.) Moreover, Mr. Toryanski's statements were made after the jury had 
I reached both a guilt and penalty phase verdict. In any event, there is no indication that Ms. 
Huskey provided any advice in this telephone call. 
I 7. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement Regarding The Existence OfAn Offer Of 
I 
One Count Of First Degree Murder, Dismiss All Other Charges, And The 
Agw;ment That No Aggmvators Will Be Presented At Sentencing 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents 
I of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
I
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p.23l, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation ofI Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to the content of this statement, as are 
I 'Shawna Dunn and the Honorable Patrick Owen. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received 
this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. I Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email. 
I 8. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That She And Mr. Toryanski Were Wrestling Mr. Abdullah To The Mat to Take A Deal, But 
'I -Mi~ Abdullah Was Resisting So Trial-Counsel Were Putting More Pressure On Him, Which Was Affecting The Attorney-Client Relationship 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents I 
I 
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Attaclunent 3, p.228, L. 17­
p.231, LIS & Exhibit.lO.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of 
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are 
I 
I Mr. Toryanski and Mr. Abdullah. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 6 & 9.). Mr. Ackley can 
only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it 
contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no 
I advice in this email. 
9. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That Mr. Abdullah Was 
I 
I AngrylHostile About The Plea Offer And Mr. Abdullah's Family SupPOrted 
The Rejection Of A Plea Offer, Which Was Affecting Trial Counsels' 
Relationship With Mr. Abdullah's Family 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents 
I 
I of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Attachment 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate, recitation of 
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Torjanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are 
I Mr~ Abdullah, Zuheir Abdullah and Sherry Rogers. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 4,6 & 
I 
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12.) Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. 
I 
I Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. 
Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email. 
I 
10. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That The Plea Offer Would 
Close When Trial Counsel Begin To Exercise Peremptory Challenges 
I 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents 
I of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of 
I 
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement and its content, as are 
I Shawna Dunn and the Honorable Patrick Owen. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received 
this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. 
Toryanski has already admitted she made. Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email. 
I 11. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That An Issue Was 
Erupting Regarding Mr. Abdullah's Insistence Of. testifying, Despite Trial 
I .Counsel Infonning Him That They Would Not Put .Him On The Stand For Ethical Reasons 
I Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote. this email and has not disavowed the 
contents of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.22S, L. 
I 17 - p.2ll, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy 'of the email is the most accurate 
recitation of Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement, and Mr. I Toryanski and Mr. Abdullah are witnesses to the content ofthe statement, the content ofwhich is 
I already part of the underlying record. (Final Amended Petition, Claims E-Ft' Addenda 6 & 9.) 
Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs.I Toryanski and that it contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. 
I . Mr. Ackley provided no advice in this email. 
I
 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED INQUIRY 18 
-

I 001883
 
 
 
-
 
 8
            
 
 
I
 
I
 
12. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That Mr. Abdullah Is MoreI And More Reluctant To Follow The Advice OfTrial COWlSel 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents I 
of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
I p.23I, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of 
Mrs. Toryanski's statement. Mrs. Toryanski is a witness to this statement, and Mr. Toryanski is aI 
witness to the content of the statement. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he received this email 
I 
- ­
from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the"statements Mrs. Toryanski 
has already admitted she made. I 13. Mrs. Torvanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That The Panel Of 
Prospective Jurors Would Impose Death, Even Those Generally Opposed ToI The Death Penalty, When Children Are Involved 
Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents 
I of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
I p.23 1, LIS & Exhibit 10.) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation of 
Mrs. Toryanski's st8.tement. Mrs. Toryanski is also a witness to this statement, as are David
"I 
I 
Leroy and Chuck Peterson. (Final Amended Petition, Addenda 1-8.). "Mr. Ackley can only 
testify that he received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it 
contained the statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. 
I 
I 14. Mrs. Toryanski's Email Statement To Mr. Ackley That None Of The 
Defense's Mitigation "stacks up against the aggravator of leaving 4 kids in a 
house on fire" 
"Mrs. Toryanski has admitted that she wrote this email and has not disavowed the contents 
I 
I of the email or disputed its accuracy. (Final Amended Petition, Addendum. 3, p.228, L. 17 ­
p.231, LIS & Exhibit 10; Response, Addendum 2,9/15/04 Email from Mrs. Toryanski to Mr. 
Ackley).) Thus, the printed copy of the email is the most accurate recitation ofMrs. Toryanski's 
I 
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statement. Mrs. Toryanski is also a witness to this statement. Mr. Ackley can only testify that he 
I 
I received this email from an address assigned to Mrs. Toryanski and that it contained the 
statements Mrs. Toryanski has already admitted she made. 
I 
15. Mr. Ackley's Telephone Call To Mr. Toryanski Identifying Steven Kingsley 
As Having Information Regarding Steven Bankhead And Wanting to Help 
In an undated notation in trial counsels' files, Mr. Toryanski documents a phone call from 
I
 
I Mr. Ackley. (See Addendum I, Mr. Toryanski's note regarding telephone from Mr. Ackley,
 
Bates Stamp 11358, attached hereto.) The notation reads as follows, verbatim:
 
TIC from Mark Ackley; 
I 
I Steven Kingsley, Orofino inmate # 15065
 
was wI Bankhead
 
Bankhead's wife@houseall the time Nov 00
 
B. buying & selling dope thru month 
I Kingsley would like to help
 Will I be in Orofino for a while.
 
'I . (Addendum 1.) There does not appear to be any further information in trial counsels' file 
regarding this contact. Mr. Kingsley did, however, testify at Mr. Abdullah's judicial sentencing 
I hearing in March of2005. (Trial Tr. Vol. VID, p.607, L.l-p.613, L.3.) 
Mr. Kingsley testified that he had read about Mr. Bankhead's involvement in Mr.I 
Abdullah's case in the newspaper. (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 607. L20 - p.608, L.2l.) When he 
,I learned of Mr. Bankhead's involvement, Mr. Kingsley testified that he immediately "called [his] 
appellate attorney's office to let him' know that I knew where Bankhead was through the month I 
of November 2000 and he wasn't in Lewiston." (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII,p. 611, Ls. 23-25.) Mr. 
I Kingsley further testified that his motivation in testifying on Mr. Abdullah's behalf was that he 
didn't "believe anybody should be judged on something that Mr. Bankhead has said. In all theI
 
I
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time that I have known Mr. Bankhead, he's never been truthful in anything that he's done either I 
to himself, his wife or his family." (Trial Tr. Vol. VIII, p.612, Ls. 7-11.) 
I Mr. Ackley would be a witness to the fact that Mr. Kingsley contacted the SAPD office 
and expressed a desire to assist in Mr. Abdullah's case. Mr. Ackley conveyed that very I information to Mr. Toryanski. (Addendum 1.) Apparently, as a result of that communication, 
I trial counsel called Mr. Kingsley to testify on Mr. Abdullah's behalf at the judge sentencing 
hearing in March of 2005. It is unclear how the information Mr. Ackley conveyed to Mr.I Toryanski could possibly render Mr. Ackley a witness to any claim where Mr. Kingsley actually 
I testified. 
CONCLUSIONI 
I 
No advice given by the SAPO to trial counsel fonns the basis of any possible conflict of 
interest between the SAPO and Mr. Abdullah. COWlSel for Mr. Abdullah have identified every 
possible conflict that could arise from advice the SAPD gave to trial counsel and explained why 
!.I.. 
I· 
the SAPO believes, in each instance, there is no conflict of interest. In addition, counsel have 
identified every possible instance where SAPO attorneys could arguably be called as witnesses 
to statements by trial counsel, and have explained. why SAPD attorneys are not witnesses to the 
I 
I content of the statements, and how most of the statements are proven by extrinsic evidence or by 
the testimony ofthe Toryanskis themselves. 
I 
Current counsel urges this Court to engage in a similar searching and targeted inquiry, on 
I the recor~ in determining (or confirming) whether an actual conflict of interest exists, and if so, 
to identify the conflict on the record. 
I
 
I
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I 
I RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITED this 25th day of September, 2009. 
I 
I ~~r::t:Lead Counsel for Mr. A Clullah 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of September, 2009. a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document, IvIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TARGETED 
INQUIRY, was delivered to the following: 
ROGER BOURNE
 
SHAWNADUNN
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
 
200 WEST FRONT ST.• RM. 3191
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH
 
INMATE #76321
 
IMSI, J BLOCK
 
PO BOX 51
 
BOISE ID 83707
 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
FacsimileI Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
--}c.- Statehouse Mail 
__ Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
MELISSA RICHESON 1\LLEGOS 
Administrative Assistant 
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I Shannon N. Romero 
I 
From: John Weatherby [jweatherby@adaweb.net]
 
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 11 :31 AM
 
To: Shannon N. Romero
 
SUbject: RE: Potential Hearing Dates in Azad Abdullah's Case SPOT0500308 
I 
I Please notice the motion for disqualification hearing for Thursday 10/15 at 3:00.
 
-"--,,,,,-~,-.,..,._._,_....._~-_ ...__.."..__... _-_.. "_"_" __"-'---_""--'-'_'--'-'------. -'~--_._----'-'
 
From: Shannon N. Romero [mailto:sromero@sapd.state.id.us]
 
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2009 10:55 AM
 
I To: John Weatherby Cc: Shawna Dunn; Mark Ackley; mark ackley; Melissa Richeson Gallegos; Michael Shaw; Guadalupe Ayala; Nicole Owens Subject: Potential Hearing Dates in Azad Abdullah's Case SPOT0500308 
I Good Morning John: 
I We need to notice some recent motions (motion for disqualification, motion for permissive appeal and others) for a hearing and oral argument. Mark Ackley spoke with Shawna Dunn and the State would like at least 14 
days to respond. We believe that is fair and consistent with the civil rules as well. Could you please indicate I the Court's availability during the below range of dates? We will then finalize a date and notice the motions for hearing. 
I October 14-16 
I October 27-29 
Thank you, 
I Shannon Romero 
Capital Litigation Unit 
I Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
 3647 Lake Harbor Lane
 
Boise, ID 83703
 
I Tel: (208) 334-2712
 Fax: (208)-334-2985
 
I CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:
 The information contained in this electronic mail message is privileged and confidential information intended
 
for the use of the addressee listed above. If you are neither the intended recipient nor the employee or agent
 
I responsible for delivering this message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure,
 copying, distribution or the taking of action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
 
If you have received this electronic mail message in error, please immediately notify the sender by telephone.
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I Case History 
I 
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Ada 
1 Cases Found. 
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I Azad Haji Abdullah, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant CV-PC-2005­21802 Post 
Judge' Cheri C.Case:Old Case: District Filed: 04/15/2005Subtype: Conviction Status: Pending 
. Copsey 
I sp-Or-05­ Relief
 00308*0
 Subjects:Abdullah, Azad Haji
 
Other Parties:State of Idaho
 
I Ph en~ing Daterrime Judge Type of Hearingeanngs: 
12/04/2009 Cher' C ,... pse Hearing Scheduled 1:30 PM 1 ......0 Y 
I 02/01/2010 . 9:00 AM Chen C. Copsey Hearing Scheduled 
Register Date 
I of actions:
 
04/15/2005 New Case Filed
 
04/15/2005 Petition For Post Conviction Relief
 I 04/15/2005 Certificate Of Mailing
 04/22/2005 Notice Of Filing 
05/12/2005 Answ To Petn For Post Convctn Relf(bower/st) 
I 06/17/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (06/29/2005) Cheri C. Copsey 06/17/2005 Order To Transport (6/29/05 @ 11 :00) 
06/29/2005 Hearing Held 
I 06/30/2005 Scheduling Order 
I 
11/17/2005 Stipulation For Release Of Jury Questionnair 
11/21/2005 Order Granting Stip For Release Of Question 
11/22/2005 Motion For Access To Computer For Reviewing 
I 
12101/2005 Qualified Non Opposition Motn Permit Access 
12101/2005 Audiolvisual Equip Review Evidence 
12/14/2005 Motion For Scheduling Order 
12/21/2005 Hear~ng Scheduled - Motn Sched Ordr (01120/2006) 
Chen C. Copsey 
I 1212212005 Ord~r G.r~nting I.n Part Mtn To Permit Access to AudloN,dlo EqUipment 
01/13/2006 Mtn for.Extension of Time to File Amended Petition for 
PC Relief 
I
 01/13/2006 Notice of Hearing (1/20/06 @ 1:00)
 01/20/2006 Motion for Petitioner Access to GJ Transcripts 
I 
01/20/2006 Order Granting Motion for Ext. of Time to File Amended 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
01/20/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
01/20/2006 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Motn Sched Ordr 
01/20/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/0212007 01 :30 PM) I 03/09/2006 Motion for Preparation of Transcripts 
04/05/2006 Opposit!on to Motion to Release Grand Jury 
Transcnpts 
I 04/14/2006 Response To State's ,?pposition To Motion To Release Of Grand Jury Transcnpts
 
04/20/2006 Notice Of Hearing (5/15/06 @ 3:00pm)
 
I 001894
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Page 2 of6Idaho Repository - Case History Page 
04/21/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/15/2006 
03:00 PM) 
04/28/2006 Order To Transport (5/15/06 @ 3:00 p.m.) 
05/15/2006 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 
05/15/200603:00 PM: Hearing Held 
06/09/2006 Order Granting Peti~ioner.Ac~s.s t~ and Possession of 
Grand Jury Transcripts with LimItations 
08/10/2006 Motion for Status Conference 
10/23/2006 Order To Transport (10/25/06 @ 4:30 P.M.) 
12/22/2006 Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File An 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
05/02/2007 Hear~ng result for Status held on 05/02/200701 :30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
07119/2007 Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
07/30/2007 Or~~r Permitting With~r~wl of ~etitioner's Amended 
-Petitton for POSt-ConVlCtion Relief . 
08/06/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status 08/09/2007 02:30 PM) 
08/06/2007 Order to Transport (8/9 @ 2:30) 
08/09/2007 Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
08/09/2007 Hear~ng result for Status held on 08/09/200702:30 PM: 
Hearing Held 
08117/2007 Motion For Waiver Of Atty/Client Privilege 
08/27/2007 Notice of Conditional Non-Objection to State's Motion 
for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
08/28/2007 Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege 
09/05/2007 Motion for Discovery 
09/05/2007 M.emorandum of Law In Support of Motion for 
DIscovery 
09/12/2007 Motion for Order Req.uiring Preservation of All Physical 
and Documentary EVidence 
09/19/2007 M~morandum in Support of Motion to Preserve 
EVIdence 
09/19/2007 Notice Of Hearing (10/11/07 @ 2:30) 
09119/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 10/11/2007 
02:30 PM)
 
09/26/2007 State's Objection To The Motn For Discovery
 
09/26/2007 State's Memorandum In Support of the State's
 
Objection to The Motn For Discovery 
10/10/2007 Order To Transport (10111/07 @ 2:30) 
10/11/2007 Hearing result for Discovery Motion held on 10/11/2007 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
10/26/2007 (3) ~otion Directing Shipment of Evidence to 
Petitioner's Expert 
10/26/2007 Motion to Permit Release of Evidence to Petitioner's 
Expert 
11/09/2007 Notice of Discovery Status 
11/09/2007 St~tes Objectio~ .to Motions Directing Shipment of 
EVidence to Petitioner's Expert 
11/14/2007 Or~er Permitting Petititoner's Counsel to Depose Erika 
Klein
 
12/04/2007 Motion for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
 
12/05/2007 Order for Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
 
12/07/2007 Motion for Preparation of Transcripts
 
12/07/2007 Notice of Hearing (12/13)
 
12/07/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/13/200702:00 PM)
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12/11/2007 Motion for Discovery
 
12/11/2007 Motion To Compel
 
12/11/2007 Brief In Support Of Motn To Compel
 
12/11/2007 Notice Of Hearing (12-13-07 @ 2 pm)
 
12/13/2007 Response to Discovery
 
12/18/2007 Hearing result for Motion held on 12/13/200702:00
 
PM: Continued To Compel And Motn For Discovery
 
12/18/2007 Hea.ring Scheduled ~Motion 12/18/200709:00 AM)
 
Motion to Compel/Discovery Issues
 
12/18/2007 Hearing result for Motion held on 12/18/200709:00
 
AM: Hearing Held Motion to Compel/Discovery Issues
 
12/18/2007 ~rder Permitting Petitioner's Counsel to Depose Tod
 
littlefield
 
12/21/2007 Order Directing the Preparation of Transcripts
 
1~j21/2QQ7 NQtic~ Of Filing
 
12/31/2007 Order re: Juror Contact
 
01/02/2008 Order to Transport (2/14/08 at 11 AM)
 
01/02/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02114/2008
 
11 :00 AM) hearing re juror contact
 
01/03/2008 Response To Order Re Juror Contact
 
01/08/2008 Memorandum in Support of Order Limiting Jury Contact
 
01/22/2008 Motion to Provide Trial Documents
 
01/24/2008 Motion for Part.ial Summary Disposition &
 
Memorandum In Support Thereof
 
01/25/2008 Response to Motio~ for Partial Summary Disposition
 
and Memorandum In Support Thereof
 
01/31/2008 Ex Parte Supplemental Response to Order Re: Juror
 
Contact
 
01/31/2008 Memorandum in Response to State's Memorandum in
 
Support of Order Limiting Juror Contact
 
02/13/2008 R~ply t? Response to Motio~ for Partial Summary
 
DIspOSItion & Memorandum In Support
 
02/14/2008 Order Granting State's Motion to Compel Discovery
 
and Granting Petitioners Motion for Protective Order
 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
 
02/14/2008 02/14/2008 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held hearing re juror
 
contact
 
03/25/2008 Motion to Vacate Depositions
 
03/27/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 04/11/2008
 
02:00 PM) Motion to Vacate Depositions
 
03/28/2008 Notice Of Hea~i.ng (4-11-08 ~ 2:00pm) Motion to
 
Vacate DepOSitions and Motion to Compel
 
04/08/2008 Order to Transport (April 11, 2008 at 2:00 p.m.)
 
Answer to Amended Petition for Post conviction Relief
 
04/10/2008 and Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State of
 
ID)
 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
 
04/11/2008 04/11/200802:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion to Vacate
 
Depositions
 
05/07/2008 Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn
 
05/12/2008 Prosecutor assigned ROGER BOURNE
 
08/29/2008 Final Amended Peititon for Post-Conviction Relief
 
09/26/2008 Motion for Court to Take Judicial NOtice
 
09/26/2008 Renewed and Supplemental Motion for Discovery
 
09/26/2008 Motion to Supplement Final Amended Petition for Post
 
Conviction Relief Addenda With Original Affidavits
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I 09/26/2008 MOtion t~ Compel Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim 
Toryanskl) 
Page 4 of6 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-

11/12/2008 Stat.e's Obje~ion to the Renewed and Supplemental 
Motion for Discovery 
11/17/2008 Objection to Motion to Compel Discovery from Trial 
Counsel 
11/25/2008 Objection to Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice 
12/15/2008 Notice of Hearing
 
12/15/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0111612009 02:00 PM)
 
12/18/2008 Hearing Reset (Motion 01/09/2009 02:00 PM)
 
12/18/2008 Order to Transport
 
01/06/2009 Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Compel
 
Discovery from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski)
 
01/06/2009 Re~l~ to St~te's Objection to Motion for Court to Take 
Judicial Notice 
01/0712009 Motion to Strike 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/09/2009 02:00 
01/09/2009 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim 
Madsen Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
01/09/2009 Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/19/2009 02:00 PM) 
0210512009 Notice of Redactions Made to Prior Findings 
02/27/2009 Response To Court 
Notice of Clarification of the Record, Limited Request 
03/06/2009 for Discovery, and Motion for the Court and the Parties 
to Rely on the Record 
03/17/2009 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Compel Discovery 
from Trial Counsel (Kim Toryanski) 
03/17/2009 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Petitioner's 
Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice 
03/17/2009 Order Regarding ~etitione~'s Renewed and
 
Supplemental Motion for Discovery
 
03/31/2009 Motion for Summary Disposition (Dunn for State of 
Idaho) 
03/31/2009 Answer to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
and Brief in support of Motion for Summary Disposition 
05/14/2009 Motion for 14 day Exentsion 
05/14/2009 Affidavit of Mark JAckley 
Order Granting Motion For 14-Day Extension To File 
05/20/2009 Response To The State's Motion For Summary 
Disposition 
06/12/2009 Order to Transport 
06/15/2009	 R~spo~~e to the State's Motion for Summary
 
DISposition
 
0611612009 Response to Motion to Strike (Juror's Affidavit from the 
Record) 
Notice of Filing Table of Contents and Index of 
06/18/2009 Addenda to Response to the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition 
06/18/2009 Notice of Supplemental Authority 
06/18/2009 Notice of Filing Original Verfication Page 
Hearing result for Status held on 0611912009 02:00 PM: 
06/19/2009 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim 
Madsen Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
06/26/2009	 M~tion ~or More ~ime to Contact Witnesses for
 
EVidentiary Hearing
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-I MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
I 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
Lead Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, I.S.B. # 6247 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
I 3647 Lake Harbor Lane Boise, Idaho 83703 (208) 334-2712 
DEC 202006 
J.c.gtifQaM,erk

By l. AMES 
DEFUTl' 
I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,INAND Ji'QRTHE COUNTY OF ADA 
I AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner,I v. 
I
 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent.
 
I STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) ss 
County ofADA. ) 
I 
) 
) Case No. SPOT 05-00308 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING 
) AN AMENDED PETITION FOR 
) POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
)
 
) : (CAPITAL CASE)
 
Mark I. Ackley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am lead counsel representing Azad Abdullah inhis post-conviction proceedings. I 2. It is my professional opinion based on my experience and training, and based on the 
standards governing perfonnance of defense counsel in capital post-convictionI proceedings, that despite the exercise of due diligence, extraordinary circumstances have 
arisen in Mr. Abdullah's case which necessitate an extension of six months for the filing 
ofan amended petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, as noted herein, the recent I departure of Mr. Abdullah's prior post-conviction coUnsel requires an extension of time 
for newly assigned counsel to adequately represent Mr. Abdullah in these proceedings. 
I Qualifications 
I 3.' I am setting forth a summary ofmy relevant qualifications as a capital appellate and post­conviction attorney for the purpose of establishing that the requested six-month extension 
I AFFIDAVIT OF MARK I. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 1 
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is both a necessary and a reasonable extension of time in light of all circumstances 
I surrounding this case. 
I 
I 
4. In May 1996, I graduated from Indiana University School of Law, in Bloomington, 
Indiana. After passing both the Indiana and Kentucky bar exams, I began my legal career 
in January 1997, at the Jefferson County Public Defender, in Louisville, Kentucky. Over 
the next three years, I tried numerous felony jUlY trials either as sole or lead counsel. 
Because Kentucky has jUlY sentencing, I gained experience and training in matters 
involving jUlY sentencing. During my emplOYment at the Jefferson County Public 
Defender, I managed an average caseload of 150-200 cases. 
I 
I s. In October 2000, Ijoined the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, (herein "SAPD''), as 
second-chair counsel in the capital litigation mrit, (herein UCLlY). I officially began 
representing Idaho death row inmates after admission to the Idaho State Bar in April 
I 
2001. With the exception of a few non-capital appeals, my emplOYment at the SAPD is 
limited exclusively to capital representation. During my emplOYment at the SAPD, I' 
have managed a caseload between three and six cases at any given time. lhave provided 
either capital post-conviction or appellate representation, and in some cases, both, for the 
following nine clients: Timothy Dunlap; Donald Fetterly; Faron Lovelace; Jimmie 
I Thomas; Michael Jauhola; Darrell Payne; Dale Shackelford; Erick Hall; and Mr. Abdullah. 
I 6. I have received over a hundred hours of continuing education focused on capital defense litigation. I have attended numerous seminars hosted by organizations recommended by 
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death I Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003)(herein "ABA Guidelines''), Commentary to Guideline 8.1. See http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf 
I 7~ I have consulted with, and received instruction from, attorneys recogniiedas experts and leaders in the capital defense community. For instance, I consulted with; and obtained an 
affidavit from, Eric Freedman in the Payne case regarding the obligations. of post­I . conviction counsel under the ABA Guidelines. Mr. Freedman is a Professor of Law at 
. the Hofstra University School of Law, an active capital litigator, and served as Reporter 
for the ABA Guidelines. I have also consulted with, and obtained a written declaration I from, David Lane in the Hall case regarding the standards for conducting an adequate 
. voir dire in light ofjury sentencing in capital cases. Mr. Lane has frequently lectured in 
matters of capital defense to attorneys throughout the country. In addition, I have I received individualized instruction and feedback from Anthony Amsterdam. 
I· 
Mr. Amsterdam heads the faculty at an annual capital post-conviction skills seminar. He 
"is also mown for his representation of William Funnan in the landmark case ofFurman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S~ 238 (1972). 
I
 
I
 
I 
. AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 2 
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILINGAN AMENDED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
-

001902
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1
1
1 
wy
wy 
wy loy
S ,
loy
loy
l
-
 
 
kno  
 
 
I
 
I 8. In September 2002, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized me as qualified to handle 
capital appellate and post-conviction cases, and included my name on the Court's "Idaho 
I Capital Defense Counsel Roster" created in compliance with Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3. See http://www.isc.idaho.gov/appcns1.htm. 
I 9. My qualifications have been recognized by my peers. Specifically, the Federal Defenders 
of Eastern Washington and Idaho,·capital habeas unit, have requested that I instrucfldaho 
attorneys in aspects of trial and appellate-level capital representation at their sponsored I conferences. Most recently, I discussed the unique hurdles associated with capital jury 
sentencing and discussed means of addressing those hurdles as well ~ potential 
constitutional infirmities in Idaho's new death penalty statue. I 
The CLU: Attorneys-and Workload 
I 10. I am setting forth a description of the attorneys in the CLUand their relevant caseloads 
I 
for the purpose of establishing that the requested six-month extensionis both a necessary 
and a reasonable extension of time in light ofall circumstances surrounding this case. 
I 
I 
11. I am lead counsel with seniority and supervising responsibilities in the CLU. With the 
recent departures of Ron Coulter and Kimberly Simmons, there are currently just. two 
attorneys assigned full-time to the CLU. The second attorney, Paula M. Swensen, was 
recently promoted from second-chair counsel to lead co1.insel A third attorney, Erik 
Lehtinen, is assigned a limited role in the CLU, serving only as second-chair counsel in 
Mr. Abdullah's case. Mr. Lehtinen maintains a non-capital appellate workload. 
I 
I 12. Over the next two months, Mr. Lehtinen must file between one and four appellant's briefs, at least four or five reply briefs, and has two oral arguments scheduled before the 
Idaho Court ofAppeals. In addition, Mr. Lehtinen has numerous cases pending decisions 
for which petitions for review may be necessary. Finally, Mr. Lehtinen has numerous 
I 
cases with petitions for review pending, for which further briefing before the Idaho 
Supreme Court will be necessary if the petitions are granted, and petitions for certiorari 
may be necessary if denied. 
I 
13. In addition to my representation of Mr. Abdullah, I am lead counsel on the following 
three capital cases: Erick Hall v. State, Ada Cmmty case no. SPOT0500155 (post­
I 
conviction); State v. Dale Shackelford. Supreme Court case nos. 27966/31928 
(consolidated appeal); and State v. Michael lauhola, Supreme Court case nos. 
27490/31435 (consolidated appeal). . 
I- a. Due to the departure of Ms. Simmons, I am the only attorney wjth significant knowledge of the facts and law relevant to the Shackelford case~ and I am 
currently the only attorney formally assigned to the case. The Shackelford case is ­
extraordinarily complicated and lengthy, even for a capital case. The relevant 
I transcripts in the Shackelford consolidated appeal exceed ten thousand (10,000) 
I AFFIDAVIT OF MARK J. ACKLEY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 3 
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pages. The clerk's record is thirty-five (35) volumes. In short, the departure of 
Ms. Simmons has nearly doubled my responsibilities on the Shackelford case. 
I 
14. Due to the departures of Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons, I am not only lead counsel for 
Mr. Abdullah and sole counsel for Mr. Shackelford, I am also supervising counsel on the 
I 
following two capital cases: Timothy Dunlap v. State, Caribou County case no. CV2006­
111, and State v. Darrell Payne, Supreme Court case nos. 28589/32389 (consolidated 
appeal). 
I 
15. While my role as supervising counsel is theoretically limited to providing guidance to 
lead and second-chair counsel, in practice, due to my experience in, and knowledge of, 
I 
capital litigation as well as my knowledge of the specifics of the cases currently handled 
by the SAPD, my role as supervising cmmsel can require a substantial amount of time 
depending on the phase of the case. For example, I played a substantial role as 
I 
supervising counsel in the Payne case in the final phases of the preparation of the 
appellant's brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court on December 13, 2006. Specifically, 
between November 14, 2006, and December 10, 2006, I spent approximately one 
hundred fifty-six (156) hours supervising revisions to the brief. During that period of 
time, there were eight weekend days; I worked four of those days on the Payne case, for a 
I total ofnearly thirty-eight (38) hours. The brief was 208 pages in length. 
The Amount of Investigation and Time Necessary to Adequately Represent Mr. AbduHah 
I 16. Adequate post-conviction representation requires a reinvestigation of the underlying 
criminal case for all arguably meritorious guilt and sentencing-phase claims inside and 
·1 outside the record. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.15.1. 
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. OneI involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client. Reinvestigating.· the case means examining the facts underlying the 
conviction and sentence, as well as such items· as trial counsel'sI perfonnance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating 
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than 
was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was notI presented previously, but also .to identify mental-health claims which 
potentially. reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of 
competency and mental-state defenses. I 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1. 
I· 17~ There are numerous potential sources of factual infortnation relevant to the identification 
I
 
and development ofpost-conviction claims. Most sourceS of information are outside the
 
record, and include, but are riot limited to the following: the client, members of the
 
. client's family, trial team members, the client's acquaintances, relevant law enforcement
 
I 
I 
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I personnel, the trial witnesses, the media, and files in possession of the trial team and law 
enforcement. See Hertz & Liebman,Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §
I 11.2b (5th ed. 2005). In addition to sources outside the record, an adequate post­
conviction investigation requires a review of the record. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 
523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that a claim of ineffective assistance of counselI "requires review of the trial transcript and the entire record to determine the nature, frequency, and effect ofcounsel's errors.") As part of the record review, post-conViction 
counsel must review all motions and objections made during the underlying criminal I proceedings to ensure that all possible federal constitutional grounds have been properly 
preserved for federal review. 
I 18. Post-conviction investigation must be diligent and exhaustive, aimed at including all 
I 
.. possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise. all possible claims may result in a 
procedural bar. See e.g., Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Such an 
investigation is obviously time intensive. A 1998 survey of the time and expenses 
required in Florida capital post-conviction cases concluded that: 
I [T]he most experienced and qualified lawyers at Florida's post-conviction 
I 
defender office, the Office of Capital Collateral Representation[,] have 
estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a 
I 
post-conviction death penalty case from the denial of certiorari by the 
United States Supreme Court following direct appeal to the denial of 
certiorari [from state post-conviction proceedings.] 
J 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citing "The Spangenberg Group, 
I Amended Time & Expense Analysis Of 'Post-Conviction Capital Cases In Florida 16 (1998).") 
I Status of the Post-conviction Reinvestigation 
I 
19. For the majority of the period between January and October 2006, Mr. Abdullah was 
represented in these post-conviction proceedings by Ron Coulter (lead counsel), and 
I 
Kimberly Simmons (second-chair counsel). However, in October 2006, both 
Ms. Simmons, and Mr. Coulter, due to unrelated circumstances, .tendered· their 
resignations. Ms. Simmons' last day ofemployment at the SAPD was October 6, 2006. 
Mr. Coulter's last day was October 16, 2006. 
I 20. The departure of Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons does notmean that the post-conviction investigation conducted to date has been for naught. Indeed, the CLUinvestigative team, . 
comprised of Michael J. Shaw (guilt-phase investigator), and Guadalupe Ayala I· . (mitigation specialist), have made substantial progress in their investigation which has. 
included gathering records, interviewing potential witnesses, and obtaining affidavits. 
However, based on my discussions with the investigators, there are numerous sources of 
I .. information yet to be investigated, and several witnesses already contacted who require 
I 
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follow-up interviews. Moreover, it is absolutely vital that the investigative team receive 
adequate guidance and direction from post-conviction counsel. Thus, in order for the 
I 
I investigation to be completed, post-conviction counsel must have an adequate 
opportunity to become familiar with the case. At a bare minimum, post-conviction 
counsel must thoroughly review the record, transcript, and trial counsels~ files. 
Time Estimates for Current Counsel to Adequately Review the Record. Transcript, and 
I "Trial Counsels' Files 
I 
21. Current counsel estimates it will take approximately twelve work weeks of uninterrupted 
review to complete a review ofthe record, transcript, and trial counsels' files. 
a.	 There are applOximately-seven-thousand (7,000) pages of relevant Reporter's 
Transcript to be reviewed. Estimating a review of four hundred pages per day I (fifty pages per hour), it will take seventeen and one half (17~) days to read the 
transcripts. This requires approximately four work weeks of uninterrupted
I review. 
I b.There are approximately 1600 pages of Clerk's Record to be analyzed and reviewed. Estimating a review and analysis of 320 pages per day (40 pages per hour), it will take forty (40) hours to read the record. This requires 
approximately one work week of uninterrupted review. I c. There are approximately thirty-six thousand (36,000) pages of documentation in 
trial counsels' files. This documentation includes discovery provided by the I prosecution, documentation obtained through the trial team's independent investigation, and notes generated by trial team members. Estimating a review 
and analysis of 1000 pages per day (125 pages per hour), it will take thirty-six I "(36) days to read the record. This requires approximately seven work weeks of 
unintemipted review. " 
I Time" Estimates for Current Counsel Taking Into Consideration Other Aspects of" 
Mr. Abdullah's Case, Time Commitments to Other Clients. and Unanticipated 
I Developments 
22.	 Current counsel anticipates that it will take qne work week to prepare a motion for 
discovery. Unless otherwise ordered, the motion for discovery will be filed with the I	 amended petition for post-conviction relief for the pwpose of linking the discovery 
requests to relevant claims in the petition. Although current counsel will attempt to 
"resolve discovery disputes without this Court's involvement, based on counsel's 
experience in other cases, unless the prosecution agrees to "open file" discovery, a formal I"" 
I 
motion is almost always necessary. "In addition, there may be some discovery that cannot 
be accessed without an order from the Court. 
I
 
I 
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I 23. Current counsel anticipates that over the next four months, a mmllnum of nine 
uninterrupted weeks must be allotted to other clients. 
I a. Based on notice received from the Idaho Supreme Court, oral argument in the 
Jauhola case will occur either in late January or early February 2007. The actual I date for argument has yet to be finalized. Counsel anticipates that it will take 
approximately forty (40) hours to prepare for oral argument. This requires 
approximately one work week ofuninterrupted preparation. I b. The appellant's brief in the Shackelford case will likely be due to the Idaho 
Supreme Court sometime in March 2007. Counsel anticipates that it will take I approximately two hundred (200) hours to complete the brief by that deadline. 
This. requires apPr9.ximately Dve w9rk. we.eks of~ninterrupted preparation. 
I	 c. It is difficult to assess the amOunt of time that must be allotted to the Hall case. 
I 
Currently, a full-day discovery hearing is scheduled for January 4,2007. Prior to 
that time, counsel must draft a supplemental discovery justification memorandum 
based in part on the recent conclusion of the court-ordered depositions of both 
I 
trial counsel. Following the hearing and receipt of any court-ordered discovery, 
counsel will file a final petition for post-conviction relief on Mr. Hall's behalf. 
Counsel will then likely respond to an anticipated motion for summary dismissal 
I 
from opposing counsel. Counsel anticipates that all of this could occur within the 
next four months. Counsel anticipates that it will take approximately three works 
to complete this phase of the Hall case. Additional time commitments to 
Mr. Hall's case are dependent q.pon whether the district court grants an 
I	 evidentiary hearing. 
I 
I 
24. There are many other case-related matters for which it is difficult to designate a specific 
amount of time but which require time commitments. For instance, current counsel must 
maintain communication with his clients. In addition, there are administrative matters 
unrelated to client representation which current counsel must attend. For instance, 
current counsel has management responsibilities for CLU team members and on occasion 
must assist the SAPD on capital legislation and rule-making issues. 
I Time Estimates: Summary 25.	 Based on enumerated paragraphs 19 and 21, current counsel estimates that an extension 
of twenty-one (21) weeks is necessary for competent post-conviction investigation and 
I· 
I reasonable in light of counsels' obligations to other capital clients. An additional five 
weeks is necessary to account for routine and unanticipated case-related and· 
administrative matters. Counsel belieyes that this time frame will obviate the need for 
. any additional extensions of time. 
I
 
I 
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I Conclusion 
I 
I 
26. Extraordinary circumstances exist in this case requiring a reasonable extension of time 
for adequate post-conviction representation. Specifically, with the departure of 
Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons from the SAPO, current counsel has been forced to 
assume responsibilities for additional cases, including the representation of Mr. Abdullah. 
Counsel takes seriously his obligations to Mr. Abdullah and this Court. Counsel assures 
I 
this Court that any prioritization of work to date or otherwise reflected in this affidavit 
has not been based on preferences to individual clients or individual courts, but instead 
based on preexisting timelines that could reasonably be met. 
I 
27. -This Court hM-already shown-great patience in- this C8Se;- Current counsel assures this 
Court that a long-tenn plan for consistent representation for Mr. Abdullah has been put in 
I 
place by the SAPD. Thus, regardless of the employment of attorneys to fill any of the 
vacancies left by Mr. Coulter and Ms. Simmons, currentcounsel and Mr. Lehtinen intend 
to represent Mr. Abdullah through the conclusion of his state post-conviction 
proceedings. 
I 28. Based on the amount of time designated herein in addition to consideration of the amount 
I 
of time that will be dedicated to other foreseeable and unforeseeable events, current 
counsel is of the professional opinion that an extension of six months is both a necessary 
and reasonable extension of time for the filing of an amended petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
I DATED this 20th day of December, 2006. 
I 
I 
I SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day ofDecember, 2006. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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12009 16:42 FAX 2082877529 FOURTH DISTRICT COURT ... PD ST APPELLANT 14l 00 1I0UlI 091 
I .---./ NO._ FILED l1.tLL 
AM_ P.M.~ 
I SEP 2~ 2009 
I J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk By J. WEATHERBY DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF I THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF ADA 
I 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, )I ) 
Plaintiff7R.espondent, )
I ) V5. ) Case No. CV PC OS~21802 
I 
) 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, ) ORDER TO RESClND 
04-06-77 ) TRANSPORT ORDER 
DefendantlPetitioner. ) 
I ------------------') 
I IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Transport Order filed on September 15,2009. directing 
the above named defendant be brought before this Court on September 25, 2009 be, and hereby is, 
I RESCINDED. The hearing has been vacated. 
Dated this ,_;1_"\_ day of September 2009. I
 
I
 
I 
CHERI C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
I
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\/2009 16:42 FAX 2082877529 FOURTH DISTRICT COURT ~ PD ST APPELLANT ~ 0021002 
',--,,'\...-.-' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 
I hereby certify that on this J1 day of September, 2009, I mailed (served) a true and
 
correct copy ofthe 'within instrument to:
 
Ada County Prosecutor - Faxed
 
State Appellate Publ ic Defender - Faxed
 
Ada County Sheriff':; Department - Faxed
 
Idaho Department of Corrections
 
Central Records - Faxed
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
". 
ORDER TO RESCDID TRANSPORT ORDER - PAGE-2
 
-

I 001911
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
 
I 
 
I 
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I
,  
 
r   
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
'I  
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I can and Email Team 
l
_ opy to Client 
&Scan Sig & Confonn Pg <., >" 
ock Document , ,\. 
rocedural index/\rJ.e" o+-fi Ie) 
, rop into Pro-Law / Log dates 
ile 
001912
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ex/\rJ.e)C. \ : 1', \ '10 'i 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I EXHIBIT H
 
I
 
I
 001913
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I  
 
 
l4J 0001/00031I03/01/~010 15:34 FAX 
II
 
II 1 
3II 
2 
5II 
4 
7II 6 
II 8 9 
11II 10 
II 12 13 
II 14 15 
II 16 17 
II 18 19 
II 20 21 
II 22 23 
II 24 25 
II 26 27 
II 28 29 
II 30 31 
II ~? 
NO. -;:-:;-::~____."...~--
FIU:O 3n~A..M -JP.M--='---'--'__ 
MAR 0 , 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
By J. WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJI ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
ORDERRE: WANER HEARING
 
R. Keith Roark has now advised the Court that Mr. Abdullah is ready to tell the Court 
whether he wants to continue to be represented by the State Appellate Public Defender's Office in 
this post-conviction case and whether he is prepared to waive any conflict. The Court has 
scheduled a hearing for Apri123, 2010, at 1:00 p.m. While both the State and the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office may attend, neither will address the Court regarding the conflict or Mr. 
Abdullah's decision to either waive the conflict or request new cOWlsel. 
The Court has already ruled that the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has a 
conflict. Without invading potential attorney-client confidences, the Court could not fully explore 
the extent of any conflict. Therefore, the Court ordered Mr. Roark to fully explore the extent of 
the conflict. Once Mr. Roark felt he had a complete understanding about the extent of the conflict 
and any ramifications, meet with Mr. Abdullah and explain the ramifications of waiving that 
conflict on future proceedings, including any successive post-conviction proceedings or federal 
habeas actions. 
At the April hearing, Mr. Roark should place on the record what materials he has reviewed 
and what depositions he took but not reveal the substance of any of those materials. Any written 
documentation, not already in the record, should be filed under seal with the Court as previously 
ordered. As indicated in the Court's January 27 order, these materials will remain sealed, even 
from the Court, unless there is a further order. 
ORDER RE= WAlVER BEARING 
CASE NO. CV-PC-200S-00308 1 001914
1  
____ ____."...~ -
LeD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
____ --='- '  
  
 
 
:furt
 
I4.J 000210003 
1103/01,2010 15:34 FAX 
II
 
II 1
 
2
 
II 3
 
4
 
II 5
 
6
 
II 7
 
9
li 
e­
10
 
II 11
 
12
 
II 13
 
14
 
II 15
 
16
 
II 17
 
18
 
II 19
 
20
II 21
 
22
 
1123
 
24
 
1125
 
26
 
127
 
28
 
129
 
130
 31
 
I~?
 
Mr. Roark should make a record at the hearing that he has fully informed Mr. Abdullah 
about his findings but not reveal any advice that he may have given Mr. Abdullah. 
The Court then will ask Mr. Abdullah whether he understands the implications ofwaiving 
the conflict on any future proceedings and then whether he actually waives the conflict. The 
Court will explain to him that only he can decide whether to waive the conflict after the advice of 
counsel. 
If he does not waive the conflict, the Court will order the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office provide conflict counsel, certified by the Idaho Supreme Court, to represent Mr. 
Abdullah in this post-conviction case. Such conflict counsel, or conflict counsel's law firm, 
cannot have had any involvement in the underlying case or in this post-conviction case. If Mr. 
Abdullah requests new counsel, the Court will order Mr. Roark to meet with that counsel to insure 
that new counsel has complete access to any material Mr. Roark fOWld. 
IfMr. Abdullah waives any conflict, then the State Appellate Public Defender's Office will 
continue to represent him in this post-conviction case and both the State and State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office should be prepared to immediately schedule an evidentiary hearing. 
Dated this 1st day ofMarch 2010. 
tlt,.,- e...,.c 
Cheri C. Copsey 2t 
District Judge 
ORDER RE: WAIVER HEARING 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILJNG 
I hereby certify that on this _' day of March 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MARKJ.ACKLEY 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
FAX: 208-334-2985 
AZAD ABDULLAH 
#76321 
IMSI-J BLOCK 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
R. KEITH ROARK
 
THE ROARK. LAW FIRM
 
409 N. MAIN STREET
 
HAILEY, ill 83333
 
FAX: 208-788-3918
 
LAMONT ANDERSON 
DEPUTY ATIORNEYGENERAL 
CHIEF, CAPITAL LITIGATION UNIT 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FAX: 208-854-8074 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Dis . t Co 
ORDER RE: WAIVER HEARING
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APR 30 2010 APR 30 2010 
STATE APPELLATE J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
PUBliC' OFFENDER By J. WEATHERBY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf~Y
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802
 
ORDER RE: APPOINTMENT OF
 
CONFLICT COUNSEL
 
On October 15, 2009, having previously found the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office had an office wide conflict, the Court appointed Keith Roark to thoroughly review the 
record and make any investigation he deemed necessary to fully evaluate the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office's conflict of interest in representing Mr. Abdullah in this 
post-conviction proceeding, including the full extent of its involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial 
counsel. After completing his review and analysis, the Court ordered Mr. Roark to meet with and 
advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any options regarding that conflict. The Court 
further ordered that once he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understood his rights and was capable 
of making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a hearing 
before this Court. 
Mr. Roark contacted the Clerk and scheduled a hearing for April 23, 2010, indicating that 
in his opinion Mr. Abdullah had been fully infonned regarding the conflict and all of Mr. Roark's 
findings. At the hearing, Mr. Roark set forth what actions he took and what materials he 
reviewed. Mr. Roark told the Court he believed that Mr. Abdullah would be able to make an 
intelligent, knowing and voluntary decision regarding the conflict and that he had been fully 
informed about the potential impact any decision would have on future litigation including any 
successive post-conviction proceedings or any federal habeas actions. Mr. Roark also indicated 
that he had informed Mr. Abdullah that any decision would have pennanent impacts on future 
litigation. The Court gave Mr. Abdullah a last opportunity to meet privately with Mr. Roark. 
ORDER RE: APPOINTMENT OF CONFLICT COUNSEL 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-21802 1 
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After that meeting, the Court advised Mr. Abdullah that it was his decision with the advice of 
counsel. Mr. Abdullah refused to waive the conflict and asked the Court to order the appointment 
of conflict counsel. I.C.R. 44.2(1) provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1) Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge 
who sentenced the defendant shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the 
defendant for the purpose of seeking any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. 
§ 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to seek. This appointment shall be 
made in compliance with the standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, and 
the a1.UJrney appointed shall be someone other than cDUJZ£e.l who represemed the 
defendant prior fa the imposition ofthe death penalty. This new counsel shall not 
be considered to be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the 
defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for the defendant. 
Therefore, in order to fulfill its responsibilities, the Court orders the Trial Court 
Administrator to contact in writing the death qualified attorneys identified in the list attached to 
this order. The Trial Court Administrator shall request they provide the Court with their resumes, 
identify any conflicts that might exist and indicate whether their workload1 would allow them to 
devote sufficient time to Mr. Abdullah's post-conviction proceeding. Once the Trial Court 
Administrator has those responses, the Court will schedule a hearing with Mr. Abdullah and Mr. 
Roark present to interview proposed counsel. After that hearing, the Court will forward the 
names of those qualified attorneys who are acceptable to the Court to the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office to allow it to negotiate the compensation. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-871 2 the Court orders the State Appellate PUblic Defender's Office to
 
arrange for conflict counsel to be compensated out of the budget of the State Appellate Public
 
Defender's Office.
 
Furthermore, as ordered in open court, in order to preserve the record for appeal, the Court 
hereby further orders Mr. Roark to file those depositions and any other material he thinks 
appropriate with the Court under seal to substantiate what Mr. Abdullah has been told regarding 
I
 I.C.R. 44.3(4). "Appointments pursuant to this Order should provide each client with quality representation in 
accordance with constitutional and professional standards. The appointing authority shall not make an appointment 
without assessing the impact llthe appointment on the attorney's workload." (Emphasis added.) 
2 I.e. § 19-871: "Should the state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act 
because of a contliet of interest or any other reason, the slale appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel jar 
indigelll defendants to be compensated alit ofthe budget a/the state appel/ute public defender." (Emphasis added.) 
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any conflict. The Court finds that sealing these documents, even from the Court, is necessary to 
protect Mr. Abdullah's attorney client privilege and right to a fair post-conviction proceeding. 
Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i)(5). Neither the Court nor the State shall have access to 
that material during this post-conviction case, except by further order of the Court. Copies of 
those documents, however, shall be made available to the new conflict counsel to determine 
whether new post-conviction claims may be made. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 30th day of April 2010. 
~~ 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of April 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
FAX: 208-287-7709 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MARK J. ACKLEY 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
FAX: 208-334-2985 
AZAD ABDULLAH 
#76321 
IMSI-J BLOCK 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
R. KEITH ROARK
 
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
 
409 N. MAIN STREET
 
HAILEY, ID 83333
 
FAX: 208-788-3918
 
LAMONT ANDERSON 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHIEF, CAPITAL LITIGATION UNIT 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FAX: 208-854-8074 
TRIAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
LARRY REINER 
J. DAVIDNAVARR 
Clerk of the Dis ri ourt 
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LIST OF DEATH PENALTY QUALIFIED ATTORNEYS FOR 
POST·CONVICTION
 
I Virginia Bond - 463-0681 
Bond Law, Cbted. 
I
 P.O. Box 1725
 Nampa, ID 83653
 
FAX: 442-0017
 I
 E-mail: vabond@fmtc.com 
I
 Marilyn B. Paul- 324·7200 
Attorney at LawI P.O. Box 623
 
Shosbone, Idaho 83352-0623
 
I
 FAX: 324-7200
 
I Terry S. Ratliff - 587-0900 
Attorney at Law 
I 290 South 2 E Mountain Home ID 83647
 
FAX: (208) 587-6940
 
I
 
I 
John M. Adams - 446-1700 
Attorney at Law 
I
 
POBox 9000
 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
 
FAX: (208) 446-1701
 
E-mail: ladams@kcgov.us 
I David Martinez 
Chief Bannock County Public Defender 
I
 P.O. Box 4147
 Pocatello, ID 83205
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
Robert R. Chastain - 345-3110
 
Attorney at Law
 
PO Box 756
 
1487 W. Hays
 
Boise, Idabo 83701-0756
 
FAX: 345·1836
 
E-mail: rrcbast@gwest.net
 
Scott E. Fouser- 454-2264
 
Attorney at Law
 
PO Box 606
 
Caldwell ID 83606-0606
 
FAX: (208) 454-0313
 
E-mail: wiebefouserattor@gwest.net
 
E.R. Frachiseur - 587-4462
 
400 W 7th S
 
Mountain Home ID 83647
 
FAX: (208) S87-2094
 
James Arcblbald - 524-4002
 
Swafford Law Office, Chartered
 
525 9th St
 
Idaho Falls ID 83404
 
FAX: 208-524-4131
 
Robert J. Van Idour-743-6100
 
Fitzgerald & Van Idour
 
Towne Square Ste 480
 
504 Maio St
 
Lewiston 10 83501
 
FAX: (208) 746-5571
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LIST OF DEATH PENALTY QUALIFIED ATTORNEYS FOR
 
POST-CONVICTION
 
I
 
I Lynn Nelson - 446-1700 
I
 
Office of Public Defender - Kootenai County
 
PO Box 9000
 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
 
I
 FAX: (208) 446-1701
 E-mail: Inelson@kcgov.us 
I
 
I 
J. Bradford Chapman - 446-1700 
Attorney at Law 
POBox 9000
 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-9000
 
I FAX: (208) 446-1701
 E-mail: bcchapman@kcgov.U8
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Randall D. Schulthies - 236-7040
 
Bannock County Courthouse
 
Chief Public Defender
 
PO Box 4147
 
Pocatello ID 83205
 
FAX: (208) 236~7048
 
E-mail: randalls@bannockcoonty.os
 
Van G. Bishop - 465-5411 
Attorney at Law 
203 12th Ave Ste B 
Nampa ID 83686
 
FAX: (208) 465-5881
 
E-mail: van@villadelpescador.com 
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REC;EiVED 
M).',' 1D2DJO	 MAY 07 2010
 
STATE APPELLATE J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
DI JRllr I1l=FJ=NDER BVJ. WEATHERBY 
"	 DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
AZAD HAJJ ABDULLAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Res ondent. 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2005-00308
 
ORDER FINDING ABDULLAH
 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
 
WAIVED THE CONFLICT
 
On October 15, 2009, having previously found the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Office had an office-wide conflict, the Court appointed Keith Roark to thoroughly review the 
record and make any investigation he deemed necessary to fully evaluate the State Appellate 
PUblic Defender's Office's conflict of interest in representing Mr. Abdullah in this 
post-conviction proceeding, including the full extent of its involvement with Mr. Abdullah's trial 
counsel. After completing his review and analysis, the Court ordered Mr. Roark to meet with and 
advise Mr. Abdullah regarding the conflict and any options regarding that conflict. The Court 
further ordered that once he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah understood his rights and was capable 
of making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision, Mr. Roark should schedule a heating 
before this Court. 
Mr. Roark contacted the Clerk and scheduled a hearing for April 23, 2010, indicating that 
in his opinion Mr. Abdullah had been fully inforned regarding the conflict and all of Mr. Roark's 
findings. At the hearing, Mr. Roark set f011h what actions he took and what materials he 
reviewed. Mr. Roark told the Court he believed that Mr. Abdullah would be able to make an 
intelligent, knowing and voluntary decision regarding the conflict and that he had been fully 
infonned about the potential impact any decision would have on future litigation including any 
successive post-conviction proceedings or any federal habeas actions. Mr. Roark also indicated 
that he had infonned Mr. Abdullah that any decision would pennanently impact future litigation. 
The Court gave Mr. Abdullah a last opportunity to meet privately with Mr. Roark. After that 
ORDER RE: DECISION TO WAIVE CONFLICT
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meeting, the Court advised Mr. Abdullah that it was his decision with the advice of counsel. Mr. 
Abdullah refused to waive the conflict and asked the Court to order the appointment of conflict 
counsel. 
Subsequent to that hearing the Court entered an Order requiring the Trial Court 
Administrator to solicit conflict counsel to represent Mr. Abdullah. On April 30, 2010, the Court 
received another letter from Mr. Abdullah indicating he wanted to change his mind and waive the 
conflict. On May 3, 2010, Mr. Roark noticed the issue for hearing on May 7,2010. 
At the hearing, the Court informed Mr. Abdullah that any decision would be permanent! 
and that it would affect his ability to raise the conflict issue in subsequent proceedings. The Court 
gave Mr. Abdullah the opportunity to again meet with Mr. Roark. After a recess of about fifteen 
(15) minutes, Mr. Abdullah indicated he was ready to proceed and after inquiry into whether this 
was his decision and only his decision, Mr. Abdullah waived the conflict. Mr. Roark placed on 
the record that he had met with Mr. Abdullah two additional times after the April 28, 2010, 
hearing and that he was satisfied that Mr. Abdullah was mentally stable, intelligent, and capable 
of making this decision himself. He also indicated that Mr. Abdullah had been carefully informed 
about his findings and that the decision would be permanent. Mr. Roark stated that he believed 
that the decision was knowing and voluntary and that Mr. Abdullah had all the information 
necessary to make the decision. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Abdullah has knowingly and voluntarily waived any 
conflict the State Appellate Public Defender's Office has. Based on that waiver,2 the Court 
1 The Court indicated that it would not allow Mr. Abdullah to change his mind again absent some extraordinary 
circumstance. 
2 I.C.R. 44.2(1) provides in relevant part as follows: 
(1) Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty. the district judge who sentenced the 
defendant shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking 
any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to seek. 
This appointment shall be made in compliance with the standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 
44.3. and the attorney appointed shall be someone other than counsel who represented the 
defendant prior to the imposition of the death penalty. This new counsel shall not be considered to 
be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the defendant, but may also be appointed to 
pursue the direct appeal for the defendant. 
ORDER RE: DECISION TO WAIVE CONFLICT
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therefore reappoints the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent Mr. Abdullah in the 
post-conviction proceeding. 
The Court hereby sets a status conference for May 12, 2010, at 3:30 p.m. The Court also 
anticipates scheduling the evidentiary hearing to begin August 30,2010. The parties should come 
prepared to address that. The Court will also set argument on the Motion to Strike at the status 
conference. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this i h day of May 2010. 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this --.::L day of May 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
GREG H. BOWER 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATIORNEY 
ROGER BOURNE 
SHAWNADUNN 
INTERDEPT. MAIL 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
 
SHANNON N. ROMERO
 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703
 
AZAD ABDULLAH 
#76321 
IMSI-J BLOCK 
P.O. BOX 51
 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
 
R. KEITH ROARK
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I GREG H. BOWER Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
I	 Roger Boume 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
I	 Jan M! )Jennetts 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
Deputy Prosecuting AttorneysI 200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702I Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
I 
RECE\VEO
 
AUG 19 20\0 
STA1"E APPELLA1"E 
p\J8L\C OEFENOE~ 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
I THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF ADA 
I
 
I DARRELL EDWARD PAYNE,
 
Petitioner,
 
I
 
vs.
 
mE STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent.I 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV PC 2010 11137 
) 
) STATE'S MOTION FOR 
) INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE 
) CONFLIer WITH THE 
) STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
) DEFENDER 
-------------) 
I 
I COMES NOW, Roger Bourne and Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorneys, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and requests that this Court hold 
I 
a hearing and to inquire into whether or not the State Appellate Public Defender 
(hereinafter "SAPO") has a conflict in representing the Petitioner in these post-conviction 
proceedings.
I 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSmLE CONFLICT WITH THE 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE) Page 1 
-
I 001930
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I
 
I
 
The State prefers to address this issue now rather than later. The State hopes to 
I avoid additional delays that would be caused were we to discover later that there is indeed 
a conflict. In addition, it is appropriate that a record be made at the district court level on 
I this issue rather than attempting to address it at a later time during appellate proceedings. 
During the re-sentencing proceedings in the present case, the State and defense I trial counsel reviewed the prison call list. In reviewing the prison call list, the State 
I discovered that Petitioner Payne was communicating over the phone with someone at the 
SAPD's Office because the call list shows that there were telephone calls made from the 
I Petitioner to the SAPD's telephone number. Although the State did not receive or have 
I 
access to the actual recordings of these telephone calls and does not know the content of 
I any of these calls to the SAPD, it is clear from the call list itself that Petitioner Payne was 
communicating with someone at the SAPD's Office because there were completed calls I to the telephone number at the SAPD's Office. The length of these calls to the SAPD 
ranged from three minutes to forty-five minutes and occurred approximately once a 
I 
month from February 4, 2009, to December 2, 2009. Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal 
filed a notice of appearance in the re-sentencing proceedings on February 2, 2009. The 
I 
call list the State has includes telephone calls from February 1,2009, to January 11,2010. 
I During the re-sentencing proceedings, this Court made a record that this Court 
observed members of the SAPD Office in the courtroom. The State similarly put on the I record that one of the SAPD attorneys was observed speaking with Petitioner Payne 
during one of the breaks. Again, the content of the conversation is unknown. However, 
I 
in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays in these post­
conviction proceedings, the State requests that this Court inquire of post-conviction 
counsel to ensure that there is no conflict. 
I The State further requests that the SAPD disclose any notes, documents and 
conversations members of the SAPD staff had with Darrell Payne and/or trial counsel for I Darrell Payne prior to the SAPD post-conviction appointment on April 30, 2010. 
I 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE 
I STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE) Page 2 
-
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I
 
The State contends that any of these conversations or notes that related specifically 
I to the Payne case would not be protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege because the 
SAPO did not represent the Petitioner during those time frames. Should the Court 
I conclude otherwise, the State requests that the Court inquire of the SAPO outside the 
State's presence on the record and review these documents en camera to determine I whether these communications demonstrate that a conflict exists. In addition, it is 
I entirely possible that this information would be relevant in responding to and addressing 
the Petitioner's post-conviction claims. 
I 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L.l::..- day ofAugust 2010. 
I 
GREG H. BOWERI Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
I 
I Roger Boume Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I 
~,#~I J M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH THE 
I STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE) Page 3 
-

001932
 
 
   
 
P
I
 
I
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~daY of August 2010, a true and correct 
I copy of the foregoing State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible Conflict With the State 
Appellate Public Defender was served on Shannon Romero and Nicole Owens, Deputy 
I State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the 
manner noted below: I \f.... By depositing copies Qf _the S8l11e in the United States Mail, postage prepa!d, first 
I class. 
o By depositing copies ofthe same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
I o By infonning the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for 
pickup at the Office ofthe Ada County Prosecutor. 
I o By faxing copies ofthe same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile nwnber: _ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
STATE'S MOTION FOR INQUIRY INTO POSSmLE CONFLICT WITH mE 
I STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (pAYNE) Page 4 
-
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
 
State Appellate Public Defender A.Af- FIlED ~
NO.=:-- ~~_

----lp.M-!f29 :State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 JAN f f 2011 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 By JANETElUs •Clerk 
DI!PuTYDeputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV PC 080 3085 
) 
v. ) AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR 
) PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. 
) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) ORiGINAL 
------------_~) 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby amends his Motion for Permission to 
Appeal filed on January 10, 2011. This amendment is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a). 
( AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 1 001934
 
  .L  -*  
 
  
EPury 
iSI l
- - ---- - - - - --------~)
 
Specifically, the Petitioner substitutes the attached page eleven (11), Appendix A, for the 
submitted page eleven (11) of the same document. 
Respectfully submitted this 11 th day of January, 2011. 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
\Juvlc Q 0 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 2 001935
th  
--
--
--
,
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 11 th day of January, 2011, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL, as 
indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL u.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 -y....- Statehouse Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83707 __ Hand Delivery 
JAN BENNETTS U.S. Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE Statehouse Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
--
Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ----v:- Hand Delivery 
~'-----
MITIGAnON SPECIALIST 
IHT/ga 
AMENDMENT TO MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 3 001936
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1.	 This Court's Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted Where Mr. Benjamin Has 
Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist, Where The State Has Not Presented 
Any Evidence Of A Conflict, And Where The Court Does Not Have The Facts 
Necessary To Support Further Inquiry Involves A Controlling Question Of Law 
This Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order finds that it is "lacking enough facts to 
make [the] determination [of whether a conflict exists.]" (Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8, 
Ls. 18-19.) This Court also finds that it is "presently lacking the factual background necessary to 
reach any conclusion." (Memorandum Decision and Order, p.7, Ls. 25-26.) Additionally, the only 
factual assertion contained in the record is that of Mr. Benjamin indicating a conflict of interest 
does not exist. Moreover, the State has not presented any factual basis warranting further inquiry 
into whether a conflict exists. The controlling question of law is whether a district court in a capital 
post-conviction proceeding can validly appoint a separate court appointed expert attorney to 
independently review the record and conduct investigation, where there are no facts indicating 
further inquiry is warranted and where the only facts before the Court indicate a conflict does not 
exist. This is a legal question of first impression and is a substantial legal issue of great public 
interest. See Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 3-4, 665 P.2d 701, 702-03 (1983). 
2.	 There Are Substantial Grounds For Differences Of Opinion Involving This Court's 
Order That A Further Inquiry Be Conducted By A Court-Appointed Attorney Where 
Mr. Benjamin Has Advised The Court A Conflict Does Not Exist, Where The State 
Has Not Presented Any Evidence Of A Conflict, And Where The Court Does Not 
Have The Facts Necessary To Support Further Inquiry 
Substantial grounds for difference of opinion regarding this controlling question of law stem 
from case law cited in the SAPD's filings regarding this issue including the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest, the Response to State's Motion for Inquiry Into Possible SAPD 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 11 001938
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NO·---IFR.ECl~~ _
Al-M ---'P.M _ 
GREG H. BOWER JAN 25 2011 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
ByJANETEWSJan M. Bennetts DePUTY 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
) 
Petitioner, ) STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
vs. ) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
) JUDICIAL NOTICE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, )
 
)
 
Respondent. )
 
)
 
--------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's Motion for 
Judicial Notice. 
The State objects to this Court taking judicial notice of portions of the State v. 
Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah) record as requested by the Petitioner. First, the State fails to 
see the relevance or need for this Court to take judicial notice of a partial record in an 
unrelated case. Although Judge Copsey's handling of the conflict issue in Abdullah, may 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
(HALL ll), Page 1 001939
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- - - -------------- - - - --) 
• • 
provide some guidance for this Court, it is not necessary or appropriate for this Court to take 
judicial notice of a partial record in the Abdullah case without relevance having been 
established. 
Second, the Petitioner is requesting that this Court take judicial notice of only a 
portion of the Abdullah record regarding the conflict issue. It would not be appropriate for 
only certain items to be judicially noticed and not others. If this Court does take judicial 
notice of these items, then it would be appropriate for the Court to take judicial notice of the 
entirety of the record related to the conflict issue in Abdullah. The remainder of the record 
ought to be considered contemporaneously with the portions requested as a matter of fairness. 
See I.R.E. 106. Again, the State objects to this Court taking judicial notice of documents in 
an unrelated case, but if it does so, the State believes it should only be done in its entirety as 
to the conflict issue. 
Because the Petitioner has failed to establish relevance for this Court taking judicial 
notice of a partial record in an unrelated case, the State requests that this Court deny the 
Motion for Judicial Notice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this a'¢day of January 2011. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
(HALL 11), Page 2 001940
By: an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
• • 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response 
to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice was delivered to the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 through the 
United States Mail, this J-~ day of January 2011. 
-----.::::'M-'Legal Assistant 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
(HALL ll), Page 3 001941
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ARJM....__- ....P.M---­GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney JAN 25 2011 
Jan M. Bennetts CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
ByJANETEWSIdaho State Bar No. 4606 DEPUTY 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) RECONSIDERATION 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's 
Motion for Reconsideration regarding this Court's Order appointing Keith Roark. 
Prior to this Court's Memorandum and Order and Appointment of Keith Roark, 
this Court considered all of the information and arguments provided by the Petitioner, the 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL II), Page 1 
001942
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State and Mr. Benjamin. This Court made a reasoned and considered decision based 
upon the entirety of the record before it. 
The State will not restate its earlier arguments and hereby incorporates by 
reference its previous filings on this subject. Nonetheless, it is important to consider 
several points. 
First, the State's interest in having this issue addressed now is not to delay 
proceedings or have this Court or anyone else go on a fishing expedition. The State 
hopes to prevent this conflict issue from becoming the basis for a possible reversal in 
subsequent proceedings. At a minimum, there must be a record that an appellate court 
can review. At this point, there is no clear record upon which an appellate court could 
make a review of this issue. There have been vague statements and broad conclusions, 
none of which provide a basis upon which an appellate court can make a meaningful 
review. Absent a clear and meaningful record, it creates the potential for an appellate 
court to remand this case requiring that a meaningful record be made. 
Second, the Petitioner discusses in the Motion for Reconsideration the information 
sharing that occurred between the SAPD in Hall I and trial counsel in Hall II. It seems to 
the State that there is a difference between merely information sharing and providing 
advice; having discussions that informed trial counsel's decisions; obtaining advice or 
having discussions about strategy or trial options; and/or taking other actions that create a 
conflict in post-conviction. In fact, if information sharing of test results and other 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL ll), Page 2 
001943
• • 
information that related to, or could have had impact on trial counsel's work in Hall II, 
did not occur, the SAPD would now be claiming in this post-conviction proceeding that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not participating in information sharing. Because 
information sharing did occur, trial counsel was better prepared for Hall II. It does not 
seem to the State that information sharing alone would create a conflict; nor did the State 
intend to conveyor imply that information sharing alone creates a conflict. Rather, as the 
State pointed out in its previous filings that will not be restated here, there are various 
ways conflicts could arise ifmore than information sharing took place. 
Third, the Petitioner cites to the State v. Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah) case and 
indicates that the SAPD represented to the Court in Abdullah that no contlict existed. 
(Motion to Reconsider, at 7.) In Abdullah, Judge Copsey determined that a conflict 
existed and thereafter appointed Keith Roark to conduct an independent review. In the 
present case, the SAPD filed an Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest on June 
29,2010. The Notice filed went beyond documenting merely information sharing ("The 
SAPD cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert information 
obtained in Hall I.") and indicated that the SAPD attorneys "may have had contact with 
trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued 
representation of Mr. Hall." However, unlike the Abdullah case in which Judge Copsey 
had details upon which to make a determination, there have been no specifics or details 
presented to the Court that would give this Court a basis upon which to determine 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL 11), Page 3 
001944
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whether a conflict exists. It is also important to note that in its Notice, the SAPD 
appeared to recognize the distinction between merely information sharing and other 
contact that could present a conflict of interest. 
In any event, the SAPD has indicated that there is certainly the potential that a 
conflict exists. In its Notice, the SAPD states several times that the contact with trial 
counsel may present a conflict: the SAPD attorney "became concerned about a conflict 
of interest"; "[a]fter an internal review, it was determined that independent counsel 
should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict."; the SAPD contacted Mr. 
Benjamin who "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall whether or not the 
conflict should be waived."; and, "In the event Mr. Hall is inclined to waive the conflict, it 
is anticipated that independent counsel will schedule a waiver hearing with this Court.',' 
(Notice, at 3 (emphases added).). Even though the SAPD did not indicate conclusively 
whether or not there was a conflict, the language of this Notice certainly suggests that 
there is a conflict and that, at a minimum, an inquiry is required. That alone is sufficient 
to warrant an inquiry. 
Fourth, the SAPD seems to argue that the State should determine whether there is 
a conflict by reviewing trial counsel's materials and/or having discussions with trial 
counsel. However, it is not the State that is required to make this determination. It is not 
the SAPD that must make the determination. It is not Mr. Benjamin that must make the 
determination. It is the Court and only the Court that must make the final determination 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL ll), Page 4 
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as to whether a conflict exists. Certainly, this Court may consider the entirety of the 
information provided to it, but it is this Court's duty to make the final determination. In 
Abdullah, it was the Court and only the Court that ultimately determined there was a 
contlict. 
In this case, the State sought guidance from this Court as to whether or not it was 
free to discuss with trial counsel conversations trial counsel had with the SAPD when the 
Petitioner was present and/or when the Petitioner was not present. The State made such a 
request because the State certainly does not want to misstep. The State sought and 
received clear direction from this Court that it is not free to have such discussions with 
Hall II trial counsel at this time and the State will abide by that Order until such a time as 
this Court directs otherwise. Further, until this issue is resolved and the State receives 
clear direction that it may obtain trial counsel's materials in discovery from the SAPD, 
the State will not do so. The materials from trial counsel may well contain information 
about the conversations that this Court has instructed that the State not be privy to. 
Unless the State misunderstands, the SAPD also appears to argue on the one hand 
that there is an attorney-client privilege related to communications with trial counsel 
and/or Petitioner about Hall II matters because the SAPD represented the Petitioner in 
Hall I; and, on the other hand, that the State is free to discuss these communications with 
trial counsel. The State cannot easily reconcile those two concepts, which is why the 
State will await permission and an Order from this Court before proceeding forward to 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL ll), Page 5 
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review any discovery or discuss communications with trial counsel. If there IS an 
attorney-client privilege that prevents the SAPD from disclosing to the State 
communications it had with Hall II trial counsel and/or the Petitioner about Hall II 
matters, then how is appropriate for the State to communicate with Hall II trial counsel 
about those same privileged communications? If there is an attorney-client privilege 
about Hall II matters, then the State cannot circumvent that privilege by going to Hall II 
trial counsel to do so. To be clear, it is the State's position, as the State has argued in 
prior filings, that the Petitioner has waived the attorney-client privilege related to any Hall 
II communications, correspondence, emails, documents, and so on, by filing this post-
conviction Petition, l but until the conflict issue is resolved and this Court issues an Order 
outlining what the State is entitled to obtain, the State will abide by this Court's Order of 
December 27, 2010. 
Fifth, the SAPD indicates that this Court did not hear from Mr. Benjamin at the 
October 19, 2010, hearing. (Motion to Reconsider, at 17.) Although the State does not 
have a transcript of that hearing, the State recalls that this Court did in fact hear from Mr. 
Benjamin. 
Finally, it is important to note that the present case is distinguishable from the 
Abdullah case in that in the Abdullah case, Judge Copsey had the relevant information to 
make the necessary findings. In the present case, this Court does not. Again, if merely 
I The State recognizes that the attorney-client privilege between the SAPD and the Petitioner related to Hall I post­
conviction matters would not be waived. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL ll), Page 6 
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information sharing occurred, that is different than advice, strategy and conversations or 
communications of that nature, but the conflict issue must nonetheless be resolved. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court deny the Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this clt/l'-day of January 2011. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
~M~ 
By: an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's 
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was delivered to the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 
through the United States Mail, this ~ay of January 2011. 
Legal Assistant 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
(HALL ll), Page 7 
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NO------;FUDEii!!n'---­
AJAMM._---P.M~---
JAN 25 2011 
GREG H. BOWER 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. ClerkAda County Prosecuting Attorney 
By JANET ELLIS 
DEPUTY 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the following response to the Petitioner's 
Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
The Petitioner seeks permission to file an interlocutory appeal of this Court's 
December 27, 2010, Order should this Court decline to grant the SAPD's Motion for 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 1 
001949
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Reconsideration. The SAPD indicates that "[n]ow it seems the State will be 
automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts 
to support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPD represents" and 
cites a case for the proposition that the State may manufacture a conflict in order to 
prevent a defendant from having able counsel. (See Motion for Permission to Appeal, at 
2, including n.!.) The State takes great issue with the implication that the State is 
somehow manufacturing a conflict in order to have the SAPD removed from a capital 
case or cases. As the State has indicated repeatedly, the State's only interest is in not 
having cases remanded and/or reversed on the basis of a conflict issue. Nor is the State 
making up conflicts out of whole cloth. 
First, in State v. Abdullah (hereinafter Abdullah), the Court concluded that there 
was in fact a conflict even though the SAPD represented that it did not believe there was 
a conflict. (SAPD Motion to Reconsider, at 7.) In State v. Payne (hereinafter Payne), 
there were numerous and lengthy phone calls between the SAPD counsel and Payne 
during a time when Payne was represented by trial counsel who were preparing for re­
sentencing proceedings. These calls certainly gave rise to conflict concerns and the 
State's concerns were well-founded as is evidenced by the fact that this Court granted the 
State's Motion for Inquiry. The Court did in fact conduct such an inquiry. 
In the present case, as in Payne, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry in an 
abundance of caution to avoid the very issues that arose in Abdullah. The State would 
certainly have been remiss in its obligations if it had not brought this issue to the Court's 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 2 
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attention, particularly in light of these other cases; the fact that this issue goes to the very 
integrity of post-conviction representation; and that this issue certainly has the potential 
for a reversal or remand upon subsequent appeals. Apparently, the State's Motion for 
Conflict Inquiry was not misplaced in the present case in light of the fact that the SAPD 
had similar concerns as it outlined in its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest 
filed on June 29, 2010, and further in light of Mr. Benjamin's Affidavit in which he 
concluded that there was an instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel. (See 
Motion to Reconsider, at 14 n.2.) 
The State is troubled by the SAPD's allegation that the State's concern regarding 
whether a conflict of interest exists has any motivation other than protecting the integrity 
of its capital cases. 
As the Petitioner points out in its Motion for Permission to Appeal in the present 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to grant its motion for interlocutory appeal in the 
Abdullah matter when it sought to appeal Judge Copsey's appointment of Keith Roark to 
examine the conflict issue in the Abdullah case. (Motion for Permission to Appeal, at 3.) 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the SAPD has standing to bring this 
Motion given that this Court has appointed independent counsel, the State objects to this 
Court granting the Motion for Permission to Appeal. The Petitioner has failed to meet the 
standards for an interlocutory appeal. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12(a) permits an appeal from an interlocutory order in a 
criminal action if the appeal "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
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substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the 
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 
12(a). Idaho's appellate courts have given little guidance regarding the interpretation of 
I.A.R. 12(a). In Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained, "[i]t was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an 
interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of 
first impression are involved." The Court further explained that a number of factors, 
none of which is controlling, are considered in determining whether such an appeal 
should be granted, including "the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties, the 
effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the appeal, the 
likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district 
court, and the case workload of the appellate courts." Id. Finally, the Court cautioned 
that I.A.R. 12 is to be used only in "the exceptional case" and should not be used to 
"broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. II." Id. 
The Petitioner argues that this Court's Order involves a controlling issue of law as 
to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion. (See Motion, at 4-12.) 
The Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Appeal is repetitive. Accordingly, the State 
will attempt to organize the arguments. The Petitioner's arguments seeking to persuade 
this Court to grant permission to appeal can be summarized as follows: (1) Whether Mr. 
Benjamin's review was sufficient; (2) Whether the Court's appointment of Keith Roark 
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interferes with the Petitioner's right to choice of counsel; and, (3) Whether requiring the 
SAPD to pay for Keith Roark's justifies an interlocutory appeal. 
1. Dennis Benjamin's Review 
The Petitioner overlooks several very important points when he argues that this 
Court should grant permission to appeal based upon Mr. Benjamin's review. First, 
regardless of whether or not the State had filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD 
Conflict, this Court would face the exact same issues it currently faces and this case 
would be in the exact same position. That is true because in its Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest filed on June 29, 2010, the SAPD stated several times that 
the SAPD contact with trial counsel may present a conflict: the SAPD attorney "became 
concerned about a conflict o/interest"; "[a]fter an internal review, it was determined that 
independent counsel should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict."; the SAPD 
contacted Mr. Benjamin who "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall 
whether or not the conflict should be waived."; and, "In the event Mr. Hall is inclined to 
waive the conflict, it is anticipated that independent counsel will schedule a waiver 
hearing with this Court." (Notice, at 3 (emphases added).). Accordingly, this is not some 
imagined conflict that this Court or the State pulled out of thin air. There is a basis for 
inquiry and careful review. Even though the SAPD did not indicate conclusively whether 
or not there was a conflict in its Notice, the language of its Notice certainly suggests that 
there is a conflict. That alone is sufficient to warrant an inquiry. 
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Second, the Petitioner seems to overlook the fact that it is the Court who has the 
duty to detennine whether a conflict exists. Neither the State's opinion; nor the SAPD's 
opinion; nor Mr. Benjamin's opinion is controlling. As the State has previously argued, 
this Court must independently make that detennination. 
Third, the Petitioner argues that this Court's failure to accept Mr. Benjamin's 
conclusion requires this Court to certify this issue for appeal. At this point, this Court 
does not have a sufficient record upon which it can rely to make an independent decision 
about whether or not a conflict exists. There is no substance to the conclusory statements 
this Court currently has before it. There must be more than conclusory statements upon 
which this Court can base a ruling. It should be noted that in Abdullah, Keith Roark 
provided Judge Copsey with a thorough written report that was provided under seal and is 
subject to appellate review. (See Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider, Appendix 7.) 
Furthennore, in the present case, there is an insufficient record for an appellate 
court to later review when this case is appealed. The State is certain that this conflict issue 
will be the basis for a subsequent appeal. As it currently stands, there is not enough 
infonnation for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review. See State v. Severson, 
147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009), rehearing denied (2009) ("In order to satisfy the inquiry 
requirement, a trial court's examination of the potential conflict must be thorough and 
searching and should be conducted on the record." (emphasis added». Additionally, if 
there is not a sufficient record for this Court to base its decision, the State fails to see how 
the Idaho Supreme Court will be in any better position to hear an appeal and issue a ruling 
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regarding a potential conflict without a sufficient record upon which to conduct a 
meaningful review. 
2. Right to Counsel of Choice 
Petitioner argues that by appointing Keith Roark, this Court is interfering with his 
right to choice of counsel. The State disagrees. The Petitioner is entitled to counsel free 
of conflict. Should this inquiry result in a finding that the Petitioner has conflict free 
counsel, the SAPD will resume their representation. Should this inquiry result in a 
finding that a conflict exists, the Petitioner will have a choice. He may either choose to 
waive the conflict and the SAPD will resume representation or he may choose not to 
waive the conflict. Regardless of the Petitioner's decision, it will not interfere with his 
right to counsel. 
It should also be noted that the final outcome of this inquiry has yet to be decided, 
which makes a current appeal premature. The SAPD has not been disqualified from 
representation for all future proceedings; rather, this Court is attempting to conduct the 
required inquiry before such a decision can be made. Only after such inquiry is 
completed, will there be a final outcome. If this Court were to ignore its obligation to 
make this independent determination, it would certainly give rise to an appellate issue. 
Furthermore, if this Court ignored its obligation and the SAPD continued its 
representation based upon the current record, it follows that the SAPD would not raise 
this issue on appeal given that the SAPD believes the current status is acceptable. The 
failure to raise this issue on appeal will be the basis for a subsequent appeal at which time 
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the Petitioner would argue that the SAPO had a conflict and continued to represent him 
when he had a right to conflict free counsel. He would then argue that not only did the 
SAPO have a conflict, which infected the entire post-conviction proceeding, but he would 
argue, as another appellate, claim that the SAPO failed to raise the conflict issue on 
appeal. 
Further, the right to counsel of one's choice is not absolute. The Sixth 
Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. One element of this basic 
guarantee is the right to counsel of choice." United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1074 
(3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047 (1996) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). However, "[t]he right to counsel of one's choice encompassed within the Sixth 
Amendment is not absolute." United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 
2001); see also State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920,930-31 (Ct. App. 1997) (right to counsel 
not absolute and does not necessarily include right to counsel of one's own choosing; it 
does entitle criminal defendant to reasonably competent counsel). As explained in Caplin 
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (quoting Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)), "those who do not have the means to hire their 
own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by 
attorneys appointed by the courts. '[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an 
attorney he cannot afford. '" See also Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 
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2000) (citing cases establishing that right to choice of counsel is not absolute, but limited 
to those who are financially able to retain counsel). 
3. SAPD Required to Pay for Keith Roark 
The Petitioner argues that this Court is in error for requiring the SAPD to pay for 
Keith Roark to conduct this inquiry. The Petitioner contends that this Court's reliance on 
I.C. § 19-871 is erroneous. Idaho Code § 19-871 is clear and unambiguous: "Should the 
state appellate public defender be unable to carry out the duties required in this act 
because ofa conflict of interest or any other reason, the state appellate public defender 
shall arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of 
the state appellate public defender." (emphasis added.) This statute clearly applies and 
this Court did not err in its ruling. Further, I.C. §19-870(1)(d) states in relevant part that 
the SAPD shall provide representation for indigent defendants in "[plost-conviction relief 
proceedings in district court in capital cases where the appellant was sentenced on or after 
September 1, 1998....,,\ 
The Petitioner cites to I.C. "§19-871(d)", but the State cannot locate a subsection 
(d). Idaho Code 19-871 has no subsections; and thus, the State is uncertain as to what the 
Petitioner is citing. (See Motion, at 17.) 
The Petitioner's reliance on I.C. §19-4904 and §19-860 is misplaced. Idaho Code 
§19-870(1)(d) and §19-871 are the controlling statutes. Pursuant to I.C. §19-870(1)(d), it 
is the SAPD's responsibility to represent the Petitioner in these post-convictions 
I The Petitioner was sentenced to death in this case in 2007. 
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proceedings and pursuant to I.C. §I9-87I, it is the responsibility of the SAPD to pay Mr. 
Roark for his services under these circumstances where the SAPD is unable to carry out 
its duties at this time. Inability to pay does not relieve the SAPD of its statutory duties. 
An interlocutory appeal based upon this Court's ruling is inappropriate. The 
impact of an interlocutory appeal on the parties is significant. Not only would an 
interlocutory appeal delay the conflict inquiry, but it would delay the post-conviction 
proceedings. An interlocutory appeal should not be used to "broaden the appeals which 
may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11." See Rudell, 105 Idaho at 4. Nor does 
an immediate appeal from this Court's Order materially advance the orderly resolution of 
the litigation in this case. Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that this Court 
deny the Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this Pl'1Aday of January 2011. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
~/I{~ 
By: M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's 
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Pennission to Appeal was delivered to the State 
Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 
83703 through the United States Mail, this ~J.ay of January 2011. 
Legal Assistant 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL (HALL 11), Page 11 
001959
 
•
NO-----,pIiiiLED!I)"-:;:a:"':}i1'tlno-
MOLLY J. HUSKEY AIJ..MM._----P.M 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho FEB -1 2011 
I.S.B. # 4843 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANET elJ.IS 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 DEPUTY 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit ORIGINAL
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) Case No. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
) REPLY TO STATE'S 
v. ) RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S 
) MOTION FOR JUDICIAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) NOTICE 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
--------------­ ) 
Counsel for Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State 
Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), submits the following reply to the State's Response to 
Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice (hereinafter State's Response). The State lodges two 
objections, namely: (1) the relevance of the documents, and (2) the selective nature of the 
materials submitted. 
The relevance of the material referenced in the Motion for Judicial Notice is two-fold: 
first, it helps to explain the reasons why the State Appellate Public Defender chose to file a 
notice to the court and undertake a review of the conflict through an independent attorney, 
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instead of merely making a representation to the Court and then waiting for the Court to appoint 
an attorney; and second, it replaces the allusions and opaque references to State v. Abdullah that 
have been made in arguments, pleadings and the Court's own order, with specific facts. 
Mr. Hall accompanied his Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order 
(hereinafter Motion to Reconsider) with several appendices and a Motion/or Judicial Notice. He 
made reference to those documents throughout his Motion to Reconsider, in order to shed 
additional light on the issue and to provide the Court with information Mr. Hall believed to be 
necessary to reconsider its decision. Any party making a motion for reconsideration under 
I.R.C.P. 11(1)(2)(B) is permitted to present new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 
472 (Ct. App. 2006). When considering a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B), the trial court should take into account any new facts presented 
by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene 
Mining Co. v. First Nat 'I Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823 (1990). The burden is obviously on the 
moving party to bring to the attention of the court any new facts. Id. 
With regard to the conflict inquiry, what occurred in State v. Abdullah is relevant if the 
evidence has "... any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." I.R.E. 401. Here, the Court appears to have used the Abdullah case as a general 
template for how to proceed. The Court has appointed the same attorney used by Judge Copsey 
in the Abdullah case, and has effectively given him the same charge. Accordingly, Mr. Hall 
believes that a fuller understanding of the proceedings in State v. Abdullah would provide the 
Court with information that clearly distinguishes the two cases, and also provides important 
context as to why the SAPD originally chose to proceed in the manner it did. 
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE-2 
001961
 
Mr. Hall argues in his Motion to Reconsider that there are several reasons the Court 
should have part of the record in Abdullah in order to more clearly understand those proceedings. 
First, the SAPD attorneys who filed the Ex Parte Notice had only recently finished the lengthy 
and laborious conflict inquiry in the case of Mr. Abdullah. The relevance is that their experience 
in Abdullah may have affected the choices they made in order to address any possible conflict 
issues. Second, one could interpret the SAPD's choice to contract with an outside attorney (prior 
to the finding of an actual conflict) in order to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall as an 
attempt by the SAPD to avoid making a representation as to whether a conflict existed, only to 
be later contradicted by the Court, as happened in Abdullah. The record in Abdullah lends 
credibility to the argument that the SAPD faced a dilemma when determining how to proceed in 
this case. The SAPD had just experienced a situation where attorneys had represented to their 
client that there was no conflict, only for the Judge to tum around and find such a conflict did 
exist and that the advice of his own attorneys was therefore compromised. Third, the Decision 
Memorandum and Order has at least suggested that the SAPD's refusal to be more forthcoming 
with the Court may be an attempt to hide information from the Court. The Abdullah record 
provides a context in which the actions by the SAPD can be interpreted as being overly cautious 
and an attempt to avoid the same scenario. Fourth, the Abdullah case also demonstrates how 
Judge Copsey had received specific information in the ordinary course of litigation that led her to 
make the finding that a conflict of interest actually existed. Mr. Hall believes that that 
procedural history is critical in distinguishing the two cases and in explaining why the conflict 
inquiry in the two cases should be treated differently. 
With regard to the selective nature of the Motion for Judicial Notice, the SAPD does not 
object to the Court taking judicial notice of additional material in that case if it would be helpful 
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to the Court. Obviously, the entirety of a capital post-conviction record is voluminous; however, 
the Motion for Judicial Notice was simply an attempt to identify those portions of the record 
which were directly relevant to the conflict inquiry. The SAPD has no objection to the Court 
taking judicial notice of the entire public record in State v. Abdullah, as long as Mr. Hall would 
be able to refer to those proceedings with specificity in any future pleading or hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we ask this Court to take judicial notice of the items 
outlined in the Motion for Judicial Notice, and in so doing recognize their relevance to Mr. 
Hall's Motion to Reconsider. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of February, 2011. 
Ian H. Thomson 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
UllUivD. 
Nicole Owens 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
NOI-__-. ~~~-
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OI;,IWiMi'w,D...A~__,.. ..J..:.~~_ 
FEB 23 2011
 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH,ERICK VIRGIL HALL, By JANET EWS 
~ 
Petitioner, Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION
 
AND ORDER
 
DENYING THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER;
 
AND SUPPLEMENTING
 
THE ORIGINAL DECISION AND ORDER
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 27, 2010, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith 
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel in this case. Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the 
rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon on October 22, 2004 (Hall II). In the period of time 
during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was represented by the State Appellate Public Defender 
("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and appeal of his conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and 
first-degree murder of Lynn Henneman (Hall I). In his amended post-conviction petition, filed in this 
case on April 7,2009, the Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel in the Hall II case provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
On June 29,2010, the SAPD filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest in this case, 
and on July 30,2010, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II). The 
Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II) on 
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August 26, 2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the 
extensive briefing filed by both parties on the issues of the scope and structure of the Court's inquiry into 
the possible conflict of interest, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith 
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel on December 27,2010. The SAPD filed its Motion to 
Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order on January 10, 2011. 
DISCUSSION 
"In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affirmative
 
duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular
 
conflict may exist.'" State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)(quoting State v.
 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278,285 (2003)). In its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of
 
Interest, the SAPD informed the Court that contact between former SAPD attorneys and Petitioner's trial
 
counsel "may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall." At that
 
point, the Court had reason to know that a particular conflict may exist, even before the State filed its
 
Motion for Inquiry. The SAPD now portrays its Ex Parte Notice as evidence of concern about the
 
"appearance of a possible conflict of interest." Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order
 
at 8 (emphasis added). However, the Ex Parte Notice did not disclose the appearance of a possible
 
conflict; rather, it disclosed a possible conflict. The Ex Parte Notice disclosed the following: (1)
 
counsel from the SAPD's office "may have had contact with trial counsel and that contact may present a
 
conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued representation of Mr. Hall;" (2) after discovering that
 
contact, an attorney in the office "became concerned about a conflict of interest;" (3) the SAPD hired
 
independent counsel "to independently evaluate the conflict;" and (4) independent counsel hired by the
 
SAPD "agreed to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall whether the conflict should be waived."
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Accordingly, this Court found that it was under an affinnative duty to inquire into the potential
 
conflict when it granted the State's Motion for Inquiry on August 26,2010. The time to request
 
reconsideration of that motion has passed. As described in the Memorandum Decision and Order filed
 
December 27,2010, the SAPD has declined to share infonnation requested by the Court in furtherance
 
of the Court's inquiry into whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Nevertheless, the
 
inquiry has so far revealed at least one instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II,
 
although no disclosure regarding the substance of that advice has been made to the Court.
 
In the Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order, the SAPD asks the 
Court to reconsider its holdings with regard to the following issues: (1) whether the SAPD has been 
candid and forthcoming with the Court while investigating any possible conflict; (2) whether the SAPD 
has been willing to share infonnation concerning contacts between the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel 
when no attorney-client privilege prevents that release; (3) whether appointing Mr. Roark to act as 
conflict counsel for the Petitioner is any different than the work already perfonned by Mr. Benjamin; (4) 
whether any further conflict inquiry is justified in light of the infonnation now before the Court; and (5) 
whether the State should be pennitted to contact and inquire of Hall II trial counsel about their 
communications with the SAPD. A decision whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration 
made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Van v. PortneufMedical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560,212 P.3d 982,990 (2009). 
The Candor of the SAPD and the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Having granted the State's Motion for Inquiry, this Court is required and has an affinnative duty 
to detennine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. The purpose of the Court's 
inquiry is to protect an important and fundamental right of this capital Petitioner to conflict-free counsel. 
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The Court has no interest in "interfering with the attorney-client relationship that already exists" as 
alleged by the SAPD. However, the very nature of an inquiry requires that questions be asked. 
The SAPD was candid and forthcoming when it brought the possible conflict to the Court's 
attention by filing the Ex Parte Notice, and the Court has expressed that opinion on several occasions. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the SAPD's level or degree of disclosure after the Motion for Inquiry 
was granted (including but not limited to the Amended Notice and the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin) 
has not been sufficient to provide the Court with the factual background necessary to determine whether 
the contacts between the SAPD and trial counsel, during which at least some advice was given, 
constitutes a conflict of interest. 
The Court appreciates the SAPD's acknowledgment that "as the issue is framed by the Court, the 
SAPD's actions since its filing of the Ex Parte Notice could be seen as evasive." As counsel is likely 
aware, failing to provide requested information is commonly perceived as potentially evasive. Although 
the Court has cautioned that candor is essential to the inquiry, the Court has not made any specific 
findings of untruthfulness or imposed any sanctions against the SAPD and therefore, does not find it 
necessary or appropriate to reconsider this issue. 
The SAPD claims that its lack of disclosure arises' in large part from the attorney-client privilege 
between the SAPD and the Petitioner during the time of the communications in question due to the 
SAPD's representation of the Petitioner in Hall 1. In support ofthis notion, the SAPD points to 1.R.P.C. 
1.6(a) which provides that: 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation 0 
the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
The SAPD goes so far as to claim that: 
Because the SAPD would not release attorney-client files to anyone without a release from Mr. 
Hall, no guarantee can be made that Mr. Roark will have access to the same information or that 
Mr. Hall will cooperate with Mr. Roark. The SAPD could envision a scenario in which Mr. 
Roark would be left to review the exact same information now available to the State and the 
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Court-the files of Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, along with the public record, and the 
statements of anyone willing to speak with Mr. Roark regarding the possible conflict. 
The facts presently before the Court indicate that the SAPD represented the Petitioner in Hall I at 
a time when attorneys in the SAPD's office had contact with and gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II. 
The Petitioner has now filed in this case a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging that those same 
Hall II trial attorneys (receiving advice from the SAPD) provided ineffective assistance of counsel. If 
the SAPD is correct that its representation of the Petitioner in Hall I and the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct or Idaho law work together to preclude the Court from completing its inquiry and reaching a 
reliable conclusion whether a conflict exists, it seems to follow that the protection of the Petitioner's 
right to conflict-free counsel would require that counsel other than the SAPD be appointed to represent 
the Petitioner, absent a waiver of the conflict. 
However, the Court need not decide whether counsel other than the SAPD is required because 
LR.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
if such disclosure is necessary "to comply with other law or a court order." This Court is conducting a 
lawful judicial inquiry in order to determine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. 
Further, this Court has entered an order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict counsel 
representing the Petitioner and who therefore is bound by attorney-client privilege. That order 
specifically authorized Mr. Roark "to conduct a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial, 
trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to its appointment to represent the Petitioner 
in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case." 
Nevertheless, in order to resolve any ambiguity regarding this issue, the Court hereby 
supplements its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict 
Counsel to clarify that: (1) Mr. Roark is authorized to view the files of the SAPD; and (2) anyone 
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employed by or affiliated with the SAPD's office who is questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his 
investigation is acting pursuant to a lawful judicial inquiry and subject to a court order as contemplated 
by LR.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). In view of the foregoing, the Court denies the Motion to Reconsider as it relates to 
the attorney-client privilege issue. 
Whether Further Conflict Inquiry is "Justified" and the Role and Compensation of Mr. Roark 
The Petitioner asks this Court to reconsider whether any further conflict inquiry is justified. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines 'justification" as "[a] lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or 
omissions; any fact that prevents an act from being wrongful." Black's Law Dictionary 882 (8th ed. 
2004). The SAPD provides no support for the proposition that the judicial inquiry is unlawful or 
wrongful. Rather, the SAPD, after acknowledging that its actions may be seen as evasive and claiming 
that attorney-client privilege has prevented it from providing the Court with requested information, now 
argues that "the Court does not have sufficient information to continue the conflict inquiry at the present 
time." It appears that the SAPD is arguing that it may disclose a possible conflict; decline for whatever 
reason to provide requested information to the Court during a judicial inquiry into the possible conflict; 
and then claim that a lack of information provided to the Court by the SAPD requires the Court to cut 
short its inquiry. This position is not supported by law. Rather, the lack of information provided to the 
Court necessitates the continuation of the inquiry until such time as the Court can determine whether the 
Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. 
Idaho law requires that an adequate inquiry must be "thorough and searching" and should be 
conducted on the record. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414,424 (2009). At the
 
conclusion of an adequate inquiry, a court must determine whether a conflict actually exists. !d. As 
stated in this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 27,2010, this Court is presently 
lacking the factual background necessary to make such a determination. The SAPD argues extensively 
that Mr. Benjamin has provided the Court with his conclusion that the advice did not constitute a 
conflict of interest. That is true. It is also true that Mr. Benjamin failed to provide the Court with the 
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factual bases for his conclusion. The Court may rely on the representations of counsel, but is not obliged 
to do so. Id. The adequacy of a judicial inquiry is for the Court to decide and not for counsel, and the 
Court declines to reconsider whether any further conflict inquiry is 'justified." 
Related to this issue is the SAPD's contention that appointing Mr. Roark to act as independent 
conflict counsel for the Petitioner is no different than the work already performed by Mr. Benjamin. The 
SAPD argues that "[t]he appointment ofKeith Roark is unnecessary, duplicative, and will not 
accomplish anything that cannot be provided by Mr. Benjamin." Although Mr. Benjamin did not file 
this motion to reconsider on behalf of the Petitioner, it has been represented to the Court that Mr. 
Benjamin is the SAPD's choice of conflict counsel, taking the place ofthe SAPD as to the conflict issue 
alone. This Court, at this stage of the inquiry, has thus far elected not to rely on the representations of 
Mr. Benjamin. The fact that the SAPD chose to hire Mr. Benjamin in no way constrains this Court's 
discretion regarding how it may conduct its inquiry. This Court took great care when deciding the 
structure of the inquiry, after considering many factors including the attorney-client privilege issues 
involved in this case. For the foregoing reasons, and having previously explained the reasons why 
independent conflict counsel was appointed and the differences in the roles ofMr. Roark and Mr. 
Benjamin in its Memorandum Decision and Order filed December 27,2010, the Court declines to 
reconsider the appointment ofKeith Roark as independent conflict counsel. 
Further, the Court declines to reconsider its order that the SAPD pay for independent counsel. In 
its Motion to Reconsider, the SAPD argues that pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-860(b), Ada County and 
not the SAPD is responsible for the cost. However, Idaho Code § 19-860(b) applies to county public 
defenders and indigent criminal defendants facing a formal charge, and the SAPD's reliance on I.e. § 
19-860(b) is misplaced. Here, the Petitioner has already been convicted. A petition for post-conviction 
relief is a special proceeding which is civil in nature; it is a proceeding entirely new and independent 
from the criminal action which led to the conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 
(1991); Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1997). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 7 
001971
 
 
 
 
 
' .. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
In the Petitioner's Motion for Pennission to Appeal, the SAPD further argues that Idaho Code § 
19-4904 provides that a county bear the cost of the representation in post-conviction cases. That is true 
in almost all post-conviction cases. However, one exception to that rule is where, as here, the post-
conviction relief proceeding is in a capital case where the Petitioner was sentenced on or after September 
1, 1998. Idaho Code § 19-870(l)(d) requires that the SAPD provide for representation in those cases so 
long as the county participates in the capital crimes defense fund. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871 
provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such duties because of a conflict of interest or any 
other reason, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public 
defender." 
The Court is aware of the current budget constraints facing nearly all state governmental 
agencies, including the SAPD. However, the level of funding appropriated by the legislature is not a 
matter for this Court to detennine; further, any funding shortfall is a matter ofless significance than 
Petitioner's basic, fundamental right to conflict-free counsel. For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
declines to reconsider its order that Mr. Roark be compensated from the budget of the SAPD. 
The State's Contacts with Trial Counsel 
Finally, the SAPD requests the Court to reconsider whether the State should be pennitted to 
contact and inquire ofHall IT trial counsel about their communications with the SAPD. The Court has 
not held that the State will never be pennitted to contact and inquire of trial counsel. Rather, the Court 
has ordered that the State wait until further instructions are given by this Court before proceeding. The 
State was not a party to any of the conversations that are at issue in this case, and in light of the potential 
attorney-client privilege issues in this case, the Court prefers to hear from Mr. Roark before allowing the 
State to proceed. Therefore, the Court declines to reconsider the issue. 
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'. . 
CONCLUSION 
In a careful exercise of its discretion, this Court DENIES the Motion to Reconsider 
Memorandum Decision and Order for the foregoing reasons. Additionally, the Court hereby 
supplements its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict 
Counsel to clarify that: (1) Mr. Roark is authorized to view the files ofthe SAPD; and (2) anyone 
employed by or affiliated with the SAPD's office who is questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his 
investigation is acting pursuant to a lawful judicial inquiry and subject to a court order as contemplated 
by I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 23~aYOf~, 2011. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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Jan M. Bennetts 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
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Tel: (208) 287-7700
 
Fax: (208) 287-7709
 
Dennis A. Benjamin 
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W Bannock St 
PO Box 2772
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Tel: (208) 343-1000
 
Fax: (208) 345-8274
 
R. Keith Roark
 
ROARK LAW FIRM
 
409NMain St
 
Hailey, ID 83333
 
Tel: (208) 788-2427
 
Fax: (208) 788-3918
 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ-<;';TIJRI~CJ..T~F-:;::-;;~~":'"7i"1r--Ne._ FILED 
A.M P.MI~~"'+--
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAR -4 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C ark 
By JANET ELLIS 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, DEPUTY 
Petitioner, Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION
 
AND ORDER
 
DENYING THE MOTION FOR PERMISSION
 
TO APPEAL
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall was convicted of the rape and first-degree murder of Cheryl Hanlon 
on October 22,2004 (Hall IT). In the period of time during which the trial took place, the Petitioner was 
represented by the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") on the matter of his post-conviction and 
appeal of his conviction for the kidnapping, rape, and first-degree murder ofLynn Henneman (Hall n. It 
has now been established that during that time period, attorneys at the SAPD gave advice to Hall IT trial 
counsel in at least one instance. Following the Petitioner's conviction in Hall II, the SAPD was 
appointed to represent him in this post conviction and appeal case. In the Petitioner's amended post-
conviction petition filed in this case on April 7, 2009, the Petitioner alleged that his Hall II trial attorneys 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
On June 29, 2010, the SAPD filed its Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest in this case, 
and on July 30,2010, the State filed its Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II). In the 
Ex Parte Notice, the SAPD disclosed the following: (1) counsel from the SAPD's office "may have had 
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contact with trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued 
representation of Mr. Hall;" (2) after discovering that contact, an attorney in the office "became 
concerned about a conflict of interest;" (3) the SAPD hired independent counsel "to independently 
evaluate the conflict;" and (4) independent counsel hired by the SAPD "agreed to evaluate the conflict 
and advise Mr. Hall whether the conflict should be waived." 
The Court heard oral argument on the State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict 
(Hall II) on August 26, 2010 and granted the motion at that hearing. After hearing oral argument and 
carefully reviewing the extensive briefing filed by both parties on the issues of the scope and structure of 
the Court's inquiry into the possible conflict of interest, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel on December 27, 2010. 
As described in earlier decisions of this Court, the SAPD has declined to share information 
requested by the Court in furtherance of the Court's inquiry into whether the Petitioner is receiving 
conflict-free counsel. I Even so, the inquiry has thus far revealed at least one instance where the SAPD 
gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II, although no disclosure regarding the substance of that advice has 
been made to the Court. 
On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed two motions on behalf of the Petitioner. The first was a 
Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order, and the second was this Motion for Permission 
to Appeal. To date, neither motion has been noticed for hearing. On February 11, 2011, the SAPD filed 
a Motion for Permission to Appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court. This Court first learned of that filing 
only through a notice it received from the Idaho Supreme Court. On February 23,2011, this Court was 
1The SAPO's representation that "counsel at the SAPO [has] determined that no conflict of interest actually exists" was made 
on the record for the first time in this Motion for Permission to Appeal. Prior to this Motion, the SAPO has declined to render 
an opinion whether a conflict of interest exists. 
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ultimately provided a copy of the motion filed in the Idaho Supreme Court by an SAPD attorney. This 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider and Supplementing the 
Original Decision and Order was filed on February 23,2011. 
DISCUSSION 
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that it is the SAPD which filed both the Motion to 
Reconsider and the Motion for Permission to Appeal on behalf of the Petitioner, and not Dennis 
Benjamin. On August 30, 2010, Mr. Benjamin filed a Limited Notice of Appearance, declaring that he 
"enters a limited appearance as attorney for petitioner as to the conflict of interest only." When asked 
direct questions about the possible conflict, the SAPD declined to answer and directed all questions to 
Mr. Benjamin. The SAPD has repeatedly referred to Mr. Benjamin as "conflict counsel" with regard to 
the issue ofwhether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel (as is his right). Yet, the SAPD has 
now filed two motions on behalfof the Petitioner regarding the conflict issue. Even though the SAPD 
has informed the Court that it does not represent the Petitioner on the conflict issue, the Court believes 
that a complete record is important in this case, and will therefore consider the Motion for Permission to 
Appeal on the merits. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12(a) provides that: 
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory order or 
judgment of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an interlocutory order ofan 
administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference ofopinion and 
in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12(b) describes the process by which a party must seek permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order: 
A motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment, upon the grounds set 
forth in subdivision (a) of this rule, shall be filed with the district court or administrative agency 
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" 
within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or judgment. The motion shall be filed, 
served, noticed for hearing and processed in the same manner as any other motion, and 
hearing of the motion shall be expedited. In criminal actions a motion filed by the defendant 
shall be served upon the prosecuting attorney of the county. The court or agency shall, within 
fourteen (14) days after the hearing, enter an order setting forth its reasoning for approving or 
disapproving the motion. 
(emphasis added). The Court notes that the Petitioner never noticed his Motion for Permission to 
Appeal for hearing as set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 12(b). Additionally, the Petitioner filed his 
Motion to Reconsider on the same day that he filed his Motion for Permission to Appeal. This Court 
regarded the Motion to Reconsider to be the threshold motion and considered it first because, had the 
Court granted the Motion to Reconsider, the Motion for Permission to Appeal would have been moot. 
Perhaps more importantly, it appears that the Petitioner has failed to present one of the issues on 
which he now seeks appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court to this Court in his Motion for Permission to 
Appeal filed January 10, 2011. The issues raised by the Petitioner in his Motion for Permission to 
Appeal filed in this Court are as follows: (1) whether this Court may appoint an attorney where an 
attorney hired by the SAPD has "already performed the very same inquiry" (See Motion for Permission 
to Appeal, p. 4); (2) whether this Court may continue its inquiry to determine whether the Petitioner is 
receiving conflict-free counsel on the record that presently exists (See Motion for Permission to Appeal, 
p. 10); and (3) this Court's order requiring the SAPD to pay for independent conflict counsel appointed 
by the Court (See Motion for Permission to Appeal, p.12). 
In his Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in the Supreme Court on February 11, 2011, the 
Petitioner presented the following issues to the Idaho Supreme Court in a section entitled "Issues for 
Appeal": 
Mr. Hall seeks an appeal on the following questions: (1) whether a district court is justified in 
ordering a conflict inquiry where an evaluation of a possible conflict has already been conducted 
by an independent attorney and the defendant does not raise a conflict; (2) whether an attorney-
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 4
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, . 
client privilege exists during the representation of a client, when communications or file 
information pertains to a pending case on which the client is being represented by other 
attorneys; and (3) whether the district court violates the separation of powers by forcing the 
SAPD to pay for services already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide 
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD. 
The first and the third of the issues presented to the Idaho Supreme Court are issued raised by the 
Petitioner in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court. However, the issue regarding 
attorney-client privilege was not raised in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court on 
January 10,2011. 
Although the Court is aware of the different issues presented in the respective Motions for 
Permission to Appeal, this Court is not tasked with deciding whether the Petitioner has violated the 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and may only address the issues properly before this Court. Therefore, this Court 
will limit its analysis to the issues presented in the Motion for Permission to Appeal filed in this Court 
January 10,2011. 
SAPD's Motivation for Filing 
In a section entitled "Motivation for Filing," the SAPD states that "[n]ow it seems the State
 
will be automatically filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts to
 
support such a motion, in every capital post-conviction case the SAPD represents." In an apparent
 
attempt to support this speculative statement, the SAPD quotes select portions of the following sentence
 
from the Unites States Supreme Court's decision in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988), in
 
which the Court held that district courts have substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflict of
 
interest:
 
Petitioner ofcourse rightly points out that the Government may seek to 'manufacture' a conflict 
in order to prevent a defendant from having a particularly able defense counsel at his side; but 
trial courts are undoubtedly aware of this possibility, and must take it into consideration along 
with all of the other factors which inform this sort of a decision. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 5
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!d. This Court is aware of that possibility as a general matter, but the facts in the Ada County cases 
where the conflict issue has arisen do not support a conclusion that the State is "manufacturing" a 
possible conflict in this case and do not provide any basis for speculation that the State will attempt to 
manufacture a possible conflict in the future. 
In Abdullah v. State, the State never filed a motion for inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. 
In fact, the conflict issue was raised by the Court based upon the record in that case. In Payne v. State, 
the factual basis for the State's Motion for Inquiry was telephone records showing that the petitioner in 
that case was placing regular and lengthy telephone calls to the SAPD's office during the time of his re­
sentencing proceedings when Payne was represented by trial counsel and was not being represented by 
the SAPD.2 In this case, the SAPD itself alerted the Court to the possibility of a conflict and the inquiry 
to date has shown that the SAPD gave advice to Hall II trial counsel. Thus, if the three cases listed 
above support the SAPD's claim that the conflict issue is "now routinely being raised in all capital post-
conviction cases," it is only because the facts of those cases called the issue into question. 
In two of the three cases in which the conflict issue has arisen, the facts show that attorneys from 
the SAPD's office gave advice to trial counsel in a capital case where the SAPD knew or should have 
known that it would be appointed to represent the defendant in the appellate and post-conviction 
proceedings. The Court found an actual conflict of interest in the Abdullah case. In this case (and now 
the subject of this decision), the inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists has not been completed. 
As the Court has noted on several occasions, the SAPD was correct in filing the Ex Parte Notice of 
Possible Conflict of Interest. Additionally, the SAPD has admitted that there is an appearance of a 
2 The SAPD provided the information requested by the Court in furtherance of its inquiry in that case. That inquiry has
 
concluded and the Court has detennined that the SAPD is not conflicted in its representation of Mr. Payne in that case.
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possible conflict of interest in this case. The facts before this Court simply do not support any inference 
that the State is seeking to "manufacture" a conflict now or that they will do so in the future. Although 
the SAPD's motivation for filing the Motion for Permission to Appeal is based upon speculation 
concerning actions not yet taken by the State, this Court will analyze each of the three issues raised in 
the Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
I.	 Whether this Court may Appoint an Attorney Where an Attorney Hired by the SAPD 
has "Already Performed the Very Same Inquiry This Court Ordered" 
The premise for this statement is that Dennis Benjamin, an attorney hired by the SAPD prior to 
notifying the Court of a possible conflict of interest, has "already performed the very same inquiry this 
Court ordered" Keith Roark to undertake. That statement is factually incorrect for several reasons 
outlined in previous decisions and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein, including the fact 
that Mr. Benjamin did not have the power to depose. Likewise, the SAPD's argument that this Court's 
appointment ofMr. Roark amounts to "attorney shopping," comparing it to a "litigant's efforts to find a 
particularly sympathetic forum and manipulate the system in their favor," has no basis in fact because 
such an argument assumes that the Court is seeking a particular outcome. This Court is conducting its 
inquiry for no reason other than to determine whether this capital Petitioner is receiving the benefit of his 
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. 
It appears that the SAPD is arguing that if it discloses a possible conflict of interest but hires 
other counsel who represents to the Court that the possible conflict is actually no conflict at all (even 
without providing the factual bases for that conclusion), then the Court must rely on the representations 
of counsel and may either: (1) inquire no further; or (2) may inquire further but may not appoint 
independent conflict counsel other than that already chosen by potentially conflicted counsel. 
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"In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affil1llative
 
duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular
 
conflict may exist.'" State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009)(quoting State v.
 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003)). A Court engaged in an inquiry into whether a
 
conflict of interest exists is not required to rely on the representations of counsel and "may inquire
 
further into the facts ..." Id. at 704, 215 P.3d at 424. The SAPD has cited no legal authority that stands
 
for the proposition that a Court undertaking a judicial inquiry into whether a Petitioner is receiving
 
conflict-free counsel is limited in how it may structure that inquiry by any action taken by potentially
 
conflicted counsel. Idaho law is clear that a court is not required to rely on the representations of
 
counsel. Thus, there is no controlling question of law or substantial grounds for difference of opinion
 
regarding whether this Court may appoint independent conflict counsel during the course of a judicial
 
inquiry into a possible conflict of interest.
 
Additionally, there is no controlling question of law or substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion regarding whether this Court's order appointing Mr. Roark as independent conflict counsel 
interferes with the Petitioner's right to choice of counsel. In the event that this Court eventually 
detel1llines that a conflict exists, the Petitioner may under certain circumstances make an intelligent, 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the conflict. 
In support of the proposition that the appointment of Mr. Roark constitutes an impel1llissible 
intrusion into an established attorney-client relationship, the Petitioner cites to an Alaska Court of 
Appeals case where that Court noted that such an intrusion is justified "only upon a substantial showing 
of necessity." Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Alaska Ct.App. 1996). However, that Court goes on
 
to list "a potential conflict between [the defendants] and their attorneys" as one of the circumstances 
"warranting interference with [the defendants'] established attorney-client relationships." Id. The 
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SAPD opines that only "an actual conflict, or serious potential for a conflict" warrants the appointment 
of independent counsel. (emphasis in the original). However, the SAPD cites no law in support of that 
statement. Moreover, this Court takes very seriously any potential conflict of interest in a capital 
proceeding where a Petitioner's very life is at stake. 
II.	 Whether this Court may Continue its Inquiry to Determine Whether the Petitioner is 
Receiving Conflict-free Counsel on the Record that Presently Exists 
After disclosing the possible conflict of interest in its Ex Parte Notice ofPossible Conflict, the 
SAPD has declined to share information requested by the Court in furtherance of the Court's inquiry into 
whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Now, having failed to provide a level of 
disclosure adequate for this Court to determine whether the SAPD's contact with and advice given to 
Hall II trial counsel constitutes an actual conflict of interest, the SAPD argues that "this Court cannot 
point to any factual basis that would result in a requirement that the Court conduct further inquiry into a 
conflict of interest." As this Court has explained previously, the inquiry to date has revealed that 
attorneys at the SAPD's office gave advice to Hall IT trial counsel. Mr. Benjamin has stated his 
conclusion that the advice did not constitute a conflict of interest; however, he did not disclose the 
factual bases for that conclusion. In addition, the SAPD's earlier failure to disclose the factual bases for 
its decision to file the Ex Parte Notice ofPossible Conflict leaves this Court with no information 
regarding whether one contact may represent a potential conflict of interest or if more than one of the 
contacts between the SAPD and Hall IT trial counsel may represent a potential conflict of interest. 
Therefore, there are facts in the present record which warrant further inquiry. 
Idaho law requires that an adequate inquiry must be "thorough and searching" and conducted on
 
the record. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414, 424 (2009). At the conclusion of an
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adequate inquiry, a court must determine whether a conflict actually exists. !d. For the foregoing 
reasons, this Court finds that the issue ofwhether the Court may continue its inquiry on the present 
record does not present a controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference 
of opinion. 
III.	 Whether this Court's Order Requiring the SAPD to pay for Independent Conflict 
Counsel Appointed by the Court is Permissible 
The SAPD argues that "[d]espite being informed by the SAPD it had no budgetary resources to 
pay for Court appointed conflict counsel, this Court disregarded the information and nevertheless 
ordered the SAPD to pay for conflict counsel to represent Mr. Hall. In so doing, this Court has 
effectively defeated the legislature's intent in creating the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund, 
and has exceeded its jurisdiction." This Court is aware of the current budget constraints facing nearly 
all state governmental agencies, including the SAPD. However, this capital Petitioner has the 
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel even during a recession. 
The SAPD argues that this Court's order "is an attempt to defeat the legislative intent in creating 
both the SAPD office and the capital crimes defense fund." The legislature's statement of intent in 
creating the SAPD office is found at Idaho Code § 19-868 and reads as follows: 
The legislature recognizes that the cost of legal representation of indigent defendants upon the 
appeal of their criminal convictions, particularly convictions for first-degree murder, is an 
extraordinary burden on the counties of this state. In order to reduce this burden, provide 
competent counsel but avoid paying high hourly rates to independent counsel to represent 
indigent defendants in appellate proceedings, the legislature hereby creates the office of the state 
appellate public defender. 
The SAPD's argument that the fact that this Court assigned the cost of independent counsel in this case 
involving an indigent Petitioner convicted of first-degree murder to it rather than to Ada County amounts 
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to "an attempt to defeat the legislative intent" is curious considering that the express intent of the Idaho 
legislature in creating the office of the SAPD was to relieve the "extraordinary burden on the counties of 
this state." I.e. § 19-868. 
In addition, the SAPD argues that pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-860(b), Ada County and not the 
SAPD is responsible for the cost. However, the SAPD's reliance on I.C. § 19-860(b) is misplaced 
because Idaho Code § 19-860(b) applies to county public defenders and indigent criminal defendants 
facing a formal charge. Here, the Petitioner has already been convicted. A petition for post-conviction 
relief is a special proceeding that is civil in nature; it is a proceeding entirely new and independent from 
the criminal action which led to the conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1991); 
Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 936 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The SAPD argues further that Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides that a county bear the cost of the 
representation in post-conviction cases. That is true in almost all post-conviction cases. However, one 
exception to that rule is where, as here, the post-conviction relief proceeding is in a capital case in which 
the Petitioner was sentenced on or after September 1, 1998. Idaho Code § 19-870(1)(d) requires that the 
SAPD provide for representation in those cases so long as the county participates in the capital crimes 
defense fund. Further, Idaho Code § 19-871 provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such 
duties, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender." 
The SAPD argues that this Court's reliance on I.C. § 19-871 is misplaced because "no 
determination was made by the SAPD that it was unable to carry out the duties required in the act." 
First, the statute does not require that the SAPD make a determination that it is unable to carry out the 
duties required in the act; it simply requires that the SAPD "be unable to carry out the duties required in 
this act." I.C. § 19-871 (emphasis added). Second, the SAPD has failed to provide requested 
information during the course of this Court's judicial inquiry and has in fact stated that it is unable to 
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answer questions posed by the Court because it does not represent the Petitioner on the conflict issue. 
The SAPD's failure to provide requested information, even after this Court's order commencing a 
judicial inquiry, combined with Mr. Benjamin's failure to provide the Court with the factual bases for 
his conclusions have left the SAPD and its choice ofconflict counsel unable to render sufficient 
assistance to this Court in light of its duty to determine whether the Petitioner is receiving conflict-free 
counsel-a determination which must be made before this case may proceed. 
Therefore, this Court finds that for the purposes of the judicial inquiry to determine whether the
 
Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel, the SAPD has shown itself to be unable to carry out its
 
duties as contemplated by I.e. § 19-871. Ada County contributes to the capital crimes defense fund, and
 
the SAPD was appointed to this case pursuant to I.e. § 19-870(1)(d). Idaho Code Section § 19-871
 
provides that provides that when the SAPD is unable to carry out such duties because of a conflict of
 
interest or any other reason, other counsel shall be "compensated out of the budget of the state appellate
 
public defender." For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that its order that the SAPD pay for Mr.
 
Roark's services as independent conflict counsel does not present a controlling question of law for which
 
there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion.
 
CONCLUSION 
In each of the Ada County cases cited by the SAPD, the factual bases for judicial inquiry into 
conflict of interest involved actions taken by the SAPD and not by the State. Therefore, the SAPD's 
stated motivation for filing its Motion for Permission to Appeal (that "the State will be automatically 
filing motions raising the issue of a conflict, whether or not there are facts to support such a motion") is 
based on speculation and is not grounded in fact. After carefully considering each of the grounds 
presented to this Court for requesting permission to appeal, the Court concludes that none of the issues 
cited present controlling questions of law for which there are substantial grounds for difference of 
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• 
opinion. Moreover, granting the Motion for Permission to Appeal would not materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the ligitation; rather, it would cause needless delay. Accordingly, this Court 
DENIES the Motion for Permission to Appeal. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ffiay of ~ ,2011. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV PC 080 3085 
) 
v. ) MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
) APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
(CAPITAL CASE) ORrSINAL 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the office of the 
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and hereby moves this Honorable Court for 
permission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the 
Original Decision and Order (hereinafter, Supplemental Order) filed February 23, 2011. 
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 27,2010, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith 
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel (hereinafter, Memorandum Decision). Mr. Hall timely 
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filed a Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order (hereinafter, Motion to Reconsider) 
on January 10,2011. Contemporaneously with the Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Hall filed a Motion 
for Permission to Appeal with the court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, which required 
Mr. Hall to seek permission to appeal from the district court within fourteen (14) days from the date 
of entry of the order at issue. Once the district court failed to rule on the motion within the twenty-
one (21) days from the date of the filing of the motion, Mr. Hall was allowed to file a motion with 
the Supreme Court without any order of the district court]. Mr. Hall filed a Motion for Permission 
to Appeal with the Supreme Court on February 11, 2011 (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38528­
2011 ). 
On February 23, 2011, the Court issued its Supplemental Order denying Mr. Hall's Motion 
to Reconsider and clarifying certain aspects of its original order. The Supplemental Order 
authorizes Mr. Roark to view the files of the SAPD even in the absence of a waiver from Mr. Hall. 
Supplemental Order, p.5, Ls.18-25. In addition, the court ordered that all employees and attorneys 
at the SAPD are ordered to cooperate with Mr. Roark during the course of his investigation, 
regardless of any attorney-client privilege that may exist, because I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) permits the 
breaching of any privilege in order to comply with a court order. Supplemental Order, p.5, L.25 ­
p.6, L.3. 
II. JURISDICTION 
In his original Motion for Permission to Appeal filed with the court, Mr. Hall "reserve[d] 
the right to amend this motion for permissive appeal to include any further findings of this Court." 
Motion for Permission to Appeal, p.2, Ls.7-8. However, because Mr. Hall had already filed a 
Motion for Permission to Appeal with the Supreme Court when the court issued its most recent 
] The court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for Permission to 
Appeal on March 4, 2011. 
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Supplemental Order, Mr. Hall is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
simply amend his prior Motion for Permission to Appeal at this point in time. See I.A.R. 12. In 
order to establish proper jurisdiction, the rules clearly state that any motion to the Supreme Court 
must be preceded by "a motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment" 
to the District Court. I.A.R. 12(b). Because Mr. Hall did not have the opportunity to request the 
court's permission to appeal the clarification of its orders as laid forth in its Supplemental Order 
when he filed his original Motion for Permission to Appeal, Mr. Hall believes he must now file the 
instant motion prior to asking the Supreme Court to consider the court's denial of his Motion to 
Reconsider. 
III. ARGUMENT 
In the absence of any controlling Idaho case law on the relevant question of law, Mr. Hall 
requests the court grant him permission to appeal the Supplemental Order to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 12, the order presents a controlling question of 
law where there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and presents a situation where an 
immediate appeal would protect Mr. Hall's significant and substantial rights, and materially 
advance the resolution of these post-conviction proceedings. 
A. This Court's Order Presents A Controlling Question Of Law 
The specific controlling question of law is whether attorneys and other employees of the 
SAPD should release the contents of its files and cooperate with the investigation of Mr. Roark, 
where: (1) such a release and cooperation would breach and violate the existing attorney-client 
privilege with Mr. Hall; (2) Mr. Hall has not granted a waiver of his attorney-client privilege with 
the SAPD; (3) the court has indicated that the breach of attorney-client privilege is in compliance 
with the exceptions provided in I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6), specifically in compliance with a court order; 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 3 
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(4) the court's order is pursuant to its affinnative "duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever 
it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist. '" State v. Severson, 147 
Idaho 694, 703 (2009) (internal citation omitted); (5) after a thorough and independent review, 
Mr. Benjamin has represented to the Court that no conflict exists between Mr. Hall and the SAPD, 
and neither Mr. Hall nor his conflict-attorney, Mr. Benjamin, have requested further inquiry into 
the possibility of any conflict; and, (6) the basis for the court's further inquiry is rooted in the 
contents of the Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest filed on June 29, 2010, and the 
Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin filed on August 30, 2010. The foregoing facts present an issue of 
first-impression for the Idaho courts. 
1. Existence Of An Attorney-Client Privilege 
As Mr. Hall has argued in previous submissions to the Court, the SAPD has had a 
continuous, uninterrupted attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hall since its appointment as post­
conviction counsel in Hall I on January 25, 2005. That attorney-client relationship certainly exists 
for the current staff at the SAPD, but also extends to those attorneys no longer working for the 
SAPD. See I.R.P.C. 1.6, Comment 19 ("The duty of confidentiality continues after the client­
lawyer relationship has tenninated."); I.R.P.C. 1.9, Comment 1 ("After tennination of a client­
lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and 
conflicts of interest".) 
According to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, "a lawyer shall not reveal 
infonnation relating to representation of a client unless the client gives infonned consent." I.R.P.C. 
1.6(a). Elsewhere, the rules state that "a lawyer should keep in confidence infonnation relating to 
representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or pennitted." I.R.P.C. Preamble 
,-r4. To release the SAPD's entire files to anyone, even where that person is another attorney 
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selected by the Court, would be a clear breach of the attorney-client privilege. The court's order 
does not limit Mr. Roark's authorization to view the SAPD files in any way. Supplemental Order, 
p.5, L.25. Those files would include all client communications, notes, communications with others 
involved in the case, work-product, memoranda, and investigation materials. The court also orders 
the SAPD cooperate if questioned by Mr. Roark, "subject to a court order." Supplemental Order, 
p.6, Ls.l-2. 
2. Absence Of A Waiver From Mr. Hall 
Mr. Hall has not granted informed consent to the SAPD to share his files with anyone other 
than Mr. Benjamin for the purpose of conducting an investigation into a possible conflict. See 
Appendix 9 to Motion to Reconsider (Authorization for Release of Information to Dennis 
Benjamin). The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear that in the absence of the 
client's informed consent, a lawyer is only permitted to reveal information relating to 
representation in very limited circumstances. The applicable exception in this case, as the court has 
noted in its Supplemental Order, is "to comply with other law or a court order." I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6). 
3. Compliance With A Court Order Under I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) 
Mr. Hall acknowledges that his attorneys are permitted to breach attorney-client privilege in 
releasing information pursuant to a court order to do so. "A lawyer may be ordered to reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client by a court ... to compel the disclosure." 
I.R.P.C. 1.6 Comment 13. However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not permit immediate 
capitulation, but instead require that "absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the 
lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized 
by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client 
privilege or other applicable law." Id. Mr. Hall's litigation surrounding the court's order 
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appointing Mr. Roark represents such an effort. "In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must 
consult with the client about the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4." Id. The 
court's Supplemental Order constitutes the adverse ruling contemplated in the Commentary to Rule 
1.6, and this instant motion is Mr. Hall's effort to pursue an appeal of that order. 
4.	 The Court's Independent Duty To Inquire Into A Potential Conflict 
Mr. Hall agrees that the "trial court has an affinnative duty to inquire into a potential 
conflict whenever it knows or 'reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist.'" State 
v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703 (2009) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)) 
(emphasis added). The "substantial grounds for a difference of opinion" as contemplated in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 12(a) surround the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable basis for the Court 
to conclude that a particular conflict may exist. 
The court has found that the SAPD's filings disclosed that (1) SAPD attorneys may have 
had contact with trial counsel in Hall II that may present a conflict of interest; (2) SAPD attorneys 
were concerned about a conflict of interest; (3) the SAPD hired Mr. Benjamin to independently 
evaluate the conflict; and, (4) Mr. Benjamin was hired to evaluate the conflict and advise Mr. Hall 
as to any waiver. Supplemental Order, p.2, Ls.20-25. In addition, the Court has found that the 
inquiry has "revealed at least one instance where the SAPD gave advice to trial counsel in Hall II." 
Id. p.3, L.6. 
5.	 Mr. Benjamin Represented That No Conflict Exists And Mr. Hall Does Not Request Further 
Inquiry 
Mr. Benjamin explained in his affidavit that although there was contact between SAPD 
lawyers and Hall II trial counsel, those contacts do not constitute a conflict under Idaho case law. 
See Affidavit oj Dennis Benjamin, ~1O. Mr. Benjamin recognizes that in one instance SAPD 
lawyers did offer advice to Mr. Hall's attorneys, but the advice given presented no conflict for the 
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SAPD. Id. at ~12. After his review and evaluation, Mr. Benjamin met with Mr. Hall and consulted 
with him. Id. at ~5. Mr. Hall has never directly, or indirectly through Mr. Benjamin, expressed any 
concern to the court that he had a potential conflict with the SAPD. 
6. Basis For The Court's Further Inquiry 
The Rules of Professional Responsibility require lawyers identify conflicts of interest. See 
generally I.R.P.C. 1.7 and 1.8. In addition, "[t]o determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a 
lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, 
to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the person and issues involved." I.R.P.C. 
1.7, Comment 3. Here, the SAPD adopted a reasonable procedure in notifying the court of its 
intent to contract Mr. Benjamin to represent Mr. Hall in order to evaluate whether a conflict exists, 
and to advise Mr. Hall on any waiver of that conflict. The result of that evaluation is represented 
by the findings in Mr. Benjamin's affidavit to the court. The court indicates in its Supplemental 
Order that these procedures undertaken by the SAPD provide the very grounds that require a 
judicial inquiry. See Supplemental Order, p.6, Ls.13-16. 
B.	 As To The Controlling Question Of Law There Are Grounds For A Substantial Difference 
Of Opinion 
There are no Idaho appellate decisions which indisputably cover the facts presented in the 
case before the Court. During the recent course of litigation, several Idaho cases concerning 
conflict have been cited as relevant to the court's obligation. However, each of those cases 
consider facts very different from those presented here. 
The case of State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009), presents an extensive discussion ofthe 
court's obligation to conduct a "thorough and searching" examination. Id. at 704. However, in that 
case Mr. Severson had been appointed counsel "despite Severson's objection that he had a conflict 
of interest" and had argued that "the appointment of [counsel] violated his right to be represented 
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by conflict-free counsel." ld. at 701. The Supreme Court made clear that "because Severson 
objected to the conflict of interest at trial, the court had an affirmative duty to inquire into the 
potential conflict." ld. at 704. In light of that crucial fact, the Supreme Court indicates that the trial 
court "'must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, or 
concern. '" ld. (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991)). Here, the 
defendant has not made an objection, requested different counsel, or shown any dissatisfaction, 
distrust, or concern about his representation by the SAPD? 
In Severson, the Supreme Court also relies on the legal precedent established by State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003). In Lovelace, the prosecution first moved that defense counsel be 
disqualified because of a conflict with his ongoing campaign to seek the position of county 
prosecutor. ld. at 59. Lovelace later filed a motion to dismiss his trial counsel "due to a possible 
future conflict of interest" and requested he be allowed to proceed pro se. ld. Although the court 
refused to appoint new counsel at· that time, a new lawyer was appointed once his original attorney 
was sworn in as county prosecutor. ld. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that "whenever a 
trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist, the trial court has a 
duty of inquiry.") ld. at 60. Once again, Mr. Hall has never made a request for new counsel, and 
the court does not have in its possession any specific facts that a conflict exists, stating that "this 
Court is presently lacking the factual background necessary to make such a determination." 
Supplemental Order, p.6, Ls.22-23. 
2 It should be noted that the Supreme Court refused to find that a conflict existed even where 
another public defender that worked in the same office as Mr. Severson's trial counsel had 
represented the mother of the victim in a civil suit directly relating to Mr. Severson's criminal case. 
ld. at 701. 
) The Supreme Court found that "Lovelace provided no facts to suggest that counsel allowed 
anything adversely to affect his representation" ld. at 61, and that "the district court's denial of 
relief on the conflict of interest claim was proper." ld. at 62. 
MOTION FOR PEIUVIISSION TO APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 8 
001996
 
 
v'
Finally, in State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256 (Ct. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals considered 
whether the defendant deserved a new trial after the trial court had undertaken appointed conflict 
counsel to advise the defendant about the effects of an actual conflict known by the court, and the 
defendant had subsequently waived any conflict. The Court of Appeals found that the record 
reflected the "district court had before it statements from defense counsel that there was a possible 
conflict and that Lopez had agreed to continued representation." Id. at 259. The statements made 
by defense counsel included information that his "same firm had represented the victim [... ] in a 
criminal matter eleven years earlier." Id. at 257. The trial court appointed a public defender to 
counsel and advise the defendant of his rights, and a hearing was held to inquire further into the 
issue. Id. at 259. The trial court subsequently granted a new trial after the jury found Lopez guilty, 
"based on the court's conclusion that it had not adequately inquired into the conflict and had 
improperly determined the conflict to be waivable." Id. at 257. The Court of Appeals found that 
"the inquiry into the potential conflict was adequate" and reversed the trial court's decision4• Id. at 
259. In the instant case, Mr. Hall has been afforded the advice of an independent conflict attorney 
and has decided not to raise any conflict issues. 
None of the Idaho cases mentioned provide clear guidance as to whether the SAPD should 
release privileged information in the absence of a waiver, where the Court orders a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege in order to inquire into a conflict where Mr. Hall has chosen not to raise 
4 The Court of Appeals noted in making its decision that "[c]onflicts can be divided into those 
which implicate the attorneys own self-interest and those which implicate the attorneys ethical 
obligation to someone other than the defendant, and the former are often more serious than the 
latter." Id. at 260. The court should note that any potential conflict which would implicate the 
attorneys "own self-interest" would not apply to the present case since neither Mark Ackley nor 
Paula Swensen represent Mr. Hall, and any conflict with those attorneys would not be imputed to 
other attorneys at the SAPD under State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 (Ct. App. 2007) and State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (2009). 
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the issue or make an objection to the SAPD's continued representation. Although these cases more 
clearly speak to the nature of a court's inquiry, they do not adequately address the SAPD's 
obligation to cooperate under court order where such cooperation conflicts with the duties imposed 
by the attorney-client privilege. 
C. A Permissive Appeal Would Materially Advance The Resolution Of The Proceedings 
Once the attorney-client privilege is waived by forcing the SAPD to release its files to 
another party, the privilege is waived forever and the protection cannot be restored. It is a classic 
case of never being able to unring a bell. If Mr. Roark is granted access to the SAPD's protected 
files, or if SAPD attorneys are ordered to answer his questions during his investigation or at a 
deposition, and Mr. Roark subsequently reports his findings to the Court, the attorney-client 
privilege is forever vanquished. A permissive appeal is the only manner by which Mr. Hall can 
protect his ongoing attorney-client privilege with either the SAPD or Mr. Benjamin. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Because the court's most recent Supplemental Order presents a controlling question of law 
as to which there remains grounds for a substantial difference of opinion, and where an immediate 
appeal would materially advance the resolution of these proceedings while still protecting 
Mr. Hall's rights, the court should grant the opportunity to file a permissive appeal with the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Consequently, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this Court grant permission to appeal 
from this Court's post-conviction Supplemental Order issued on February 23, 2011, and then stay 
these post-conviction proceedings pending resolution of the appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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Respectfully submitted this i h day ofMarch, 2011. 
u~
 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
l)JJJh D. 
N1C6iEOWENS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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MAR 10 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE RANDALLGREG H. BOWER OEPUTY 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Idaho State Bar No. 4606 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ) STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
) SUPPLEMENT ORDER 
Respondent. ) 
) 
-------------) 
COMES NOW, Jan M. Bennetts, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho, and responds to the Petitioner's Motion for Permission to 
Appeal Supplement Order filed on March 7, 2011. The State objects to the Petitioner's 
Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL SUPPLEMENT ORDER (HALL 11), Page 1 
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It appears that the Petitioner's Motion reiterates, in large part, what has already 
been presented to this Court in previous State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) filings 
regarding this issue. This Court has already denied the Motion for Pennission to Appeal 
regarding the three issues presented to it: (l) appointment of Keith Roark; (2) this 
Court's continued conflict inquiry; and, (3) this Court requiring the SAPD to pay for the 
appointment of Keith Roark. (See Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion 
for Pennission to Appeal, March 4, 2011.) In denying the Petitioner's Motion for 
Pennission to Appeal, this Court concluded that none of these three issues presented a 
controlling question of law for which there is substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion. 
There do not appear to be any new arguments or infonnation that would require this 
Court to change its ruling denying the Motion for Pennission to Appeal. It is also worth 
noting that the SAPD argues that "Mr. Hall has never directly, or indirectly through Mr. 
Benjamin, expressed any concern to the court that he had a potential conflict with the 
SAPD." This Court should reject that argument. First, it is the Court's duty, and the 
Court's duty alone, to detennine if there is a conflict regardless of whether the Petitioner 
has expressed a concern because there is an independent basis from which this Court has 
detennined that it does have a duty to inquire. Second, as the SAPD well know, this will be 
an issue that is appealed long after the SAPD no longer represents the Petitioner. If this 
Court fails to conduct an inquiry or bases its decision on the lack of record currently before 
it, there will be no way for a future appellate court to detennine whether the inquiry was 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL SUPPLEMENT ORDER (HALL 11), Page 2 002002
 
·. 
sufficient. Further, the Petitioner will then claim in a future appeal that there was a conflict; 
that it was not sufficiently developed on the record; that he failed to understand the nature 
of the conflict; and/or that he would not have waived it. At this time, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the Petitioner could even make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
waiver ofa conflict should one exist. 
In addition to the above, the SAPD is also now arguing to this Court that the 
Petitioner should be permitted to appeal regarding the attorney-client privilege issue. 
This Court stated as follows in its Memorandum and Decision Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider filed on February 23, 2011 at page 5: 
However, the Court need not decide whether counsel other than the SAPD 
is required because I.R.P.C. 1.6(b)(6) provides that a lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client if such disclosure is 
necessary "to comply with other law or a court order." This Court is 
conducting a lawful judicial inquiry in order to determine whether the 
Petitioner is receiving conflict-free counsel. Further, this Court has entered 
an order appointing Keith Roark as independent conflict counsel 
representing the Petitioner and who therefore is bound by attorney-client 
privilege. 
The State is not persuaded by the SAPD arguments regarding the attorney-client 
privilege that an immediate appeal is appropriate. Courts are often engaged in making 
inquiries that require disclosure of attorney-client privileges to a Judge, outside the presence 
of the State, under certain circumstances where the Court has a duty to inquire. For 
example, when a defendant requests a different public defender or claims that there is an 
issue with his or her defense attorney that needs to be addressed, the Court will clear the 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL SUPPLEMENT ORDER (HALL D), Page 3 
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courtroom, require the State to leave the courtroom and will conduct an inquiry outside the 
presence of everyone except the court reporter so that the Court can inquire. The Court will 
then inquire of both defense counsel and the defendant, outside the presence of the State, 
about the nature of the issue. This inquiry requires the defense attorney and/or defendant to 
reveal privileged information for the limited purpose of the Court determining what action 
to take, ifany. 
The Petitioner has failed to establish that there is a controlling question of law for 
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. He has further failed to 
establish that an immediate appeal would materially advance the orderly resolution of this 
litigation. If anything, an interlocutory appeal will cause unnecessary delay. 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons the State has set forth in its previous 
filings surrounding this conflict issue, which are incorporated herein, the State requests 
that this Court deny the Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this!l!!:... day of March 2011.
 
GREG H. BOWER
 
Ada County Prosecutor 
~1Itn4 
By. an M. Bennetts 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STATE'S 
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
SUPPLEMENT ORDER was delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 through the United States 
Mail, this £. day of March 2011. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL SUPPLEMENT ORDER (HALL 11), Page 5 
002005
 
 
.... 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTMcT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAR 15 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RIC , Clerk 
By JANET ELLIS 
DEPUTY 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As discussed in previous decisions issued by this Court in this case, which are hereby 
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein, this Court has a duty to detennine whether the 
SAPD is providing capital Petitioner Erick Virgil Hall with conflict-free counsel in light of the fact that 
the SAPD had contact with Petitioner's trial counsel; that contact included at least one instance where 
advice was given; and the SAPD has now filed claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel on behalf of the Petitioner. 
On December 27,2010, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith 
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel. On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed three motions on behalf 
ofPetitioner. The two motions relevant to this decision are the Motion for Pennission to Appeal and the 
Motion to Reconsider. In its Motion to Reconsider, the SAPD argued that independent counsel should 
not be appointed by this Court for various reasons, including possible attorney-client privilege issues. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1 
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Even so, the SAPD chose not to request pennission to appeal that issue in its Motion for Pennission to 
Appeal filed with this Court on the same day. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for Pennission to Appeal filed 
March 4,2011, this Court noted that the SAPD requested pennission to appeal the attorney-client 
privilege issue in its Motion for Pennission to Appeal filed in the Idaho Supreme Court, but that the 
SAPD failed to request pennission to appeal that issue in this Court as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 
12(b). Three days later, on March 7, 2011, the SAPD filed its Motion for Pennission to Appeal 
Supplemental Order. 
DISCUSSION 
The issues argued by the SAPD in the Motion for Pennission to Appeal Supplemental Order are 
a repeat of arguments made by the SAPD in previous motions, including the Motion to Reconsider filed 
the same day as the first Motion for Pennission to Appeal. The Motion to Reconsider contained an 
entire section entitled "The SAPD Has Been Willing to Share Infonnation with the Court Whenever 
There is No Attorney-Client Privilege," yet the SAPD chose not to raise that issue in the first Motion for 
Pennission to Appeal. This Court's supplement to its original decision in the order denying the Motion 
to Reconsider filed February 23,2011 was simply a restatement of its order filed December 27,2010 and 
did not change the order filed December 27,2010. The restatement was issued because it was clear from 
the briefs filed by the SAPD in this case that it had become necessary to plainly restate the obvious-that 
Keith Roark had been appointed independent conflict counsel pursuant to this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order filed December 27,2010; that "a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre­
trial, trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial ofHall II" might include a review of SAPD files; and 
that those questioned or deposed by Mr. Roark during his investigation were acting pursuant to a lawful 
judicial inquiry and were subject to a court order. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2
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In its Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order, the SAPD admits that it has 
argued the attorney-client issue "in previous submissions to the Court." Indeed, the arguments that the 
SAPD makes in the Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order are no different than the 
arguments that the SAPD made in prior filings. Nevertheless, permission to appeal was not timely 
requested in this Court with regard to the attorney-client privilege issue even though the SAPD made the 
same arguments in the Motion to Reconsider filed on the same day as the first Motion for Permission to 
Appeal, and even though the SAPD later requested appeal on that issue in the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Following this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as 
Independent Conflict Counsel filed December 27,2010, the SAPD failed to file a motion for permission 
to appeal the attorney-client privilege issue within fourteen (14) days from date of entry of the order or 
judgment as required by I.A.R. 12(b). The fact that it was necessary for this Court (in the Order Denying 
the Motion to Reconsider) to remind counsel that the order of December 27, 2010 was indeed a court 
order does not reset the clock. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner's present Motion for Permission to Appeal addresses no issue which could not 
have been raised within fourteen days following this Court's Memorandum Decision Appointing Keith 
Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel filed December 27,2010. Therefore, the present motion is not 
timely pursuant to I.A.R. 12(b). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for Permission 
to Appeal. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this t5~ay ot(\A~A~ ,2011. 
ar~o.~ 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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I hereby certify that on this ,;-day of ~ 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
Ian H. Thomson 
Nicole Owens 
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln 
Boise, ID 83703
 
Tel: (208) 334-2712
 
Fax: (208) 334-2985
 
Jan M. Bennetts
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
 
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Tel: (208) 287-7700
 
Fax: (208) 287-7709
 
Dennis A. Benjamin
 
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP
 
303 W Bannock St
 
PO Box 2772
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Tel: (208) 343-1000
 
Fax: (208) 345-8274
 
R. Keith Roark
 
ROARK LAW FIRM
 
409 NMain St
 
Hailey, ID 83333
 
Tel: (208) 788-2427
 
Fax: (208) 788-3918
 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
Deputy Clerk 
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MAR 13 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS~MRlaTQ~HER D. R'CH, 'lerk
"y JANET EWS 
D&PUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, Case No. CV-PC-2008-03085 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice is the last of three motions filed by the Petitioner on 
January 10, 2011 to be considered by this Court. The procedural history of these post-conviction 
proceedings are set forth in this Court's previously filed Memorandum Decision and Orders, filed on 
February 23,2011 and March 4,2011, which are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth 
herein. The Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice is accompanied by two bound collections of 
documents, measuring approximately two inches thick. 
The Petitioner requests that this Court take judicial notice of fifteen items, including eleven 
documents. Each of the eleven documents (some with voluminous attachments) for which the Petitioner 
requests judicial notice are documents filed in connection with judicial inquiries to determine whether a 
conflict of interest existed in one of two capital post-conviction cases unrelated to this case. However, 
the documents for which the Petitioner requests judicial notice are selected and do not encompass the 
entirety of the record pertaining to the judicial inquiries in either of the two unrelated cases. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 1 
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On January 25,2011, the State filed the State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial 
Notice, objecting to this Court taking judicial notice ofthe requested documents because ofthe selective 
nature of the documents and because the relevance of the documents to the instant case has not been 
established. On February 1,2011, the Petitioner filed his Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's 
Motion for Judicial Notice, arguing that the selected materials are relevant for two reasons: (1) they help 
to explain the actions of the SAPD; and (2) they replace "allusions and opaque references" to State v. 
Abdullah with specific facts. 
DISCUSSION 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 is entitled "Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts" and provides in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned. 
(d) When mandatory. When a party makes an oral or written request that a
 
court take judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the
 
court file in the same or a separate case, the party shall identify the
 
specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is requested
 
or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of such
 
documents or items. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
 
party and supplied with the necessary information.
 
The Petitioner has requested that the Court take judicial notice of each of fifteen items pursuant 
to I.R.E. 201(d). However, items numbered one through four are the Petitioner's recitations of which 
attorneys from the SAPD's office served as counsel for two different Petitioners (for himself and another 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2 
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capital petitioner) at different times. Items one through four as presently requested do not comply with 
LR.E. 201 (d) because the Petitioner has not identified the specific documents or otherwise provided the 
information necessary for the Court to identify the specific record, exhibit or transcript in the court file 
from which the information may be verified. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. An 
"adjudicative fact" is "[a] controlling or operative fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that 
concerns the parties to a judicial or administrative proceeding and that helps the court or agency 
determine how the law applies to those parties. For example, adjudicative facts include those that the 
jury weighs." Black's Law Dictionary 669 (9th ed. 2009). Items five through fourteen are a list of 
documents from the court file in Abdullah v. State, post-conviction Case Number SPOT 0500308. Item 
fifteen is a document from the court file ofPayne v. State, post-conviction Case Number CV-PC-20I0­
11137. These documents are related to judicial inquiries into conflict of interest issues in those cases, 
but are selected and do not encompass the entire histories of the judicial inquiries in those cases. In 
response to the State's questioning of the relevance of the documents to the instant case, the Petitioner 
replied: 
The relevance of the material referenced in the Motion for Judicial Notice is two-fold: first, it 
helps to explain the reasons why the State Appellate Public Defender chose to file a notice to the 
court and undertake a review of the conflict through an independent attorney, instead of merely 
making a representation to the Court and then waiting for the Court to appoint an attorney; and 
second, it replaces the allusions and opaque references to State v. Abdullah that have been made 
in arguments, pleadings and the Court's own order, with specific facts. 
The Petitioner further opines that "a fuller understanding of the proceedings in State v. Abdullah 
would provide the Court with information that clearly distinguishes the two cases...." However, the 
Petitioner's argument specifically identifies only one fact to distinguish the two cases: the fact that 
"Judge Copsey had received specific information in the ordinary course of litigation that led her to make 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 3
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the finding that a conflict of interest actually existed." This Court is aware of that fact. However, the 
fact that Judge Copsey mayor may not have structured her inquiry differently than this Court, and the 
fact that the judicial inquiry in Abdullah was spurred by an apparent conflict that was identifiable from 
filings in that case are not controlling facts in this case; rather, they are merely background facts from an 
unrelated case. 
The remainder of the Petitioner's argument focuses on the reaction of the SAPD to the rulings in 
the Abdullah case such as how that case "affected the choices they made;" how the Abdullah Court's 
finding of a conflict of interest "compromised" the advice of the SAPD to Mr. Abdullah; and how the 
SAPD "faced a dilemma when determining how to proceed in this case" because of the Abdullah Court's 
rulings. The reaction of counsel to rulings in an unrelated case is not an adjudicative fact, and the 
arguments and orders based on the different facts of that unrelated case are not controlling or operative 
facts in this case. Further, no explanation at all has been given why item number fifteen from the Payne 
case was included in the Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Requested items one through four do not comply with I.R.E. 201(d) as presently requested, and 
the Petitioner has failed to connect items five through fifteen to any adjudicative fact in this case. 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Petitioner's Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice without 
prejudice. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 23~yof~ ,2011. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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I hereby certify that on this 12. day of~2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of 
the within instrument to: 
Ian H. Thomson 
Nicole Owens 
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
3647 Lake Harbor Ln 
Boise, ID 83703
 
Tel: (208) 334-2712
 
Fax: (208) 334-2985
 
Jan M. Bennetts
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
 
200 W Front St, Rm 3191
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Tel: (208) 287-7700
 
Fax: (208) 287-7709
 
Dennis A. Benjamin 
NEVIN BENJAMIN MCKAY & BARTLETT, LLP 
303 W Bannock St
 
PO Box 2772
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Tel: (208) 343-1000
 
Fax: (208) 345-8274
 
R. Keith Roark
 
ROARK LAW FIRM
 
409 N Main St
 
Hailey, ID 83333
 
Tel: (208) 788-2427
 
Fax: (208) 788-3918
 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
~.-Jlt)~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY, LS.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender APR f 3 20ff 
State of Idaho 
CHRJSTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
By JERI HEATONIAN H. THOMSON, LS.B. # 8327 OEPUTY 
NICOLE OWENS, LS.B. # 7679 
Deputy Appellate Public Defenders 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Appellant ) Case No.CV PC 080 3085 
) Supreme Court Case No. 38528 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) (Capital Case) ORiGINAL 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, THE ADA 
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, appeals against the above-named Respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing 
Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel, entered by the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, on December 27, 
2010; and from the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, entered by the 
same District Court on February 23, 2011, during the capital post-conviction 
proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL	 1 
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2.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, has been granted permission to appeal the above 
orders to the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12(c), by the 
Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Permission To Appeal," 
dated March 23, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38528, a copy of which is 
attached hereto. 
3.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, intends to raise the following issues (among 
others which may later be identified): 
a.	 The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and rule of 
confidentiality are determined by the existence of the attorney-client 
relationship and not by the content of the communication between the 
attorney and client; 
b.	 The district court was not justified in ordering a conflict inquiry where an 
independent attorney had evaluated the possible conflict and determined 
none existed, Mr. Hall had never raised the issue, and neither the State nor 
the district court were able to provide the specific facts necessary to justify 
a further inquiry; 
c.	 The district court cannot order the disclosure of attorney-client privilege 
communications and work product of current post-conviction counsel in 
an effort to investigate a possible conflict where Mr. Hall has never raised 
the issue, and neither the State nor the district court were able to provide 
the specific facts necessary to justify a further inquiry; and, 
d.	 The district court violated the separation of powers by forcing the Idaho 
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter SAPD) to pay for services 
NOTICE OF APPEAL	 2 
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already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide 
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD. 
4.	 No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. Although certain 
documents were originally filed under seal, all such documents have since been 
unsealed by order of the district court. 
5.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that the Reporter's Transcripts of all 
hearings of every nature and description conducted in Ada County Case No. CV 
PC 0803085 be prepared pursuant to I.A.R. 25(d). Mr. Hall requests the transcript 
be provided both in electronic and hard copy format, and include at least the 
following hearings: 
a.	 06/09/2008, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
b.	 0711412008, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
c.	 02/0312009, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
d.	 07/24/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
e.	 0812812009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
f.	 10/3012009, Discovery Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
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g. 04/22/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
h.	 06/11/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
1.	 08/06/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
J.	 08/26/2010, Motion Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
k.	 09/01/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; and, 
1.	 10/19/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
6.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests a to-date Clerk's Record of Ada County 
Case No. CV PC 080 3085 be prepared including all documents in the trial court 
file of every nature, kind, and description, including briefs or memoranda filed or 
lodged. Mr. Hall requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(2)(0): 
a.	 03/11/2008, Motion for Order Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege; 
b.	 10/09/2009, Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and 
Petitioner's Request for a Protective Order; 
c.	 10/20/2009, State's Specific Response to Petitioner's Discovery Requests 
and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Discovery and 
State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order (Hall II); 
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d. 04/15/1 0, Notice of Change in Status of Counsel; 
e. 04/30/2010, Order RE: Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for 
Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege; 
f. 06/29/2010, Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (filed under 
seal); 
g. 07/28/2010, Ex Parte Motion (filed under seal); 
h. 07/30/2010, Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict; 
1. 08/06/2010, Response to State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD 
Conflict (Hall II); 
J. 08/1312010, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict; 
k. 08/20/2010, Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for 
Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II); 
1. 08/30/2010, Amended Notice of Possible Conflict ofInterest; 
m. 08/30/2010, Notice of Limited Appearance of Dennis Benjamin; 
n. 08/30/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal; 
o. 08/30/2010, Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin; 
p. 10/04/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal; 
q. 10/04/2010, State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible 
Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin; 
r. 10/12/2010, SAPD Letter to Judge Thomas F. Neville, with enclosed 
transcript; 
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s. 12/27/2010, Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as 
Independent Conflict Counsel; 
1. 01/10/2011, Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order; 
u. 01/1 0/20 11, Motion for Permission to Appeal; 
v. 01/10/2011, Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice; 
w. 01/11/2011, Amendment to Motion for Permission to Appeal; 
x. 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice; 
y. 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration; 
z. 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to 
Appeal; 
aa. 02/01/2011, Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial 
Notice; 
bb. 02/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider, and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order; 
cc. 03/04/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for 
Permission to Appeal; 
dd. 03/07/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; 
ee. 03/10/2011, Response to Petitioners Motion for Permission to Appeal 
Supplemental Order; 
ff. 03/15/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for 
Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; and 
gg. 03/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petitioner's 
Motion for Judicial Notice Without Prejudice. 
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7.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that any offered or admitted exhibits be 
copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8.	 I certify: 
a.	 A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter; 
b.	 Petitioner-Appellant Erick Hall is an indigent prisoner and represented by 
the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for transcripts, which should be provided at the 
expense of the county pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and 
I.C. § 67-2301; 
c.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented 
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to 
I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and I.C. § 67-2301; 
d.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented 
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for the appellate filing fee under I.A.R. 23(a), and 
pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(2) and I.C. § 67-2301; 
e.	 Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to I.C. § 67-1401(1)). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of April, 2011. 
L<~IANH.~MSON 
pep ty Appellate Public efender 
V	 I~JjJ~ . 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 13th day of April, 2011, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, as indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LAMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
HON. THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
SUE WOLF 
COURT REPORTER 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
---v- U.S. Mail 
---A- Statehouse Mail
 
Facsimile

===Hand Delivery
 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
--FacsimileX Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
-if-- Facsimile 
~ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
-V- Facsimile 
-A- Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
--Facsimile 
~ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
--. Facsimile ~ Hand Delivery 
IHT/jf 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
RECEIVED
 
NAR 2~ 2011 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, STATE APPElLPJE 
PUBLIC DEFENIER ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
Petitioner, ) PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
) 
v. ) Supreme Court Docket No. 38528-2011 
) Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Ref. No. 11-124 
Respondent. ) 
1.	 A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with attachments, was filed by counsel for 
Petitioner on February 11,2011, requesting permission to appeal, pursuant to the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, Rule 12, from the district court's written Memorandum Decision and 
Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel issued on December 27, 
2010. 
2.	 A RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL with 
attachments, was filed by counsel for Respondent on February 25, 20II. A NOTICE OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRICT COURT ORDER IMPACTING PENDING 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL was filed by counsel for Appellant on February 25, 2011. 
3.	 A NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT DECISION with attachment, was filed by counsel 
for Respondent on March 8, 2011. A NOTICE OF DISTRICT COURT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL with attachment, was filed by counsel for Petitioner on 
March 8, 2011. 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by permission under I.A.R. 12 
from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent 
Conflict Counsel, filed December 27, 2010. 
IT FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with the 
Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order, which appeal 
shall proceed as iffrom a final judgment or order entered by the District Court. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL - Docket No. 38528-2011 
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DATED this '),3 day of March 2011. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
cc:	 Counsel ofRecord 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Thomas F. Neville 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL - Docket No. 38528-2011 
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MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 HO.-_-~Il"="~~--
State Appellate Public Defender FILEO 4' 0A.M'- ~P.M .0 
State of Idaho 
JUN 14 2011IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
NICOLE OWENS, I.S.B. # 7679 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ·ClerkDeputy Appellate Public Defenders By BRADLEY J. THIES 
Capital Litigation Unit DEPUTY 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, 10 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) Case No.CV PC 080 3085 
) Supreme Court Case Nos. 
v. ) 38528/38704 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Respondent. ) 
)
) 
ORiGINAL 
(CAPITAL CASE) ---------~) 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, THE ADA 
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, appeals against the above-named Respondent to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing 
Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel, entered by the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, on December 27, 
2010; and from the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, entered by the 
same District Court on February 23, 2011, during the capital post-conviction 
proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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2.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, has been granted pennission to appeal the above 
orders to the Idaho Supreme Court, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12(c), by the 
Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Pennission To Appeal," 
dated March 23, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38528; and by the Idaho 
Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion For Pennission to Appeal and 
Consolidation," dated April 20, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38704, a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. This Notice of Appeal is timely filed 
pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's "Order Granting Motion to Reissue 
Order," dated June 13, 2011, Supreme Court Docket No. 38704, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
3.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, intends to raise the following issues (among 
others which may later be identified): 
a.	 The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and rule of 
confidentiality are determined by the existence of the attorney-client 
relationship and not by the content of the communication between the 
attorney and client; 
b.	 The district court was not justified in ordering a conflict inquiry where an 
independent attorney had evaluated the possible conflict and detennined 
none existed, Mr. Hall had never raised the issue, and neither the State nor 
the district court were able to provide the specific facts necessary to justify 
a further inquiry; 
c.	 The district court cannot order the disclosure of attorney-client privilege 
communications and work product of current post-conviction counsel in 
NOTICE OF APPEAL	 2
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an effort to investigate a possible conflict where Mr. Hall has never raised 
the issue, and neither the State nor the district court were able to provide 
the specific facts necessary to justify a further inquiry; and, 
d.	 The district court violated the separation of powers by forcing the Idaho 
State Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter SAPD) to pay for services 
already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide 
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD. 
4.	 No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. Although certain 
documents were originally filed under seal, all such documents have since been 
unsealed by order of the district court. 
5.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that the Reporter's Transcripts of all 
hearings of every nature and description conducted in Ada County Case No. CV 
PC 0803085 be prepared pursuant to I.A.R. 25(d). Mr. Hall requests the transcript 
be provided both in electronic and hard copy format, and include at least the 
following hearings: 
a.	 06/09/2008, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
b.	 07/14/2008, Status Conference, Court Reponer Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
c.	 02/03/2009, Scheduling Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
d.	 07/24/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
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e.	 08/28/2009, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
f.	 10/3012009, Discovery Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript 
pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
g.	 04/22/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
h.	 06/11/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
1.	 08/06/2010, Status Conference, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
J.	 08/26/2010, Motion Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
k.	 09/01/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; and, 
1.	 10/19/2010, Hearing, Court Reporter Sue Wolf, transcript pages for this 
hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
6.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests a to-date Clerk's Record of Ada County 
Case No. CV PC 080 3085 be prepared including all documents in the trial court 
file of every nature, kind, and description, including briefs or memoranda filed or 
lodged. Mr. Hall requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(2)(O): 
a. 03/11/2008, Motion for Order Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege; 
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b. 10/09/2009, Response to Respondent's Motion for Discovery and 
Petitioner's Request for a Protective Order; 
c. 10/20/2009, State's Specific Response to Petitioner's Discovery Requests 
and Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Discovery and 
State's Reply to Motion for Protection Order (Hall II); 
d. 04/15/10, Notice of Change in Status of Counsel; 
e. 04/30/2010, Order RE: Respondent's Motions for Discovery and for 
Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege; 
f. 06/29/2010, Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (filed under 
seal); 
g. 07/28/2010, Ex Parte Motion (filed under seal); 
h. 07/30/201 0, Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict; 
1. 08/06/2010, Response to State's Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD 
Conflict (Hall II); 
J. 08/13/2010, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Inquiry into Possible 
SAPD Conflict; 
k. 08/20/2010, Reply to Memorandum in Support of State's Motion for 
Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict (Hall II); 
1. 08/30/2010, Amended Notice of Possible Conflict ofInterest; 
m. 08/30/2010, Notice of Limited Appearance of Dennis Benjamin; 
n. 08/30/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal; 
o. 08/30/2010, Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin; 
p. 10/04/2010, Notice of Filing Under Seal; 
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q.	 10/04/2010, State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible 
Conflict and Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin; 
r.	 10112/2010, SAPD Letter to Judge Thomas F. Neville, with enclosed 
transcript; 
s.	 12/27/2010, Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as 
Independent Conflict Counsel; 
1.	 01110/2011, Motion to Reconsider Memorandum Decision and Order; 
u.	 01110/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal; 
v.	 01110/2011, Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice; 
w.	 01111/2011, Amendment to Motion for Permission to Appeal; 
x.	 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial Notice; 
y.	 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration; 
z.	 01/25/2011, State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Permission to 
Appeal; 
aa. 02/01/2011, Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial 
Notice; 
bb.	 02/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider, and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order; 
cc.	 03/04/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion for 
Permission to Appeal; 
dd.	 03/07/2011, Motion for Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; 
ee.	 0311 0/2011, Response to Petitioners Motion for Permission to Appeal 
Supplemental Order; 
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ff. 03/15/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for 
Permission to Appeal Supplemental Order; and 
gg. 03/23/2011, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Petitioner's 
Motion for Judicial Notice Without Prejudice. 
7.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, requests that any offered or admitted exhibits be 
copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8.	 I certify: 
a.	 A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Reporter; 
b.	 Petitioner-Appellant Erick Hall is an indigent prisoner and represented by 
the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for transcripts, which should be provided at the 
expense of the county pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and 
I.C. § 67-2301; 
c.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented 
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for the preparation of the clerk's record pursuant to 
I.C. § 31-3212(4), I.C. § 1-1105(2), and I.C. § 67-2301; 
d.	 Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Hall, is an indigent prisoner and represented 
by the SAPD, a state agency and public defender office, and is therefore 
exempt from paying for the appellate filing fee under I.A.R. 23(a), and 
pursuant to I.C. § 31-3212(2) and I.C. § 67-2301; 
e.	 Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to I.C. § 67-1401(1)). 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2011. 
lL-tt-~
 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy Appellate Public Defender 
NICOLE OWENS 
Deputy Appellate Public Defender 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 14th day of June, 2011, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, as indicated below: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LAMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
HON. THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
200 W. FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
SUE WOLF 
COURT REPORTER 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
IHT/jf 
U.S. MailX Statehouse Mail 
== Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile
=:s:: Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
_'__ Facsimile 
-'.--- Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile
=== Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
y Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
-- Facsimile
-----r:- Hand Delivery 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
~RECEIVED
 
APR 21 2011 
IN THE MATIER OF THE MOTION FOR ) STATE APPELLATE 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND ) PUBLIC DEFENDER 
CONSOLIDATION. ) 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
-------------------------------------------------------­ )) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND 
) CONSOLIDATION 
Petitioner, ) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 38704-2011 
v. ) Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) Ref. No. 11-192 
) 
Respondent. ) 
A MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION with attachments, 
was filed by counsel for Petitioner on March 29,2011, requesting permission to appeal, pursuant to 
I.A.R. 12, from the district court's written Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to 
Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order issued February 23, 2011 in Ada 
County case no. CV PC 2008-03085. Petitioner requests that the Court consolidate this case with 
the original Motion for Permission to Appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 38528. The Court is 
fully advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
AND CONSOLIDATION be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by 
permission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the 
Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, filed February 23,2011. 
Petitioner shall file a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21) 
days from the date of this Order, which appeal shall proceed as if from a final judgment or order 
entered by the district court. 
IT FURTHER ORDERED that appeal no. 38528 and 38704 shall be CONSOLIDATED FOR 
ALL PURPOSES under 38528, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers. 
IT FURlHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a LIMTED 
CLERK'S RECORD, in Docket No. 38704 which shall include the documents requested in the 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION ­
Docket No. 38704-2011 002035
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Notice ofAppeal (to be filed by counsel for Petitioner), together with a copy ofthis Order which shall 
be due on July 22, 2011. 
DATED this ). 0 day ofApril, 2011. 
By Order ofthe Supreme Court 
81ee~ ~~ _ 
Stephen W. Kenyon, ~ 
cc:	 Counsel ofRecord 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Thomas F. Neville 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDAnON ­
Docket No. 38704·2011 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
__ RECEIVED
 
JUN 13 2011 
IN THE MATIER OF TIlE MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND 
CONSOLIDATION. 
) 
) 
) 
STATE APPELLATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
-------------------------------------------------------­ )) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
REISSUE ORDER 
) 
Petitioner, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 38704-2011 
) Ada County Docket No. 2008-3085 
v. ) 
) Ref. No. 11-283 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
On April 20, 2011, this Court entered an ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION allowing Petitioner leave to appeal by 
pennission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the 
Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, filed February 23, 2011. 
ANotice ofAppeal was not filed with the Clerk ofthe District Court by Petitioner within twenty-one 
days ofthe date ofthat Order. Thereafter, aMOTION FORCOURTTO REISSUEAPRIL 20, 2011 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND CONSOLIDATION AND 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF was filed by counsel for Petitioner on May 17, 2011, 
requesting this Court to reissue the April 20, 2011 Order so that Petitioner may file a Notice of 
Appeal with the district court. A RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR COURT TO 
REISSUE ORDER was filed by counsel for the Respondent on June 2, 2011. The Court is fully 
advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION FOR COURT TO REISSUE APRIL 
20, 2011 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL AND 
CONSOLIDATION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT THEREOF be, and hereby is, GRANTED 
and Petitioner is granted leave to appeal by pennission under I.A.R. 12 from the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider; and Supplementing the 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REISSUE ORDER - Docket No. 38704-2011 
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Original Decision and Order, filed February 23, 2011. Petitioner shall file a Notice ofAppeal with 
the Clerk of the District Court within twenty-one (21) days from the date ofthis Order, which appeal 
shall proceed as if from a tinaJ judgment or order entered by the district court. 
IT FURTHER ORDERED that appeal nos. 38528 and 38704 shall be CONSOLIDATED 
FOR ALL PURPOSES under 38528, but all documents filed shall bear both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for the filing of the Clerk's Record and 
Reporter's Transcripts in these consolidated appeals shall remain as previously set for July 22, 2011, 
in Supreme Court Docket No. 38528-2011. 
DATED this /3"";,.y ofJUDe, 20II. 
By Order of Supreme Court 
cc:	 Counsel ofRecord 
District Court Clerk 
Court Reporter Susan Wolf 
District Judge Thomas F. Neville 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REISSUE ORDER - Docket No. 38704-2011 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender ­
NO.- Fll.E~P},J) ­State of Idaho	 
__--.J-.~ 
A.M.­I.S.B. # 4843 
SEP \ 6 20\\
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212 o RICH, Clerk 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders eHRISTOP~;:ET eu-IS 
By oEPUTY3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) Case No. CV PC 0803085 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) NOTICE OF CHANGE IN 
v.	 ) STATUS OF COUNSEL
 
)
 
STATE OF IDAHO,	 ) 
) OR1Gl NAL 
Respondent. ) 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
--------------) 
Petitioner ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate 
Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), hereby provides notice of change in the status of his 
counsel. On August 17, 2011, Ms. Nicole Owens left the office of the SAPO and therefore will 
no longer be representing Mr. Hall as co-counsel. As of this writing, Mr. Hall is represented by 
Mr. Thomson and Mr. Jordan E. Taylor in these post-conviction proceedings. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2011. 
~.~ 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy State ApR 
JORDAN . AYLOR 
Deputy ate Appellate Public Defender 
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of September, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL, 
as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ~and Delivery 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ~ Statehouse Mail 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail 
IMSI Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
Jody
 
CLU
 
NOTICE OF CHANGE IN STATUS OF COUNSEL - 2
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I'ILED 4'•Of:>A...IIIy'"- ..-JP.M 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT SEP 30 2011 
451 WEST STATE STREET CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. ClerkBOISE, IDAHO 83702 By BRADLEY J. l'HIES
FAX 334-2616 DEPUTY 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, Docket No. 38528-2011 
38704-2011 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
Case No. CVPC-2008-0003985 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on September 29, 2011, 
lodged twelve (12) transcripts of 379 pages in length, as 
listed below, for the above-referenced appeal, with the 
District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial 
District. 
s~~---------
Official Court Reporter 
TRANSCRIPTS: 
06-09-08 Scheduling Conference 
07-14-08 Status Conference 
02-03-09 Scheduling Conference 
07-24-09 Status Conference 
08-28-09 Status Conference 
10-30-09 Discovery Hearing 
04-22-10 Status Conference 
06-11-10 Status Conference 
08-06-10 Status Conference 
08-25-10 Motion Hearing 
09-01-10 Hearing 
10-19-10 Hearing 
I 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38528 
Petitioner-Appellant, 38704
 
vs.
 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State ofIdaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the followingUnsealed documents (see Order Unsealing 
Documents, filed January 11,2012) will be submitted as EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice Of Possible Conflict Of Interest (Filed under seal), filed June 29,2010. 
2.	 Ex Parte Motion To Vacate And Reschedule Hearing (Filed under seal), filed
 
July 28, 2010.
 
3.	 Affidavit Of Dennis Benjamin (Filed under seal), filed August 30, 2010. 
4.	 State's Response To SAPD Amended Notice Of Possible Conflict And Affidavit Of 
Dennis Benjamin (Filed under seal), filed October 4,2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 6th day of February, 2012. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY~Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38528 
Petitioner-Appellant, 38704
 
vs.
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
OCT 04 lOll 
Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38528 
Petitioner-Appellant, 38704
 
vs.
 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County ofAda, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice ofAppeal was filed in the District Court on the 
13th day ofApril, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender NO. ~=~__ 
State of Idaho A.M., F-l'l~~ 3)$LC
I.S.B. # 4843 
OCT 25 2011IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ClerkDeputy State Appellate Public Defenders By JANET ELLIS3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v.	 ) MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Respondent. ) 
)	 aRIG' NAL (CAPITAL CASE)) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at the 
Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) and moves this Honorable C0U11 to unseal 
the following documents in the clerk's record, which had originally been filed under seal: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June 
29,2010; 
2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30,2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4.2010. 
MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS Page - 1 
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Mr. Hall brings this motion in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), 
which states that "any interested person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, 
redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding." 
Although copies of the two ex parte notices (items 1 and 2) were subsequently provided 
to the attorneys for the State, they were never technically unsealed by the Court. (See 
38528/38704 Tr., p.247, L.24 - p.248, L.18; p.254, Ls.12-16.) 
In settling the record for an interlocutory appeal, counsel for Mr. Hall has reviewed the 
four sealed documents and determined the entire contents of those documents have already been 
extensively litigated and argued before the District Court. Mr. Hall no longer has any privacy 
interest in the contents of those filings. Consequently, none of the information contained in 
those documents is now privileged or sensitive. Without concerns of privilege, there is no longer 
any purpose served in maintaining those documents as sealed in the District Court or on appeal. 
In addition, unsealing the documents will make argument and filings before the Supreme Court 
more expeditious and convenient for all parties. 
Counsel for Mr. Hall has spoken with Mr. Hall, Mr. Dennis Benjamin, and Jan Bennetts, 
on behalf of the Ada County Prosecutor, and none of those parties have objections to the 
unsealing of these documents. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2011. 
IAN H. THOMSON 
Deputy State Ap llate Public Defender 
JORD . AYLOR 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS Page - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LaMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
ADA COU1\rTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702-7200 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY 
303 W BANNOCK 
PO BOX 2772 
BOISE ID 83701 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail
 
.

=:.x; FacsimileHand Delivery 
--X- Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile ~.Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box) 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
-----v ;acsimile 
~HandDelivery 
Statehouse Mail 
XU.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
MOTION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS Page - 3 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofIdaho NO.-----::~~:--;;;:u__ 
I.S.B. # 4843	 A.M., FIL~.~. 3]~ 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 OCT 25 2011JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 By JANET ELLIS 
Boise, Idaho 83703	 DEPUTY 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704 
) 
v.	 ) 
) OBJECTION TO THE RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
--------------)	 OR1G\NAL 
TO:	 THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND L. LaMONT 
ANDERSON, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that appellant in the above-entitled proceeding hereby 
objects to the record on appeal served October 4,2011, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 
29. This objection is based upon the fact the appellant is requesting the items listed below. 
Accordingly, the appellant requests, pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a), that the following be added to the 
record: 
1. Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June 
29,2010; 
OBJECTION TO THE RECORD - Page 1 002049
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2. Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010. 
Idaho case law currently indicates that any missing portions of the record are presumed to 
support the trial court's ruling. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 390, 582 P.2d 728, 736 (1978); 
State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 45, 878 P.2d 213,219 (Ct. App. 1994). The requested items are 
currently missing from the record. Unless made part of the record on appeal, the events and 
testimony of this hearing will be presumed to support the district court's rulings, decisions, and 
orders, which are now on appeal. In order to overcome this legal presumption and to have his 
case considered on its facts and merits, Mr. Hall requests that the above-mentioned items be 
made part of the record on appeal and filed with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Although copies of the ex parte documents were subsequently provided to the attorneys 
for the State, they were never technically unsealed by the Court. (See 38528/38704 Tr., p.247, 
L.24 - p.248, L.18; p.254, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Hall files contemporaneously with the Court a Motion 
to Unseal Documents requesting these documents be unsealed, and that they be included in part 
of the record as such. 
DATED this 25th day of October, 2011. 
~H~~~ 
JORDJl(l\f~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
OBJECTION TO THE RECORD - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, OBJECTION TO THE RECORD, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LaMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702-7200 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
FacsimileX Hand Delivery 
---4- Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
___ Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
~ Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box) 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
~ Hand Delivery 
OBJECTION TO THE RECORD - Page 3 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho NOV 01 2011 
LS.B. # 4843 
CHRISTOPi i'::A D. RICH, ClerkIAN H. THOMSON, LS.B. # 8327	 By KATHY BIEHL 
DeputyJORDAN E. TAYLOR, LS.B. # 8212 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,	 ) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704 
) 
v.	 ) 
) STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) RECORD 
) 
Respondent. ) 
) (CAPITAL CASE) OR1GrNAL 
---------------) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner-Appellant, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorney, . 
Ian Thomson, at the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD), and Respondent, State of 
Idaho, by and through its attorney, L. LaMont Anderson, at the Idaho State Attorney General's 
Office, and hereby submit this stipulation regarding the settlement of the record pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 29(a). Mr. Hall previously filed an Objection to the Record on 
October 25,2011, covering the same material. Accordingly, both parties agree that the following 
documents be added to the record: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of interest, originally filed under seal on 
June 29,2010; 
STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD	 Page 1 002052
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2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 20 10; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010. 
Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant an order including the 
named documents in the Clerk's Record, as reflected in the proposed Order to Settle the Record 
filed herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1sl day ofNovember, 2011. 
\~~
 
IliTHOMSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD	 Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI - J BLOCK 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LaMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702-7200 
Statehouse Mail
 
U.S, Mail
 
Facsimile
 
~ Hand Delivery 
-X-- Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
~ Hand DeliveT)7 (Supreme Ct. Box) 
Statehouse Mail
 
U.S, Mail
 
Facsimile
 ~ Hand Delivery 
F 'r
 
ministrative Assistant
 
STIPULATED OBJECTION TO THE RECORD Page 3 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY	 NO. F~LED if : AM P.M.--f-J----­State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843	 NOV 02 zon 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 CHNITOPHER D. RICH. Clertt 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212 ItKATHY BIEHL 
IlIIIlIlJDeputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO,
 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
) 
)
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
 
CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085
 
STIPULATION TO UNSEAL
 
DOCUMENTS
 
(CAPITAL CASE)
 
--------------) ORIG1NAL 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys, Ian 
Thomson and Jordan Taylor, at the State Appellate Public Defender's Office (SAPD), 
and Respondent, State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, by and through its 
attorney, Jan Bennetts, at the Ada County Prosecutor's Office, and hereby submit this 
stipulation regarding the unsealing of documents in the above-captioned case. 
Petitioner and Respondent agree that the following documents should be 
unsealed, and that they be made public for the purposes of future post-conviction 
litigation and on appeal: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Confhct of Interest, originally filed under seal on 
June 29, 20 10; 
STlPULATlON TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS - I 
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2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 
28,2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit 
of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010. 
This stipulation is made in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i), which 
states that "any interested person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, 
redact, seal or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding." The parties 
also stipulate that the interest in public disclosure predominates any remaining privacy 
interest. 
Based on the foregoing, the parties ask this Honorable Court to grant an order 
unsealing the documents, as reflected in the proposed Order to Unseal Documents filed 
herewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 2011. 
~Al.~ ~N~ 
IAN H. THOMSON JA BENNETTS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Ada County Prosecutor 
STIPULATION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of November, 2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document, STIPULAnON TO UNSEAL 
DOCUMENTS, as follows: 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 ,"" Hand Delivery 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL ~ Statehouse Mail 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
L LaMONT ANDERSON Statehouse Mail 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL U.S. Mail 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 ~ Hand Delivery (Supreme Ct. Box) 
JUDGE THOMAS F. NEVILLE Statehouse Mail 
ADA COU1\fTY DISTRICT COURT U.S. Mail 
200 W FRONT STREET Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702-7200 ~ Hand Delivery 
DENNIS BENJAMIN Statehouse Mail 
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY 
303 W BANNOCK 
y.. U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
PO BOX 2772 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83701 
Jod){ Fa 
CLU' aministrative Assistant 
STIPULATION TO UNSEAL DOCUMENTS - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v.	 ) ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
-------------~) 
The Court having before it a Stipulation	 of the parties, and good cause appeanng 
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents contained in the Clerk's 
Record be unsealed and disclosed: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June 
29,2010; 
2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Be~amin, filed under seal on October 4,2010. 
In so ordering, the Court finds that the interest of public disclosure predominates over 
any remaining privacy interest in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i). 
DATED this __ day ofNovember, 2011. 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of , 2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS by method 
indicated below to: 
IAN THOMSON U.S. Mail 
JORDAN TAYLOR Statehouse Mail 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER Facsimile 
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83703 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE U.S. Mail 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83702 __ Hand Delivery 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL Statehouse Mail 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE 10 83707 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON Statehouse Mail 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL U.S. Mail 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 Facsimile 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 __ Hand Delivery 
DENNIS BENJAMIN Statehouse Mail 
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY U.S. Mail 
303 W BANNOCK Facsimile 
PO BOX 2772 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83701 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER Ul'JSEALING DOCUMENTS 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR«;1;T~O~¥,---:~:-;;,;- _ 
AM	 <:/'. I,.., ji FILED"~~M __ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAN 11 2012 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANET ELLIS 
CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 OEPUTY 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
) 
The Court having before it a Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing 
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents contained in the Clerk's 
Record be unsealed: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on June 
29,2010; 
2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4, 2010. 
In so ordering, the Court finds that the interest of public disclosure predominates over 
any remaining privacy interest in accordance with Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i). 
~ 2012.... 
DATED this ~ day of.fSl~. 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -.U- day of O1J~ .. -- , 201L. I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER UNSEA--eiNGDbcUMENTS by method 
indicated below to: 
IAN THOMSON U.S. Mail
 
JORDAN TAYLOR __ Statehouse ~ail 0
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER -L fi"Efcslmne 
 
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100 __ Hand Delivery
 
BOISE ID 83703
 
JAN BENNETTS Statehouse Mail
 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
__ U.S. Mail. ()
 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 =:2'~ile"~
 
BOISE ID 83702 __ Hand Delivery
 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL Statehouse Mail
 
INMATE # 33835 U.S. Mail
 
IMSI - J BLOCK Facsimile
 
PO BOX 51 __ Hand Delivery
 
BOISE ID 83707
 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON Statehouse Mail
 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
__ U.S. Mail ~
 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 VFacsimile
 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 __ Hand Delivery
 
DENNIS BENJAMIN Statehouse Mail
 
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY __ U.S.Mail ~
 
303 W BANNOCK ~FacslmI1e
 
PO BOX 2772 Hand Delivery " ,
 
-- "~I '" BOISE ID 83701 ••' '\ ~\H JUb ",
,,' .,~ ••••••• ~C/ '" 
.: ,,'V •• •• ,_ '" 
, ~'-J •• •• "'''; "
"'-J. .~ " 
: £..... : of 'tHE S1J\]'~•• G) ; 
~:lJ:. - . ~C;;:. ~:;:r:.. -OF- :-i: 
. :r-~ :~: 
Deputy Clerk ':. ~.. IDAHO .. ,..,:
':. c:?' •• •• 'J: 
"" /.1- •• •• ... ....", . .........:.«" "
 
" {,Ii) ~\J'- .'
"I. FOR AD!>, C "., 
rl, '" ""......' 
2ORDER UNSEALING DOCUMENTS 
002061
~ ~   I J...
SEAEGD6cUMEN
 
 
 
  
-L 
  
 
 ail _  
~i
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
csiII1i  
  
 
  
1e 
........ " "~I I" 
  
    
 
.. "t 1 7 ·.
 -:r:.  
":.  
>
.   ... :,. ...  
f  
  ,,
 
\. 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
IAN H. THOMSON, I.S.B. # 8327 JAN 11 2012 
JORDAN E. TAYLOR, I.S.B. # 8212 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JANET ELLISCapital Litigation Unit DEPUTY3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) CASE NO. CV PC 08-03085 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) SUPREME COURT NOS. 38528/38704 
) 
~ ) 
) ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) (CAPITAL CASE) 
-------------) 
The Court having before it a Stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing 
therefore; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents be added to the Clerk's 
Record: 
1.	 Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest, originally filed under seal on 
June 29,2010; 
2.	 Ex Parte Motion to Vacate and Reschedule Hearing, filed under seal on July 28, 
2010; 
3.	 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on August 30, 2010; and 
4.	 State's Response to SAPD Amended Notice of Possible Conflict and Affidavit of 
Dennis Benjamin, filed under seal on October 4,2010. 
U'A_ ~ 2..D(2,DATEDthis~:..:...clayof~OlL 
~~ .. Hono~hOlllaSi ~eville'" 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of ~ 2011 I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document ORDER ON OBJECTION TO THE RECORD as 
follows: 
IAN THOMSON 
JORDAN TAYLOR 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3050 LAKE HARBOR LANE, SUITE 100 
BOISE ID 83703 
JAN BENNETTS 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
 
INMATE # 33835
 
IMSI - J BLOCK
 
POBOX 51
 
BOISE ID 83707
 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
DENNIS BENJAMIN
 
NEVIN BENJAMIN & McKAY
 
303 W BANNOCK
 
PO BOX 2772
 
BOISE ID 83701
 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
------;;r- Facsimile ~ 
~
v 
Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail ~ 
Wlesimile 
Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Paesimile -e---f) 
Hand Delivery 
Statehouse Mail 
U.S.Mail ~ 
,/Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
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002063
1l.f\A ,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~
 
 
